

The Rohingya issue and international migration: a historical perspective

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Abstract

This paper examines the Rohingya Muslim experience historically, but perhaps more significantly, it examines their experience through a contemporary humanitarian and human rights lens as well. Indeed, it begins with a brief history of the Rohingya Muslims in post-colonial Myanmar. The second section analyzes contemporary humanitarian developments. The third section explores several key human rights abuses perpetrated against the Rohingya Muslims. The final section concludes with recommendations.

Keywords: Rohingya, Muslim, humanitarian, human rights, abuses

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1.1 INTRODUCTION

More than seventy five percent of the world's population dwells in countries where state restrictions on religious freedom prevail¹. Despite laudable strides towards democratic reform, Myanmar is among those nations. In fact, it stands out as among the world's twenty-five most populous nations with the most government restrictions on, and social hostilities due to, religion. Notably, the religious hatred or bias is directed toward the Rohingya Muslim population². The United Nations has long characterized the Rohingya Muslims as one of the world's most persecuted minorities. By way of background, anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim sentiment has long tainted the state's political and social spheres³. More recently, escalating violence has not only exasperated the humanitarian crises confronting the Rohingya Muslims, but it also threatens to undermine the Burmese transition from one-party military rule to democratic governance. It adversely impacts global security, too.

1.2 BACKGROUND ON MYANMAR

Upon achieving independence from England in 1948, Myanmar struggled with armed ethnic conflict and political instability during a prolonged period of political reformation⁴. In 1962, a military coup produced a one-party, military state informed by socialist notions of governance—it would last for more than sixty years.⁹ During that time, the Burmese army committed numerous human rights abuses, such as killing, raping, and torturing the state's Rohingya Muslim population⁵. Notably, the army subjected the group to mass expulsions in 1977⁶ and 1992⁷, creating what has been widely viewed as a chronic refugee crisis in neighboring

Bangladesh. Two years later, many of the Rohingya were forced to return to Myanmar; instances of excessive force by the Bangladeshi security forces and the Burmese troops (receiving the Rohingya) resulted in some deaths. Those Rohingya who returned were granted limited rights to movement and employment. Thousands remain displaced even today, surviving on international humanitarian aid while continuing to endure brutal repression by state border guards. Such repression includes forced conscription to perform labor, arbitrary detention, beatings, and other mistreatment.

The human rights and humanitarian condition of the Rohingya is further exasperated by their official “statelessness.”⁸ The Citizenship Act, enacted in 1982, codified the legal exclusion of the Rohingya, presently numbering approximately one million, by denying the group citizenship rights⁹. The Act officially recognizes 135 “national races” that qualify for citizenship. The Rohingya Muslims are not included on that list and as such are denied the full benefits of citizenship on account of what the Burmese government has described as their “nonindigenous ancestry.” Widespread societal prejudice against the group informs the historical (and contemporary) lack of political will to repeal the law¹⁰.

To be sure, the denial of Burmese citizenship has resulted in additional injustices and inequalities. Illustrative is a Burmese law—the Emergency Immigration Act—requiring the possession of National Registration Certificates by all citizens. As noncitizens, however, the Rohingya can only possess Foreign Registration Cards, which are rejected by a number of schools and employers. The government has also

restricted their rights to marry, own property, and move freely—rights guaranteed to non-citizens as well as citizens under international law¹¹. Human rights violations continue until present day notwithstanding a nominally civilian Burmese government ushered in by popular elections in March 2011¹².

1.3 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ROHINGYA

At the heart of the debate as currently framed by the mainstream international media lies the question of citizenship. Since the Burmese government and large parts of society do not accept the Rohingya as one of the countries “national races,” a majority of the Muslims living in Rakhine are today de facto stateless. They are considered to be migrants from Bengal that only settled in Myanmar after the first Anglo-Burmese War and subsequent British colonialization in 1824. As such they are not eligible to full citizenship according to the 1982 Citizenship Act. Those who advocate for a distinct Rohingya identity, in return, insist that their ancestors have been natives to Rakhine as early as the 8th century, wherefore they merit recognition as an ethnic group of Myanmar and thus deserve full citizenship rights. However, in view of the historical evidence such a representation of the Rohingya turns out more problematic than willingly suggested by contemporary Rohingya advocates and mainstream international media.

What appears historically verified based on the current state of research is the claim that Muslims had indeed settled in Arakan (now Rakhine) prior to the Burmese conquest in 1784. But there is no historical evidence available, which proves that Muslim settlements have existed in Rakhine since the 8th century. In fact, the earliest historical sources mentioning Muslim settlers date back to the late 16th century and suggest that they had travelled on trading fleets from Bengal to Rakhine (Leider 2013).

To contest the Bengali origin and provide prove for a Rohingya ethnic identity, Rohingya advocates refer to an article published by the British ethnographer Francis Hamilton-Buchanan in 1799. He mentioned Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan and who call themselves Rooinga. However, in the Chittagonian dialect, which the Muslim settlers spoke, the name “Rohingya” means nothing but “Rakhine.” Given that the name is not mentioned in a single other historical source, it seems unlikely that the Muslims Hamilton-Buchanan met referred to a shared Rohingya identity. Instead, it appears more convincing that they simply stated their place of settlement.

In line with this British testimonies suggest that the early Muslim settlers had largely assimilated to local Rakhine society and did not articulate a separate ethnic or communal status. In the 1872 population census the British therefore simply recorded them as Arakan Muslims (Suaedy & Muhammad 2015). In other documents they further distinguished between Burmese Muslims, which referred to those who had inhabited the land prior to the arrival of the British, and Indian Muslims, sent to support the colonial

administration after colonization. A majority of Muslims living in Rakhine today are descendants of these later migrants from Chittagong (Pugh 2013). The large influx of new Muslim settlers drastically altered the dynamics between the two religious communities in Rakhine. Large segments of the Buddhist population grew to resent the newcomers based on their greater access to labor opportunities and British favoritism (Cheung 2011).

With the end of the British Empire also the culturally, linguistically and socially inter-related Muslims of Chittagong and Rakhine were separated by international borders. Inspired by the independence movement that led to the separation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan from India, Muslim settlers in the 1950s started to advocate for the northern part of Rakhine to become an autonomous Muslim zone or alternatively merge with East Pakistan today Bangladesh (Khin 2016). In choosing the name Rohingya, the Muslim insurgents known as Muhjahid identified themselves with the history and geography of Rakhine state and thereby aimed to legitimize their fight for autonomy. Against this backdrop, the Rohingya, as a distinctive group, appear to have their origin first and foremost in a political movement that emerged from a historical moment of separation and since then has been reinforced by their shared suffering under the military regime.

Until the military took over control in 1962, the Muslim population in Rakhine was not only socially better integrated, but also enjoyed the same civic rights as the Buddhist Rakhines (Cunningham 2015). The junta used the political movement of the Rohingya to demonstrate that only the military could keep

the Union of Myanmar together and thereby legitimized its own leadership claim. The military first stripped the Muslims off their legal documents, and then stigmatized them as foreigners. De facto stateless more than 200,000 Muslim Rakhines were violently forced into Bangladesh in 1978. After the mass exoduses of Muslims in 1978 and again in 1991 and 1992, international pressure each time persuaded the government of Myanmar to allow repatriation of some Muslim communities back to Myanmar. However, upon the Rohingya's return the Buddhist majority entirely thought of them as Bengalis and their living conditions further deteriorated.

When violence escalated between the communities in 2012, the military similarly spurred tensions to force Aung San Suu Kyi to take sides in the conflict. She had just been elected into parliament and now faced a dilemma: Showing solidarity with the Rohingya would equal political suicide in Myanmar, especially for her as a member and representative of the ruling Bamar ethnicity. But internationally her silence was seen as indifference and harmed her reputation as a human rights defendant.

1.4 THE ROHINGYA MINORITY

The Rohingya is an ethnic group living in Rakhine State of Myanmar. About 90 percent of the 50 million population of Myanmar is Buddhist, while the Muslims represent a religious minority of just over 4 percent of the population. The Rohingya is the largest Muslim group in Myanmar, although a fraction of the Rohingya are Hindu. The Rohingya have suffered longstanding marginalization. They have been denied Myanmar citizenship and have never been

legally recognized in Myanmar as an ethnic group¹³. Many people in Myanmar hold the opinion and belief that the Rohingya are originally from Bangladesh, while many Bangladeshis similarly think that the Rohingyas originate from Myanmar. Neither Bangladesh nor Myanmar is willing to recognize them as citizens.

Myanmar is a highly ethnically diverse country. The Bamar is the largest ethnic group and represents a majority of the population. Since Myanmar's independence in 1948, the different ethnic minorities have been subject to various forms of systematic discrimination and deprivation, especially since the military coup and seizure of power in 1962. Ethnically driven internal armed conflicts have been recurring since the Myanmar independence¹⁴.

Rakhine State, where the Rohingya in Myanmar are concentrated, is found on the western coast of Myanmar, bordering the Bay of Bengal. To the north, Rakhine State borders Bangladesh. Rakhine State is characterized by poverty and tension between different ethnic and religious groups. The Muslim Rohingya population in Rakhine State has been estimated to be slightly over 1 million. The Rakhine Buddhists, estimated to be around 2 million, have long harboured grievance against the Rohingya, regarding them as foreigners with no legitimate claim to reside in the state. Beyond the refusal of the Myanmar government to grant the Rohingya citizenship, the Rohingya have been denied access to higher education and suffered restrictions in their freedom of movement. Land owned by the Rohingya has been confiscated, Rohingya males have been exploited in forced labour and the Rohingya

have been required to comply with restrictions on the number of children¹⁵.

The recent escalation of the conflict in Rakhine State should be seen against the background of the increased national prevalence of expressions of religious intolerance and hatred since 2012, during which Muslims have repeatedly been portrayed by ultra-nationalist Buddhist organizations as a “threat to race and religion”. In some instances, politicians have even publicly argued in favour of killing the Rohingya¹⁶.

1.5 RECENT POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN MYANMAR

Myanmar has recently experienced an extensive transfer of power from the military to the civil society. Open national elections were held in November 2015 for the first time in 25 years. A civilian government, under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, assumed power in March 2016. It has, however, been pointed out that the political influence of the military remains strong through continued control of 25 percent of the seats in Parliament and the power of the Commander-in-Chief to appoint key government Ministers.

The new civilian government has stated its intention to pursue reconciliation between the different ethnic groups of Myanmar. In the national elections of November 2015, however, Muslim candidates were not allowed to participate, resulting in a Parliament with no Muslim members. The government has also opposed calls to grant the Rohingya minority citizenship¹⁷.

1.6 CURRENT SITUATION IN RAKHINE STATE

The situation in Rakhine State has escalated in the aftermath of the 9th of October 2016, when insurgents from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) reportedly attacked Myanmar border posts at the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. Myanmar security forces retaliated by conducting what they referred to as “area clearance operations”, where they claimed to have targeted militant Rohingya groups in the northern part of Rakhine State. It is still ongoing. The conflict has resulted in over 688 000 Rohingya refugees fleeing the country¹⁸, mostly to Bangladesh, although previously, Rohingyas have fled from Bangladesh to Myanmar. The access of humanitarian organizations in Myanmar has simultaneously with the increase of refugees been severely limited. Reports of human rights abuses in the northern Rakhine State have been widespread¹⁹.

According to the Mission report by the Office of the High Commissioner, the Myanmar security forces in August 2017 began operations aimed at expelling the Rohingya from Myanmar. The report concluded that the operations constituted systematic human rights violations and that the perpetrators were Myanmar security forces, in many instances with collaboration from the local population of Rakhine Buddhists. Moreover, the report stated that civilian Rohingya were intentionally targeted. The findings contest the position of the Myanmar government that the operations have been targeted at Rohingya militants.

Based on interviews with Rohingya refugees, the report detailed features of the ongoing persecution. According to the findings,

Myanmar security forces have engaged in indiscriminate violence against Rohingya villages, shooting against the inhabitants and torching homes. Places of cultural significance to the Rohingya population have been deliberately destroyed and educated members of the communities have been arrested and arbitrarily detained. Summary executions and sexual violence have also been marked features of the ongoing persecution. According to the findings, the attackers have often stated that the Rohingya do not belong in Myanmar. The findings confirmed the conclusion of earlier reports that severe human rights violations have been prevalent in Rakhine State. The actions described above are considered crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and possible genocide according to UN definitions. The High Commissioner for Human Rights has described the actions of the Myanmar security forces as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing”²⁰.

The leader of the Myanmar Government, Aung San Suu Kyi, has denied the allegations that Myanmar forces engage in organized persecution of the Rohingya minority. She has stated that the Myanmar security forces have operated with the intent of neutralizing Rohingya militants²¹. On 23 August 2016, the Myanmar Government established the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State lead by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (the Annan Commission). The task of the Annan Commission is to find a solution to the situation in Rakhine State²². In November, Bangladesh and Myanmar reached a principal agreement to enable the return of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar²³.

The agreement has not yet been implemented, and several actors – including the UNHCR and several states on the Security Council – has warned that conditions on the ground are not yet safe for the return of refugees²⁴.

1.7 ROLE AND PREVIOUS ACTIONS BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The Charter of the United Nations gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Security Council has the authority to take military and non-military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a principle, based on existing international law, to prevent and stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The principle was unanimously adopted by heads of state and governments at the UN World Summit in 2005.

According to R2P, all member states have a duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities. This duty lies first and foremost with the state, but the international community has a responsibility to assist if the state fails to protect its own population. The international community also has a responsibility to take action if it is the state that is responsible for the crimes. The principle is divided into three pillars to further the implementation of R2P;

Pillar I: The state bears the primary responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes and violations, including their incitement;

Pillar II: The international community has a responsibility to assist and encourage the state in fulfilling its protection obligations;

Pillar III: The international community has a responsibility to take appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations from these crimes. The international community must also be prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, in accordance with the UN Charter, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations, if a state manifestly fails to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes. Such action may entail coercive measures, including the use of force, where appropriate, and through the Security Council.

1.7.1 Alternatives to the use of military force

Military force remains a measure of last resort. Other measures that the Security Council could impose through a resolution include arms embargos and economic sanctions against Myanmar and against key figures. Human rights monitoring and humanitarian assistance are other tools. Further, the Security Council has the authority to refer a criminal investigation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). If the Security Council uses this authority, the ICC has jurisdiction regardless of whether the concerned state is party to the court's Statute.

1.7.2 Previous actions by the Security Council

Despite reports of the increasing violence and repression against Rohingyas in Rakhine State, the Security Council remained largely inactive on the issue during 2016 and the first

half of 2017. A few meetings were held on the situation under the agenda point “any other business”, and no action was taken. In the second half of 2017 and beginning of 2018, the attention devoted to Myanmar and Rakhine State increased. Meetings were held much more frequently and regularly, and a range of briefers, including Secretary-General António Guterres, updated the Security Council on the situation²⁵.

On 6 November 2017 the Security Council issued a unanimous statement *inter alia* condemning the “widespread violence that has taken place in Rakhine State” and calling on the government of Myanmar to “ensure no further excessive use of military force in Rakhine State”. Simultaneously, the Security Council reaffirmed its “strong commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Myanmar” and condemned the attacks carried out by ARSA²⁶. The Security Council has, however, not adopted any legally binding resolution regarding the conflict.

1.8 SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Sexual and gender-based violence is considered a war crime if it is widespread and systematically executed. Hence, it is also a reason for the R2P principle to take effect, where other member states take action in order to ensure the protection of the people. According to the Office of the High Commissioner, sexual and gender-based violence against the Rohingya has been prevalent before the current crisis and has likely been underreported for decades²⁷. When the Office of the High Commissioner in January 2017 conducted interviews with Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, more than

50 percent of the women stated that they had experienced rape or other forms of sexual violence. Similar findings were reported by the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict in December 2017. Moreover, the majority of rape victims stated that they had been raped by more than one perpetrator. The perpetrators were described as soldiers²⁸. The conclusions were confirmed by the findings of the Office of the High Commissioner in subsequent interviews with refugees during September 2017²⁹.

The question for the Security Council is how sexual and gender-based violence can be stopped in this conflict. Furthermore the Security Council must consider how this best can be achieved, i.e. by enforcing accountability, reconciliation and/or transitional justice. The resolution should urge Myanmar to refrain from organizing, facilitating or in any way tolerating sexual and gender-based violence in the Rakhine State. The Security Council must also address concrete measures to ensure an end to these acts.

1.9 RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE

A reconciliation process is imperative to ensure that the society in Rakhine State will function in the future. It is also imperative that the perpetrators are brought to justice. The reconciliation process should be implemented according to the concept of transitional justice²⁴ and should aim to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. In the resolution, the Security Council should address which reconciliation mechanisms that can be used in this conflict and how the perpetrators should be brought to justice.

One possible justice mechanism is the International Criminal Court (ICC) that can prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. ICC has its own Statute and is independent of the UN. ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory of a state that is party to the Statute or by a national of such a state. However, if the Security Council refers a situation to the ICC, the court enjoys jurisdiction and can investigate the suspected crime even if the concerned state is not a member of the ICC. As an alternative to ICC as a mechanism for justice, reconciliation mechanisms such as a truth commission or tribunal can be used.

The government of Myanmar could be urged to establish national courts specifically tasked with handling cases related to human rights violations perpetrated in this conflict.

1.10 HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Humanitarian access refers to the ability by neutral humanitarian actors such as NGO's and the UN, to enter a conflict-area and provide humanitarian aid as well as monitor and promote human rights. In Myanmar, the northern Rakhine State has been restricted and hundreds of thousands of Rohingya remain in the state without any humanitarian assistance. In its statement on 6 November 2017, the Security Council welcomed the Government of Myanmar's 'decision to establish 'the Union Enterprise Mechanism for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement, and Development in Rakhine''. According to the Government of Myanmar, this body shall allow both local and international organizations to participate in the future development of Rakhine State.

In its resolution, the Security Council should address possible mechanisms to ensure that humanitarian access is granted and reaches the intended receiver. In order to assess the actual humanitarian needs, humanitarian organizations must firstly be granted access to conduct fact-finding missions.

1.11 CONCLUSION

The Myanmar Government should grant humanitarian access and address the root-causes of the conflict. In the long-term, this involves that the Rohingya are granted Myanmar nationality. In the short-term, the Rohingya must be granted a legal status and civil rights such as the right to education and freedom of movement.

1.12 RECOMMENDATIONS

- ✓ The primary goal of the international Rohingya debate and subsequent policies should be the improvement of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine. From a political point of view it is therefore essential to acknowledge the complexity of the conflict and take into account the existing fears within both communities.
- ✓ As an important first step in the resolution of the conflict, the improvement of the Rohingya's legal status matters to guarantee their basic civil rights, such as freedom of movement and access to government services.
- ✓ To reduce such resentments and contribute to rebuilding trust between the communities, from an international donor perspective it is therefore essential to accord

development aid equally to all groups in Rakhine state.

- ✓ In response to the military crackdown on Rohingya communities following the attacks on police stations in October 2016 an extreme policy, such as the cancellation of urgently needed development aid in Rakhine would thus be counter-productive.

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⁴ The Government Could Have Stopped This, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 1, 2012), <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/08/01/government-could-have-stopped>.

⁵ Muslims Vanish, supra note 6 (Myanmar is predominantly Buddhist, but about 5% of its 60 million people are Muslims.).

⁶ The Government Could Have Stopped This, supra note 8. (In 1977, for instance, the Burmese government implemented a nationwide initiative scrutinizing illegal immigrants but which in effect, resulted in killings, mass arrests, torture, and other abuses against the Rohingya, forcing more than 200,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. Engaging in political spin, the Burmese government stated, "19,457 Bengalis fled to escape examination because they did not have proper

registration papers,” again refusing to identify the Rohingya as such while also underestimating the number of refugees. Once in Bangladesh, the refugees were deprived of food aid in the host country’s bid to force them back to Myanmar; more than 12,000 starved to death and others were forcibly repatriated to Myanmar.).

⁷ In 1992, for instance, more than a quarter million fled to Bangladesh, where they once again confronted a familiar hostility as well as beatings and the denial of food rations, after military personnel burned its way through villages, killing hundreds.

⁸ Jay Milbrandt, *Stateless*, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L., 75, 80 (2011) (“People are stateless because they did not acquire a nationality at birth, their state of origin no longer exists, or no state will accept them as citizens”)

⁹ The Government Could Have Stopped This, *supra* note 8. See also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2012: BURMA (2012) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORT], available at <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper> (follow Drop down Menu “Countries/Regions” and select “Burma” hyperlink). (The government consistently denied citizenship to most Rohingya on the grounds their ancestors did not belong to a national race or indigenous group present in Myanmar before the beginning of British colonial rule in 1823, as required by the 1982 citizenship law.).

¹⁰ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013 6 (2013), <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/burma?page=3>.

¹¹ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 24; see also The Young and the Hopeless in Bangladesh’s Camps, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, Jan. 23, 2013, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5100ecaf2.html>.

¹² Myanmar Profile, BBC NEWS (July 16, 2013), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12992883>.

¹³ See Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, p. 2–4, and

Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016, p. 5–7.

¹⁴ See Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, p. 2–3.

¹⁵ See Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, p. 7–13, and Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016, pages 5–6.

¹⁶ See Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, p. 7, and Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016, p. 5.

¹⁷ See Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, p. 3.

¹⁸ UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Action, <https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis>

¹⁹ See Mission report of OHCHR rapid mission to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, p. 1–2, and <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=58114#.Wi51wFXiZaQ>.

²⁰ See <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22041>.

²¹ See <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/05/asia/rohingya-myanmar-bangladesh/index.html>.

²² See <http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/228>.

²³ See <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/27/asia/rohingya-myanmar-bangladesh-agreement/index.html>.

²⁴ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/11/637152-conditions-myanmars-rakhine-not-place-enable-safe-returns-un-refugee-agency>

²⁵ See Chronology of Security Council meetings and actions on Myanmar at <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/myanmar.php>.

²⁶ See Full statement at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13055.doc.htm>.

²⁷ See *Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar*, p. 9.

²⁸ See *Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016*, p. 20–25.

²⁹ See *Mission report of OHCHR rapid mission to Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, 13–24 September 2017*, p. 7–8.