ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE CASE OF THE KOSOVO/A CONFLICT

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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November 2005

ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE CASE OF THE KOSOVO/A CONFLICT

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

of

Bilkent University

by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BILKENT UNIVERSITY

ANKARA

November 2005

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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War was followed by an increase in the influence of ethno-national conflicts in the world politics. International Relations theories have contributed to the study of inter-state war. The question raised in this dissertation is whether the same logic can be used to study ethno-national conflict. To answer the question this dissertation evaluates the contribution of traditional International Relations theories, post-Cold War approaches and Constructivism to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. It points to their strengths and weaknesses in explaining this conflict. The Kosovo/a conflict is used as a case study to illustrate to what extent different International Relations approaches help us to understand it.

This dissertation asserts that traditional theories and post-Cold War approaches help us to examine the context that would encourage conflict. Pointing to the limits of these approaches, this dissertation emphasizes the contribution of Constructivist approaches, which assist us to understand the constructive and relational processes which make the conflict and shape the participants. At the same time, this dissertation shows awareness of Constructivism weaknesses.

ÖZET

Soğuk Savaş sonrasında dünya politikasında etnik-milliyetçi anlaşmazlıkların sayısında bir artış görülmüştür. Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri devletlerarası savaşların çalışılmasına katkıda bulunmuştur. Bu tezde sorgulanan etnik-milliyetçi anlaşmazlıkların çalışılmasında da aynı mantığın kullanılıp kullanılamayacağıdır. Bu sorunun cevabını verebilmek için bu tez, geleneksel Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerinin, Soğuk Savaş sonrası yaklaşımların ve İnşacı yaklaşımın etnik-milliyetçi sorunları anlamamıza olan katkılarını değerlendirmektedir. Bu tez onların ihtilafların açıklanmasındaki katkılarına ve eksikliklerine işaret etmektedir. Kosova anlaşmazlığı farklı Uluslararası İlişkiler yaklaşımlarının ihtilafı anlamamızda bizlere nasıl yardımcı olduğunu göstermek için örnek olarak kullanılmıştır.

Geleneksel teoriler ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası yaklaşımlar ihtilafların oluşması için gerekli şartları incelememize mümkün kılarlar. Bu yaklaşımların sınırlarına işaret ederek, bu tez bir ihtilafı yaratan ve iştirakçilerini şekillendiren yapıcı ve bağıntılı süreçleri anlamamızı sağlayan İnşacı yaklaşımların katkılarını vurgulamaktadır. Aynı zamanda, bu tez İnşacı yaklaşımların eksikliklerinin de farkında olduğunu göstermektedir.

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In my study, above all, I have had the privilege and good fortune to enjoy the supervision of Assist. Prof. Dr. Pinar Bilgin, who shared with me her keen understanding and vast knowledge on the theory of International Relations. Her guidance reminded me constantly of the importance of balance and objectivity in scientific interpretation. In addition to his friendly support and encouragement, Dr. Bilgin helped shape the final version of this dissertation. Her constant guidance and comments on content and style are beyond any acknowledgement. I am ever so glad to record my heartfelt thanks to her.

I acknowledge with much appreciation the generosity of Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre (Political Science Department - Bilkent University), Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş (International Relations Department - Middle East Technical University), Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu and Assist. Prof. Dr. Paul Wiliams (International Relations Department - Bilkent University), which offered comments on the manuscript.

I would also like to thank my colleagues from the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, such as Ozlem Gokakin, Temel Ersoy and Hakan

Fidan, which have been close to me during the years I have been in Turkey and have helped me with their advice, friendship and encouragement. I am ever so much appreciative of the time and efforts they devoted to me.

I am sure that I would not be able to complete this work without the help, encouragement and the patience of my father Safa Abazi. None of this would have been possible had it not been for my late mother Safije Abazi's and grandmother Hasije Myderrizi's encouragement and help throughout my life. They constantly supported and encouraged my ideal to proceed in the scholarly life. They were so much looking foreword to see me succeed in my academic career. If this work is a success, I would like to dedicate it to them.

The rest of my family, my sisters Genciana and Arnisa have certainly been with me with their advice and encouragement throughout the years of my studies. I am grateful for their support and encouragement made throughout.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AKUF	**:** Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (Study Group on the Causes of War at Hamburg University)
	: Central European Time
CIA	**:** US Central Intelligence Agency
COPRI	**:** Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CSCE	**:** Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ELIAMEP	**:** The Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy
EPC	**:** European Political Community
EU	**:** European Union
FRY	**:** Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
GDP	**:** Gross Domestic Product
HIICR	**:** Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research
HUIPS	**:** Hamburg University, Institute of Political Science
IR	**:** International Relations
I.C.J.	**:** International Court of Justice
KFOR	**:** NATO Kosovo Force

KLA	**:** Kosovo Liberating Army
NATO	**:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	**:** Nongovernmental Organizations
OSCE	**:** Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe
PPU	**:** Peace Pledge Union
RFE/RL NEWSLINE	**:** Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
SIPRI	**:** Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UN	**:** United Nations
UN CHARTER	**:** United Nations Charter
UNCHR	**:** United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNHCR	**:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	**:** United Nations Security Council
USSR	**:** Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics
JNA	**:** Yugoslav Peoples' Army
UCK	**:** Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (Kosova Liberating Army)
US	**:** United States
WWI	**:** Word War I
WWII	**:** World War II

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II (WWII) and particularly in the post-Cold War era, ethno-national conflict has increasingly made an impact on world politics. Ethno-national conflict stands for the clash of national groups and their demand for nationhood. Yosef Lapid observes that "[t]he trend toward expanding levels of ethnic conflict was, for instance, solidly occurrence established by late 1960s" (1996: 4; see, also, Gurr, 1994; Gurr, 2001). As the occurrence of ethno-national conflict has proceeded at a rapid pace, so have the scholarly endeavours to explain them. Since the late 1960s, what has emerged is a plethora of explanations, which treats ethno-national conflict within the approaches that focus on the historical processes of fragmentation and globalisation in world politics (Gaddis, 1992), de-colonisation (Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Gurr, 1994) and modernisation (Rejai and Enloe, 1960; Holsti, 1975; Horowitz, 1985). Yet, what is lacking in these explanations is a comprehensive understanding of the implications of ethno-national conflict on international relations. International

Relations (IR)[1] theories promise to offer such explanations. However, before the end of Cold War the explanations about ethno-national conflict has been found wanting in IR.

Ethno-national conflict defines a specific condition of war. The parties involved in an ethno-national conflict are the ethnic communities or "ethnies" (Smith, 1993: 49). In this dissertation the definition provided by Anthony Smith (1993) for ethnic communities is taken into consideration. Thus, ethnic community is to be understood as "a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity" (Smith, 1993: 47).[2]

For the purpose of this dissertation ethno-national conflict is understood as a dispute about important political, economic, social, cultural and/or territorial issues between two or three ethnic communities. Hence, ethno-national conflict is to be seen as "the product of demands for political

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[1] Capital letters are used to indicate 'International Relations' as a discipline, to distinguish from 'international relations' (world politics) as the subject of this field.

[2] Smith (1993; see, also, Anderson, 1991) defines six criteria that the group should met before it can be called an ethnic community. They are summarised shortly in what follows. First, the community should have a defined name for itself. Second, the people in a group should believe in a common ancestry to be considered as an established ethnic community. Third, the members of the group should share historical memories to be viewed as consolidated ethnic groups. Fourth, the group must have a shared culture, generally based on a combination of language, religion, laws, customs, institutions, dress, music, crafts, architecture even food. Fifth, the group must feel an "attachment to a specific territory…what is crucial for ethnicity is not the possession of the home land, but the sense of mutual belonging, even from afar" (Smith, 1993: 51). Sixth, the members of the group must "feel an equal sense of belonging to the community."

recognition" (Smith, 1993: 48). This conflict represents according to Stathis Kalyvas:

> [P]rocesses of competition over sovereignty. At least two political actors exercise variable sovereignty over parts of a state. Control, as we may call the exercise of sovereignty, is strong in some places and weak in other places. Sovereignty is divided in some areas meaning that both actors claim control over the same territory. In this context…the role of civilians is crucial (2000: 15).

The main characteristic of ethno-national conflict is the breaking of domestic order and use of coercion in dealing with irreconcilable difference of interests over the sharing of the state. According to Alexis Heraclides (1991, 1997), ethno-national conflict is internationalised in four cases. First, conflict is transformed into a politico-military struggle when an ethnic group aims to separate one part of the communal state, posing, in turn, a credible threat to the state in question. Second, there is legitimacy and collective support for self-determination. Third, there is a strong opposition from the state to the bid for independence, culminating with acts of punishment and extermination towards the regionally based movement. Fourth, there is a military mobilization and the state is in a status of war, facing mobilisation of state armed forces (including para-military and security forces) to face the activity of separatist guerrilla forces.

Ethno-national conflict does not always involve the use of violence. However, potentially it represents threats to state dismemberment and have the possibility of turning into violent conflict and being internationalised and, in turn, becoming a concern for International Relations. However, ethno-national conflict and nationalism "were not simply absent in the sense that classical studies did not care; they were radically absent because they *could not* be represented in

the classical state-centric theory" of International Relations (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 242). War in International Relations is considered as "somatic violence between states actors" (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 565). The reason for this outlook of war in International Relations is explained by the fact that:

> [t]he potential for organized violence has been highly concentrated in the hands of states for some time, a fact which states have helped bringing about by recognizing each other as the sole legitimate bearers of organized violence potential, in effect colluding to sustain an oligopoly (Wendt, 1999: 9).

Thus, the state in International Relations is treated as the primary units of analysis for "thinking about the global regulation of violence" (Wendt, 1999: 9). According to Hedley Bull, war is an inter-state practice "qualified by a sense of the overriding need to contain war within tolerable bounds" in the society of states (Bull, 1977: 198). Consequently, in traditional International Relations theories, state-centrism is the locus for understanding war and peace in world politics. The state-centric outlook in International Relations neglects the importance of non-state actors in the understanding of war (Aron, 1981). Consequently, it can be concluded that ethno-national conflict is not dealt in its own right in International Relations.

With the end of Cold War, International Relations scholars began to increasingly deal with this conflict. There are two plausible explanations for this growing interest. According to Lapid (1996), two developments–one in the realm of contemporary world politics and the other in the realm of the discipline itself–would justify the emergence of such interest. Starting with the context of contemporary politics, expanding levels of ethno-national conflict is to be seen

as a development that encouraged International Relations scholars to turn toward studying ethno-national conflict. Thus, International Relations scholarship could be seen as reacting to a broader view shared by IR scholars that there is a shift in the causes, nature and impact of war in world politics (Creveld, 1991; Huntington, 1993, 1996; Kaplan, 1994, 1997; Franck, 1995; Holsti, 1996; Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 2001; Jung, 2003; Guzzini and Jung, 2004). The main assumptions about the increasing role and impact of the ethno-national conflict in contemporary politics can be summarised in four main points.

First, ethno-national conflict in number compare to other forms of violence in international relations constitutes the majority (Gurr, 1994; Gurr and Harff, 1994; SIPRI, 1998).[3] An analysis of the empirical evidence suggests that war in its classical form (as an inter-state phenomenon) has declined in number (Small and Singer, 1982: 129-131). The data gathered by the Study Group on the Causes of War at Hamburg University (the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, AKUF), shows that in the period between 1945-1992, of the 196 wars fought only 43 were inter-state wars in the classical sense.[4]

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[3] Different sources show a decline in number of civil wars, particularly after 1992 (HIICR, 1999; Gurr at al. 2001; PPU, 2003; HU, 2004; Newman, 2004). However, what is important is the fact that intra-state conflicts constitute the predominant form of violence in international relations. According to Melvin Small and David Singer, in the period between 1816-1897 the number of wars per nation was 1.69; it declined to 0.75 in the years 1898-1980. Within the period that followed WWII until 1980, the number of war for nation declined to 0.23 (Small and Singer, 1982: 129-131).

[4] The data are taken form the database of AKUF as published in Jung and Schlichte (1999: 37-38).

Second, ethno-national issues encourage states to go to war with one another. The intervention of third parties to stop the conflict for humanitarian[5] or security reasons could potentially transform an ethno-national conflict into an inter-state war.[6] In such a situation, ethno-national conflict could become an independent source of threat to security at the regional and international level, since it can trigger larger conflicts involving other states, destabilising regions and challenging the stability of well-established states (Ikenberry, 2000; Gelb, 1994).

Third, ethno-national conflict creates material and human consequences that can be compared with the ones produced by inter-state war. The case of the Kosovo/a[7] conflict is a good example to illustrate this phenomenon. The practical intents and purposes of humanitarian intervention in the case of the Kosovo/a conflict were to compel a state (Serbia) to change its behaviour. According to NATO sources the length of the campaign was 78 days, including over 38,000 combat and 10,484 strike sorties. The number of

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[5] In a common sense, international humanitarian intervention is understood as the exercise of "collective capacity [by the society of states] for enforcing minimum standards of humanity" (Wheeler, 2000: 12). International interventions are gaining prominence in international relations if we consider the increase in the number of civilian casualties as compared to military ones. The rate of civilian casualties compared to military ones is estimated to have increased from 0.8 in the 1950s to 8.1 in the 1990s (Kaldor and Vashee, 1997). This change is mainly due to the continuous increase in number of ethno-national conflicts.

[6] For an account of international humanitarian interventions in different cases of intra-state conflicts, see Nicholas Wheeler (2000). The author observes that humanitarian interventions have secured a new legitimacy after the end of Cold War. During Cold War the normal response of states to humanitarian outrages was non-intervention. In the post-Cold War period interventions in the case of "supreme humanitarian emergencies" are treated as a moral duty (Wheeler, 2000: 13).

[7] Kosovo is the Serbian name for the region. Kosova is the Albanian name for the region. Kosovo/a is used throughout the text as a way of representing both names.

casualties according to NATO sources was estimated to be between 488 and 527, while the Yugoslav sources claim 1,200-5,700 civilian deaths. The number of refugees and displaced persons was estimated by the UNCHR in Geneva to be approximately 1 million people. From the analyses of these facts and figures it can be concluded that the Kosovo/a case, although in theoretical terms an ethno-national conflict, in terms of its material impact, it was destructive as an inter-state war.[8]

Fourth, ethno-national conflict is increasingly affecting international relations because it leads to the fragmentation of states. Ethno-national conflict involves national groups and their demand for nationhood. The requests for self-determination and state-formation are quite often the cause of fragmentation in world politics. To cite Ted Gurr et al.:

> Sixty-eight territorially-concentrated ethnic groups have waged armed conflicts for autonomy or independence at some time since the 1950s, not counting the peoples of former European colonies. More than a third of them continue to fight for greater self-determination at the beginning of 2001 including some Somalis and Oromo in Ethiopia, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Chechens in Russia…[There are also] another 54 territorially-concentrated groups that currently are seeking greater self-determination by political means. Their tactics may include isolated acts of violence but thus far they have stopped short of serious armed conflicts (2001: 14).

Furthermore, there are several *de facto* states or political entities established by separatist ethno-national movements, which are not yet recognised by the international community. Many observers fear that contemporary ethno-national conflict (involving self-determination) might continue the process of state

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[8] War in International Relations is also defined in terms of casualties. According to Steven David (1998), a conflict that causes more than 1000 casualties can be considered an international war (see, also, Small and Singer, 1982; Holsti, 1991).

breakdown as signalled by the break-up of Soviet Union and Yugoslav Federation in the beginning of the 1990s (Mearsheimer, 1990, 1990a; Hassner, 1991; Wæver et al., 1993; Lapid, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998; Kaldor, 1999). International Relations have traditionally dealt with relations between states. Yet, ethno-national conflict increasingly raises concerns that the discipline should take into consideration.

These four points indicate the growing importance of ethno-national conflict both as a force shaping world politics and as a threat to security. Accordingly, this kind of conflict can no longer be neglected by International Relations scholarship. Although war has been at the centre of IR, the discipline has so far failed to account for the ethno-national conflict in a comprehensive manner. This conflict has "rendered apparent IR's inability to encompass vastly accelerated…dynamics of disintegration…at the sub-state level" (Lapid, 1996: 10).

Such dissatisfaction with Cold War scholarly work on intra-state conflict in general and ethno-national conflict in particular is reflected in the current wave of theoretical analyses that try to address them. In 1990-1991, the journals *International Security* and *Foreign Affairs* were packed with scholarly work about the spread of ethno-national conflict following the end of Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implications of these developments for international relations (see, for example, Mearsheimer, 1990; Larrabee,

1990/91; Van Evera, 1990/91). Later in 1993, *Survival* dedicated a whole issue to the causes of ethno-national conflict, the conditions under which conflict is more likely to happen and the problems it poses for international relations (Posen, 1993; Hassner, 1993; Snyder, 1993; Smith, 1993; Welsh, 1993). These scholarly works looked at nationalism and non-state actors to explain ethno-national conflict. In the same year *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (1993) in a special issue: "Culture in International Relations" discussed the role of identity and culture in understanding world politics and ethno-national conflict. In the same journal (1999), the issue of nationality and self-determination and their implications in international relations were paid special attention (see, for example, Castellino, 1999; Agnew, 1999; Conversi, 1999).

The ensuing debate has been among the most interesting and stimulating in International Relations scholarship. According to Yosef Lapid, the discussion stimulated by the issues of ethno-national conflict and globalisation have both "directly and inescapably forced the IR scholarly community" (1996: 4) to reconsider "the 're-'moment in the very idea of social (re)search" (1996: 5; see, also, Ferguson and Mansbach, 1994; Kaldor, 1999). Some of the major theoretical debates focused on rethinking, reclaiming, reorienting, and returning moments of "IR's…social scientific sensibilities" (Lapid, 1996) brought to the fore refinements or reconstruction of the main assumptions of the discipline, which now seems to be better equipped to study ethno-national conflict. In turn, these "re" moments in the realm of the discipline, according to Lapid (1996), represent

the other development that justifies the increasing of interest in International Relations toward ethno-national conflict. This dissertation also looks at ethno-national conflict in International Relations.

The main aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the contribution of various International Relations approaches to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. International Relations approaches have contributed to the study of inter-state war in world politics. The question is whether the same logic can be used to study ethno-national conflict? In answering this question, this dissertation evaluates the contribution of different International Relations approaches accounts on explaining ethno-national conflict. Three perspectives, traditional International Relations theory (namely, Realism, Rationalism[9] and Revolutionism),[10] the post-Cold War approaches (neo-Realism[11] and "New Wars") and Constructivism[12] (Alexander Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's approaches) are discussed.

The reason behind choosing to examine traditional International Relations, the post-Cold War approaches and Constructivism is as follows. First,

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[9] Rationalism is also referred to as the English School.
[10] Capital letters are used to indicate Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism as schools of thought. Martin Wight (1991) was the first to name the traditional International Relations theories as Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism.
[11] Neo-Realism in not a post-Cold War theory, but was revamped in the post-Cold War era by Posen to account for ethno-national conflict.
[12] Constructivism is not a homogenous body of thought (Reus-Smit, 2002: 488). This dissertation only looks at what Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's approaches have to say about war and the Kosovo/a conflict.

traditional International Relations, the post-Cold War approaches and Constructivism have dealt extensively with the question of war and peace in International Relations. Thus, they have intrinsic merits. Second, all theories provide a combined understanding of war and peace in international relations, in a set of rich and diversified ideas that in Charles W. Kegley terms "overlap and reinforce each other by speaking to common concerns and issues" (1995:2).[13] The last but not the list, the organising principles of different International Relations theories can be used to examine ethno-national conflict. So it would be of interest to look what can they offer to our understanding of ethno-national conflict.

Furthermore, this dissertation looks at all these theories because most of International Relations approaches do not address directly the issue of ethno-national conflict. Moreover, the literature that directly addresses the changing of political practices after the end of Cold War is of little help because very few works are concerned with ethno-national conflict per se. Instead, the study of ethno-national conflict occurs mostly within the context of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000; Mayall, 2000), globalisation (Snow, 1996; Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 2001), culture and identity (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; Wendt,

[13] See, also, Harvey Starr (1995), who believes that "realism and neo-liberalism can be brought together by viewing them as different positions on a continuum rather than as exclusively rival approaches" (1995: 313). Joel H. Rosenthal (1995) argues as well that the point of convergence between Realism and Liberalism far exceed the points of divergence, particularly with respect to the attention both perspectives give to the importance of an international consensus about moral norms for the maintenance of order. See, also, Ray (1995), Rosenberg (1990).

1999), security (Wæver, et al., 1993; Buzan, et al., 1998) and legal aspects of self-determination (Falk, 1999; Castellino, 1999; Agnew, 1999; Conversi, 1999). Yet, they have implications for our understanding of ethno-national conflict.

To organise the evaluation of these approaches contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict the model proposed by Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth that consider the main organising principles of traditional approaches namely, power, order and emancipation to look at security, is followed. I have added to their model, identity as the organising principle of Constructivism. In this dissertation these principles are used to organise and arrange the chapters.

This focus is deemed necessary taking into account the vast and heterogeneous body of work in International Relations. Furthermore, focusing on these organising principles is done for three main reasons. First, each scholarship's literature on war does not yet offer a unified body of thought. However, in all cases there is agreement about what the organising principle is. Second, reducing the set of arguments of each perspective to the organising principle facilitates and broadens the possibility for generalisations. Therefore, concepts germane to the study of inter-state war in International Relations can be utilised to examine ethno-national conflict. Third, this simplification is necessary to avoid entanglement in the internal debates of each scholarship,

which could, potentially draw the attention away from the main purpose of this dissertation.

To evaluate the contribution of these approaches to our understanding of ethno-national conflict this dissertation points to their strengths and weaknesses in explaining ethno-national conflict. Pointing to the limits of traditional theories and post-Cold War approaches, this dissertation emphasizes the contribution of Constructivism, which assist us to understand the constructive and relational processes which make the conflict and shape the participants. The implications of different International Relations approaches for our understanding of ethno-national conflict are considered in a single study in a novel manner.

Following the theoretical discussion in Part I, the aim of this dissertation is fulfilled by applying these approaches to the case of the Kosovo/a conflict. Although there is a voluminous literature on the Kosovo/a conflict (Maliqi, 1998; Vickers, 1998; Veremis and Kofos, 1998; Mertus, 1999; Ramet, 1999; Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000; Clark, 2000; Judah, 2002), most of it does not approach the case from a theoretical perspective. These accounts are in the form of historical and journalistic narratives. In other scholarly accounts, the Kosovo/a conflict is discussed in the framework of humanitarian interventions (Wheeler, 2000; Thakur and Schnabel, 2000; Ignatieff, 2000; Bellamy, 2002; Chandler, 2002), international diplomacy and law (Caplan, 1999; Falk, 1999;

Weller, 1999; Roberts, 1999), human rights (Booth, 2001), security (Spillmann and Krause, 2000; Bacevich and Cohen, 2001; Lambeth, 2001; Van Ham and Mendvedev, 2002) and strategy (Posen, 2000; Clark, 2001). These works discuss implications of the Kosovo/a conflict for different aspects of international relations. Different from these works, the aim of this dissertation is to examine what existing International Relations approaches can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict.

Considering the scope of this dissertation, a diachronic account of the Albanian-Serbian relationship is avoided. The reason for this escape rests in the fact that this dissertation is neither an historical account nor a study of the processes of self-identification and self-designation of the Serbian or the Albanian communities. This is also why this dissertation does not either deal with the issue of nationalism or provide an exhaustive historical account of the emergence of the conflict.

This dissertation is a qualitative research. As such, it involves the use of different written sources, such as books, scholarly and newspapers articles, working papers, documents issued by different institutions and Internet resources. Secondary sources in the form of scholarly books, articles, working papers, and conference papers written on the causes of war and ethno-national conflict are used when evaluating the contribution of different International

Relations to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. The insights are advanced based on the contributions of certain key thinkers in the discipline.

When looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, other informative sources, such as historical documents and documentary books and articles are used. In this part primary sources are also used to support the explanations. Primary source materials in the form of official documents issued by international institutions like the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU, NATO and the UN agencies are evaluated. Information from news services and press reports such as Agence Europe, Radio Free for Europe/Radio Liberty Reports, Facts on File, Keessing's Contemporary Archives, the BBC World report, Reuters and Open Media Dissertation Institute (OMRI) are considered as additional primary sources. The Internet has also been used to acquire current information. Materials for this dissertation are drawn from sources in different languages (namely, Albanian, French, Italian and English) and from a variety of disciplines (including history, sociology, religion, political theory, economics and statistics).

The dissertation is organised as follows. Part I looks at different International Relations approaches to war and tries to assess what they have to say about ethno-national conflict. Part II focuses on the case study, and evaluates their contribution to our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. Part I, "International Relations Theories and War" evaluate the explanatory capacity of

three major International Relations scholarships, namely, traditional International Relations Theory (Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism), the post-Cold War approaches (neo-Realism and "New Wars") and Constructivism (Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's approaches). These scholarships adopt competing principles when looking at war. Their main organising principles, namely, power, order and emancipation for traditionalism; power and cosmopolitanism for the post-Cold War approaches; and identity for Constructivism arrange the chapters.

After having assessed the explanatory capacity of three main International Relations scholarships to ethno-national conflict, Part II, "International Relations Theories and Kosovo/a Conflict," seeks to do that for the Kosovo/a conflict. Here, the organising principles of presented International Relations perspectives are used to assess the Kosovo/a conflict. The aim of Part II is not to provide an exhaustive overview of the dynamics of the Kosovo/a conflict. Rather, its purpose is to find out to what extent International Relations accounts for this case. Thus, in this dissertation only the events and facts from the case study that International Relations approaches allow us to see are presented.

More specifically Chapter 1, "War and Peace in Traditional International Relations Theories," looks at three traditional International Relations approaches, namely, Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism and points to their organising principles, namely, power, order and emancipation to

assess their contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. Chapter 1 also points to the weaknesses in the theoretical underpinnings of these traditional approaches to ethno-national conflict.

Chapter 2, “The Post-Cold War Approaches and Ethno-National Conflict,” focuses on the post-Cold War approaches to ethno-national conflict. The explanatory capacity of two post-Cold War approaches to ethno-national conflict is assessed, namely, post-Cold War neo-Realism and the “New Wars.” They point respectively to power and cosmopolitanism to organise the explanation of ethno-national conflict. Furthermore, both approaches look at non-state actors and use identity to explain ethno-national conflict. This chapter also discusses these approaches’ main weaknesses in explaining ethno-national conflict.

Chapter 3 “Constructivism and War,” focuses upon the constructivist approaches of Alexander Wendt and the Copenhagen School. In contrast to the approaches looked in previous chapters, these approaches study the social aspects of war. In these approaches, the concept of identity is used to study the dynamics of world politics. The chapter concludes with an assessment of both approaches relevance in explaining ethno-national conflict, while assessing their weaknesses as well.

In Part II, the insights gleaned from Part I, are used to scrutinize the Kosovo/a conflict. Chapter 4, “Traditional International Relations Theories and the Kosovo/a Conflict,” is organised around Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism and their accounts of the Kosovo/a conflict. This chapter ends by discussing what these approaches allow us to see in the Kosovo/a case.

In Chapter 5, “The post-Cold War Approaches and the Kosovo/a Conflict,” the insights of the two post-Cold War approaches outlined in Chapter 2 are used to study the Kosovo/a conflict. These approaches analyse power (post-Cold War neo-Realism) and cosmopolitanism (the “New Wars” approach) to explain the conflict between Serbs and Albanians, which are viewed as unitary and reified ethnic groups.

In Chapter 6, “Constructivism and the Kosovo/a Conflict,” Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s approaches are used to examine the Kosovo/a conflict. Both constructivist approaches focus on identity and the collective shared memories of the actors to present the social aspects of the Kosovo/a conflict. Different from Wendt’s approach, the Copenhagen School’s approach points to the process of “securitisation” to explain the emergence of conflict.

The concluding chapter evaluates what different International Relations theories allow us to see when looking at ethno-national conflict in general and the Kosovo/a conflict in particular. It is argued that Constructivism,

in comparison to the other approaches offers a more comprehensive understanding of ethno-national conflict while showing awareness of its weaknesses.

PART I: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND WAR

CHAPTER 1

War and Peace in Traditional International Relations Theories

This chapter examines war and how it is treated in traditional International Relations theories by referring to the theoretical positions of three schools of thoughts namely, Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism (Wight, 1991; see, also, Wheeler and Booth, 1992). A special emphasis is given to the evaluation of these theories' contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. The contribution of the three theories is discussed by considering their respective organising principle, namely, power, order and emancipation as defined by Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (Wheeler and Booth, 1992; Linklater, 1990).

This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section looks at Realism and what it can tell us about war in general and ethno-national

conflict in particular. Realism attributes the causes of war mainly to the evil nature of human beings and the lack of world government in the condition of which the struggle of power can turn into conflict (Carr, 1994; Morgenthau, 1985; Waltz, 1979). Section 2 discusses Rationalism and its approach to war. Rationalism views the causes of war as a product of reason (or lack of it) (Bull, 1977; Jervis, 1978; 1982; Ruggie, 1986). The third section examines what Revolutionism can tell us about war. Revolutionism sees the causes of war as a product of man's society (Wight, 1991; Booth, 1991, 1991a; Linklater 1990; Doyle, 1986, 1997; Fukuyama, 1989, 1992; Deutsch, 1957). The three scholarships approach war from contending perspectives (Keohane, 1986; Kegley, 1995; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1999), offering at the same time alternative insights to scrutinize ethno-national conflict.

They all share a state-centric outlook of war in international relations and offer a metaphysical understanding of war. Their understanding of war is metaphysical, because it does not reflect upon the dynamics, intensity and the context in which war develops. Furthermore, none of these traditional theories approach to war pays sufficient attention to the study of particular wars. These common weaknesses are responsible for an incomplete understanding of war in International Relations, which, in turn, are also reflected in what traditional International Relations scholarship can tell us about ethno-national conflict. The insights of this chapter are used in Chapter 4, to see what traditional International Relations can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict.

1.1. Realism and War

1.1.1. Classical Realism: Human Nature, States and War

Drawing from Thomas Hobbes's ideas,[14] a realist view about international relations can be summarised as follows:

> Primacy of states as international actors, the separation of domestic and international politics, and describe the latter in terms of anarchy and a concomitant ubiquitous struggle for power and security (Griffiths 1992: 217).

The realist perspective views the state as the primary source and cause of war. Furthermore, the main concern of state in an hostile self-seeking environment (anarchy) is considered to be survival. In this environment, the military instrument and power are expected to gain importance, because the "*ultimo ratio*" of power in international relations is considered to be war (Carr, 1994: 78). Therefore, for realists the main concern of the state is about power. Hence, in the realist scholarship, war is viewed to be fought in order to make one's state militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent another state from becoming militarily stronger. In this assumption, there is much justification for Edward H. Carr's epigram that "the principal cause of war is war itself" (1994: 78).

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[14] In Hobbesian tradition, war is seen as being caused by human nature's instinctive lust for power and desire to dominate others, which, in turn, drives human beings motivations and behaviour. Accordingly, human beings live in a continuous "state of nature" that leads to insecurity and fear. Making analogy with the human beings life, states interrelations are seen to be in a "state of nature," which is anarchy. Human life characteristics in the absence of

Realists regard state as a rational actor. Rationality for Hans Morgenthau assumes cautious foreign policies, which in some respect minimise the negative effects of the conflictual relations among the states. It also offers an explanation for the "patches" of peace in international relations. However, Morgenthau suggests that states are guided in their foreign policies and behaviour by the logic of national "interest defined in terms of power" (1985: 14). All states are regarded as sharing the same concern of maximising power for the sake of their own security. Therefore, international politics, indeed all politics including war[15] are to be defined as "struggle for power." As Morgenthau argues, the concept of interest defined in terms of power induces prudence in international relations. Prudence, according to him results from "a rational, discriminating understanding of the hierarchy of national interests and the power available for their support" (1965: 14).[16] However, war is considered always possible since:

> [T]he desire to attain a maximum of power is universal, all nations must always be afraid that their own miscalculations and the power increases of other nations might add up to an inferiority for themselves which they must at all costs try to avoid (Morgenthau, 1985: 208).

Consequently, state's hunger for power and miscalculations of it in a "state of nature" situation (anarchy) are to be understood as the underlying causes of war in international relations. By this logic "the characteristics and the interactions of

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hierarchical order are extended to the relations among states. Hobbesian approach to war and international relations is treated fully by Hedley Bull (1977: 46-51, see, also, 1966).

[15] According to Carl Von Clausewitz (1984) war is to be understood as the rational continuation of policy by other means.

[16] As cited by Robinson (1967: 142).

behavioural units are taken to be the direct cause of the political events [including war]" (Waltz, 1990: 33).

The realist approach as developed by Carr and Morgenthau, views war as the outcome of quest for power and miscalculation of it. Thus, state and power are the core tenets of classical Realism upon which the understanding of war in international relations develops. It is worth noting that the state-centric outlook of war in the classical realist approach does not help our understanding of the ethno-national conflict. However, the principle of power can be used to study ethno-national conflict. Thus, ethno-national conflict can be explained in the framework of state's efforts to maximise its power. The realist approach's contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict is further discussed while looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 4. The weaknesses of realist approach to ethno-national conflict are further detailed at the end of this section.

1.1.2. Neo-Realism: The International System and War

Kenneth Waltz in his books *Man, the State and War* (1959) and *Theory of International Politics* (1979) views war as an effect of the structure of international system. Thus, in the international system, wars are to be expected "because there is nothing to prevent them" (Waltz, 1979: 113). The absence of

an international government, thus, international anarchy is considered to be "the underlying" and "the permissive" cause of war in international relations (Waltz, 1959: 232-233).

Waltz's understanding of the international state system depends on the characteristics of its structure, which, in turn, define war and peace scenarios in world politics. For him, the structure of international system have three main characteristics: the ordering principle of the system that is considered to be anarchical; the character of the units (states) that are viewed as being functionally not differentiated, since all seek security; and the distribution of power capabilities (either military or economic, or both) among the units in the international system (Waltz, 1979: 88-97).

According to Waltz, all states seek to maximise their power for the sake of their own security. Thus, the main concern of states in the international system is about security.[17] This is the case because the anarchical international system is seen as homogenising the foreign policy and behaviour of states, so they all have the task of providing for their own security. Hence, the anarchical nature of the international system is expected to impose on states the burden of power accumulation as a means to provide for security. That is why states are seen in the neo-realist scholarship as alike units in the international structure.

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[17] In difference with Realism, Neo-Realism would see as the ultimate concern of state security not power (Waltz, 1995).

In Waltz's understanding, it is structure that "shapes and shoves the units" (1990: 34). As for the position of a state in the international system, it is to be understood as defined in function of the distribution of capabilities measured in terms of military power. According to this assumption, the best position in the system would be for the strongest military power(s), which, in turn, have a saying in world politics. This would also explain why states are concerned for their "relative gains" (Grieco, 1988; see, also, Wohlforth, 1993). Hence, power change even in relative terms would affect state's position in the system and today's friend can become tomorrow's foe and, eventually, a threat to its security.

For Waltz, stability in the anarchical environment results exclusively from the maintenance of the balance of power in the system. Therefore, peace is to be viewed as lasting, as long as the established balance of power among states remains unchanged. Yet, the mechanism of balance of power cannot always be successful. That is why war is to be expected to occur every time this balance is undermined. This situation, for Waltz, results from the situation of "security dilemma"[18] that encourages changes in the distribution of power in the international system (bipolarity or multipolarity). The "security dilemma" presumes, in neo-realist accounts, a situation in which states, while looking to

[18] John H. Herz introduced the concept and the definition of the "security dilemma" in his article *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma* (1950). Later Jervis (1976, 1978) developed the concept in the format of "game theory" where the "security dilemma" is analysed under conflict and cooperation strategies.

increase their security by enhancing their military capabilities unintentionally create insecurities to others. As a result of such behaviour, which is to be understood as imposed on states by the anarchical international system, a vicious circle of security-insecurity situations would explain state's behaviour. The "security dilemma" as such, is to be assessed as an attribute of the structure rather than a psychological property.

The "security dilemma" is viewed as being experienced by all the states regardless of their domestic regimes. In Waltz's words:

> Whatever the weaponry and however many states in the system, states have to live with their security dilemma, which is produced not by their wills but by their situations. A dilemma cannot be solved; it can more or less readily be dealt with (1979: 187).

In the process of mutual interaction, states, while trying to cope with their "security dilemma" end up, according to Waltz, perpetuating the characteristics of the structure of international system. Consequently, the characteristics of the structure are to be seen as the cause for the production and reproduction of the potential for organised violence. On the other hand, Waltz (1979) suggests that in the condition of anarchy the distribution of power in the international system (being either bipolar or multipolar) explains war frequency. Hence, multipolarity in comparison to bipolarity is seen as bring more insecurity and increasing the possibility of recurrence of war in international relations (Waltz, 1979: 161-193; see, also, Mearsheimer, 1990, 1990a).

To sum up, in the neo-realist approach collective actions among alike units (states) defined in terms of power and resolved in terms of "rational choice," significantly preclude cooperation. Therefore, the state of war is to be understood as a permanent condition of international politics defined by the structural distribution of power and states quest for security. The state-centric outlook of the neo-realist approach leaves out explanations about the causes of ethno-national conflict. However, neo-realist approach allows us to examine ethno-national conflict in the context of increasing or decreasing insecurities of the state in the condition of multipolar or bipolar distribution of power in the international system (Mearsheimer, 1990, 1992). Further fine points about the contribution of the neo-realist approach to our understanding of ethno-national conflict are discussed, while looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 4. The main weaknesses of the neo-realist approach to war in general and ethno-national conflict in particular are discussed at the end of this section.

1.1.3. Other Structural Accounts of War

Following Waltz's structural account on the causes of war, Robert Gilpin in his book *War and Change in World Politics* (1981), provided a more dynamic approach to the understanding of war and presented the concept of the "hegemonic war." For Gilpin, war is caused by the disequilibrium of the distribution of power in the international system. Tensions, uncertainties and

crises are thought to accompany this disequilibrium. The accumulating discontent of rising powers facing the existing power distribution in the international system ends for Gilpin by a “hegemonic war.”

War is called “hegemonic” because it is viewed to be the ultimate mean that changes the distribution of power and consequently the economic, territorial and diplomatic realignment, which has been established in the existing international system by the hegemonic power. Using the same logic, WWI and WWII are presented by Gilpin, as not only the decay of the European hegemony, but also as the impairment of the European political liberalism and economic laissez-faire ideologies. Hence, the triumph of the American power in these wars meant not only American power hegemony over the international system, but also the establishment of a liberal world order. In short, according to Gilpin (1981), “hegemonic war” is a functional and integral part of the international system that defines the distribution of power on it.

In Gilpin’s structural framework, “hegemony” is the central concept that is used to explain the prospects for war and peace in the international system. Unlike Waltz, who sees states as alike units, Gilpin “focuses on the dynamics of the system change” (Holsti, 1995: 41). Gilpin’s understanding of world politics remains in line with the power arguments of the classical realist approach where the distribution of power among states (either military, or economic or both) define the conditions for stability and disorder, thus, war and

peace in international relations. As in the case of the neo-realist approach, ethno-national conflict is to be treated in the context of instability or stability in international relations.

Fred Halliday (1994, 1999) is another scholar who explains revolutionary war by pointing to the characteristics of the structure of the system. Different from Waltz (1979), who defines the structure of the international system in terms of power, Halliday defines it essentially in terms of the social relations that reflect class stratification. The revolutionary war, according to Halliday, is the culmination of accumulated changes in classes' socio-economic practices that at the last stage would lead to a qualitative change of the existing political order. The effect of the mode of production over the structure of society (capitalist, feudal or slave) fashioned from an historical and dialectical materialist perspective is to be seen as the main underlying cause of conflicts in international relations.

Halliday sees in the present capitalist mode of production two main classes: the proletariat and the capitalists (as conceptualised in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's work *The Communist Manifesto*, 1848). The proletariat looks to change its position of subordination, if necessary through the use of force. The capitalist's class aims to preserve the dominant and exploitive position. In this class context, revolutionary war is to be understood as a systemic struggle with classes as the main actors. Halliday drawing from Marx and Engels

considers this war as the final act that will end the current domination and exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class. Marx prophesied the class struggle as a form of revolutionary war that would change the existing capitalist and state based order.

While addressing war in the international system as a class struggle, Marx, Engels and Halliday neglect other forms of estrangement and alienation, which can cause conflict (Linklater, 1995). Dependence theorists in an attempt to broaden the vision of Marxist theories took under examination Third World countries' problems resulting from uneven economic development. Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979), Johan Galtung (1971) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1979), sought to explain Third World countries' dependency in the world economic system and the challenges it brings to international relations.

The common theme of these authors is the examination of the exploitation of the "periphery" by the "core." States are classified as core, semi-periphery and periphery according to their scale of the economic development in the global economic system. Cardoso, Faletto, Galtung and Wallerstein, by according primacy to state economic development, saw the international system as hierarchically organised and based on asymmetric economic power distribution. This structure, at the same time, is to be considered as the one that defines the nature of social relations at the world system level and the possibilities for war and peace in international relations. The economic

exchange relations between a developed “core” and an underdeveloped “periphery” are seen as being exploitative and the source of insecurities at the international level (Wallerstein, 1979).

Dependency theorists present a conflicting and exploitive picture of international relations. Thus, the advantages of the economic development are viewed in this scholarship as enabling the dominant “core” to determine the parameters of the relations between the dominant and dominated actors. The inter-state relations (defined by patterns of dominance) remain perpetually loaded with conflict. However, dependency scholarship do not envisage war at the system level since vested interests of the elites in both the “centre” and the “periphery” look for the preservation of the dependency structure as a means that will guarantee the preservation of their ruling position (Hills, 1994). The dependency approach tries to reflect upon the role of domestic classes’ differentiation to trace the interest of the political class in power.

These structuralist approaches are either state or class focused. Other non-state actors are neglected. In these scholarships “hegemonic” or “revolutionary” war, although recognised as social phenomena, are seen as occurring either to strengthen their respective states’ power or change the international order, which thereby cause a redistribution of power in the system. Therefore, the ethno-national conflict, which claims the distribution of territory, is to be seen in function of the preservation of equilibrium between great powers or

the change of the hegemonic power. Thus, the structure of the system (of states or classes) is to be understood as the underlying cause of conflict. So, these approaches are subject to the same weaknesses as Waltz's approach to ethno-national conflict. These weaknesses are discussed in what follows.

1.1.4. Realism and War: A Critique

All forms of Realism share as their assumptions the importance of the state and power as two key concepts to explain world politics in general and the causes of war in particular. In the words of Scott Burchill:

> Realists…argue that power is rooted in the nature of the humankind, neo-realists…point to the anarchical condition of the international realm, which imposes the accumulation of power as a systemic requirement on states. The former account relies on a particular understanding of human nature to explain conflict in international politics, always a difficult approach to substantiate. The latter abandons such a reliance on reductionism, preferring to treat the international system as a separate domain, which conditions the behavior of all states within it (1996: 86).

Based on these assumptions, Realism has substantially contributed to the understanding of world politics and war by offering "the most venerable and persisting model of the international relations" (Holsti, 1995: 36), and being "simple and elegant" (Rothstein, 1993: 410).

Nevertheless, Realism in all its variants remains highly criticised, especially for its lack of relevance in explaining contemporary international relations and practices of war in particular. The relevance of this scholarship in

explaining international relations is questioned since “[a] theory of international relations needs to perform four principal tasks. It should describe, explain, predict and prescribe. On each of these tasks, critics complain that realism is deficient and scientifically unsophisticated” (Kegley, 1995: 8).

In all forms of Realism, statism remains central to realist scholars understanding of war. In the words of Richard Wyn Jones:

> Statism is a view of the world that regards states-conceived in unitary and often anthropomorphized terms-as the only significant actor in world politics. Statism also involves a normative claim-and herein lies the justification for referring to ‘statism’ rather than ‘state-centrism’-that in political terms, states should be accorded a high, if not the highest, value in themselves (1999: 95).

Under this logic, war is considered to be a “rational choice,” since states are qualified to be both the judgers of their own interests and the holders of the means (power) that would defend and attain them (Art and Jervis, 1985). Realism’s intrinsic propensity for legitimising statism does not help our understanding of ethno-national conflict. There are serious weaknesses of this approach, which does not help our understanding of ethno-national conflict. Three of them will be discussed here.

The weaknesses of the realist approach to ethno-national conflict reflect upon its basic foundations. All variants of Realism share the assumptions of: states being unitary actors and at the centre of world politics, power and military force being of principal importance in shaping international behaviour; and the objectivist conception of theory (Bilgin, 1999; Wyn Jones. 1999). In the first assumption war is examined from a statist perspective. Power is viewed as

the solution to state's security problems in the second assumption. In the latter case, war is considered as a fixed and given concept that is not supposed to assume important changes. A detailed discussion of these assumptions implications in our understanding of ethno-national conflict follows.

First, statism offers a state-centred outlook of war in international relations, which makes a state (conceived as a unitary actor), the exclusive focus of understanding war. State-centrism has implications for our understanding of contemporary war practices considering the increasing importance of "non-state actors" and other agent's role in the causes of war, which are neglected by the realist approaches. It is also important to recognise that, transnational links between non-state actors and their external patrons, who offer support of different kinds to those actors, may be helping in accounting for the explanation of the internationalisation of contemporary conflicts (Kaldor, 1999; Duffields, 2001; Jung, 2003).

Furthermore, as Kaldor (1999) observes, contemporary conflict does not fit within the Clausewitzian definition of war. Clausewitz conceived war as a rational instrument of state policy. Therefore, the fragmenting effects of contemporary warfare in the world and especially in South-Eastern Europe cannot be properly understood by focusing on inter-state interactions to the neglect of other actors. Thus, once the unitary image of the state is faced with the contemporary practices of war, Realism seems problematic and, as J. Ann

Tickner emphasises, "the realist assumptions about boundaries between anarchy and order is turned on its head" (1995: 181). So, it can be concluded that war cannot be seen only as a state to state practice. Domestic politics and sub-state actors need to be considered in the understanding of contemporary practices of war (Campbell, 1992).

Kalevi Holsti argues that traditional understanding of states as unitary and functionally the same "may overlook some important discontinuities that have significant effects on [actors] behaviour" (1991: 330). He observes that in the definition of state security priorities there is a great difference between the states of Third World and the ones of the European state system. So, the causes of war in Third World countries are seen as mostly related with internal insecurities such as gross disparities of wealth, environmental degradation, class and ethnic disparities.[19] However, accounts of Third World security consider the state as a provider of security inside the country and focus on threats directed to the state from the outside (Ayoob, 1995).

The problem with these assumptions is two-fold. First, state cannot be seen as a source of insecurity and an underlying cause of conflict. Second, the role of other non-state actors as referent objects of analysis is neglected. According to Linklater (1995) this .perspective serves as an ideology function to

[19] See, Bilgin (2003) for a more detailed account of Third World security literature.

discipline those within the state who aim to challenge the authority of the state. Thus, state-centrism of the realist approaches does not allow us to understand the sources of insecurity at the societal level that remain the cause of most ethno-national conflicts. This, in turn, would underdetermine our understanding of the causes of ethno-national conflict.

Second, in many respects Realism in all its variants treats war as a fixed concept. As Pinar Bilgin argues, International Relations traditions "have embedded normative concerns such as the maintenance of the status quo or the promotion of state sovereignty even to the detriment of individual and groups rights" (1999: 33). While for Holsti, the traditional approaches to war reflect "explicitly or implicitly on the patterns of Cold War history" and "activities of great powers over approximately the last 350 years" (1992: 38-39). This, in turn, is a selective approach, which offer a Euro-centric understanding of war, which leaves unexplained the wars that take place in Third World countries.

The majority of the contemporary wars take place in Third World countries; they reflect "processes and structures of other ages and locations," while their "etiologies are far removed from the major security concerns of [great] powers" (Holsti, 1992: 38-39). In a similar logic, Mary Kaldor (1999; see, also, Holsti, 1996; Duffield, 1998, 2001; Laqueur, 1998; Jung, 2003; Guzzin and Jung, 2004) observes that contemporary wars, which she prefers to call "new wars," are not waged for borders or territorial integrity that represent only the

material aspects of the war. “New wars,” which she understands as reflecting the socio-economic effects of globalisation, are seen as being waged for political influence and control of resources beyond the borders of the state. Consequently, the “new wars” seem not fitting within the fixed classical Clausewitzian definition of war that conceives it as a rational instrument of state policy.

Third, realist approaches would point to power and the distribution of power to study ethno-national conflict. The explanations based on these two concepts are too general. Different scholars would argue that war is shaped not only by the struggle for power and wealth, but also by cultural factors, commonalities, differences and norms (Wæver et al., 1993; Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998; Wendt, 1999). The struggle for power and its distribution among states in the international system can be a necessary but not a sufficient condition to explain the recurrence of war. John Vasquez argues, “the great mistake of realism has been to assume that a struggle for power is a constant *verite* of history” (1993: 148) and an everlasting underlying cause of war. Consequently, it can be concluded that by pointing to power the realist approaches leave out of consideration other sources of conflict that seem at play in the case of ethno-national conflict.

Furthermore, realist structuralist approaches over-exaggerate the effects of structure (anarchy) in the interpretation of the causes of war. In Hidemi

Suganami's words international anarchy "is no more than one of the trivial permissive causes of war" (1996: 27). This is because:

> although international anarchy…is a constant factor, its constancy does not in fact explain war's *recurrence* as such. It shows only part of the reason why the recurrence of war is *possible*. Clearly, 'possibility of recurrence' and 'actual recurrence' are not of the same order (Suganami, 1996: 27).

The arguments that: international system is normatively regulated (Bull, 1977; Suganami, 1989); cooperation is possible under anarchy (Jervis, 1978; Keohane and Nye, 1987; Keohane, 1989); "logic of anarchy" is overcome among democratic states (Doyle, 1986; Talbot, 2000)[20] and in the case of "pluralistic security communities" (Deutsch, 1957; Holsti, 1995) challenge Waltz's thesis that anarchy is "the most profound cause of war as such" (Waltz, 1959: 229). Different scholars suggest that anarchy does not necessarily entail only disorder among states, since it is what states make of it (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, by pointing to anarchy, neo-realists enable us to look at the general context, which favour the occurrence of conflict without being able to account for its materialisation.

To sum up, there are serious weaknesses in the theoretical underpinning of realist approaches to ethno-national conflict. As it was explained above, statism of traditional realist approaches is an hindrance to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. Different scholars such as Posen (1993), Kaufman (1996a, 1996, 2001), Ramet (1992, 1996), David (1998), Roe (1999) have tried to make refinement to neo-realist approach to war in order to

better accommodate ethno-national conflict in International Relations. Chapter 2 examines these theoretical endeavours.

1.2. Rationalism (English School) and War

The principle that organise the rationalist's explanations of international relations is order. In Hedley Bull's definition, international order "means a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society" (1977: 8).[21] Different from the realist approach that underestimates progress and leaves little room for ethics in international relations, this tradition posits that "the regulatory rules and instruments of a system usually, and perhaps inexorably, develop to the point where the members [states] become conscious of common values" (Watson, 1987: 151). Thus, for rationalists "[o]rder…can be achieved not only simply through the manipulation of power but through the growth of the society of states" as well (Wheeler and Booth, 1992: 7).

For Bull (1977), states seeking order create norm and rules, which are internationally recognised. These norms and rules embedded in international

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[20] Waltz (1991) recently has admitted to ground hopes on the "democratic peace" thesis.
[21] In Bull's definition, the society of states or international society "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the making of common institutions" (1977: 13).

law are expected to facilitate and satisfy states' needs through their communicative and managerial functions. By clarifying rights, responsibilities and competencies, they also assist the state in its cooperation activities, fulfilling both the state and collective interests within an anarchical system. In return, the commitment of states to norms, principles and international law increases the degree of certainty that they will be obeyed, which, in turn, reduces unpredictability in the international system and limits the occurrence of war (Starr, 195: 299-315).

As with Realism, Rationalism also takes the existence of states or "independent political communities" to use Bull's (1977) words, as the point of departure in its analysis of international relations. The state, in this approach, is defined in terms of sovereignty and territoriality, recognising "the institutionalisation of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domain" (Ruggie, 1986: 143). International society, in turn, is seen as preserving the state by recognising and sanctioning the primacy of sovereignty and territoriality. A recognition that is viewed as being anchored deeply in a society of commonly shared interests and values.

In Bull's understanding, war is considered to be a separate and present institution of international order, a state-to-state practice that international society itself uses so as to achieve its own purposes such as "enforcing international law, …preserving the balance of power, and arguably,

…promoting changes in the law generally regarded as just" (Bull, 1977: 188; see, also, Suganami, 2002: 307). Thus, Rationalism offers a state-centric outlook of war. As Kenneth Watkin words:

> Traditional view of armed conflicts is perhaps more clearly represented, in the narrow *de jure* concept of 'war' as a conflict between the states. Since World War II, the term international armed conflict has been used to describe those interstate struggles. Its use reflects the increasingly limited scope that has been assigned to the *de jure* concept of 'war' (2004: 3).

There are two main insights that can be drawn from this rationalist' understanding of war. First, not every kind of violence can be considered as war. That is, only war waged by sovereign states (inter-state war) is legitimised within the society of states.

Second, war is viewed as being limited and controlled rather than prohibited in the society of states. Bull sees the regulating agreements between states as limiting the right to go to war. These agreements are seen as legitimising a set of principles such as, states and only states have the right to wage war; war's worst excesses are circumscribed by agreed frameworks; "the reasons or causes for which a state can legitimately resort to war" are restricted (Bull, 1977: 188). To cite Barkin and Cronin, "diplomatic procedures, treaties, international laws, wars, and all other institutions that provide for communications and interaction among the states" founded "on the mutual recognition among government leaders that they each represent a specific society within an exclusive jurisdictional domain" (1994: 110) serve the purpose of keeping war under control.

Accordingly, in a sovereignty based international society, many threats (interventions, annexation, secession and self-determination) that were previously seen as part of the natural behaviour of the states in an anarchical system are de-legitimised unless they are justified (James, 1992). In Buzan's (1993) understanding, this framework constitutes a step forward from an international system that recognises only the balance of power as an unintentional mechanism in controlling war recurrence. However, rationalist framework is in many respects restrictive in understanding changing practices of international relations and war since it does not take into consideration non-state actors.

However, in Nicholas Wheeler's understanding, the complex relation between human rights and state sovereignty in the case of ethno-national conflict has exposed "the conflict between order and justice at its starkest" (Wheeler, 2000: 11). From the rationalist scholarship about humanitarian interventions can be drawn some interesting insights that can be used to examine ethno-national conflict. In Wheeler's understanding there are two rationalist approaches to humanitarian interventions, namely, pluralist and solidarist perspectives. According to him, scholars that generally "focus on how the rules of international society provide for an international order among states sharing different conceptions of justice" are defined as pluralists (2000: 11; see, also, Bull, 1977; Nardin, 1983, 1992). The scholars that "look to strengthen the legitimacy of international society by deepening its commitment to justice" are

identified as solidarists (Wheeler, 2000: 11; see, also, Vincent, 1978; Vincent and Miller, 1990; Walzer, 1992). These perspectives differ in the understanding of the role of order and justice in the strengthening of legitimacy in the society of states. These two rationalist perspectives can offer useful insights to scrutinize ethno-national conflict.

In the pluralist approach, "states and not individuals are the principle bearers of rights and duties in international law, and pluralists are sceptical that states can develop agreement beyond a minimum ethic of coexistence" (Wheeler, 2000: 11). This is the case, because, as Terry Nardin argues:

> The common good of this inclusive community [of states] resides not in the ends that some, or at times even most, of its members may wish collectively to pursue, but in the values of justice, peace, security, and co-existence, which can only be enjoyed through participation in a common body of authoritative practices (1983: 6).

In the pluralist perspective, the integrity and sovereignty of the state are understood as primordial and important for the preservation of order and legitimacy in the society of states. This interpretation precludes international intervention. Consequently, ethno-national conflict as an internal conflict is neglected in this perspective.

In the solidarist perspective the protection of human rights is understood as important for the preservation of order and legitimacy in the society of states. In Michael Walzer's words:

> The right of states rest on the consent of their members. But this is consent of a special sort. State rights are not constituted through a series of transfers from individual men and women to the sovereign…what actually happens…[is that] over a long period of time, shared experiences and cooperative activity of many

> different kinds shape a common life…most states do stand guard over the community of their citizens, at least to some degree: that is why we assume the justice of their defensive wars (1992: 53-54).

So, the violation of human rights in the case of ethno-national conflict is to be seen as a concern of international society. The issue of human rights is treated in this perspective under international humanitarian law. As Watkin argues:

> Attacks by nonstate actors challenge the view of a neat division of armed conflict into the two spheres of international and noninternational. Identification of the boundaries of noninternational-armed conflict has never been easy. While international humanitarian law is generally interpreted to have limited impact in situations that do not reach a level above 'internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated as sporadic acts of violence, the dividing line between the operation of that law and human rights law is not always clear or absolute (2004: 5).

In this perspective, governments are held responsible internationally for their behaviour towards their own citizens. At the same time, humanitarian intervention is justified on the grounds that "the society of states is the one in which states accept not only a moral responsibility to protect the security of their own citizens, but also the wider one of 'guardianship of human rights everywhere'" (Wheeler, 2000: 12; see, also, Bull, 1966).

However, again as Wheeler argues "[t]his conception of international society recognises that individuals have rights and duties in international law, but it also acknowledges that individuals can have these rights enforced only by states" (2000: 11; see, also, Walzer, 1992).[22] In this interpretation is made clear that the issue of human rights violation is important for the preservation of order and legitimacy in the society of states, which, in turn, justify humanitarian

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[22] In the 1990s Walzer moved his position to the one of recognising the right of self-determination to peoples who claims it. Walzer (1992, 1994) suggests the creation of "protected spaces" as the way of giving to the different tribes the right to "self-determination."

intervention. Thus, the human rights violation by the state is to be seen as the underlying cause of humanitarian intervention.

The state-centric outlook of war in the rationalist approach is of little assistance to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. In the current prevailing normative framework the interpretation of ethno-national conflict as war and consequently the recognition of the right to wage war to non-state actors by international society, is in Buzan's view, an act that would require "a good deal of functional accommodation" by international society (Buzan, 1993: 334). This consent seems difficult to be achieved, since states pledge the preservation of the present territorial borders in the international system as a precondition for order and security (Helsinki Act, 1975; see, also, Aron, 1981).[23]

However, by pointing to the concepts of order and justice in the society of states, this approach can assist our understanding of ethno-national conflict. This approach can examine ethno-national conflict from two perspectives. From a pluralist perspective, ethno-national conflict is viewed as an internal conflict. In this case, the state is legitimised by the society of states to resolve the conflict by its own means while international intervention is precluded. From a solidarity perspective, human rights violation is considered to be a concern of the society of states and significant for the preservation of order.

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[23] Helsinki Act (1975) has sanctioned "the inviolability of frontiers" and "territorial integrity of the states" and "non-intervention in internal affairs," as the basic principles and norms that serve the preservation of peace and security in Europe.

The society of states is held responsible to stop humanitarian disaster by intervening. Further details about the rationalist approach contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict are discussed while looking at the Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 4. The weaknesses of this approach to war in general and ethno-national conflict in particular are discussed in the following part.

1.2.1. Rationalism and War: A Critique

In this section are discussed two main weaknesses of the rationalist scholarship that limit our understanding of ethno-national conflict: its state-centrism and inflexible meaning of order. First, in this scholarship war is understood as direct violence between states. The state-centric outlook of war in both perspectives (pluralist and solidarist) of this approach is a barrier to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. In the case of ethno-national conflict the adversary emerges as violent actor from the sub-state level to challenge state from within. The demands of non-state actors for recognition and self-determination,[24] on equal footing with states, are considered as illegal from an international society perspective (pluralist and solidarist).

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[24] Self-determination is recognised as "the right or aspiration of a group, which considers itself to have a separate and distinct identity, to govern itself and to determine the political and legal status of the territory it occupies" (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 497).

Furthermore, international society through the policy of non-recognition denies the recognition of these new actors and turns down their claims for self-determination (Aron, 1981). Hence, in the society of states only states enjoy the right to wage war. According to Bull (1977), the extension of such right to non-state actors would challenge state's sovereignty and thus, order. Referring to the case of the ethnic clashes in Lebanon, Bull argues that "war as a mean of enforcing law" or "effecting just change" as claimed by non-state actors is renounced by states "qualified by a sense of the overriding need to contain war within tolerable bounds" (Bull, 1977: 198).

Therefore, even in the case the need for justice in the society of states is emphasised as a requirement for the preservation of order in the society of states, for solidarists, the safeguarding of state's sovereignty prevails over all considerations. James Mayall argues:

> The constitutional order of international society has not been fundamentally modified since the importance of the rule of law to international society remains the one of serving the state rather than mastering it (2000: 327).

In the UN Charter, the case of ethno-national conflicts is not considered as a threat to international order. In the Charter, the state remains the one who has the exclusive right to resolve internal conflicts.

As Stephen Tierney argues, in the society of states, the state is assumed to have an instrumental value, being conceived "as a secure

environment for the exercise of the individual's moral autonomy" (2002: 943).[25] In view of that, the Charter does not have explicit stipulation that would allow the UN to take all necessary measures, including the use of force to control and settle ethno-national conflict. As Mayall points out:

> The reason why the international society cannot cope with societal breakdown is that...it is first and foremost a society of states and not peoples. In other words when public authority collapses it is not clear with whom foreign governments should deal and on what legal or institutional basis (1998: 179).

That is why ethno-national conflict in the rationalist accounts is understood as civil war "in which compromise fails in the face of the passionate and self-righteous belief of the belligerents in the justice of their respective causes" (Mayall, 2000: 325). Like the realist approach, rationalist approaches build their explanation of war, upon the assumption of the centrality of the state. This, however, is in not the best framework for understanding ethno-national conflict.

Second, although Rationalism goes beyond Realism in its recognition of "progress" in inter-state relations, it seems inflexible in accommodate contemporary forms of violence. This is the case because the existing normative framework offers a narrow concept of state sovereignty that leaves unexplained its usage in exceptional cases like turmoil, civil strife or the dissolution of the state (Berman, 1986; see, also, Werner, 2001). This framework reminds us of the medieval Western world where the institution of the Church had a very strong influence and nothing existed but Christianity as a norm regulating

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[25] However there are scholars that seem to be in favour of some limited right of secession under international law for groups denied the opportunity to retain their cultural identity (Franck, 1995; Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Walzer, 1992, 1994).

coexistence among actors and as a supreme authority that oversaw relations among them. This set-up, although legitimised by God, maintained stability and order during that period. The earth was seen as God's garden; things were the way God had made them, and it was a sin to believe that one could improve upon God's work, which is similar to realist and rationalist understanding of "states acting as bastions of mutually exclusive identities" (Buzan, 1993: 337) and "sovereignty of states as the foundation of social relations among them" (Buzan, 1993: 339). This framework restricts our understanding of ethno-national conflict. The rationalist approach by pointing to order assumes a shared consensus in the society of states about the definition of ethno-national conflict. However, this consensus refers not to outcomes but to a set of established rules, norms and institutions concerned for the continuation and maintenance of order in the society of states. This framework does not help much our understanding of ethno-national conflict.

1.3. Revolutionism and War

For the revolutionist scholarship, human emancipation would undermine the significance of war in society. The accumulation of power is viewed as threatening, and generating fear. The strengthening of order at the inter-state level would encourage despotism and injustice. Order and power, the organising principles of Rationalism and Realism, are viewed as "inherently unstable"

(Booth, 1991). Different from Realism and Rationalism that study war from its own prerogatives, Revolutionism examines the conditions for the establishment of peace. Emancipation is perceived by Ken Booth, as a process that leads to "freeing peoples from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do" (1991a: 539). Such a process implies the lifting of restrictions that may be of a legal, economic, moral, political or physical nature (Booth and Wheeler, 1992: 8).

Emancipation, according to Booth, progresses through the growth of a state of justice and a feeling of community that guarantees respect and morality among states. Hence, it would encourage integration among them. According to Michael W. Doyle, "as culture grows and men gradually move toward greater agreement over their principles, this leads to mutual understanding and peace" (1995: 99). Hence, peace is to be seen as "grounded in the existence of an international moral community in which governments accept the standards of mutual respect and peaceful resolution of differences that exits among individuals within their societies" (Zacher and Mathew, 1995: 122). The emancipation of world society is seen in this approach as an ongoing process that can be assessed by looking at the progressive diminishing role of power and use of force in international relations.

Revolutionists share the assumption that individual freedom is a value above the others, and states ought to be constrained from acting in ways that

would undermine that freedom (Booth, 1991, 1991a; Linklater, 1990; Held, 1993; Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). The establishment of individual freedom is to be seen as the necessary condition for the avoidance of war in international relations. In this approach, democratic civil society is understood as the revolutionary force that would emancipate and direct society toward a new democratic social order that would be the basis for a peaceful order (Cox, 1999). However, as Booth and Wheeler note "[s]tates are not the primary referent for emancipatory projects but they are key actors and must be taken into account" at least in short terms (1991: 13).

This approach represents a major challenge to traditional Realism and Rationalism, since it cast doubt on two of their assumptions. First, this tradition does not see the state as a unified rational actor in world politics. Thus, state is considered to be limited in the decision-making process by its democratic accountability to its citizens, and the need to respect human rights and values and the rule of law. Second, this approach questions the assumption of Realism and Rationalism that presume a sharp division between domestic and international domains in studying world politics. Revolutionism emphasises the importance of domestic regime in explaining state's international behaviour and the possibilities for internal upheavals.

In this approach, the morality of liberal democracy is considered to be an important prerequisite against the immorality of the war. First of all, democracy is claimed to be an important idea because as David Held argues:

> [I]t does not just represent one value among many, such as liberty, equality, and justice, but is the value that can link and mediate among competing perspectives concerns…democracy does not presuppose agreement on diverse values. Rather it suggests a way of relating values to each other and of leaving the resolution of value conflicts open to participants in a political dialogue (1993: 274).

For revolutionists, liberal democracy holds on the idea that individuals everywhere should have freedom, which, in turn, is the condition for the absence of war. Liberal-democracy is perceived as peaceful from the foundation since it excludes the resort to violence in the settlement of the disputes among various actors within the society and democratic pairs.

For traditional Revolutionism progress in international relations, can be evidenced in the working of liberal democracy (Doyle, 1986, 1997; Fukuyama, 1989, 1992; Held, 1993; Owen, 1994) and "pluralistic security communities" (Deutsch, 1954, 1957). In both cases, the examination of the conflict is based on two assumptions: democracies are inherently peaceful toward each other and democracies are less prone to domestic upheavals (Mann, 2004). John M. Owen (1994) believes that liberal states act to preserve freedom and therefore, wars are fought by these states only in the cause of preserving peace and freedom.

As with Realism and Rationalism, traditional Revolutionism takes the state as the point of departure in its analysis. In this approach, the absence of

war between states is attributed to the very nature of the democratic political system inside states. Michael Doyle, drawing from a careful historical empirical analysis of international relations formulated the "democratic peace" thesis. In this thesis it is argued that "[e]ven though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another" (Doyle, 1983: 213). Furthermore, "[t]he very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interest, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal states can exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and non-liberal societies" (Doyle, 1983: 324).

In support of Doyle's thesis, Owen (1994) argues that liberal-democratic states are less prone to wage war since citizens have leverage over war decisions. The citizens are expected to use the electoral mechanisms to express approval or disapproval on the issue of war. Furthermore, liberal states have liberal institutional structures that allow for public control of foreign policy; therefore even illiberal leaders will not be able to lead liberal states into war against other liberal states. According to Jack S. Levy (1989) the absence of war among liberal states has achieved the importance of an empirical law. Furthermore, Bruce Russett (1997) in a recent empirical study of "democratic peace" theses, founded that all elements mentioned by Kant in his "Perpetual Peace" treaty, namely, joint democracy, shared trade and membership in the

same international organisations, independently contribute to peace between states (see, also, Oneal and Russett, 1997; Maoz, 1997).[26]

Analysing contemporary politics, Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) looks at the end of the Cold War era as “the end of history” defined by the end of ideological division in Europe and the triumph of democracy over communism. This claim rests in the assumption that “the combination of liberal democracy and capitalism has proved superior to any alternative political/economic system, and the reason lies in its ability to satisfy the basic drives of human nature” (Griffiths, 1999: 69). The spread of democratic states and values, from a Kantian perspective, is seen as leading towards the ‘perpetual peace.’ Based on the assumption of the universality of Western values and ethics, Fukuyama believes that liberal democracy will progress regardless of natural and cultural distinctions and will be adopted by the rest of non-western world.

Fukuyama claims, that progress in human society can be measured by the elimination of conflict and adoption of the principle of legitimacy that in a liberal democratic system is embedded in domestic politics. So, a world

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[26] The empirical evidence upon which “democratic peace” thesis is based is contested based on different arguments. Gelp (1996) provides evidence that democracies initiate the use of force in an effort to divert attention away from their domestic problems. Ray (1995) calling upon the problem of definition of democracy underlines its effect upon the case of democratic pairs in conflict. Layne (1994) offers the empirical evidence of four cases of confrontations of democracies where democratic principles have failed to play any role in mitigating the conflict. Building upon the premises of structural explanations Layne concludes that democratic states “would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democracies or not” (1994: 12) if their behaviour is constrained by structural characteristics. Drawing upon the findings of the

organised around liberal-democratic principles would provide for a more peaceful order since states that are bound by such principles "should have much less incentives for war, since all nations would recognize one another's legitimacy" (Fukuyama, 1992: xx).[27]

Furthermore, democratic states are expected to be spared from internal upheavals since domestic politics are under the scrutiny of the public and established liberal institutional structures represent and defend indiscriminately the interests of the citizens. Following on such arguments, Strobe Talbot (2000; see, also, Tierney, 2002) argues that democracy has transformed the nature of the nation-state, thereby giving way to a new system in which nations feel secure enough in their identities and in their region to make a virtue out of porous borders and intertwined economies and cultures. Talbot believes that:

> [Democracy] has well-developed mechanisms for opening borders and societies, protecting minorities, empowering regions, pursuing trans-national cooperation, and promoting the principle that differences in language and culture can be a source of strength within societies and states (2000: 162).

By working in a regime based on democratic values, states are expected to be feeling free in their identities and trust each other, which, in turn, make them more confident in providing more autonomy to sub-national groups (Talbot,

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empirical research Small and Singer (1976) have found the evidence that democratic "monads" are as war prone as autocratic "monads."

[27] Fukuyama (1992) interprets the end of Cold War and the expansion of democracy values as the "obsolesce" of war in world politics. Doyle is more cautious since he does not exclude the possibility of war between democracies and non-democracies. See, for more, Griffiths (1999: 63-4).

2000). Democracy conceived as such, is expected to contribute to the consolidation of peace, stability and prosperity based on the establishment of bonds of trust between individuals, social groups and states.

In explaining the conditions for the absence of war in inter-state relations Karl W. Deutsch (1954, 1957) puts emphasis on the importance and effects of cooperation among states, which leads to the idea of “pluralistic security communities.” Deutsch’s conceptualisation of “pluralistic security communities” is based on the idea of international cooperation among legally sovereign states. After certain time, cooperation is seen as leading to integration and the development of a set of shared values among peoples and elites of respective states where the chance of force being used to resolve conflicts between them is seen as being virtually nil.

Cooperation among states (political, cultural or economic) and “the growth of integrative institutions and practices among them” (Deutsch, 1954: 39-40)[28] are viewed as the driving forces towards progress in international relations that is measured by the absence of war. Peaceful relationships are mostly attributed to democratic governance, defined as “economic liberalism and political democracy” (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 468) that encourages cooperation and sharing of norms and institutions, which, in turn, would explain

[28] As cited by Griffiths (1999: 179).

the softening of the effects of anarchy in the relations among democratic states. On the other hand, the set of democratic shared values is expected to develop patterns of behaviour that persist over extended periods of time. These shared values are seen as infused with normative significance, which would mark at the same time the creation of "pluralistic security communities" or "zones of peace" (Deutsch, 1957; Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992; Weede, 1996).

According to Deutsch, the maintenance of such "security communities" would be possible if three main conditions are fulfilled: compatibility of values and ethics, responsiveness to each other's needs, and predictability of policy goals by political elites. The persistence among states of the same patterns of behaviour in time can be considered as a socio-psychological process, during which people come to value and trust each other, to spontaneously respond to their needs, to emphasise their similarities and dismiss animosities, and to embrace common principles and norms that are persistent and compulsory.

Revolutionism offers the necessary preconditions that would eliminate war from inter-state relations. "Democratic peace" and "pluralistic security communities" theses assume a framework of social interaction among democracies freed from tensions and disputes that could cause wars. Although this tradition posits progress in social relations of all kinds, state is the object of analysis. The state-centric outlook of this approach seems limiting our

understanding of ethno-national conflict, since non-state actors are neglected in the study of war and peace in world politics. However, some interesting insights to examine ethno-national conflict can be drawn from some scholarly work that, based on empirical observations, provide evidence that consolidated democracies are least prone to internal upheavals compare to new democracies (Hegre et al. 2001).

In this literature it is suggested that states in a transition process from autocracy to democracy are to be viewed as most at risk for civil wars (Snyder, 2000). Revolutionism point to facts such as: the lack of accountable leaders (Doyle 1986; Ray, 1995), the manipulation and control of the information (Schultz, 1999) and deviations from common democratic norms (Risse-Kappen, 1995) in non—or new—democratic states to explain the emergence of civil conflict. This framework can be used to examine the emergence of ethno-national conflict. Further details about the explanatory capacity of this approach to our understanding of ethno-national conflict are discussed while looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 4. The following of this section deals with some of the weaknesses of this approach to ethno-national conflict.

1.1.3. Revolutionism and War: A Critique

Revolutionism offers a limited contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict for two main reasons. First, although this approach seems the least state-centric of all traditional theories, since the states are not seen as black-boxes, state remains the referent object of analysis. Second, democracy is considered to be domestically peaceful from the foundation. Revolutionism, as with Realism and Rationalism, takes the state as the point of departure in its analysis of war and peace in international relations. In the words of Roland Axtmann:

> The collective 'self' whose own determination modern political liberalism aims to ensure in the democratic process is the politically organized nation. Individuals must be members of the state, must be its 'nationals,' in order to possess citizenship rights…Democratic rule is exercised in the sovereign, territorially consolidated nation-state (2004: 262).

In so arguing, the democratic regime within the state is viewed as important in defining inter—and intra—state relations and resolving disputes among different actors.

David Held (1992) offers an analytical critique of Fukuyama's understanding of social processes within the state. Held, while looking at the challenging effects of globalisation and fragmentation on liberal democracy, asserts that in order to extend democratic control at the international level a more cosmopolitan rather than a state model is required. Democracy, according to him, needs to assert more flexibility in accommodating peoples' needs and rights beyond centres of national government. A cosmopolitan model of

democracy that focuses more on individuals and communities and achieves a more inclusive attitude towards others' cultures, political and economical systems is seen as correcting the "democratic deficit" between the sovereign state on the base of contemporary democracy and the dispersion of political authority away from the state.

Held's approach shifts attention from states to individuals and communities' well-being and the freedom of movement. This development requires the elimination of exploitation, estrangement and alienation as sources of constraint based on gender, race nationalism and state sovereignty (Linklater, 1996). Drawing from Kantian approach, Ken Booth offers a cosmopolitan model that "is not the same as sameness. It entails what has been called 'sensitive universalism,' with a dialogue between universal values and local definitions" (1995: 119). This cosmopolitan model is viewed as being the end result of an emancipatory project, which relies on two concepts that interact with each other: "community" and "subsidiarity" (Booth, 1991: 540). As Booth conceives it:

> Community building…is concerned with breaking down distinctions between in-group and out-group, 'us' and 'them,' and creating positive relationships based not only on reciprocal obligations and mutual self-interest (Gesellschaft) but also on a sense of loyalty and moral obligations (Gemischaft) (1991: 540).

On the other hand, "subsidiarity" as a concept implies "the idea that decisions will be taken at the lowest level" (Booth, 1991: 540). Peace and the absence of war is conditioned by moral behaviour that is embedded in social evolution that would progressively diminish the role of power in international relations. This approach looks at social groupings other than the state as the referent object of

analysis; as such it makes a better contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict.

Furthermore, the euphoria that surrounded the end of Cold War about the “end of history” of wars in international elations has been replaced by the recognition that the emancipation foreseen as the growth of democratic values and institutions is neither inevitable nor irreversible, and there is still a long way to go to reach the “the perpetual peace” envisioned by Kant. According to James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul (1992), the disruption of “the end of history” is manifested in the existence of two zones: the “zone of peace” and the “zone of war.” In the zone of peace, peaceful relations are mostly attributed to the democratic governance, which has softened the effects of anarchy in the relations among the states. Hence, in the “zone of peace” “rather than balancing, core states are seeking to bandwagon, not around a power pole but around a share set of liberal beliefs, institutions and practices” (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 480).

The “zone of war” is viewed made up of non-democratic and failed states, which are faced with internal and external security problems that can equally be a cause for war. Relations between groups and within states are being defined in terms of power, shifting of interests and hostile alliances. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky (1993) predict that the two zones will continue to persist in international relations. Therefore, it can be concluded that it is too

early to talk about the end of history of wars in world politics. This does not mean that democracy and emancipation are unimportant: democratic regime still is important for determining a democratic state's behaviour.

Second, the assumption that democracy is speared from internal upheavals inhibits us from understanding other sources of tensions that could cause ethno-national conflict. In most cases of ethno-national conflict the warring parties do not ask for equality they demand recognition of differentiated rights or status within the existing state. These demands go beyond the rights of citizenship that are supposed to be guaranteed by the institutional arrangements of liberal-democracy (Kymlicka, 1995; Franck, 1995). In Montserrat Guibernau's terms:

> The current proliferation of demands for self-determination in several parts of the world indicates that the desire of the nation-states to present themselves as democracies does not necessarily result in the adoption of a dialogic attitude towards the national minorities they contain (1996: 144).

As Franck argues, "self-determination is not an early version of democracy. While democracy invokes the right of each person to participate in governance, self-determination is about the social right of a people to constitute a nation state" (1995: 92). Hence, the right to self-determination and the right to democratic government are not one and the same thing. Therefore, self-determination represents a challenge to the state integrity even in the case of consolidated democracies. Thus, democratic regimes are not protected from all kind of internal upheavals as pretended in the revolutionist approach. The

revolutionist approach fails to see self-determination as a source of tension that may lead to conflict.

Furthermore, for some scholars democracy and pacifism are open to objections. David Campbell argues:

> What we have been less able to confront is the possibility that the collapse of communism has been followed by the failure of democracy, and that, at least as conventionally thought, democracy has been insufficient in the face of new forms of conflict. Even worse, we have not stopped long to contemplate that democracy could be one of the facilitators if not causes of these conflicts (1998: 193).

For Kalevi Holsti, modernity and democratisation do not have only pacifying effects as it is foreseen in the revolutionist scholarship. In his words:

> The required goals of the 'revolution of rising expectation' in the underdeveloped countries will lead to frustrations, domestic revolutions, political instability, and messianic politics. These are likely to have spillover effects into the international system, causing rivalries at best and the intervention of the great powers at worst (Holsti, 1975: 827).

For Kalevi Holsti, this is the case, because the introduction of new values "involve breaking down traditional social patterns and practices" that in many respects are incompatible with industrialization, "community development" and many other "favoured Western notion of what constitute a good society" (1975: 833; see, also, Jung, 2003). The breaking of old structures of conflict mitigation is viewed as leaving those societies vulnerable toward different sources of insecurity that are not negligible, since most of the time they lead to conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). According to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995), the basic problem of democratising states is that they lack the stabilising

institutions of mature democracy (see, also, Lacina, 2004). As a result, elites indulge in short-run thinking and reckless policymaking can lead to war.[29]

Examples indicate that democracy and ethno-nationalist conflict can coexist not only in the case of weak democracies, but also in the case of consolidated democracy. Hence, as Bethany Lacina observes, "models of conflict onset have not revealed what, if any, mechanisms of democracy offers states protection against civil war" (2004: 195). Therefore, it can be concluded that the accounts of the revolutionist approach can offer a limited contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict.

Three International Relations traditions, namely, Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism offer interesting and useful explanations of war and the prospects for peace in international relations. In these approaches war is understood as a means used by the state to an end, be it power, order or emancipation. This logic can be used to examine ethno-national conflict as well. However, the explanations using these organising principles are too general and can be of help in understanding only the necessary conditions that could favour or hinder the occurrence of ethno-national conflict. As argued throughout the chapter, the state-centred outlook of all traditional International Relations approaches appears to be of little help to our understanding of the social context in which the

[29] On the issue of democratisation (formal and substantial democracy) see: Huntington (1991),

ethno-national conflict take place. The contribution of these approaches to our understanding of ethno-national conflict is further detailed while looking at the Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 4.

Nodia (1996) and Linz and Stepan (16).

CHAPTER 2

The Post-Cold War Approaches and Ethno-National Conflict

This chapter discusses two approaches, namely, post-Cold War neo-Realism and “New Wars” scholarship. They are included in this chapter because they both promise to address the immediate causes of post-Cold War conflicts. These approaches attempt to resolve the tensions between the traditional understanding of war and the practice of contemporary conflicts by trying to mediate for the weaknesses of traditional International Relations approaches. Both approaches look at non-state actors such as ethnic groups or politico-military formations and identity to examine the post-Cold War conflicts. By adopting these changes, both approaches pretend to bring an important correction to the state-centrism and narrow understanding of power and cosmopolitanism of the traditional approaches. The anarchy or globalisation is

viewed as the underlying cause of conflict. However, these two approaches utilise identity as a means, rather as an organising principle of actors' behaviour and operate the organising principles of the traditional schools through the quasi-state or failed state logic, which limit our understanding of ethno-national conflict.

This chapter is divided in three parts. First and second part, focus in a critical engagement with post-Cold War neo-Realism (Ramet, 1992; Posen, 1993; Kaufman, 1996; David, 1998; Roe, 1999) and "New Wars" scholarship (Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 1998, 2001; Lacquer, 1997; Franck, 1995) approaches to ethno-national conflict. The final part offers an overview of discussed material while emphasising the weaknesses of both approaches.

2.1. Post-Cold War Realism and Ethno-National Conflict

The traditional Realism and its variants have not addressed the question of ethno-national conflicts during the Cold War era. Michael E. Brown (1993: vii) attributes this negligence to three main reasons. The first reason of this negligence is seen to be related to the fact that "for most of the postwar era, authoritarian rule dampened ethnic problems and stifled national aspirations" in different parts of the world (Brown, 1993: vii). Second, according to Brown, during the Cold War the most serious threat to international security was

considered to be the possibility that an East-West confrontation would lead to nuclear war. That is why many scholars "not unnaturally, focused their intellectual energies on this issue" to the neglect of "ethnic and other forms of communal conflict" (Brown, 1993: vii). Third, the moves toward integration in Europe and growing international interdependence led, in Brown's view, "many to think that ethnic and national identifications—and the prospects for ethnic conflict—were fading" (1993: vii). Thus, for one reason or another ethno-national conflict received little attention in International Relations scholarship during the Cold War era.[30]

With the end of Cold War there is a growing attention in International Relations scholarship toward this type of conflict. For Stathis N. Kalyvas (2000) two related political developments in world politics have been driving this interest (although not explicitly attributed to the end of Cold War): the decline of inter-state wars and the concomitant rise of internal wars (see, also, Small and Singer, 1982; David, 1997); and the decline of civil wars that are classified as "ideological" or class based and the concomitant rise of conflict classified as ethnic (see, also, Brubaker and Latin, 1998; Fearon and Latin, 2001).

[30] To be fair to the IR's literature, there is an enormous literature on civil wars waged in the context of the de-colonisation process (Rejai and Enloe, 1960; Mazrui, 1977). However, this literature is mainly concerned with civil wars waged in the colonial possessions, which are treated from a legalistic point of view in close linkage with anti-colonialism. This body of literature therefore appears to be very specific and difficult to be used for different practical applications (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 497-498).

However, the reluctance to address the issue of ethno-national conflict can also be attributed to Realism's ontological preference: the view of the world as being divided into states pursuing national-interests in terms of power. This ontological preference narrows down the range of conflicts that can be explained within a Realist framework. This is a comprehensive reason that explains why Realism neglected the case of ethno-national conflict for so long. Nevertheless, with the end of Cold War there is an increasing tendency among realist scholars to study them (Mearsheimer, 1990; Ramet, 1992; Posen, 1993; Kaufman, 1996; David, 1998).

The neo-realist scholars just after the end of Cold War examined the issue of ethno-national conflict especially with reference to the end of Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of multipolarity in world order. John Mearsheimer (1990) explains the increasing occurrence of ethno-national conflicts after the end of Cold War by emphasising the effects of multipolarity. He brings ethno-national conflict in the neo-realist framework without trying to make any major revision to the main assumptions of the scholarship. Mearsheimer is careful to emphasise the three-main assumptions of neo-Realism for world politics. First, for him nation-state remains the "principal actor in international politics for a long time to come" (Mearsheimer, 1992: 217). Second, anarchy is viewed as the underlying and permissive cause of war, while polarity (distribution of power) would account for its frequency. Third, war is the permanent condition of international relations since with the establishment of the

state system; anarchy is viewed as having established its primacy over hierarchy.

Trying to explain the emergence of ethno-national conflicts after the end of the Cold War era, Mearsheimer argues “the insecure states in multipolarity will be irresistibly drawn toward bellicose policies” (Mearsheimer, 1990: 57). It is still anarchy that for Mearsheimer constitutes “hyper-nationalism” as “a force for trouble” because it is expected to release oppressed ethnic rivalries and “ancient hatreds” that were silenced by the imposition of the ideological beliefs during the Cold War period (Mearsheimer, 1990: 57). Thus, the effects of hyper-nationalism are examined in function of the logic of international anarchy.

According to Mearsheimer, it is anarchy rather than hyper-nationalism, which “compel states to worry about their security” and induce among participants the “belief that other nations or nation-states are both inferior and threatening” (Mearsheimer, 1992: 221). Thus, anarchy is to be seen as a source of exacerbating tensions between participants. However, hyper-nationalism is considered to affect offensive capabilities since it is expected to help nations or nation-states to “build formidable killing machines” (Mearsheimer, 1992: 221). Mearsheimer’s approach does not present any major departure from traditional neo-realism approach to war.

Barry Posen (1993, 1993a) offers a more sophisticated analysis of the causes of ethno-national conflict by making use of Waltzian neo-realism. He thinks that:

> [t]he security dilemma and realist international relations theory more generally have considerable ability to explain and predict the probability and intensity of military conflict among groups emerging form the wreckages of empires (1993: 43).

Posen is not alone in his enterprise of studying of ethno-national conflict by using core neo-realist assumptions (Job, 1992; Kaufman, 1996, 1996a; Glaser, 1997; Snyder and Jervis, 1999; Melander, 1999; Rotberg, 2004). The concept of the "security dilemma," which is widely used by neo-realists scholar to explain conflict among states, is employed by Posen to account for ethno-national conflict.[31]

The "security dilemma" is considered to succeed where four factors prevail. First, anarchy is the permanent condition of group inter-relations. Second, there is a permanent lack of trust among actors (even the present friend can turn into an enemy in the future). Third, a situation of misperception and lack of communication that is supposed to prevail due to the establishment of sovereignty as the ordering principle of states is expected all the time to lead to conflict. Fourth, ambiguity regarding the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities is a constant incentive that encourages conflict.

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[31] For the definition of the "security dilemma" see p. 26.

To use neo-realist explanations to account for the case of ethno-national conflict, this approach draws parallels between anarchy in international relations and the emergence of disorder in the domestic realm of dissolving "imperial" regimes (Posen, 1993; see, also, Kaufman, 1996; Kaufmann, 1996; Snyder and Jervis, 1999) or "failed states" (Job, 1992; Rotberg, 2004). The domestic hierarchical authority of the state is viewed as breaking down because of the struggle between ethnic, religious or cultural groups (seen as potential states) looking for secession (Posen, 1993; see, also, Kaufman, 1996; Kaufmann, 1996; Melander, 1999) or because the state have ceded parts of its territory to insurgent groups that rule despite the possibility of an ethnic majority (Job, 1992; Rotberg, 2004). However, the causation of conflict is to be understood as running in the opposite direction.

Hence, in the post-Cold War neo-realist scholarship, the emergence of anarchy, rather than groups' differentiation is to be seen as the underlying cause of conflict (Posen, 1993: 27). The situation created after the state loses its authority is seen as comparable with Hobbesian "state of nature," where no sovereign protects fearful individuals from each other and security is the prevailing objective of all participants. The anarchical nature of created structures after the dissolution or failure of the state is viewed as the source of uncertainty. In this context, it is to be expected that "groups acting against perceived threats to assure their own security or securities consequently create

an environment of increased threat and reduced security for most, if not all, others within the borders of the state" (Job, 1992: 18).[32]

Emerging groups are viewed as being not certain of one another's intentions. Anarchy is seen as forcing groups to adopt self-help behaviours. In this context, groups are expected to undertake security-seeking policies vis-à-vis potential adversaries. The next move is expected to be the increase of group's capacity to mitigate the security policies of others. This situation is summarised by Robert Rotberg as follows:

> when state authority is equated with domestic anarchy conditions are rife for 'security dilemma.' Groups that once lived together because they could depend on the state to protect them will suddenly become wary of one another (2004: 58).

This view reflects a position similar to that of Waltz, who explains "[a]mong men and among states, anarchy or the absence of it, is associated with the occurrence of violence" (1979: 102). Hence, in both inter-states and inter-groups levels, the cause of conflict is to be viewed as depending on the characteristic of the structure that is defined as being anarchical and imposing upon participants the need for security.

Differently from the traditional neo-realist approach, Posen points to "groups – ethnic, religious, cultural – of greater or lesser cohesion," which "still

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[32] Job (1992) and Rotberg (2004) apply security dilemma in the case of weak or failed states when groups within the state have to seek for their own security. To make the difference with the security dilemma as an inter-state phenomenon, Job uses the term insecurity dilemma, while Rotberg calls it with the traditional name. Job uses different labels to imply that security dilemma and insecurity dilemma is not the same thing. However, in Job's explanations state is viewed as

lack many of the attributes of statehood" and emerge after "the 'sovereigns have disappeared'" to explain the ethno-national conflict (1993: 28). However, not every ethnic group is to be seen as referent object of analysis. Stuart Kaufman (1996) points out that ethnic group can be referred as object of analysis,

> [i]f anarchy reaches the point where the government cannot control its territory effectively enough to protect its people, while ethnic-based organizations can, then the ethnic organizations have enough of the attributions of sovereignty to create a security dilemma (Kaufman, 1996: 151).

For Rotberg "determining whether groups can constitute a security dilemma, involves inquiring into their internal characteristics in order to discover how much these characteristics shape the behaviour of the individuals who join" (2004: 63). Thus, groups are viewed as "black boxes" and what is important is their observable behaviour, not the way they have forged the internal ties, quality of leadership and so on. Accordingly, groups are assessed in this scholarship regardless of inherited or primordial traits, what is important is that "a group can serve as a potential vessel for individuals coping with the absence of the state" (Rotberg, 2004: 63).

Thus, for post-Cold War neo-realists, the "security dilemma" is to be understood as a by-product of "emerging anarchy" after the dissolution of the state, which at the same time should be held responsible for groups' behaviour. The "security dilemma" is the tool that for neo-realists relates structure with the units and explains their competition and possibility of engagement in conflict.

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a micro-system with which parallels can be drawn easily with the anarchy of the international structure.

Groups' priority to assure their security and competition over it in the condition of "emerging anarchy" is to be seen as driving the "security dilemma." In this assumption, as in the case of state system, it is supposed that all groups are security-maximisers and insecurity is caused by the inescapable self-help nature of anarchy. In this anarchical setting, self-help strategies are viewed taking precedence and implying preventive attacks to hedge against possible threats to security, which would explain for Posen (1993) why leaders adopt a worst-case scenario, thus conflict. To cite Posen:

> Often statesmen…do not empathize with their neighbours; they are unaware that their own actions can seem threatening. Often it does not matter if they know of this problem. The nature of their situation compels them to take the steps they do (1993: 28).

However, different scholars would claim that security-maximisation is not the only priority of actors that would led the "security dilemma" toward conflict. Thus, there are cases when group's leadership would seek to improve their security through expansion (Glaser, 1997). Thus, security driven expansions has to be seen as the underlying cause of conflict if there is a belief that by doing so the power imbalance and security issues can be addressed at the same time (Snyder and Jervis, 1999).

However, in both cases, the increase or the decrease of the likelihood of conflict is viewed as depending on the relative distribution of military capabilities (material and intentional) including the offensive-defensive balance. In the condition of the emergence of anarchy after the dissolution of the state, groups are expected to evaluate the other's relative capabilities in order to

guarantee their own security and protection. Posen (1993: 27) suggests three set of questions that groups are supposed to answer while evaluating their power in relation to the other groups. "Are they a threat? How much of a threat? Then, "Will the threat grow or diminish over time?" To conclude with the question "Is there anything that must be done immediately?" The answers, according to Posen would determine the possibility to be involved or not in conflict, as they would reveal the group's potential "windows of vulnerability and opportunity" (1993: 34).

In the process of empire dissolution, the distribution of capabilities according to Posen (1993) is unfair, which favours one group at the expense of the others. In these circumstances:

> [i]f those with greater advantages expect to remain in that position by virtue of their superior numbers, then they may see no window of opportunity. However, if they expect their advantage to wane or disappear, then they will have an incentive to solve outstanding issues while they are much stronger than the opposition (Posen, 1993: 34).

The group's power calculations under the condition of the emergence of anarchy are viewed as the motivating and driving force for waging or retreating from using violence. As Posen argues, perceived military superiority of the other, "often motivated states in the past to initiate preventive military actions" and is expected to motivate the emerging groups (yet to be granted sovereignty) to initiate ethno-national conflict as well (1993: 35).

The evaluation of threats under the new situation (the dissolution of the state and the emergence of anarchy) for Posen is seen to be difficult

because of two conditions. First, the emerging anarchical structures "produces conditions that make the offensive and defensive capabilities indistinguishable" (Posen, 1993: 29). Second, the emergence of anarchy "make[s] offence superior to the defence," which is supposed to have "a powerful influence on the prospect for conflict, regardless of the internal politics of the groups emerging from old empires" (Posen, 1993: 29). In the condition of offensive capabilities superiority, Posen expects the "security dilemma" to be acute, which would explain why conflict breaks out.

While using the "security dilemma" to explain the emergence of ethno-national conflict is a commonly used framework in the post-Cold War neo-Realists' accounts, different scholars differ on the role of perceptions and ideologies in the instigation of conflict. Posen sees nationalism as having an "inherent offensive military power" (1993: 29; see, also, Posen 1993a). Thus, nationalism purveyed by local politicians in their struggle for power is viewed as serving only "the express purpose of improving [group] military capabilities" (Posen: 1993a: 81). This is supposed to be the case because nationalism, in Posen's terms "would…help generate the individual commitment and the organized cooperation that make for combat power on the battlefield" (1993a: 81; see, also, Mearsheimer, 1992). The superiority of the offensive capabilities acquired from the usage of nationalism should be seen as encouraging the occurrence of conflict. This is the case because offence, as Posen explains, has "tremendous tactical military advantages in operations" such as "ethnic

cleansing," which is often the main goal of the ethno-national conflict aiming to establish an ethnically homogenous state (Posen, 1993: 33).

On the other hand, Kaufman (1996a) views the intentions of group's leadership as "intentionally" causing both "mass hostility" and "security dilemma" (1996a: 158). Similarly, Posen (1993) in his explanations emphasises the importance of negative past inter-group experiences and domestic speeches of different politicians who write their version of history appropriate for mobilising the public in favour of their struggle for power. To cite Kaufman, "[l]eaders spread the key myth that the ethnic group is somehow threatened, by offering false or misleading factual claims as 'proof,' and by appealing to motive symbolic issues as somehow representing that threat" (1996a: 170). Although this conceptualisation seems similar to constructivist accounts of war, this proto-constructivist understanding is subordinated to the dynamics of realists' "security dilemma." Posen writes:

> Analysts inclined to view that most of the trouble lies elsewhere, either in the specific nature of group identities or in short-term incentives for new leaders to 'play the nationalist card' to secure their power, need to understand the security dilemma and its consequences (1993: 28).

Remaining on the same line of argument with Posen, Kaufman explains that "security dilemma" emerges when group's leadership "fail to recognize the degree to which their security measures threaten other states and therefore provoke hostility" (1996a: 151). So, both nationalism as an ideology and intentions of politicians that use nationalism are viewed in function of the logic of anarchy. To sum up, the post-Cold War neo-realist scholarship choice of the

“security dilemma” as the key concept to account for ethno-national conflict, would allow us to see the conflict as resulting from groups’ power competition in the condition of increased insecurities caused by the emergence of anarchy in a decaying state.

Different from the above mentioned neo-realist scholars, Sabrina P. Ramet (1992) utilises Morton A. Kaplan’s (1957) typology of international systems as a framework for analysing patterns of behaviour among ethnic groups, rather than states in the multi-ethnic Yugoslav Federation. The Yugoslav Federation is viewed as a system in which the constitutive units (republics and autonomous provinces) are the referent object of analysis. In the framework of such a system, the patterns of behaviour among the constitutive units are identified in terms of power and varying conditions of anarchy. Here, parallels are drawn between the inter-actors relations in Yugoslavia from 1918-1963 and the loose bi-polarity in the international system or the balance of power and inter-actors relations from 1965 onwards.

According to Ramet, Yugoslavia was a success story until the end of the 1980s because of flexible coalitions and alliances between the constitutive units. In her interpretation, the units are conceived as unitary actors and their behaviour within the framework of the Federation (viewed as a system) is compared with the behaviour of states in the international system. In Ramet’s understanding, peace prevailed among the units in Yugoslavia so long as the

balance of power was preserved between the constitutive units at the system level (Federation). Conflicts emerged in the early 1990s because the requirements for the maintenance of the balance of power were undermined.

Thus, Serbia's effort for the hegemonic control of the system (Federation) is viewed by Ramet as jeopardising the balance of power in the system (1992: 225-238; see, also, Caratan, 1997). The fact that Serbs represented the biggest ethnic group in the Federation, according to Ramet presented a window of opportunity for them. The existence of this window of opportunity favoured preventive military actions (direct or indirect) to consolidate Serbia's superiority that was challenged by other national groups (Ramet, 1992; see, also, Caratan, 1997). However, Ramet recognises that her interpretation of conflict is "relevant only to systems in which administrative units are organized on ethnic or quasi-ethnic lines" (1992, 5) to which the quality of unitary units can be attributed.

David (1998) is another realist scholar, who finds Realism suitable to be used to explain ethno-national conflict. Realism is accounted as important in interpreting different aspects of ethno-national conflict. He proposes to view the decaying state as a "microcosm" of the international system. In view of his assumption, at least three of realists' fundamental theses are important in the interpretation of ethno-national conflict. The realist assumption about human nature (the human being's ability to kill its own kind, is a necessary condition of

war) offers according to David the best interpretation of “the brutality and persistence of civil conflict” (1998: 78). Furthermore, the author views anarchy as having a permissive role in the causation of ethno-national conflict. That is because these conflicts “occur because there is nothing to stop them, [which] is as true for conflicts within the [decaying] states as it is among them” (David, 1998: 78). The balance of power is the other assumption of neo-Realism that is considered as important in view of the belligerents’ calculations in waging or proscribing conflict. David considers this assumption “as relevant for internal war as it is for interstate conflict” (1998: 78).

Ramet (1992) and David (1998) as well as Posen (1993) and Kaufman (1996) refine the assumptions of Realism and its variants to interpret ethno-national conflict. They replace states with ethnic groups and consider the decaying state as an anarchical system. The post-Cold War approaches compared with traditional neo-Realism are of greater help to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. They look to explain the immediate causes of ethno-national conflict. The unitary actor and billiard ball framework remain present in their treatment of ethnic groups and conflict. This framework of analysis offers a distorted understanding of ethno-national conflict. The weaknesses of this approach to ethno-national conflict are discussed as follows.

2.1.1. Post-Cold War Realism and Ethno-National Conflict: A Critique

As argued above realist and neo-realist scholars tried to address the issue of the post-Cold War ethno-national conflicts by treating ethno-national groups as states and dissolving state as an anarchical system. They consider identity as a means used to improve group's power capabilities (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996). These works, according to David, are "better at explaining the actions of groups after state collapse than they are at explaining why the collapse occurred at all" (1998: 93). This approach offers a limited contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. Two issues are discussed as follows.

First, the post-Cold War neo-realist approaches point to ethnic/national groups emerging from the ashes of dissolving empires as the referent object of analysis. These groups are viewed, as black boxes acting in an anarchical system. Therefore, these groups are expected to have the same security concerns as the state in an anarchical system.

The conceptualisation of groups as unitary and reified actors does not allow us to look at insecurities that may arise from ethnic minorities within the group. These minorities are viewed by the majority group as a challenge to the status quo. This status quo implies the rightness of the majority claim over the territory and political autonomy of the group (Campbell, 1998). In this case, the conflict might arise from the efforts of the majority group in meeting internal

rather than external threats (Job, 1992). This context is neglected in the post-Cold War neo-realist approaches.

Commenting on the work of authors such as Posen, who make unitary ethno-national groups as the referent object of analysis, Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams argue that a "shift…to a prima facie focus on structures of exclusionary group-identity will merely replicate the inside/outside structure of anarchy," which "hardly provides us with a capacity for thinking about [conflict]" (1997: 48). Thus, this approach neglects many sources of insecurities that stand as underlying causes of ethno-national conflict.

Second, anarchy is not the only factor that forces actors to assume a "worst-case" scenario as Posen (1993) and other neo-realist scholars assert. This is the case because anarchy is not an inherent condition of the structure as neo-realist scholars assume. Thus, Posen's interpretation of anarchy is contradicted by other interpretations, which assume that anarchy is socially constructed and therefore there is no single logic of anarchy (Wendt, 1992). So, this explains the fact why actors "act differently towards enemies than they do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not" (Wendt, 1992: 397). Thus, unless actors (states or ethno-national groups) have constructed each other as enemies in the process of mutual interaction, there would be no Hobbesian anarchy and consequently the cause of conflict would fail as well. The neo-realist explanation of conflict according to Kalevi Holsti

“explains the recurrence [of war] without accounting for non-recurrence or the great deviations from and average pattern of recurrence” (1991: 301; see, also, Holsti, 1998).

To account for the non-occurrence of conflict, anarchy is to be seen as what actors make of it (Wendt, 1992). In this interpretation of anarchy, actors’ identity constituted in relation to the other is important in defining the nature of anarchy and the way actors behave towards each other (competitive versus cooperative). Thus, groups’ differentiation rather than anarchy is the cause of conflict. In view of that, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil in commenting on Posen’s interpretation of the Yugoslav wars argue that “the dissolution of central authority [emerging anarchy] was not the ‘cause’ of the outbreak of the conflict” (1996: 115). The causes of the conflict, they argue, cannot be found “without an explicit theoretical treatment of group differentiation, which, in turn, generates the ‘anarchical environment,’ structural arguments do not explain conflict, they merely redescribe it” (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: 115).

In this scholarship, the relationship between the “security dilemma” and conflict seems to be problematic. The emergence of anarchy is considered by Posen (1993) and Kaufman (1996) as inevitably promoting competition, “security dilemma” and conflict among groups. However, as Hidemi Suganami argues, in the neo-realist scholarship the “security dilemma” is supposed to follow from the “‘logic of anarchy’—according to which anarchy *entails* disorder,"

which "is not even pervasive" (1996: 49). So, "the dilemma is faced only where [actors] are unsure of one's another's intentions" (Suganami, 1996: 50). So, the case of pluralist security communities as an example of cooperation of different actors, including states, communities and people indicate that the relationship between the "security dilemma" and conflict fails to operate fully (Deutsch, 1956; Keohane, 1989; Suganami, 1996). Groups in the case of pluralist security communities will still have security problems to solve, but not all problems are dilemmas. The emergence of anarchy, in the sense of the absence of the state authority, is not sufficient by itself to necessitate the "security dilemma" and to explain its escalation to conflict. Other factors should be taken into consideration in order to account for the social aspects of conflict.

2.2. The "New Wars" Approach and Post-Cold War Conflicts

Among others Mary Kaldor (1997, 1999), Mark Duffield (1998, 2001), Walter Laqueur (1998), Thomas Franck (1995) and Kalevi Holsti (1996) have examined the ethno-national conflict in the context of globalisation. In these authors' judgments the globalisation process has led to the emergence of a new type of violence involving global and local, and public and private actors. Post-Cold War conflicts are referred to as "new wars" (Kaldor, 1997, 1999), "post-modern conflicts" (Duffield, 1998, 2001; Laqueur, 1998), "post-modern neo-tribalism"

(Franck, 1995) or wars of “third kind” (Holsti, 1996) to make the distinction with the old wars (inter-state wars).

The “New Wars” approach argues that globalisation do not generate only integration, spread of liberal democracy and peace in international relations as claimed by liberal scholars (Keohane and Nye, 1989; Hurrel and Woods, 1995). The process of globalisation for the “New Wars” scholarship generates also fragmentation, exclusiveness and conflict (Kennedy, 1993; Hassner, 1993; Gaddis, 1992; Jung, 1993; Clark, 1997). In this, the “New Wars” approach differs from the liberal approaches. Furthermore, the “New Wars” approach take as a referent object of analysis groups composed of local—and trans—national actors as well as the state. With this the “New Wars” approach could also be considered as attempting to refine and correct the state-centric outlook of war in traditional approaches and broaden the understanding of effects of globalisation in international relations.

This section is organised in three parts. In the first part, globalisation and its effects on international relations, in general, and war, in particular are discussed. In the second part, the “New Wars” approach to conflict is examined. In the third part, the relevance of the “New Wars” approach to our understanding of ethno-national conflict is discussed.

2.2.1. Globalisation and Post-Cold War Conflicts

Different scholars would agree that globalisation is the process of "widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of social life, from the cultural to the criminal, from the financial to the spiritual" (Held et al., 1999: 2). Globalisation is viewed as penetrating states and societies, "breaking traditional patterns of vertical organization, a contradictory process involving integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and diversification" (Kaldor, 1999: 3).[33] Globalisation is perceived as the driving force behind the rapid social, political and economical changes that are shaking up and reshaping modern societies and the world order (Giddens, 1990, 1998). Globalisation is also considered as an unprecedented development in the history of the mankind, where the classical distinctions between internal and external, domestic and international, war and peace are becoming blurred and governments and societies facing "new frontiers" have to adjust themselves to these changes (Rosenau, 1990; Ruggie 1993; Linklater and MacMillan 1995; Kaldor, 1999).

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[33] In IR there are three main theoretical approaches to globalisation, which divide scholars in skeptics, transformalist and globalist. The skeptics (Gaddis, 1992; Waltz, 2000) view globalisation as the continuation of the historical process of integration and fragmentation in international relations. Therefore, globalisation is seen as exogenous to international relations. The transformalists conceive globalisation as the driving force behind the changes that are reshaping different institutions of international relations (ex. the state) (Held et al, 1999; Giddens, 1990, 1998; Ruggie, 1993; Rosecrance, 1996; Clark, 1997; Keohane, 1995; Kaldor, 1999). Globalists view the globalisation process as bringing changes that are substantially transforming international relations (Ohmae, 1995; Rosenau, 1997).

Globalisation is also understood as introducing changes in the world economy by bringing the de-nationalisation of the economies through the establishment of trans-national networks of trade, finance, investment and production. Globalisation, as J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin (1994) suggest, is seen as challenging the traditional meaning of territory. According to them, in the condition of globalisation borders are becoming porous and the state's exclusive authority over its territory and population is weakening. Thus, a logical consequence of globalisation is the separation of sovereignty from its territorial content. To cite Robert Keohane, sovereignty should be better understood "less as a territorial barrier" and more "as a bargain resource for politics characterised by complex trans-national networks" (1995: 105).

In Rosalie Higgins's logic, "territory" in the view of globalisation is no longer the only source of jurisdiction in international relations. As the concept of "impact jurisdiction" has gained importance, since "an acceptable balance between the sovereign equality and independence of states on the one hand and the reality of an interdependent world and the international law commitment to human dignity on the other" is seen as established in international relations (1986: 30; see, also, Forbes, 1993: 217). From that it follows that the intervention in the internal affairs of the state (undermining the territorial integrity of the state) in the name of the human values and rights is to be considered as acceptable.

It has been suggested that the most significant transformation that globalisation has brought in international relations is the one related to the role and the place of the state. Thus,

> [t]he impersonal forces of world markets…are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong…the declining authority of state is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority of other institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies (Strange, 1996: 4).

The state as “the principal aggregation of political power” (Cox, 1981:126) is considered as coming under the pressure of different authorities. The presence of different authorities is seen as an expression of the erosion of state authority and its role in many aspects of social life including war. Many areas of political activity, previously considered as the exclusive property of the state, are to be viewed as “globalised” in the sense that state authority over these issues is shared with other public and private agencies at the local, national and global level (Rosenau, 1990).

Hence, the autonomy of the state is weakened by mafia organisations and other trans-national agents that are becoming substitute agents for most of the state functions including the usage of violence. Thus, revealing in Strange’s (1996) terms, the retreat of the state in international relations. Therefore, the erosion of state authority and the growing in importance of other local and trans-national actors is considered as having transformed at the same time the dynamics of war and the use of force in world politics.

In this respect, the fragmentation processes is attributed to the sudden loss of state autonomy and authority in both international and domestic domains, as well as to changing security practices (Barkin and Cronin, 1994: 127). The erosion of state authority is seen as resulting from the growing role of different military organised groups that question the state's autonomy and authority and which aim to bring about profound (structural) political and/or economic-social changes "in a negative spiral of incivility" (Kaldor, 2000: 5). The state is viewed as not capable of regulating the privatisation of violence, justice, and taxation, which "gives rise to violent conflicts" (Kaldor, 2000: 5). The manner the "new wars" are organised and financed, according to Kaldor, reveals how the state's monopoly on violence is eroding in favour of the privatisation of violence. In view of this trend, the military domain is viewed as becoming independent, which is reflected in the privatisation of military capabilities and self-employment of redundant soldiers aimed at regaining power and control over the resources (Albrecht and Schmeder, 1998).

The actors in the "new wars" are viewed as being organised in an horizontal way. So, the units that fight these wars are considered to include a disparate range of groups, such as: paramilitary troops, local warlords, police forces, breakaway units of the regular army, while the global presence in these wars includes mercenary troops, diaspora volunteers, military advisers, peacekeepers and a veritable "army" of international agencies (Kaldor, 1999: 3-

4). These distorted politico-military formations[34] facing the erosion in legitimacy of the established political class are to be seen as using violence as a means to fulfil their interests of personal enrichment or extension of control over resources. In the external realm, different power groups looking to legitimise various criminal or/and informal forms of private aggrandisement, utilise war as a means.

2.2.2. The "New Wars" Approach and Post-Cold War Conflicts

Kaldor argues that the international community's approach to post-Cold War conflicts is shaped by "misperceptions, the persistence of inherited ways of thinking about violence, the inability to understand the character and the logic of new warfare" (Kaldor, 1999: 113). Misperceptions are related to the fact that these conflicts are treated either as "old wars" or as the outcome of anarchy. Therefore, the warring parties in these conflicts are viewed as nascent states assuming they possess the authority to negotiate solutions to settle the conflict. In fact this is what Posen (1993) and Kaufman (1996) did in their explanation of ethno-national conflict and the "New Wars" approach can be seen developing as a criticism to post-Cold War neo-Realism scholarship.

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[34] Trade networks, tying together individuals, politicians, corporations, governments and international institutions are claimed to have created politico-military formations, which are bind

In Kaldor's understanding post-Cold War conflicts are "new wars." She is not alone in this claim; other scholars share her opinion (Franck, 1995; Snow, 1996; Laqueur, 1997; Duffield, 1998, 2001). Kaldor defines the main distinctions between old and new wars as follows:

> The new wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by private organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gains) and large-scale violation of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals) (1999:2).

For Donald M. Snow, in the "new wars":

> [t]here is no common centre of gravity to which the combatants appeal; in many cases it is not clear that the "insurgents" have any interest in or intent on gaining political power or responsibility; and there is little sense of boundaries on the extent of violence both sides would commit. These conflicts seem, indeed, to be a new breed of internal violence (1996: ix).

In the "New Wars" approach the globalisation process is viewed as creating the necessary conditions that permit the emergence of "new wars." Globalisation is seen as favouring the weakening of the capacity of states to inflict maximum violence; and generating increased opportunities for economic motives in the post-Cold War conflicts. These two developments are viewed as having influenced the changing patterns of violence in world politics (Newman, 2004). Kaldor (1999: 5) lists some of the factors that she sees as having contributed to the weakening of state monopoly over the means of violence such as: the growing destructiveness of military technology, the increasing interconnectedness or interdependence of states especially in the economic and

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together by common socio-economic interests although, having different loyalties (Strazzai, 2003).

military fields, the evolution of the international law and norms and the privatisation of organised violence.

It should also be noted that different authors (Mearsheimer, 1990; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Franck, 1992) have examined these two developments and their effects on the obsolescence of war. The contribution of the "New Wars" scholarship is the discussion of these developments in the context of globalisation and their role in the causation of conflict. So, “new wars” are viewed in this scholarship as “one aspect of the current globalized era” (Kaldor, 1999: 1; see, also, Duffield, 1998, 2001; Lacqueur, 1997; Franck, 1995).

The “New Wars” scholarship looks at different features of post-Cold War conflicts to establish the difference between the "old" and the "new" wars. It looks at features, such as: the actors that are to be considered as the referent object of analysis; the context in which the conflict is taking place; the primary motives and ideologies of protagonists and the strategies they use. By looking at these features of conflict this scholarship aims not only to establish the distinction between the “new” and “old" wars, but to provide, at the same time, an understanding of them. In what follows these features are discussed by looking at the insights of different scholars of this approach. The purpose of such examination is to present the explanatory capacity of this approach to our understanding of ethno-national conflict.

The referent object of analysis in the “new wars,” is the group composed of insurgents, criminal gangs, mafia organisations, diaspora, international organisations, mercenaries, paramilitary troops as well as regular armies. The protagonists are viewed as not being bounded by common loyalties such as ethnic or national identity. An interesting observation of this literature is the fact that international organisations and interventions are viewed as exacerbating “new wars.” To cite Dietrich Jung: “mafia-style economies and protracted internal warfare are often a result of international interventions which are actually claiming to foster the establishment of market structures and democracy” (Jung, 2003b: 12). The goals of these actors are viewed as being particularistic and aiming at satisfying needs of private aggrandisement rather than the ones of community. Their goals may be material, identity-based, or ideological or a combination of all three (Duffield, 2001: 14). However, socio-economic interests are the ones that bind together different protagonists of the “new wars” in common formations.

In this approach, globalisation is to be seen as the context that permit both the erosion of the state autonomy and the increase in influence of other than state actors, such as trans—and sub—state actors. Globalisation, at the same time, is considered as standing for a new mode of warfare (the means with which war is fought). For Kaldor, the mode of warfare reflects upon the mode of production, which has come, in turn, to dominate and shape the means and the way wars are fought. Following on the same logic, Martin Shaw writes:

> Once economy and society had been incorporated directly into the supply side of war, as a 'home front', then military logic (with the aid of aerial technology) transformed them into a part of the battlefield. The logic of warfare-production relationship made first 'strategic' industries and then whole urban populations into targets (2000: 175).

Total war became a mode of warfare, which dominated the capitalist mode of production, during mid nineteenth century and was "intimately bound up with the evolution of the modern state" (Kaldor, 1999: 13). War during this period is seen as being waged for borders and territorial integrity. In the contrary, the post-Cold War period's conflicts are defined as "new wars" because the post-Cold War period's conflicts are to be seen as "part of a process which is more or less a reversal of the process through which modern states evolved" (Kaldor, 1999: 5). These conflicts are viewed as using a new mode of warfare that represent a mixture of war, organised crime and the massive violation of the human and civil rights (Kaldor, 1999). This change in the mode of warfare is seen to be a by-product of globalisation that has favoured a global production.

The "new wars" literature suggests that globalisation has created the necessary conditions for the privatisation of violence. Globalisation is favouring the growth of "organised crime and the emergence of paramilitary groups," while the "political legitimacy [of the state] is disappearing" (Kaldor, 1999: 9). These groups' informal and criminal activities are seen to serve to generate the financial resources to sustain the war. Furthermore, the fighting units are seen as financing themselves through plunder, the profits coming from the illegal trade and international aid or assistance. According to Duffield (1998), these groups finance themselves through domestic "asset transfers" (redistribution of

dissolving state's assets) and/or the revenues generated from the "parallel economy" including drug and arms trafficking. In his latter book, he also claims that this financing logic is self-sustaining and rational, rather than a manifestation of the emergence of anarchy, as pretended by neo-realists' accounts (Duffield, 2001:14). In Kaldor's words, "the warring parties need more or less permanent conflict to reproduce their position of power and for access to resources" (1999: 110). Because these different resources finance the conflict the "new wars" are also referred as "globalized war economies" (Kaldor, 1999: 9). For Kaldor, the resources that finance the war are sustained through violence; therefore "a war logic is built into the functioning of the economy" (Kaldor, 1999: 9; see, also, Jung, 2003; Pugh et. al, 2004).

Furthermore, the protagonists of "new wars" are viewed as seeking alternative sources (international and domestic) to sustain their positions of domination and access to resources. Thus, conflict is seen as a vicious circle. To cite Kaldor "[t]he warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their position of power and for access to resources" (1999: 110). This is the reason why the "new wars" are viewed as representing forms of criminal and informal activities rather than conflicts in the Clausewitzian understanding.

This approach also adopts identity in the form of identity politics to study "new wars." For Kaldor "the goals of the new wars are about identity

politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars" (1999: 6). For Kaldor, "identity politics means movements around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power" (1999: 76). In the conflicts after the 1990s, political nationalism has come to be seen as the mobilising ideology of identity politics. Different from modern nationalism, which gave birth to the modern state, political nationalism in the 1990s is viewed as leading to fragmentation of the state and the discrimination of the other. Identity politics is viewed as a means, which, serves to legitimise the violence against the civil society and the civil population and in the worst case, expel it from a given territory (Bougarel, 1995). Thus, identity politics is considered in the explanations of this approach as a means utilised by political groups to legitimise their activities of private aggrandisement and for access to resources. In Snow's words, the "new internal wars" give the impression of being "less principled in political terms, less focussed on the attainment of some political ideal" and they "often appear to be little more than rampages by groups within states against one another with little or no ennobling purpose or outcome" (1996: 57). Thus, the "new wars" are to be seen as missing clear political objectives and ideology.

The aim of "new wars" is considered to be the total annihilation of the other group and seizure of the territory in its disposal. Here, territory represents the market. Hence, the protagonists use war to achieve control over the territory by the displacement of the population and ethnic cleansing (Bougarel, 1995).

Thus, to cite Kaldor, “atrocities against non-combatants, sieges, destruction of historical monuments, etc., now constitute an essential component of the strategies of the new mode of warfare” (1999: 8). Otherwise, these wars are described also as cases of violations of human rights and systematic destruction of the social, economic, cultural and historical existence of the targeted population, which, in turn, is to be seen as part of the war’s aims. In function of the conflict's aims, the techniques used to achieve the political control over a territory require a guerrilla type of warfare, which would involve a low-level confrontation, viewed as a feature particular to the "new wars."

To sum up, the “New Wars” approach considers globalisation as a process contributing to the erosion of state authority and privatisation of the means to wage war. In this context, the economic motives and greed of different non-state actors for private enrichment are to be understood as the driving forces of violent conflict. This approach offers a distorted picture of the causes of the post-Cold War conflicts. The weaknesses of this approach are discussed in the next part.

2.2.3. The “New Wars” Approach and Post-Cold War Conflicts: A Critique

In the "New Wars" approach, conflict is viewed as taking place in the context of state’s eroding capacity to manipulate coercion due to the process of

globalisation, which gave rise to different militia and distorted politico-military formations. So, the “new wars” are seen as fought by these new actors engaged in “a negative spiral of incivility” for “personal aggrandizement and access to resources” (Kaldor, 1999: 110). In the “New Wars” approach there is an effort to extend the referent object of analysis by including different actors from the local, national and international levels. This effort is to be seen as an attempt to correct the state-centrist outlook of war in the traditional approaches. The protagonists in the “New Wars” approach are viewed as being a mélange of different power groups that struggle against the state, sometimes displacing or harnessing the state.

Looking at the post-Cold War period’s conflicts as “new wars” limits our understanding of their causes for three reasons. First, the “New Wars” approach to conflict remains state-centric. As in the case of the mainstream accounts of “state failure”[35] the understanding of “new wars” is reduced to an explanation of:

> [s]tate strength and success, or weakness and failure, [which] is therefore simplistically reduced to an empirical observable capacity to manipulate (usually) coercive resources resulting in an anti-democratic overtone of control and subordination (Bilgin and Morton, 2002: 63).

Thus, as in these accounts, in the “New Wars” approach, the state is understood primarily as an actor which has lost the monopoly of coercive violence in the

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[35] Buzan defines as such weak or failed states, “their principal distinguishing feature is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government; in other words, weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation” (1991: 99).

condition of the erosion of its authority. Hence, according to this scholarship, the restoration of the legitimacy of the state in the framework of a cosmopolitan project that seeks a role for international organisations and civil society would bring to an end the “new wars.” So, at the end, the state is the object of analysis, while the other actors are part of a transitory process.

Second, the “New Wars” approach uses the concept of identity to explain the post-Cold War conflicts. In these explanations, identity is used in instrumental terms; it helps to legitimise actors’ power positions and interests of enrichment. However, as Scharpf argues:

> Peoples act not on the base of objective reality, but on the base of perceived reality and of assumed cause and effect relationships operating in the world they perceive. And peoples act not only on the base of objective needs but also on the basis of preference reflecting their subjectively defined interests and valuations and their normative convictions of how it is right or good or appropriate to act under the circumstances (1997: 19).

By using identity as a means to an end the “new wars” approach fails to account for variations in the forms of groups’ inter-relations (enmity, rivalry or friendship) (Wendt, 1992). To account for the social aspects of conflict, the identity and the interests of groups have to be seen as constructed in the process of mutual interactions, which, in turn, can help accounting for variations in the forms of groups’ interactions. The conceptualisation of identity as a social signifier rather than a means to an end allows to account for the conflict as the result of groups’ differences constituted in subjective rather than economic terms. The “New Wars” approach misses this explanation.

Third, the "New Wars" approach defends the idea that the post-Cold War conflicts are "new" because they are the outcome of the recent acceleration of the globalisation process. Differently from Kaldor, other scholars do not see the "new wars" as really new (Gaddis, 1992; Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Newman, 2004). For Gaddis, globalisation is not a new process. In the contrary he sees globalisation as an ongoing process of the internationalisation of modernity, world capitalist economy, nation-state system, world military order, and of the division of labour. In this respect, most of the so called "new wars" are seen as being caused by a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts of an ethnic nationalistic nature since the 1950s and 1960s rather than a sudden change associated with a new, post-Cold War international system (Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Newman, 2004).

Following in the same line of argument, Ted Gurr et al. (2001; see, also, Harff and Gurr, 1994) supports the idea that the post-Cold War conflicts are the continuation of de-colonisation process started in the 1950s rather than a new type of conflict attributed to the acceleration of globalisation. For Stephan Van Evera, in Eastern Europe, in the Balkans and in the countries of Third World the process of transformation from the nation to statehood remains of great significance since the transition is still on going and this transformation quite often is done by using violence (Evera, Van, 1990/91: 11). Thus, the so-called "new wars," for these scholars rather reflect types of conflict that are not

particularly "new," that in fact, represent enduring patterns of processes continuing from the last century.

To sum up, besides finding a new name for post-Cold War conflicts, the "New Wars" approach offers a limited contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. The analysis of conflict ends up ignoring the historical contingent processes of conflict formation.

In Chapter 2, two approaches to the post-Cold War period's conflicts, namely, post-Cold War neo-Realism and the "New Wars" approach were discussed. These approaches claim to offer some new interpretations to the causes of current conflicts. Both approaches focus on actors other than states and use nationalism and identity in their explanations in an effort to refine traditional theories approach to ethno-national conflict. Post-Cold War neo-Realism looks at the emergence of anarchy and "security dilemma" in the case of dissolving imperial or federal states as the permissive cause of the post-Cold War ethno-national conflicts. The "New Wars" approach suggests that globalisation is the underlying cause of "new wars." The rivalry of emerging private—often criminal—groups in the vacuum created by the erosion of state authority in the condition of globalisation is pointed as the immediate cause of "new wars."

Both approaches' arguments contain a number of problems that limit our understanding of the causes of ethno-national conflict. Nationalism and identity are considered in the explanations of the causes of conflict in instrumental terms affecting either the material offensive capabilities of groups or legitimising the private economic interests of different actors. This way of involving identity in approaching conflict, remains in the same line with traditional approaches that consider identity as given and unproblematic. Furthermore, these approaches exaggerate the importance of anarchy (for Posen) and globalisation (for Kaldor), while neglecting how conflict is used not only to advance interests (economic and politic), but also to define and defend identity.

CHAPTER 3

Constructivism and War

Traditional International Relations theories and the post-Cold War approaches discussed in the previous two chapters offered an understanding of war that emphasised power calculations and the immediate interests of actors as the main causal factors. In these assumptions, the state and ethno-national groups, treated as states, are considered as the referent objects of analysis. Conflict is seen as the struggle of states or quasi-states for power, security and economic domination. The traditional and the post-Cold War approaches, according to Paul Kowert,

> explain how actors should choose (parametric theories) or how they should bargain (strategic theories). They offer answers to some important questions about when states should cooperate and when they may be expected to fight (1998: 2).

Hence, traditional International Relations theories and the post-Cold War approaches offer an important contribution to the understanding of actors' choices, applying mainly the "rational choice" theory[36] as a guide for understanding actors' behaviour. However, they restrict our understanding of conflict to a particular conception of society, set of actors and values. This is the case because in these approaches the process of rational logic is separated from the process of subjective interaction, capturing as such a structure of actors' inter-relations stripped of the social context (Ashley, 1986).

These approaches in many respects do not clearly distinguish between objective and subjective aspects of the practices that are scrutinised (Ruggie, 1986). These theories distance themselves from questioning how social actors have been constituted and interact over time. The post-Cold War approaches, on the other hand, made an effort to introduce the concept of identity to the understanding of ethno-national conflict. However, as Lapid and Kratochwil (1996: 105-126) argue, in these approaches identity was considered as a means rather than a social signifier.

The set of social theories, known as Constructivism try to address the weaknesses of the traditional and post-Cold War approaches. Constructivism is

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[36] The "rational choice" is defined in terms of utility maximisation that presupposes efficient decisions. The social dimension of choice is mainly neglected and as such, experience has revealed that subjects' perceptions could lead to modifications in behaviour. See, for more, on the "rational choice," Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992) and Stephen M. Walt (1999).

used for the study of the problem of collective action in international relations. This chapter looks at the constructivist approaches of Alexander Wendt and the Copenhagen School, to see what they can tell us about ethno-national conflict.[37] These approaches point to identity and culture to explain behaviour in international relations. Although, neither of these two approaches specifically deals with the issue of conflict this chapter tries to demonstrate that useful insights and specific explanations can be drawn from the constructivist theory to account for ethno-national conflict. These approaches use identity and culture to organise the study of conflict.

The chapter discusses first the constructivist approach of Alexander Wendt and its relevance in explaining ethno-national conflict. Then it discusses the operationalisation of the concept of identity and culture in the theorising of the Copenhagen School and its contribution to our understanding of the immediate causes of ethno-national conflict. The chapter concludes with a section that emphasises the contribution of these approaches while showing awareness of their weaknesses.

[37] Constructivism is not a homogenous body of thought (Reus-Smith, 2002: 488). This Chapter looks only at what Wendt's and the Copenhagen School approaches can tell us about conflict.

3.1.1. Alexander Wendt's Approach and War

Alexander Wendt in his approach addresses the inadequacies of the traditional approaches, especially of neo-Realism in dealing with the problem of collective action in international relations. Wendt's theorising with a particular emphasis on what it can tell us about war in particular is discussed in this section. Wendt offers a constructivist approach to the understanding of war and peace in international relations. Hence, war is seen as an human practice that has been socially constructed. Wendt organises his study of international relations by using the concepts of identity and culture.

The aim of Wendt is not to show that traditional approaches are wrong. He is trying to mediate their incomplete explanations and bridge the gap between Realism, Rationalism and Constructivism (Wendt, 1996, 1999). The way Wendt views structure and agency and their role in behaviour (including war) constitute what he calls "via media." Wendt's "via media" would aim "at reconciling what many take to be incompatible ontological and epistemological positions" (1999: 40). In theoretical terms, reconciliation, for Wendt, aims to combine in a single theoretical explanation the holists' (structuralist) top-down conception of social life with individualists' bottom-up view. In Wendt's terms:

> The real debate between individualist and holist is not about whether culture constructs agents, but about the character of this construction process, and in particular whether it is limited to causal effects or also includes constitutive ones (1999: 166).

Constructivism is offered by Wendt as the way towards a synthetic view that could combine the relationship of “interaction” or “co-determination” that define agency with the relationship of “conceptual dependence” or “mutual constitution” that define structure (1999: 165). In his words:

> Constructivism can show that culture not only causes but also constitutes agents therefore, its value-added over rationalism is *two*fold. It helps us look at causal effects on the properties of the agents and it helps us think about constitutive effects on behaviour and properties (1999: 166).

Accordingly, Wendt’s theorising provides a combination of material conditions with institutionalised subjective interactions in the explanation of war. In Wendt’s understanding, agency and structure are mutually constructed in the process of interactions. Therefore, they both are responsible for the recurrence of war (Wendt, 1987). The agency and structure as constituted entities has to be researched separately and in the interaction process, to explain different expressions of collective behaviour such as war, rivalry and peace in international relations. Although a greater dependence of agents on structure in constitutive terms is recognised, Wendt argues that the source of social behaviour within the realm of interaction is the outcome of both agents and structure.[38]

Furthermore, Wendt tries to combine in a single theoretical explanation both constitutive and casual effects on an agent’s properties and

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[38] Regarding the relationship between the agency and the structures of the system, Wendt has moved his position from “mutual” construction (1987) to bilateral “supervenience” (1996, 1999). Thus, for Wendt “[s]upervenience is a nonreductive relationship of dependency, in which properties at one level are fixed or constituted by those at another, but are not reducible to them” (Wendt, 1996: 49).

behaviour or on both (1999: 26-29). This theoretical framework is expected to delineate both the sources and the character of behaviour in international relations. Given the importance of the interrelationship between the structure and agency, where the potential of motivational and behavioural dispositions is located, the arguments developed by Wendt about them are outlined and assessed as follows.

In Wendt's approach ideational factors assume a predominant role in explaining international relations and consequently war. For Wendt, the intersubjective aspects of culture (socially shared knowledge) account for the primacy of purposes and worldviews that shape actors and explain their behaviour. Although power and related interests in their material standing are not dismissed as sources that effect actors' war prone or friendly behaviours, according to Wendt both "have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up. Power and interests explanations presuppose ideas, and to that extent they are not rivals to ideational explanations at all" (1999: 135).

For Wendt, the material factors' effects upon collective actions depend on the ideational explanations that the agency assigns to them. In other words, power and related interests are considered to be what the agents make of them. Thus, Wendt shifts the attention from rational theorising and the importance of the material factors to explain war and peace in international relations, to culture

and the ideas that make them.[39] His approach addresses the issue of subjectivity and its implications on behaviour by accounting for the relationship between culture and the intersubjective aspects of an agent's identity. In this framework it is instructive to examine these two aspects of subjectivity in order to understand how both culture and agency would play a role in the recurrence of conflict.

3.1.1. Culture and the Problem of Collective Action

Wendt would argue that war prone behaviour as an expression of interactions with the "other" depends upon social structures (culture). In Wendt's theorising, social structure has three important characteristics. First, structure is made of ideas that are intersubjectively shared by the members of the system. So, to cite Wendt "[c]ultural structure consists of the stock of interlocking beliefs, ideas, understandings, perceptions, identities," which otherwise are called "knowledge held by members of the system" (1996: 49). Second, the structure "constrains" agents, as such affecting their social behaviour. Third, structure "constitutes" agency. In this it is assumed that structure defines an agent's properties such as identity and interests. These characteristics are considered by Wendt to be endogenous to social interactions, which create, reproduce and reinforce the

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[39] "Culture," "culture of representation" and "shared collective knowledge" are used interchangeably throughout the text.

properties of the structure and of the members of the system. Wendt, however, assumes that “constitutive effects imply a greater dependence of agents in structure” (1999: 27). His argument is based on the logic that:

> Structural theorising is likely to yield a high rate of explanatory return. Even if we lack detailed knowledge about actors and their intentions, we should be able to explain, and even predict, patterns of their behaviour if we know the structure of rules in which they are embedded. Structure confronts actors as an objective social fact that constrains and enables actions in systematic ways, and as such should generate distinct patterns (1999: 184).

Wendt’s particular understanding of social structure plays a vital role in his theorising about the problem of the collective action in international relations.

For Wendt, social structures are defined by the distribution of culture, rather than power at the international level. In this assumption Wendt (1999) differs form Waltz (1979), which assumes a structure defined by the material distribution of capabilities. According to Wendt, the cultural form “refers to macro-level regularities that are discontinuous with micro-level ones; neither explains the behaviour of particular actors nor relies on the intentional theory of action” (1999: 164). Accordingly, an agent’s war prone behaviour is expected to reflect upon culturally defined situations that stand for “homeostatic tendencies,” which are seen as important prerequisites for having a “stabilised social order” in international relations (Wendt, 1999: 187).

Accordingly, Wendt would define war as a practice that reflects upon an agent’s previous experiences that would tell him how to handle a dangerous situation. However, behaviour according to Wendt is a two-fold process. First,

before acting, agents have to define the situation they find themselves and culture serves as a guide. In the case an actor perceives a threat to his survival, culture provides the information to get engaged in conflict or not. Second, cultures, besides being the necessary foundation for guiding an agent's behaviour, depend on the process of interaction that helps in Wendt's logic to produce and reproduce the structure of international relations.

For Wendt, an undefined situation would offer surprises all the time in the process of interaction with the "other." The end result of interaction in an undefined context not only will question an agent's subjective self-understanding, but will also create perpetuated chaos in international relations. As a matter of fact, international relations are not in a perpetual state of disarray, which for Wendt demonstrates both the existence and the importance of culture.

Anarchy is a situation culturally defined in Wendt's approach. Differentiating between different kinds of anarchy is fundamental to Wendt's approach to international relations and to what he can tell us about war. Different cultures of anarchy, according to Wendt, provide for enemy, rival or friend images with almost "homeostatic" qualities, sustaining the logic of respectively Hobbesian, Kantian or Lockean anarchy. These types of anarchy would explain the behavioural predisposition of an agent. So, in the condition of Hobbesian anarchy Wendt would expect war to recur since culture induces actors to define one another as enemies.

Furthermore, for Wendt, culture provides a coherent and plausible account for the satisfaction of an agent's needs for "socialisation and ontological security" (Wendt, 1999: 187). These validity-claims are supposed to be present in all cultural situations. They are useful according to Wendt:

> [a]s long as individuals see themselves as having an allegiance and commitment to the group, collective memories will be available as a resource for mobilising collective action even if they are not believed, in a phenomenological sense, by individuals, and in that way they can help explain patterns in aggregate behaviour (1999: 163).

The implications of culture are far reaching for Wendt. Thus, culture viewed as constructed "by an on-going process of socialisation and ritual enactment" (Wendt, 1999: 163) defines stereotypes or imageries upon which behaviour is based. In Mattern's terms, culture implies "a particular instance of force" that not only shows who the agent is and how it relates to others, but at the same time, justifies an agent's existence (2001: 358). Thus, culture provides the narrative that "cements or stabilizes an identity/reality in the face of competing alternatives. Fastening reinforces an identity's ability to perpetuate normative structures and affect behaviour" (Mattern, 2001: 362).

In the case that the negative collective memories prevail over the other memories of the group, for Wendt, there is an "aggregate tendency for…conflict to recur over time" (Wendt, 1999: 163). Collective memories are viewed as being constituted in the historical process of agents' interactions with each another and kept alive through generations by an on-going process of socialisation and ritual enactment. Thus, negative collective memories are to be seen as the guide that channels behaviour toward conflict. This assumption

would hold true for Wendt, if actors share at least three things. First, interacting actors should be unitary and alike. Second, the “other” has to be seen as the enemy and a threat to actor’s existence. Third, the negative collective knowledge would tell the actor why and when to use violence to handle the enemy (Wendt, 1999: 268).

On the other hand, collective representation of the “other” that are positive explains, for Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998), the absence of conflict. Security communities are an example of that. Thus, positive collective representation of the “other” used in the process of sharing meanings and norms (collective knowledge) and kept alike by an on-going process of socialisation would establish, for Adler and Barnett, a culture of cooperation. This culture of cooperation would condition social behaviour by excluding the use of force between the members of community.

Although, for Wendt, culture reveals “homeostatic qualities” that agents refer while trying to meet their needs, it is constituted in the process of agents’ interactions. So, “in both a causal and constitutive sense, therefore, structure [culture] is an ongoing effect of process, at the same time that process is in an effect of structure” (Wendt, 1999: 186). The fact that agents are constructed by society and that structure is continually in a process of construction might seem to suggest that there is an infinitively changeable society and cultural realm.

However, the emphasis on the process and its variability, although a recurrent feature of Wendt's theorising, is a circumscribed version. For research and practical purposes, Wendt proposes to "bracket" the process of construction in order to study structure and its effects. In Wendt's words:

> Constitutive analysis is inherently static. It tells us what structures are made of and how they can have certain effects, but not about the processes by which they move through time, in short about *history.* This is clearest in the case of structural change, which is caused by actions that undermine existing structures and generate new ones (1999: 185).

This approach, according to Wendt, makes it possible to account in practical terms for the source and character of international behaviour.

The cultural forms, although a property of the structure and an important point of departure in explaining social relations, cannot exist according to Wendt separately from an agent's beliefs and interests. Anarchy as a cultural form (as Wendt's puts it) is what "states make of it" (1992: 183). So, an agent's war prone behaviour, for example, is to be viewed both independent of culture and dependent on it. Wendt argues that:

> The distribution of knowledge in a social system at any given moment exists only in virtues of actors' desires and beliefs...but it is also true of collective knowledge, which supervenes on desires and beliefs even if it cannot be reduced to them (1999:185).

This injunction highlights the importance of the interrelationship of structure with agency that for Wendt should not be regarded as separate entities. The cultural forms (anarchy) are understood as associated with agency through the concept of an agent's roles. At this point, it is important to explain an agent's roles, how they are constituted, what their effects are on war prone behaviour and how they relate to cultural forms (anarchy) and agency's properties: identity and interests.

3.1.2. Role-Structure Relationship and the Problem of Collective Action

Wendt views roles as constituted in a process that entertains three rationales. First, roles are seen as being constituted in the process of agent's interactions. Second, roles represent the objective "configuration of subject positions" (Wendt, 1999: 257). Third, roles are viewed as being "attributes of structures" embedded in different forms of culture. In Wendt's understanding, roles are attributes of the structure and as such they represent "the configuration of subject positions that shared ideas make available to its holders" (Wendt, 1999: 257). Roles, according to Wendt, differ from identities because they "are not based on [agent's] intrinsic properties and as such they exist only in relation to others" (Wendt, 1999: 227). So, roles are understood as "the objective, collectively constituted positions that give meaning to [the] understanding" of the "other" (Wendt, 1999: 257).

In this approach, roles depend on the culture and the "other," which, in turn, is expected to extinguish an agent's self-potential for autonomous action. For Wendt, "the sharing of expectations on which role identities depend is facilitated by the fact that many roles are institutionalised in social structures that pre-date particular interactions" (1999: 227). However, roles, in Wendt's logic, cannot be reduced to a simple account of a structure's cultural context. Roles are considered to be internalised in an agent's identity and reflecting upon individual beliefs and ideas about whom or what the agent is. Therefore, war

and peace in international relations should be analysed as resulting from the combination of factors that reflect upon an agent's values and interests, "substantial rights and behavioural norms" and "the degree of interdependence" or "intimacy" between the "self" and the "other" (1999: 228).

For Wendt, the interaction, establishes the options of choices that are considered to remain within the limits of structural effects such as: constitutivity and constraints. In this approach, agents are considered as being restrained in choosing their behaviour since in their choices they have to face the collective knowledge about the "other." The "other's" reaction in the process of interaction is seen as providing for a reflective appraisal to the agent that is expected to constrain the redefinition of an agent's values and interests. Accordingly, following Wendt's logic, war is what agents make of it.

In Wendt's theorising, identity is a crucial concept linking social structure with agent's role in enacting social behaviour. Different from the traditional International Relations approaches that introduce identity in analysing conflict as a substitute for missing resources; Wendt offers a social narrative of identity. He adopts the concept of "social identity," which is borrowed from social theory, to analyse the behaviour of corporate agents. Thus, identity and culture are to be seen as the organising principle of Wendt's theorising and as such they can be utilised in the examination of the Kosovo/a conflict.

In social theory, social identity can be seen as the various ways in which people understand themselves in relation to the “other” and how they view their past and their future (Peirce, 1995). For the purpose of this work it is important to examine Wendt’s definition of social identity and it relation to the problem of collective action and war as an expression of it.

3.1.3. Identity, Interests and the Problem of Collective Action

In Wendt’s conception, social identity indicates both the social construction of the agent and its dependence on the interaction of independently existing agents (1999: 169). Hence, social identity “takes the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’ to its logical conclusion, identification” (Wendt, 1999: 229). Agents’ identity in Wendt’s terms, is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a “relatively stable, role specific understanding and expectations about self that would be hard to change” (1992: 398).

Identity, as Wendt understands it is “a property of international actor that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions” (1999: 224). Accordingly, social identities represent “cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine who ‘I am/we are’ in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understanding and expectations” (Wendt, 1994: 385). Seeing social identity as an attribute of structure has two implications. First, state is

privileged as a referent object of analysis. Second, the corporate identity, which "refers to the intrinsic qualities that constitute actor individuality" (Wendt, 1996: 50), is not sees as responsible for the collective action. For Wendt, corporate identity has its roots in domestic politics and is ontologically prior to the state system (1999: 21). Therefore, to explain war, we have to point how an agent defines the "self" in relation to the "other," which would offer the necessary tools to study his behaviour.

Wendt recognises that an actor has multiple identities "constituted to varying degree by cultural forms," which, in turn, indicated "why they are and what should we do in a certain context" (1992: 230). Wendt's approach provides an account of behaviour where much depends "on the extent to which an identity is threatened" in this case "a non salient identity which is highly threatened may dominate a more salient one that is not. But as a first approximation to a general, long-term tendency the proposition may have merit" (1999: 231). The implication of such an assumption defines behaviour as the result of mutually constitutive relationships between the self and the other, while neglecting the interaction between an actor's internal and external identities. This assumption privileges the unitary nature of the actors, which is a weakness of this approach with implications for our understanding of ethno-national conflict. The issue is further discussed in the next part.

In Wendt's theorising interests assume also an important role in explaining the behaviour of an agent. Interests, together with identity, are considered to be interrelated properties of an agent, and are responsible for an agent's behaviour. To define the relationship between identity and interests Wendt stipulates, "without interests identities have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction" (1999:231). Identity defined as such drive interests and since identity reflects upon various forms of culture so do the interests. Thus, interests defined in terms of needs are a necessary condition but insufficient contributor to constant behaviour since there is no guarantee that they would be translated into beliefs. Thus, interests are subordinated to identity. This assumption aims at stressing the importance of identity and its ideational nature in the understanding an actor's behaviour, while underdetermine the effects of the material factors that are mainly embedded in interests.

Wendt offers a state-centric outlook of international relations. Wendt argues that explaining international relations requires viewing states[40] as agents and structure as made up of states. Wendt justifies this choice as such: "states are unitary actors to which we legitimately can attribute anthropomorphic qualities like identities, interests and intentionality" (1999: 43). States are viewed as "self-organised entities whose internal structures confer capacities for

[40] Wendt's choice of the state as the referent object of analysis excludes the individuals as a referent object. This choice is done on the merit of an agent's social identity, which compared to that of an individual allows us to "see how the relationship between agents and structure can be at once independent and dependent, causal and constitutive. We can have both dualism and duality (Wendt, 1999: 183-184).

institutionalised collective actions—corporate agency—on their members" (Wendt, 1999: 43). In Wendt's approach, the accounts of internal identity (corporate identity) are considered as unimportant in the understanding of international politics.[41] This assumption is based on the premise that "the boundaries and policies of the state coincide with the boundaries and needs of the pre-existing groups subject to its rule" (Wendt, 1999: 211).

For Wendt, state-society interaction is unproblematic. This assumption is based in his conclusion that the historical process of "the emergence of the state, in which coercive resources become monopolised by political-military elites, creates enormous potential for constructing societies from the top down" (Wendt, 1999: 210). In this process all points of contentions between the state and the society are seen as being erased. The institution of citizenship, according to Wendt's logic emerged out of this historical process as an egalitarian principle that excluded the "other" that did not share the same citizenship. Following this logic, the relations between individuals and the state are seen as being unproblematic.

State, according to Wendt, represents the best form of social organisation that provides for security by offering both protection from foreigners' assaults and well-being by keeping order and preventing individuals from hurting each other. Under this assumption behaviour is to be seen as

[41] Wendt, however, admits the importance of "corporate identity" in explaining foreign policy.

resulting from a mutual constitutive relationship between the "self" and the "other" that transcends the state-society interaction problem. This assumption keeps Wendt and us away from understanding the role of state-society interactions in shaping actor's behaviour, which appears to be of relevance in the interpretation of ethno-national conflict. This issue is discussed in the following section.

3.1.4. Wendt's Approach and War: An Assessment

Wendt's scholarship offers a constructivist and structuralist approach to the understanding of war and peace in international relations. The concept of collective identity viewed as a social signifier is introduced to explain war and cooperation in international relations. The structure constituted by ideas (culture) is the ones that according to Wendt (1996, 1999) provides the basis for an actor's knowledge and behaviour. Culture is viewed as helping an actor to find common solutions to problems and define its behaviour. How an agent thinks about the "other" and how it comes to frame identity, interests and the future actions of the "other" is supposed to depend upon the characteristics of the structure and the process of agent-structure interaction.

In the condition of Hobbesian anarchy, Wendt assumes that actors, which fear each other, develop identities in enmity terms. In this case, culture is

comprised of formalised practices of antagonism, hostility concerning the conception of the "other" and repetitive aggressive methods of conflict management. The culture constituted as such is supposed to define and redefine an actor's identity in enemy terms and indicate whom and what would constitute a serious threat to his existence as well. For Wendt, collective identities and the cultures that constitute them may be quite durable, although they are viewed as continuously in a process of construction. That is because as Wendt argues:

> Indeed, if anything, structural change should be quite difficult. As a self-fulfilling prophecy culture has natural homeostatic tendencies, and the more deeply it is internalised by the actors the stronger those tendencies will be (1999: 315).

Although, it is supposed that "the evolution of identities is a dialectic of actual and possible selves…there are no guarantees that the weight of the past will be overcome" (Wendt, 1999: 340). Thus, conflicting densities embedded in the negative collective memories of actors are viewed as persisting in time without major changes and as such, the possibility for the recurrence of conflict. Wendt posits this conclusion as such:

> The members of a system represent each other as enemies, eventually a 'tipping point' is reached at which these representations take over the logic of the system. At this point actors start to think of enmity as a property of the system rather than just of individual actors, and so feel compelled to represent all others as enemies simply because they are part of the system (Wendt, 1999: 264).

The change of existing conflictual structures is limited because as Wendt explains "once collective memories [structure] have been created it may be hard to shake their long-term effects, even if a majority of individuals have 'forgotten' them at any given moment" (1999: 163). Thus, the collective identity formation

would end up reproducing the Hobbesian anarchical nature of the international system. This is the case for Wendt because:

> [s]ometime [collective identity] reproduction is unproblematic because contestation is low, in which case taking them as given may be analytically useful. But in doing so we should not forget that what we take to be given is in fact a process that has simply been sufficiently stabilized by internal and external structures that it appears given. A methodology should not be a tacit ontology (1999: 340).

The possibility of change from enmity to friendly identities among actors is viewed as embedded in the argument about cultural transformation at the system level. For Wendt, system change is "frequency dependent." As more and more states represent each other as friends rather than enemies, "a tipping point" will be reached when this representation take over the system (1999: 264, see, also, 340). At this point, the possibility of war between friendly states would become nil. However, for Wendt this situation has a long way to become reality.

From these explanations two main implications can be drawn for our understanding of ethno-national conflict. Actors' engagement in conflict is to be seen as resulting from their conflicting identities, embedded in conflictual cultural structures, which indicate war as the appropriate solution to handle the situation. The conflict is expected to recur as long as actors see each other as enemies. Considering that the change from enmity to friendly identities is rather difficult, the conflict is to be seen as being almost a permanent condition of interrelations between actors that view each other as enemies. This framework can tell us little about the discursive practices, which encourage the use of violence. The Copenhagen School approach promises to address this issue by using the concept of "securitisation." This approach is dealt in the next section.

Furthermore, this approach cannot account for the "non-recurrence or the great deviations from and average pattern of recurrence" of conflict (Holsti, 1991: 301; see, also, Holsti, 1998), which provides us with a distorted picture of the relations between actors.

Similar to Waltz (1979), Wendt's social theory of international relations is state-centred. Wendt clearly admits that:

> Regardless of the extent to which interdependence blurs the *de facto* boundaries between domestic and foreign policies, in the contemporary international system authority is organized formally in a bifurcated fashion: vertically within states ('hierarchy'), horizontally between ('anarchy'). This is partly due to the nature of states, and partly to the international institution of sovereignty, in which states recognize each other as having exclusive political authority within separate territories. As long as political space is organized in this way, states will behave differently towards each other than they do towards their own societies (1999: 13).

The boundary between the state and the system as social constructions is presented in Wendt's approach as un-problematic. Consequently, the state is understood as a unitary and rational actor that has resolved the problems of unity and cohesion by the monopolisation of the means of coercion in the hands of a single authority.

Wendt, while recognising the existence of non-state actors that constrain state activity, at the same time dismisses their importance based on the assumption that:

> States are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channelled into the world system. It may be that non-state actors are becoming more important than states as initiators of change, but system change ultimately happens *through* states (Wendt, 1999: 9).

In Wendt's thinking, state and society (or state-nation) have matched each other and as such their objective interests are translated into needs, which do not contradict with each other. Whatever Wendt's theoretical justification is, treating the state an unitary actor and the referent object of analysis is subject to criticism (Booth, 1991a; Wæver at al, 1993; Shaw, 1994, 2000; Buzan et al., 1998; Bilgin, 2001, 2002, 2003).

Critical of Wendt's state-centred approach, Martin Shaw states: "state-centrism is an inadequate beginning" for Wendt's approach. In the state-centric approach of Wendt, "the key structural differentiation of national and international is taken for granted as foundational. Subjectivity enters only into how the separated 'international' sphere is constituted" (Shaw, 2000: 1). This assumption does not allow Wendt to see that an actor's identity is a dual process that reflects upon both internal and external processes. Discounting the relationship between the two processes is to ignore some of the most basic sources and dynamics of conflict in contemporary politics on the one hand and security community building on the other hand (Barnett, 1993; Adler and Barnett, 1998). In Paul Kowert's terms the lack of scrutiny over state's internal processes,

> [h]as implications for international relations: civil wars, spin-off crises, changing alliances patterns, the dissolution of existing states, and the constitution of new ones. It is easy to recognize the importance of such identity politics in international relations (1998: 101).

In Campbell's words "the social space of inside/outside is both made possible by and helps constitute a moral space of superior/inferior" (1992: 85). The

preservation of this distinction through the practice of “securing” the state through “discourses of danger” creates the possibilities of turning both aspects of identity (internal and external) to deal with the threatening “other” that, in turn, prioritises national interests and at the same time reconstitutes state’s political identity. This framework prevents us from understanding the consequences of the breakdown of state’s internal cohesion and threats that states cause to their own population or segments of them (Linklater, 1995; Moller, 2000), which represent the main causes of intra-state conflicts in contemporary politics.

Wendt’s approach beside its state-centrism that is shared with the traditional International Relations theories (and as such it is vulnerable to the same criticisms as they are), offers an intersubjective and constructivist explanation of war and peace in international relations. Thus, the key structures in the state system are considered to be intersubjective rather than material and actor identities and interests are in large part viewed as constructed by those structures. Therefore, since importance is given to socially constructed “meanings” and to causal mechanisms that construct and promote collective actor’s identities this approach offers interesting “interpretative understanding with causal explanation” (Lapid, 1996: 133). The priority that is given to culture and social identity and intersubjective “meaning” to explain the problem of collective action in international relations is the main contribution of this approach. By pointing to social identity, as a key link in both the mutual constitution of agent and structure and in the way agents relate to each other,

this approach helps our understanding of social aspects of ethno-national conflict. Further details about Wendt's contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict are discussed while looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 6.

3.2. The Copenhagen School's Approach and War.

Many scholars view nationalism and its equivalent, namely, nation-state ideal, as one of the several sources of instability in world politics. The process of matching state with nation has been crucial and the source of many wars in Europe aimed to get a close correlation between the state and the nation. In Western Europe this process seems to be almost exhausted while in Central and Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world this process is still in an earlier phase (Larabee, 1990/1991; Sugar, 1995; Todorova, 1995, 1997; Schopflin, 2000). So, nationalism and identity issues are to be seen at the root of violence. However, explanations about identity and its role in collective actions have been founded wanting in International Relations before the end of Cold War.

In defining and explaining the dynamics of current international relations different perspectives other than the state-centred ones need to be adopted. The changing practices of conflict in world politics during the 1990s,

according to Copenhagen School scholars[42] revealed that these dynamics "can be brought out by a constellation made up of at least three kinds of (non-like) units: states, nations and the EU" (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 249). The approach of the Copenhagen School scholars came as a theoretical challenge to classical state-centric approaches in International Relations. These scholars deal with issues such as nationalism and ethno-national conflict using a new theoretical conceptualisation of identity-security issues. For Wæver, et al., (1993) "society" is about identity. At the same time, society is seen as the referent object of security. This is the case because as Buzan and Wæver argue:

> 'Societies' defined in terms of identity could be seen as the referent object for some cases of securitisation, where that which could be lost was not sovereignty but identity. The two share the role of being the definition of existential threat: for a state, sovereignty defines when a threat is existential, because if a state is no longer sovereign, it is no longer a state; and similarly identity is the defining point regarding existential threats for a society because it defines whether 'we' are still us (1997: 242).

However, the state in this approach is not dismissed as a referent object of security. Hence, both society and the state are considered referent objects of security, both assuming the same importance in explaining security problems.

Why is society chosen as referent object of analysis of security? This choice is justified based on the fact that "societal insecurities" over ethnic, national and religious identities have become as important as "national

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[42] The Copenhagen School was named as such for the first time by Bill McSeeeney (1996). The Copenhagen School acknowledges the collective work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre, Morten Kelstrup, Jaap de Wilde, Haakan Wiberg, Ula Holms, Bjorn Moler and many others that for reasons of space can not be all mentioned here.

insecurities." Hence, this scholarship looks about nationalism and identity implication on security issues. So, the societal security like national security in traditional approaches is considered as an important mobilising force for collective action including war and peace in international relations. In this case, security is cast as an issue of the survival of society, which, in turn, is defined in identity terms (Wæver et al., 1993).

Furthermore, the dynamics of the events in the post-Cold War era, have demonstrated according to Copenhagen School's scholars, that in many cases, the state, instead of being the protector of its citizens' rights, has become a source of threat to them (Moller, 2000). This situation of insecurity in many cases is expected to lead to conflict that need to be studied and state seems not the right referent object of analysis. For the scholars of this approach, the current dynamics of world politics have revealed, "society detached from the state" (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 248). Therefore, society is to be seen as a referent object of security and for the same reason of conflict as well.

By this choice, at the same time, the Copenhagen School scholars seem to be looking for a concept of security that is not reduced at the individual level or "negating state security" (Wæver et al., 1993: 24). In Wæver' words:

> Whenever security is defined via individual security there is a high risk that the core of the classical security problematic which one is allegedly trying to redefine, not forget, will be missed. A new agenda may be set successfully only at the price of losing one's grip on something, which is also very real: the specific type of interplay among human collectivities, which follows the logic of security. This classical logic can neither be studied nor avoided by measuring how secure

individuals are. Security in this sense is a collective phenomenon and the way these collectivities relate is a trait of the system (1993: 24).

Wæver's position is not much different from the one of Buzan in his book *Peoples, States and Fears.* Buzan argues: "[t]o pursue individual security as a subject in its own right would take one deeply into the realm of politics, psychology and sociology" (1991: 35). Buzan, in contrast to his previous state-centric approach to security that is central to his seminal book *People, States and Fear*, redefined his position in his later works, by dropping the state as the only referent object of security. He argues for his change as follows: "[w]e argue that what is or is not prime in international security, including the state, depends on historical conditions" (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 249). So, the Copenhagen School scholars would present this change as an answer to the dynamics of conflict in contemporary politics, which have encouraged according to them, transcending the individual and state levels of analysis. This is the case because conflict is a collective action that cannot be the responsibility of the individuals although they are the subjects that experience its violence.

Although, this approach does not deal explicitly with the case of ethno-national conflict, its theoretical underpinnings can offer interesting insights that would help our understanding of ethno-national conflict, since society can be considered as a referent object of analysis.[43] In this approach, the state and

[43] Wæver provides a more detailed explanation of the choice of society and state as a referent object of security in his article "Securitization and Desecuritization" (1995: 53-54).

society are seen as autonomous actors that stand for the political will of their members.

3.2.1. Society, Societal Identity, Societal Security and War

The Copenhagen School's approach points to concepts such as society and societal identity to examine security issues in contemporary international relations. These concepts can be used to study ethno-national conflict as well, since security issues and conflict seem to be interrelated. In Buzan's terms "societies are fundamentally about identity. They are about what enables a group of peoples to refer to themselves as 'we'" (1993: 5-6). In Ole Wæver's words: "[s]urvival for a society is a question of identity, because this is the way a society talks about existential threats: if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as us" (1993, 25-26). This charge has a somewhat double-edged quality emphasising both the continuing importance of preserving the processes and practices that construct peoples' and groups' self-image and perpetuating at the same time their existence. So, society is to be understood in terms of identity and security is to be seen as presuming the need for identity preservation.

Wæver distinguishes between the definition of societal identity and its political usage. He defines societal identity in function of ethnicity and religion. The reason for this choice is justified by the fact that they "have acquired

prominence...because of their historical association with the development of the modern state" and have created well-established structures of representation that in time remains almost unchanged (Wæver, 1993: 23). Different from the number of social identities that a group is supposed to have, national identity is considered in this approach as the most important collective identity that challenges all other kinds of identities.

Wæver writes: "national identity is usually able to organise the other identities around itself" (1993: 22). That is because, national identity is viewed as the glue that bind peoples together when facing vulnerabilities caused by scarcity, violence and quest for a self-positive image, which generate respectively "interests of physical security, recognition by the other actors, and economic development" (Adler, 1997: 252). In such a case, national identity acquires a primordial character that marks common loyalties, which, in turn, have the capacity to mobilise for collective actions based on general collective approval.

In the definition of national identity, Wæver draws upon Anthony Smith. Smith defines a nation as "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (1991: 14). Wæver sees nationality as a manifestation of societal identity and shared property of the group based on cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic ties.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen School's scholars view identity as "an intersubjectivity constituted value" that stands at the base of society (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 245). For them, identity is constituted in the process of interactions among a nation's people, which with time precipitate in a common identification, which patterns would be hardly malleable in normal conditions. Accordingly, identity is to be understood as being "the same throughout the period relevant for an analysis...Identities as other social constructions can petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with" (1997: 245). This approach is considered by Buzan and Wæver (1997) as

> [a] social constructivist position 'all the way down'…that focuses on how the very security quality is always socially constructed: issues are not security issues by themselves, but defined as such as a result of political processes (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 243).

Yet, for them identity can change in time by the redefinition of the "self" and the "other." Hence, change is to be seen as contingent upon a new circle of interactions. However, for research purposes, Wæver proposes to see identity as fixed at the moment of analysis. This position is not any different from the one presented by Wendt (1996, 1999).

At the same time, Wæver looks at the political significance of societal identity to explain the security problems of the post-Cold War period. He later uses this aspect of identity to explain "securitisation," which is discussed in the next section. For Wæver, the political significance of societal identity should be seen in its ability to be a referent object of security. As Wæver argues:

> Societal identity is the one that is not only robust in construction and comprehensive enough in its following, but also broad enough in the quality of

> identity it carries, to enable it to compete with the territorial state as a political organizing principle. A societal identity is able to reproduce itself independently from the state and even in opposition to the state's organizational principle…societal identities provide legitimacy for governments, and partly contradictory, as when societal division provide the basis for assaults on governmental legitimacy and authority (1993: 23).

To assess the causes of ethno-national conflict, then we should scrutinize the nature of threats to societal identity to define the nature of security problems that could lead to conflict. Society as a referent object of security draws on a complex combination of material/physical and sociological/emotional needs. First, society is expected to satisfy the individuals' needs of survival and well-being. Second, it provides the possibilities for development and improvement. Thus, societal identity is seen implying the creation and the preservation of the conditions in which the members could develop and be safe. Threats to society's social and physical conditions, which might be translated as threats to its survival, are viewed as having negative consequences, which may even justify the emergence of conflict.

In this approach, the examination of the nature of relations between state and society is seen as being helpful in the identification of the sources of the security problems. In the case state and society match each other; the relation between the two would serve, according to Buzan (1991), the consolidation of state's social cohesion, which contributes, at the same time, to the reproduction without problem of state and society identity that has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion. In that, Buzan is in agreement with Wendt's

(1999) claims about the constructed nature of international politics and the role of state's social identity in behaviour.

In the case that the state does not match with society than the interactions between the two can be problematic. Then, “society” is to be seen as representing a potential opponent to the state. In this case, as Pierr Hassner argues, the state of citizenship “is being jeopardized by the trend towards national, sub-national and ethnic re-territorialisation” (1993: 129). The claims of different ethno-national groups for self-determination in the face of oppression from the state, would explain the emergence of conflicts involving disputes over autonomy as a challenge to state's sovereignty.

Threats to societal identity some time assume the form of ethnic cleansing even genocide (that aims to cause irreparable damages to the “other”). In extreme cases the objective of such actors is aiming at the elimination of the “other's” existence. This explains why civilians, women, children and youth are chosen as targets for ethnic cleansing. In this case, the security of society is seen as related with the preservation of identity, defined as the process that constructs peoples and groups self-image and perpetuates their existence (Wæver, 1993: 25). Hence, identity is to be understood as an important determinant for the security of the group since, as Schopflin suggests: “identity offers individuals the security of community and solidarity of shared patterns of meanings, a bounded world in which to live and in which one can find

others like oneself” (2000: 10). Accordingly, identity is seen as a mechanism that provides for security; this is why it receives importance vis-à-vis the “other.”

Threats to societal identity are expected to be manifested with “the collapse of the state monopoly on the use of force and recognize social relations which forces an ethnicisation of society” (Schoch, 2001: 57). So, threats to society and societal identity are to be seen as creating a “societal security” problem. Wæver defines the concept as such:

> [s]ocietal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or acute threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom (1993: 23).

Buzan and Wæver, by introducing the concept of “societal security,” offer an understanding of identity that makes it operational and helpful to study ethno-national conflict. To understand the dynamic of conflict this approach would suggest to scrutinise the security and societal identity interaction. The societal identity as the social glue that binds members of society together operates at two levels, which vary in terms of outwards distinguishability and resistance to threats. For Wæver, the outwards distinguishability reflects upon the intrinsic characteristics of the group that are expected to persist over time and resist change, which for Wendt are embedded on actor’s ”corporate identity.” Societal identity presumes also differences that depend on intersubjective understandings of the group and the “other.” Differences do not self-generate security problems. Differences can be source of richness, dynamism and progress or vice versa depending on negotiated interests and collective norms,

which are viewed as congruent to mutual responsiveness of the independent agents.

In this approach identity becomes a referent object of security when it is used as a political leverage that mirrors conflicts of interest on the preservation of power dominance and established structures of relationships, which might take the form of a "security dilemma." In difference with the traditional "security dilemma," "societal security dilemma" develops out of ideational rather than material processes. Thus, the actors while competing to strengthen their societal identity would escalate a "security dilemma," which, in turn, would lead to conflict (Bilgin, 2003). A more detailed contribution of this approach to our understanding of ethno-national conflict is discussed while looking at the Kosovo/a conflict. However, to better understand the dynamics of this "security dilemma," we have to see what Copenhagen School can tell about the "securitisation" process and the role it plays in the dynamics of conflict.

3.2.2. Operationalising Societal Identity: "Securitisation" and War

The Copenhagen School's approach points to the concept of "securitisation" to explain the dynamics of the contemporary security issues. "Securitisation" is to be seen as a process that "takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames an issue either as a special kind of politics or as above

politics" (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). This approach looks at security as a practice of social interaction. To cite Wæver, security is:

> [a] specific field of social interactions, with a specific set of actions and codes, known by a set of agents as the security field…National security is simply social in the sense of being constructed intersubjectively in a specific field, and it should not be measured against some real or true yardstick of 'security' derived from (contemporary) domestic society (1995: 51).

Wæver defines "securitisation" as a "speech act" through which an actor intends "by uttering security…to move a particular development into a specific area, and there by claims a specific right to use whatever means are necessary to block it" (1995: 55). So, by labelling a particular development as a security problem, it became a security issue. Wæver (1995, 1998) presents the "speech act" as a domestic discursive process used by elites (of state or society) rather than other actors (Wæver, 1995: 54) to achieve pre-defined political goals.

"Securitisation" is to be seen as a process that relies on arguments that make reference to the survival of the actor (state or society). However, the questions of survival need not necessarily be of a military nature and an actor need not necessary be the state. The Copenhagen School's scholars view society as equally important as the state, and referent object of security. To explain the causes of conflict this approach would suggest to study the process through which a chosen development is claimed as a serious security threat to the very existence of the actor and how an appropriate audience accepts this threat. In this context, conflict would be explained as the response of the "securitising actor" (Roe, 1999: 196, footnote 21) to the claimed threat.

Accordingly, conflict is to be viewed as the end result of a successful "securitisation" process.

Different from traditional power politics explanations that emphasise the material aspects of power in explaining behaviour, the Copenhagen School's approach emphasises the causal role of the "speech act." In the conceptualisation of the "speech act," the contextual and intersubjective character of security issues is emphasised. Following the earlier explanations about the fact that the identity of the actors is seen as petrified at the moment of analysis, the accounts of the "speech act" define security as a question of survival, and identity as a determinant of society. In this approach, identity alone does not define threats to actors' existence, however it can "be the definition of external threats" (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 242).

To explain ethno-national conflict, the Copenhagen School's approach would suggest to study the process of the successful "securitisation" of the ethnic aspects of identity. "Securitization" is to be understood as the strategy used to create rather than respond to threats (Gagnon, 1994/1995: 194-195). However, successful "securitisation" is not seen as a process where actors are free to do what they choose to do. In this approach, the "speech act" elements should reflect upon a "specific rhetorical [social] structure" that facilitates the conditions for the 'securitisation' of a claim" (Buazan at al. 1998: 26). In that the Copenhagen School is in agreement with Wendt that social structures (culture)

“shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behaviour” (1999: 71).

In the “securitisation” process, the narratives in the “speech act” are suggested to be exploiting ethnic differences to create a political context in which the interests of the actors are claimed to be in danger. The other aspects of identity are silenced in this created environment. Thus, in the case of images of threat to the nation, a context where actor’s ethnicity is all that matters is expected to be created and other identities are not considered relevant. By using the “securitization” process to provoke conflict the ruling elite creates the possibility for repositioning itself and receive advantages that would have been unthinkable in “normal” politics when identity was un-problematised.

In the case of “normal” politics the rationalist models that hold identity and interest constant might fare well in explaining actor’s behaviour. However, these models do not hold in the case identities are securitised. Differently from the traditional rationalist approaches, Copenhagen School’s approach by looking at the “securitisation” processes that put the pre-existing identities in a discursive practice is able to tell us how identity is translated into behaviour in the current practices of conflict.

3.2.3. The Copenhagen School's Approach and War: An Assessment

The Copenhagen School offers a comprehensive theoretical framework for the understanding of ethno-national conflict. This approach by pointing to societal identity and security would explain conflict as emerging from an escalated "security dilemma" that is build on actors' competing identities. Like Wendt, this approach points to identity, which is viewed as socially constructed in the process of interaction to analyse behaviour. Differently from Wendt, this approaches focuses to one aspect of international relations, that of security. On the other hand, society is seen to be about identity, which refers to ethnic and religious loyalties. The contrast with Wendt, who takes states as the object of analysis, is pronounced in the introduction of the society as a referent object of analysis. This framework fits better the changing practices in international relations and opens the way for the study of ethnic and national conflict in a more comprehensive way.

The other contribution of this approach is its constructivism, which is similar to the one of Wendt. So, the "shared meanings" are considered to be created in the process of actors' interactions and be responsible for actor's behaviour. The Copenhagen School's approach introduces beside societal identity the concept of "securitisation," which explains the process through which identity is translated into behaviour, and helps our understanding of the dynamics of contemporary security problems and conflict.

Nevertheless, we need to be aware of this approach's weaknesses. In the Copenhagen School approach society is presented as a referent object of analysis on equal footing with the state. This association of "society" with "state" according to Lapid and Kratochwil runs the risk of "leading us straight back to a narrow statist matrix" (1996: 119). This is the case, because identity in this approach is assumed as identifying the group and being little more than mutual recognition of 'like' units interacting in a system" (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: 119). For Bill McSweeney, the objective definition of the concept of society and identity in the Copenhagen School approach assumes "the same objectivity and ontological status as the state" (1999: 90). Being in the same line with Wendt, this understanding does not allow us to understand the intra-group interaction dynamics, which can be a source of conflict. Therefore, society as a referent object can be criticised with the same arguments as the state-centric approaches and be responsible for hiding some of the sources of tensions that can be the cause of current ethno-national conflict. This argument prepared the ground for the following critique.

Second, for McSweeney, societal identity in the Copenhagen School approach just identifies society. Identity as a cognitive concept "is stressed to the point that loses sight of an essential material feature of all questions of security and identity formation" that is interests (McSweeney, 1999: 126). For McSweeney, this approach fails to give a proper role to interests in the

perception of security issues and the definition and transformation of collective identity.

In the Copenhagen School approach as in the case of Wendt, interests are subordinated to identity following the logic of structure's primacy over agency. McSweeney claims the opposite. For him, "[t]he range of interests available to us can cause us to reinvent the social identity appropriate to them" (McSweeney, 1999: 127). Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's assumption about identity dismiss the primacy of interests over identity. However, McSweeney thinks that actor's interests should have almost the same weight in explaining behaviour in international relations. Therefore, this assumption would ask to see the causes of conflict behind actors' interests constituted in the process of interaction.

Furthermore, in the Copenhagen School approach, society is defined as a function of "a single value and interest" (McSweeney, 1999: 90). This conceptualisation, for McSweeney may excuse racist claims or ethnic cleansings, by allocating identities in an "ontological hierarchy" that, is not admissible and permissible for a society that speak for the respect and equality of human rights. In this case, as McSweeney argues, "the security is not there because peoples have separate identities, it may be well the case that they have separate identities because of the security problem" (1999: 73). This underlines the fact that identity not only shapes behaviour and interests, but it is also

shaped by interests. From that it can be assumed that conflict should not only be expected out of conflicting or competing identities as it would be the case in Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's approaches explanations. Hence, interests for McSweeney would have the potential to transform otherness in exclusivist terms; therefore, they should be equally considered to explain conflict.

This chapter looked at what Wendt's and Copenhagen School's approaches can tell us about ethno-national conflict. Both approaches offer a constructivist and structuralist approach to war, which allow for a combined interpretative and causal explanation of behaviour. This framework can easily be applied to study conflict. Hence, conflict in these approaches is to be understood as a socially constructed practice developing out of the shared meanings of participants. At the same time, conflict recurrence is to be seen depending on the properties of the structure that are identity (social identity for Wendt and societal identity for the Copenhagen School) and culture, although, neither approaches specially relies on the concept of culture (Pasic, 1996: 85). Conflict is to be understood as a social practice embedded on actors' collective knowledge about one another.

There are two problems with both approaches that are related with their conceptualisation of identity and actor-centrism. Both approaches look at identity (socially constructed and petrified at the moment of the analysis) and

culture to explain collective behaviour in international relations. These approaches assume an established conflictual relationship, which would be hard to change, which justify, at the same time the idea of the recurrence of the conflict in time.

At the same time, the actor-centrism prevents both approaches from recognising tensions within the unit of analysis, which can provide guidance for understanding alternative sources of conflict. Although, actor-centrism is a general weakness of both approaches their constructivism and structuralism allow us to develop interesting accounts of the social aspects of the conflict neglected from the other approaches. These constructivist approaches are used to study Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 6.

Part II: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND THE KOSOVO/A CONFLICT.

CHAPTER 4

Traditional International Relations Theories and the Kosovo/a Conflict

The traditional approaches of International Relations discussed in Chapter 1 offer alternative principles that can be used to look at the Kosovo/a conflict. Chapter 4 presents the explanations that traditional approaches offer to the Kosovo/a conflict in three sections. The first section examines what Realism can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. Realism would point to power as the underlying cause of the Kosovo/a conflict. The second section discusses Rationalism and assesses its contribution to our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. By looking at order Rationalism would allows us to account for the intersubjectively shared definitions of the Kosovo/a conflict in the society of states. The third section assesses the contribution of Revolutionism in

explaining the case study. Revolutionism refers to emancipation to examine the Kosovo/a conflict. This chapter concludes by summarising the contribution of Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in explaining the Kosovo/a conflict.

4.1. Realism and the Kosovo/a Conflict

Realism would explain the Kosovo/a conflict by looking at Serbia's power (classical Realism) and security (neo-Realism) interests. In the realist interpretations of conflict, Serbia is understood as a rational unitary unit. Hence, the Kosovo/a conflict would be resulting from Serbian leadership's efforts to manipulate power and opportunities with the aim of preserving and strengthening its dominant position vis-à-vis the other states of the region.[44] This section discusses both classical realist and neo-realist approaches to conflict. It concludes with some remarks on the weaknesses of Realism to our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict.

4.1.1. Classical Realism and the Kosovo/a Conflict

Classical Realism would interpret the Kosovo/a conflict by pointing to the state of Serbia and its power as defined in military terms. Thus, the conflict in

Kosovo/a is to be seen resulting from the efforts of Serbian leadership to maximise power. A stronger Serbia, according to classical Realism, stands the best chance for survival and for securing its borders. By pointing to power and the efforts of Serbia to maximise it, realist scholars would explain wars that ravaged Yugoslavia including the conflict in Kosovo/a as Serbia's state wars (Cigar, 1995: 62-85; Caratan, 1997: 293-296). To cite Branko Caratan, "[t]he conflict did not have the characteristics of a civil war because Serbian state planned, organized, armed and supplied the war in all parts of Yugoslavia" (1997: 294).[45]

Explaining conflict by referring to power, realist accounts draw attention to the fact that nowadays, the acquisition of power is a difficult job for the state. As Ronnie D. Lipschutz argues "[w]ithin a liberal framework, efforts to capture power are now seen as internationally legitimate only if they occur through some form of nominally democratic electoral process" (1998: 51). By applying this reasoning to the Yugoslav case it can be concluded that the lack of inherited democratic structures and practices would exclude from Serbia the possibility of acquiring power through normal electoral processes.

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[44] Works that explain the conflict from this perspective include: Mearsheimer (1990), Banac (1992), Cigar (1995), Caratan (1997), Judah (1997), Lipschutz (1998) and Aybet (2000).
[45] The idea of the Serb guilt is contestable. Serbs cannot be blamed for all that happened in Yugoslavia. Yet, "the Serbian leadership must take the lion's share of the blame" (Judah, 1997: 75) because as Tim Judah explains they acted first.

However, from a realist perspective the efforts of the political leadership to create “a state of one’s own” are to be viewed as “another strategy available to those seeking power and control” (Lipschutz, 1998: 51). Under this strategy “[i]f one cannot capture power within an existing state, why not create a new one, within which one’s brethren or associates in political belief do constitute a majority” (Lipschutz, 1998: 51). Accordingly, realist approaches would understand Serbia’s efforts of building a “state of it’s own,” as an act of maximising power and strength. At the same time, this effort has to be seen as the underlying cause that led Serbia to get involved in the Kosovo/a conflict.

The intentions of Serbian elite to maximise Serbia’s power through the creation of a “state of one’s own” can be seen in the slogan “all Serbs in one state” that was issued at the start of the Yugoslav conflicts in the early 1990s. Hence, Serbian leadership’s involvement in the four consequent wars[46] and policies of centralisation within both the Federation and Serbia proper (resulting in the removal of the autonomous region status from Kosovo/a and Vojvodina) would make sense for realist scholars if this actions are interpreted in terms of power (Ramet, 1992; Banac, 1992; Cigar, 1995; Caratan, 1997; Anastasijevic, 2000; Pavkovic, 2001).

[46] The Serb-Croat war in Croatia, Serb-Moslem and the Serb-Croat wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb-Albanian war in Serbia. Except for the Kosovo/a case, Serbia did not wage all the wars directly. In the other wars Serbia was supporting Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Hence, Serbia’s support for Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and in a direct way its involvement in Kosovo/a are seen in a realist perspective as state's efforts to maximise power. Power of Serbia is expected to be maximised by including detached territories inhabited by ethnic Serbs from the other republics of Yugoslavia (the Srbska Republic from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Krajina from Croatia) and keeping under control the adjacent territories such as Kosovo/a and Vojvodina although a Serbian majority was not present (Cigar, 1995; Caratan, 1997; Anastasijevic, 2000). Hence, including all the Serbs living in Yugoslavia in one state means the creation of a state twice in number and territory of what is the present Serbia. To cite Tim Judah, the wars in Yugoslavia were waged in order to establish Serbia as “the strongest nation in the region to lead and dominate” (1997: 59) the other nations next to its borders.

Classical realist explanations for Serbia’s behaviour and the conflict in Kosovo/a can be summarized as follows. The demand of the Albanians for the secession of Kosovo/a is to be understood as a threat to the power of the Serbian state. This threat is to be seen as magnified by similar demands for secession in Vojvodina and Sandjak by the Hungarians and the Muslim minorities respectively (Clement, 1997). Hence, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which left territories inhabited by Serbs outside Serbia’s borders, and serious problems in Kosovo/a with the Albanians, would justify from a realist perspective, Serbian leadership’s concerns regarding its power. In this context the use of military force to establish a state of all Serbs is to be expected, since

Serbia is viewed as having military superiority compared to the other republics. This superiority is based on the accounts that the Yugoslav army was under Serbia's control (Larrabee, 1990/1991; Caratan, 1997; Aybet, 2000; Dérens, 2003).[47] The decision of Serbia's leadership to wage war in Kosovo/a and other parts of Yugoslavia for Realism at the same time is to be viewed as a rational calculation of Serbia's national interests in terms of power.

4.1.2. Neo-Realism and the Kosovo/a Conflict

The neo-realist approach points to both the end of bipolarity and the return of multipolarity in the international system to explain the increase in frequency of ethno-national conflicts such as the Kosovo/a case (Mearsheimer, 1990). According to neo-realists scholars, during Cold War (bipolar system), security threats in international relations were limited to the ones coming from the confrontation of the two superpowers. In this case the two super-powers are viewed as successfully containing, even suppressing, all other kind of threats in international politics. Hence, to use John Mearsheimer's words, during the Cold War Yugoslavia is to be seen as being "secure from [the] other as well as from attack by the rival great powers" (1990: 3). So, in the condition of bipolarity, each

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[47] In the framework of the legal dissolution of Yugoslavia, the equal distribution of assets of the dissolving Federation to the successor states did not apply to the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) (Aybet, 2000). Therefore, the Serbs inherited the lion's share of the Yugoslav army and controlled it through the officers' corps and non-commissioned officers 70 percent of whom were Serbs (Caratan, 1997: 295; Larrabee, 1990/1991: 71).

superpower, while looking to take the Yugoslav Federation under its own sphere of influence, is expected to have protected Yugoslavia from different threats.

In a bipolar system, neo-Realism views states' choices to acquire, increase and project power as being limited. According to Mearsheimer, under these circumstances, states "no longer providing for their own security lacked the incentive to whip up nationalism to bolster public support for national defence" (1990: 6). Yugoslavia, in the neo-realists' view, represents a good example for this assumption. The transition of the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity is to be understood as the underlying cause of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

The neo-realist perspective would understand multipolarity as the cause of the main pathologies of Yugoslavia and Serbia's wars. To cite John Major:

> The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia. Once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred (John Major as cited by Malcolm, 1995: 5).

The neo-realist approach would explain Serbia's behaviour as being motivated by "expectations about future trends and assessments of the likely effects of today's policies on tomorrow's distribution of power resources" (Wohlforth, 1993: 98). Following this logic, the crumbling of the Yugoslav Federation would account for Serbia's worries about its security and power. Haakan Wiberg articulates these frustrations as follows "the Yugoslav project and the Greater

Serbia project were…complementary to each other" providing "two basic guarantees important for the Serbian nation: the protection of Serb identity and safety under the Federation coverage" (1993: 100; see, also, Banac, 1992). This account suggests that the perception of multiple threats emanating from the dissolution of Yugoslav Federation is expected to fuel Serbia's "security dilemma," which would explain Serbia's engagement in war(s) of last resort. Hence, Milosevic's efforts to seize control of the Yugoslav Federation through policies of centralisation in the framework of the Federation and Serbia proper[48] should be explained in the light of the "security dilemma" accelerated in the condition of multipolarity.[49]

Furthermore, the neo-realist perspective explains that multipolar system imposes upon states greater threats than the bipolar one. The multipolar system is expected to encourage states' search for zones of influence as an effort of establishing the balance of power. In this unstable environment the possibilities for the recurrence of war are considered to be high (Mearsheimer, 1990; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Kupchan, 1998). The great powers' policies in the pursuit of zones of influence in the Balkans and the bandwagoning of the states of the region, in the condition of multipolarity, would be considered in a neo-realist perspective as the underlying causes of conflict.

[48] For Milosevic's policies of centralisation see, for example Cigar (1995), Caratan (1997), Judah (1997), Pavkovic (2000).

The credibility of these explanations is supported in the neo-realist accounts by drawing parallels between the post-Cold War situation and the one before World War I (WWI) in Europe and in the Balkans. That is, before WWI, the Balkan actors were manipulating opportunities to increase their power by using the card of nationalism[50] and alliances with the great powers of that time. The great powers of Europe were dragged into region's affairs to help drawing the borders of the region. But their contribution is viewed as reflecting their geo-strategic interests in the region as opposed to the interests of regional states (Danopoulos and Messas, 1997). Nationalism combined with great power rivalry at the international and regional levels in the condition of multipolarity are to be seen as the plausible causes of the Balkan's wars in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that later led the whole of Europe into WWI (Toynbee, 1923; Seton-Watson, 1935).[51] In this accounts nationalism is understood in instrumental terms. It is seen as the ideology that is used to either mobilise an army (Mearsheimer, 1992; Posen, 1993) or change the redistribution of territory. The consequences of nationalism are viewed as affecting the distribution of power in the region and challenging the established balance of power at the regional and international level that is accounted for as the underlying cause of WWI.

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[49] We are obliged to refer to both Yugoslavia and Serbia, the first one for the Cold War period and the later for after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation.

[50] Posen (1993) also, views nationalism as a strategy of the nation aiming to boost and project groups' power.

Through drawing parallels with a previous multipolar period in world history, neo-realists scholars would like to give credibility to their explanations about the causes of wars in Yugoslavia (Larrabee, 1990/91; Mearsheimer, 1990). Accordingly, neo-realist scholars would pointing to the political games of the current great powers, which saw the need to be active in the Balkans in order to protect their own interests and "pursue a relative power advantage over the other states" (Desch, 1996: 361), as the underlying cause of the Kosovo/a conflict.

In these explanations the support of Germany and the United States (US) for the Kosova Liberating Army (KLA)[52] and their siding with the Albanians in the Rambouillet negotiations[53] are to be understood as affecting the balance of power in the region. The alliance of the US with the Albanians of Kosovo/a is to be understood in the light of American interests in the region. Hence, some observes suggested that Kosovo/a represent the US's zone of influence in the

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[51] See, also, Todorova (1997: 116-139) for a more detailed account of the literature that blames the rivalry and nationalism of the Balkan's states for causing WWI.

[52] According to the data of transnational peace organizations, the German intelligence first, then the US Central Intelligence Agency, CIA and private mercenary companies, did their utmost to make the KLA a forceful actor in the province from 1993 onwards. See, also, for more details in this issue: Oberg (2000), Chossudovsky (1999).

[53] The first round of Rambouillet negotiations was held on 6-23 February 1999. The second round was held from 15 to 18 March 1999. Only the Kosovo/a Albanian representatives signed the Peace Agreement. The Agreement had five main points: immediate cessation of violence; the withdrawal of FRY military, policy and paramilitary forces from Kosovo/a; the stationing in Kosovo/a of an international military force led by NATO; the safe return of all civilians and displaced peoples; political solution for the autonomy of Kosovo/a. Different sources claim that the text of the agreement was prepared in such a way that was going to receive a "yes" from the Albanians and a "no" from the Serbs. This situation is expected to establish Kosovo/a as an American zone of influence. The Albanians are considered to serve American interest in the region Oberg (2000), Chossudovsky (1999).

Balkans. The construction of Bonsteal Air Base in Kosovo/a that can replace Aviano Air Base in Italy (one of the primary European airfields of the U.S. Air Force) can be mentioned among other facts in the support of raised assumption. Hence, the US allying with the Kosovo/a's Albanians to the disfavour of the Serbs (Oberg, 2000; Chossudovsky, 1999) should be seen as an action that disrupted the balance of power in the region, as such, it can be seen as an underlying cause of violence.

On the other hand, Russia's alignment with Serbia is to be understood in the framework of Russia's policies of extending zones of influence in the Balkans (Levitin, 2000: 131).[54] The duration of NATO's air campaign in Kosovo/a for 78 days, is to be assessed in this perspective as an example that show how the alliance between Russia and Serbia[55] translated in terms of power did shape the behaviour of the latter.

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[54] Different sources claim that Russia favoured a close relationship with Milosevic's regime. First, it is mentioned the special relationship developed between Russian military intelligence and the Belgrade regime. Second, the exchanges of visits between Moscow and Belgrade high officials that became more frequent on the eve of the Kosovo/a conflict, including the visit of Milosevic to Moscow and his meeting with Yeltsin in June 1998, are mentioned as being of relevance for this relationship (Reuters, 21 June 1998). Furthermore, calls for saving Slav kinship and the creation of a Pan-Slavic Union drafted by the Committee on Legislation, Judicial and Legal Reform and its Committee on International Affairs of the Russian Duma, but ever approved, is accounted as another aspect of this close relationship (Reuters News Service, 06 November 1998). In the neo-realist perspective these close relations are to e weighted in terms of power and creation of zones of influence.

[55] The situation was considered by Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president at the time, as a serious threat to Russia's own security. He is recorded as having denounced the act as a "naked aggression" and warned that Russia reserved the right to take "adequate measures, including military ones, to defend …the overall security of Europe" (Niall, 26 March 1999). Different agencies reported that all cooperation between Russia and NATO was suspended and Russia's military and diplomatic representatives were recalled from NATO headquarters (ITAR-TASS-World Service, 23 March 1999); Duma abandoned the ratification of the Start III arms reduction treaty (Daily Telegraph, 03 April 1999).

To sum up, neo-Realism holds the view that in a multipolar world, states try to maximise their security by resorting to power accumulation and alliances with the great powers. In these context the preservation of the balance of power is difficult both at regional and international level. The disruption of the balance of power in the condition of anarchy is to be seen as the fundamental cause of conflict.

4.1.3. Realism and the Kosovo/a Conflict: A Critique

Realist accounts points to Serbia's quest for power and security to explain the Kosovo/a conflict. However, power and security, while important, cannot be the only determinants of Serbia's behaviour. The weaknesses of Realism in explaining the case study lie mainly on its state-centric outlook (Bilgin, 1999; Wyn Jones, 1999) and single logic of anarchy (Wendt, 1992). First, the state-centred outlook of Realism is of little help to our understanding of the causes of conflict. The realist accounts would point to Serbia as a unitary actor to explain the case. This assumption does not allow us to account for state-society relationship as an important determinant of state's behaviour (Campbell, 1993; Wæver et al., 1993; Holsti, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998). Hence, in the realist explanations, the other party in the conflict, the Kosovo/a Albanians as an ethnically defined group within the state of Serbia, and their claims for self-

determination are seen in function of Serbia's national interests or need for security.

Furthermore, the state-centred perspective of the realist approaches would point to power either as an end in itself (classical Realism) or as a means to an end (neo-Realism) to explain the Kosovo/a conflict. Looking at the recent historical facts, Serbia, after the removal of the autonomous status of Kosovo/a in 1989, assumed full control over the province. So, Serbia did fulfil its aim of creating a "state of its own" at least in military and institutional terms, thus, maximising its power vis a vis the others. Then, why did Serbia felt the need to carry on with its policy of ethnic cleansing against the Albanians in Kosovo/a? Power based explanations cannot account alone for this behaviour of Serbia in Kosovo/a. In Chapter 6 is argued that identity is a better referent to explain the policies of the Serbian government toward the Albanians.

Second, the realist approach looks at anarchy as the underlying cause of conflict. This single "logic of anarchy" excludes cooperation between states as a possible situation in international relations.[56] This assumption, however, is contradicted by the practice of international involvement in the Kosovo/a case. Thus, although there were divergences among major international players about

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[56] Wendt (1992, 1999) views anarchy as what states make of it and as such there are three types of anarchy in international relations: Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian. Realism considers only the case of Hobbesian anarchy.

their respective attitudes toward the Kosovo/a conflict,[57] there was cooperation to end the violence. Close consultations took place to settle the conflict between Russia and NATO. The UN Security Council resolutions 1160 (31 March 1998) and 1199 (23 September 1998) were approved with the full consent of the UN Security Council members (China abstained).

Furthermore, there was cooperation in the framework of the Contact Group, including Russia, before and during the Rambouillet negotiations. The intermediation of the Russian envoy helped to finalise a military-technical agreement, which led to the withdrawal of the Serb forces from Kosovo/a and the establishment of the peace implementation mission, KFOR in Kosovo/a (10 June 1999). Therefore, the accounts of cooperation of great powers in the case of Kosovo/a conflict are inconsistent with the explanations of Realism that foresee only competition and contradiction over the zones of influence between states in international relations. Therefore, Realism does not get to the heart of the problem: the causes of conflict (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997).

Third, in the neo-realist accounts, the Kosovo/a conflict is explained as a by-product of multipolarity, which is considered to increase state's insecurities and make the balance of power harder to be achieved. Under these circumstances war is expected to occur more frequently. According to these explanations, multipolarity is to be seen as the fundamental cause of conflict.

[57] The major players in international politics did consider the conflict as an internal conflict. The

However, the conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians for the control of Kosovo/a is not new. So, it is difficult to relate this conflict occurrence with the end of bipolarity. Recent historical evidence reveals several clashes between the two communities during the Cold War period.

Accordingly, the Kosovo/a Albanians unsuccessfully rebelled and tried to secede from the second Yugoslav Federation (1944) several times. For example, the Albanian armed uprising for the independence of Kosovo/a from Serbia started after the end of WWII and continued until 1947. In 1968, Albanians rose up again. The life-long president Yosef B. Tito, decided to calm them down by granting extensive minority rights and an autonomous status for Kosovo/a. In 1981, right after Tito's death (1980), Albanians asked again for the status of the republic, but they were unsuccessful, due to the lack of support from the other Yugoslav republics. Another unsuccessful riot took place in 1989 before the conflict in 1999. Therefore, the emergence of multipolarity in international relations did not create a new conflict, since the problem of Kosovo/a is not new for Serbia and it existed during bi-polarity as well.

To sum up, in the realist scholarship the Kosovo/a conflict is to be seen as either caused by Serbia's desire to maximise its power and miscalculation of it (classical Realism) or security threats emanating from the international anarchy and distribution of power on it (neo-Realism). Overall,

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divergences were seen only upon the internationalisation of the conflict.

power and anarchy are viewed as the underlying causes of war. The assumptions of the realist approaches are too general and based only on descriptions of power and security threats (Weldes, 1996; Rosenberg, 1990). These explanations contribute to the understanding of the general context that would favour the emergence of the Kosovo/a conflict. However, they cannot account for the immediate causes of the conflict.

4.2. Rationalism (English School) and the Kosovo/a Conflict

This section promises to present what Rationalism can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. Rationalism, as it was explained in Chapter 1, refers to intersubjectively shared principles and norms in the society of states to offer a definition of war. So, different from Realism, which looks at military power to examine conflict, Rationalism views the Kosovo/a conflict through the lens of order. The rationalist accounts of the conflict points to Serbian state and traditional principles (sovereignty and non-interference) and norms (rejection of ethnic secession and preference for multi-ethnic state) of international order to account for the Kosovo/a conflict (Wheeler, 2000; Mayall, 2000; Groom and Taylor, 2000).

A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor argue that two decisive and determining principles of international order "fixed territorial boundaries"

(internationalisation of the internal borders of the Republic of Serbia within the Yugoslav Federation) and "a doctrine of multi-ethnicism" (multiethnic Serbia) determined international community's interpretation of the Kosovo/a case (2000: 292). At the same time, rationalist explanations reflect also on the principle of just *in bello* – the right to war. The right to war, from a rationalist perspective is assigned to a legitimate authority, which in the case of Kosovo/a conflict is held by the state of Serbia, and consented for a just cause (self-defence) as the last resort.

The rationalist interpretation of the Kosovo/a conflict is inferred from the relevant literature and the international arrangements and international diplomatic documents on the case.[58] The analysis is confined to the conceptual aspects of the researched case, that is, to discuss what Rationalism enables us to see in the Kosovo/a conflict. Accordingly, this section does not provide an exhaustive overview of all issued international diplomatic documents, international negotiations and arrangements offered to settle to the case. Some of the weaknesses of Rationalism that limit our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict are discussed at the end of this section.

Rationalism, by pointing to the principles and norms of international order, would provide a definition of the Kosovo/a conflict that is intersubjectively shared in the society of states. The rationalist approaches refer to the

peremptory and universal nature of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia to define the Kosovo/a conflict (Wheeler, 2000; Mayall, 2000). The commitment of international society to these principles would explain why the Arbitration Commission of the European Community,[59] the so-called Badinter Commission, did choose to apply the principle of *uti possidetis juris* (recognition of the existing borders at the time of independence) to reach its legal judgment on the right of self-determination in the dissolution of Yugoslavia.[60]

Accordingly, although the Commission considered self-determination as a safeguard of human rights and an important principle in the society of states (International Convenants on Human Rights, 1966), it took the decision to guarantee this right without questioning the inter-republican borders (territorial borders) of the Republic of Serbia and its ethnic composition (Pellet, 1992; Weller: 1993; Kamminaga, 1996; Vereshchetin, 1996). In the Opinion 2 of the Arbitration Commission (1992) it was stated:

> Republics must afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups, all the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized in international law, including where appropriate, the right to their nationality (Opinion 2 of the Arbitration Commission, 1991, as cited by Pellet, 1992: 184).

This predisposition of the Badinter Commission infers from the rationalist logic that accepting the right to self-determination on national and ethnic ground

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[58] This analysis considers the international diplomatic documents since the moment the dissolution of Yugoslavia started (1991).

[59] In August 1991, the peace conference on Yugoslavia hosted by Lord Carrington established the European Community Arbitration Commission recognised as the Badinter Commission, which was embodied with authority to negotiate solutions for the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

[60] Some authors would question the decision-making legitimacy of the Badinter Committee. For more on this topic see, for example, Williams (1998: 130-131,138, 140-141), Akhavan (1996:

would "challenge territoriality as the basis of claims to statehood in the society of states" (Wheeler, 2000: 248). This normative consideration would explain why the legitimisation of the right to self-determination on national grounds to Albanians[61] and Serbs[62] at the moment of the dissolution of Yugoslav was rejected. The propensity of international society towards the preservation of territorial integrity, which is viewed as the precondition for the safeguarding of order in the society of states would explain the decision of international community. In this decision the right to statehood was accorded to the Republic of Serbia and as its international borders were recognised its inter-republic borders at the moment of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Consequently, drawing from this rationalist perspective, international community considers the Kosovo/a Albanians living within the Republic of Serbia as a minority group. Therefore, the demands of the Albanians for self-

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227-228,233-235, and 240-242). However the issue of legitimacy will not be discussed in this chapter since it goes beyond its purpose.

[61] Albanians of Kosovo/a did base their request for self-determination in equal footing with the other republics of the Yugoslav Federation, in two arguments. The first argument was explained in the "Letter by the Government of the Republic of Kosova to the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, 21 December 1991" (Truth About Kosova, 1993: 329). In this letter the Kosovo/a Albanians argued to the Badinter Committee that under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, Kosovo/a enjoyed equal rights of representation along with the other republics at the Federal level, ever thought it had the status of an autonomous province. The second argument was based on the fact that on July 1990, the Albanian delegates of the Kosovo/a Assembly declared Kosovo/a region an "independent and equal entity within the framework of the Yugoslav Federation and as an equal subject with its counterparts in Yugoslavia" (Constitution Declaration of the Assembly of Kosovo/a, 2 July 1990,1993: 329). After this declaration, in September 1991, a clandestine referendum was organised. 87.01 percent of the voters voted in favour of an independent and sovereign state of Kosovo/a, which was proclaimed soon after the referendum (Silber, 1992: 25; see, also, Maass, 1991: 13; Troebst, 1998).

[62] Serbs did ask for the right to self-determination based on nationality grounds, claiming that they were a constituent nation (not republic) of the Yugoslav Federation. This claim implied the inclusion of all Serbs living in Yugoslavia in one state (Weller, 1992).

determination on national and ethnic grounds are to be seen as an internal affair of Serbia.[63] The Kosovo/a case is understood as a domestic issue of Serbia because in the moment of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, it was a simple region within the Republic of Serbia. Since 1989, its status of autonomous province was changed to that of a simple region within Serbia by the constitutional changes adopted by the Serbian parliament (1990).[64]

This rationalist interpretation of the Kosovo/a case can also be inferred from all UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 (31 March 1998), 1199 (23 September 1998), 1203 (24 October 1998) and international diplomatic documents and negotiations referring to the case after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Concerned with the pluralist principles of order, these resolutions establish the commitment of "members states [of the Security Council] to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and reaffirmed the "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo" (Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999). As Werner argues, "the policy of the European Community and its Member-States, approached the exceptional situation more from the perspective of state sovereignty" (2001: 183).

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[63] The implication of the EC decision was that Serbs living outside Serbia would have to accept the status of a minority group (Weller, 1992: 569-607).
[64] In the framework of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974, the republics and the autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) enjoyed equal rights of representation at the Federal institutions. However, regions did enjoy an inferior status. The regions enjoyed the right of representation only at the republic's structures.

Pointing to the importance of Serbia's sovereign exclusive competence in internal affairs, the pluralist perspective would recommend to see the Kosovo/a conflict as an internal violence. James Mayall states:

> In former Yugoslavia, once the overreaching federal structure had been removed, the populations of the successor republics refused to accept the legitimacy of their previously internal-but now international-borders. What were formally interstate wars had all the characteristics of a ferocious civil war, in which compromise fails in the face of the passionate and self-righteous belief of the belligerents in the justice of their respective causes (2000: 324-325).

Based on a pluralist understanding of order, different rationalist accounts understand the Kosovo/a case as a domestic uprising. In these accounts the events in Kosovo/a are seen as encouraged by criminal activities that aimed at the secession of the region from the Serbian state (Chossudovsky, 1999; Oberg, 2000; Judah, 2001; Artisien, 1984).[65]

In a document published in Serbian Government official web site entitled *Albanian Terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija* (1998), the events in Kosovo/a are defined as terrorist activities aiming at secession. In the document is stated: "the activities of Albanian terrorist organizations function to create ethnically pure territories in Kosovo and Metohija and to promote the secession of this region." At the same time, Serbian government appeals to international community are to be seen as being in accordance with the pluralist attitude toward the principle of state sovereignty. In the appeal is stated: the "terrorism deserves the same condemnation everywhere" and fighting it requires

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[65] The act of secession assumes the division of Kosovo/a from Serbia or its (re)unification with Albanian an act that would lead to the creation of "Greater Albania" (Judah, 2001). See, Artisien

"cooperation and coordination by the entire international community, in consistency with international agreements and declarations on terrorism."

This definition of the case can also be found on the declaration of the US special envoy for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, who defined also the KLA as "without any questions a terrorist group" and its activity as terrorism (Gelbart, 1998). Soon after, the Resolution 1160 (31 march 1998) of the UN Security Council reaffirming the pluralist principles for the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) condemned "terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance, arms and training."

Drawing from the international legal stipulations about international terrorist activity[66] and secessionism[67] the Kosovo/a conflict is to be seen as an

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(1984) for a detailed analysis of the Kosovo/a case in the framework of the Yugoslav Federation and the Republic of Serbia.

[66] If we refer to the Geneva Convention on Terrorism (1987), then the use of force by Serbia's against the Albanians can be considered as legitimate. Referring to the stipulations of the Declaration the case can be defined as "non-international armed conflict" and the right to use force by the Kosovo/a Albanians is constrained. At the same time, the Declaration and the Article 51 of the UN Charter allow for Serbia's unilateral use of force in the region against the KLA for purposes of self-defence (countering terrorism and secession).

[67] The United Nations and its member states do not support claims for unilateral secessions. In normal cases the claims of different groups for secession are dealt under a human rights paradigm. International community in a series of declarations and covenants insists that these groups have the right to the protection of their identities and that they should have the opportunity to participate effectively in the political and economic life of their states to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs (Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, 1994; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 1993; Council of Europe, Framework Convention Regarding the Rights of National Minorities, 1995; see, also, Nanda, 2003; Buchanan, 1996).

internal conflict and as such a domestic affair of Serbia. Since the society of states rejects the idea of secession and condemns terrorism, the use of violence by Serbian government is to be seen as justified by its right in the society of states to exercise violence to enforce authority upon its internationally recognised territory and population. This right, at the same time, precludes international intervention based on the principle of non-interference and self-defence sanctioned respectively in the Article 2(7) and Article 51 of the UN Charter. In this case the rationalist approach, besides defining the Kosovo/a conflict as an internal conflict, preclude the case from being a subject of analysis in International Relations and as such is of no help to our understanding of conflict.

However, the level of violation of human rights in Kosovo/a raised, as Nicholas Wheeler frame it, "the dilemma of what to do about strangers who are subject to appalling cruelty by their governments" (2000: 1). The rationalist solidarist perspective would suggest to see the violation of human rights in Kosovo/a by Serbian government not as an exclusive issue within the domestic jurisdiction of Serbia. This perspective allows us to view the issue of human rights violation as threat to international peace and security.

Different accounts understand the violence used by Serbian government in Kosovo/a conflict as a violation of human rights and a threat to peace and security. The foreign ministers of the Contact Group meeting in

London on 9 March and in Bonn on 25 March 1998 agreed that "the situation in Kosovo is not a simply internal matter, but also has a direct impact on the stability of neighbouring countries and peace in the Balkans."[68] Later this statement was repeated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1160 (31 March 1998). This solidarist interpretation of the case imply the importance of justice for the preservation of order by assuming that "there is a mutual compatibility between order and justice" in the society of states (Wheeler, 2000: 267).

From this interpretation can be inferred a retreat from a strict interpretation of the inviolability of Serbia's sovereignty, which at the same time implies international intervention as a means to censure the regime of Belgrade in its actions in Kosovo/a. However, the territorial sovereignty rights of Serbia are not proscribed in the solidarist perspective as well. In all issued diplomatic documents, the commitment of all member states of the UN Security Council reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

The preservation of sovereignty is important even in the solidarist perspective. So, different solidarist scholars and international diplomatic documents, which reflect on this perspective, while discussing the conflict are very careful in their statements to refer to the person, not to the group. Thus, human rights not the right of the group to secede are of concern in the solidarist

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[68] Statement by the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, to the UN Security

perspective (Watkin, 2004). As Wheeler states “this conception of international society recognizes that individuals,” in our case the Serbs and Albanians, have “rights and duties in international law, but it also acknowledges that [these] individuals can have these rights enforced” only by the state that in our case is Serbia (2000: 11). This solidarist perspective can be ascertained in the insistence of international community on the preservation of Serbia as a multiethnic state.

To sum up, the pluralist approach enables a view of the Kosovo/a conflict as an internal conflict, which does not help our understanding of the case in International Relations. The solidarist approach allows for an understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict under the international humanitarian law. This framework accounts for the consequences of the conflict rather than its causes. Furthermore, the rationalist approach offers a state-centric outlook to theconflict, which is an hindrance to our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. These two issues and their implications in our knowledge about the case are further discussed in the following section.

Council on Kosovo Resolution, 31 March 1998, as cited by Duke (1998).

4.2.1. Rationalism and the Kosovo/a Conflict: A Critique

As mentioned above, like Realism, Rationalism offers a state-centric outlook of the Kosovo/a conflict. As Bull (1977) argues in the society of states since its inception, the state is the one who holds the monopoly to use legitimate violence within and outside its borders. So, at both levels, international and intra-state, state is held as the legitimate authority to negotiate and settle conflict. One exception to this interpretation is the case of humanitarian intervention treated by the Chapter VII, Article 39 of the UN Charter. The dispositions of the Chapter VII allow other states to intervene in the domestic affaires of member state with the permission of the UN Security Council. However, even in this case the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the intervened state overrides other social and political considerations. For that reason, Rationalism would start looking at the Kosovo/a case by emphasising the sovereignty and territoriality of the state of Serbia, considering them as essential for its membership in the society of states and the preservation of order.

Accordingly, the rationalist literature on the Kosovo/a case has discussed the conflict either by emphasising Serbia's right to self-defence (pluralists) or seeing it as a case of violation of human rights (solidarists) (Mayall, 2000; Wheeler, 2000; Groom and Taylor, 2000). The state-centric outlook to war in the rationalist approaches impedes us from finding a proper definition for the Kosovo/a conflict. As explained above, the major international

documents and the vast literature on the Kosovo/a case based on a rationalist perspective did define the conflict as a terrorist activity, ethnic secession (civil war) or an human right violation case.

An alternative explanation, which would interpret the struggle against the incumbent government as a national liberation movement, is neglected. This is the case because in the rationalist's interpretation of conflict "state sovereignty and self-determination are seen as competing notions: more state sovereignty is emphasized, the less room is left for the self-determination of peoples" (Werner, 2001: 172; see, also, Wilson, 1990; Quaye, 1992). Hence, to recognise the right to self-determination to the Kosovo/a Albanians in the society of states, would mean to define an ethno-national conflict like the Kosovo/a case as international war. In this case, state-based international regime and institutions would be challenged, which according to the rationalist scholars would have implications for the maintenance of order (Wheeler, 2000).

In the case of ethno-national conflicts like Kosovo/a, the violation of human rights points to the definition of sovereignty, which appears to be too narrow in the rationalist perspective. Hence, the traditional conceptualisation of sovereignty leaves unexplained the use of the concept in the case of Kosovo/a conflict. In this case, the effective control over Serbia's territory (including Kosovo/a) was no longer the exclusive right of Serbian government, since the establishment of the shadow government of the Albanians in Kosovo/a (1990).

Hence, Albanians as a group of people were separated from the political processes in Serbia and the entire population of that state. This situation can be defined as the separation of the Kosovo/a "people" from the entire population of the Serbian state.[69] This situation rendered Serbia's "sovereignty uncertain."[70] However, in the rationalist approaches as Werner states:

> This separation of 'people' and 'the entire population of the state' is set aside: the bearer of the right of self determination (and consequently the right to freedom from foreign intervention) is the entire population living on the territory of the state and not 'the people' as a group with distinctive ethnic or cultural characteristics (2001: 189).

Hence, rationalist approaches by giving primacy to state's sovereignty defined in territorial terms undermine another aspect of sovereignty. Sovereignty is also defied as the effective control of a government over a population living in a well-defined territory (Werner, 2001: 184). Accordingly, the rationalist accounts of Kosovo/a conflict, by emphasising Serbia's territorial exclusive rights, prevent us from looking at the Kosovo/a case as a self-determination case or national liberation movement. The rationalist framework allows for a very narrow interpretation of the case in International Relations, which limits our understanding of the case study.

The accounts of the case indicated that the case was not simply an internal uprising or a case where the human right were abused, as the rationalist approaches tell us. Different accounts demonstrate that the force used by

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[69] Three criteria are suggested by Werner (2001: 175-180) to identify "a people": objective criteria (common language, culture, history, etc.), subjective criteria (the will to be recognized as a people) and territorial grievances.
[70] This terminology is used first by Werner (2001: 180).

Serbian government against the Albanians in Kosovo/a was greater than what is considered as necessary to bring to an end a terrorist activity. Different authors provide facts, which prove that Serbia was following a policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo/a (Caplan, 1998: 475; Soloway, 1998: 30; Smith, 1998: 13; Maliqi, 1998; Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000: 27-28). The brutality of the Serbian government in Kosovo/a made clear as Craig Nations states that:

> Serbian repression was now interpreted not merely as an exaggerated reaction to a domestic insurgency, but as a campaign launched with genocidal intentions at the Kosovar Albanian population as a whole (1998: 35).

Other accounts show that by the end of 1998, Serbian offensive, codenamed as "Operation Horseshoe," in essence aimed to shift the ethnic balance of Kosovo/a rather than settling an internal uprising. In Daadler and O'Hanlon's words:

> [T]he attacks would involve a broad swath of territory in the shape of a horseshoe, moving from the northeast down to the west and back to the southeast of Kosovo along the Albanian and Macedonian borders. It also apparently entailed emptying the cities of Prizren, Pec and Prishtina of their largely Albanian populations (2000: 59).

The rationalist approaches seem to neglect these dynamics of the conflict revealing that its accounts are of little help to our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict.

4.3. Revolutionism and the Kosovo/a Conflict

Revolutionism allows us to scrutinize the case of Kosovo/a through the lenses of emancipation. As should be evident from Chapter 1, in this approach democracy

and “pluralist security communities” are seen as part of emancipatory projects, which pacify the relations between states and different agents within society (Deutsch, 1957; Doyle, 1986; Talbot, 2000). The revolutionist approach points to Serbian state’s regime to explain the Kosovo/a case. The accountability of Serbian leadership, the character of the information and reforms are scrutinised in this approach in order to define whether Serbia is a democratic state or not. The nature of the state’s regime would define whether Serbia is prone to internal uprising or not. This section outlines and assesses what the revolutionist approach can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. It concludes by accounting for the weaknesses of the revolutionist approach to our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict.

The reforms (decentralisation and self-management) that took place in the Yugoslav Federation, since early 1950s, are considered to be short of democratic content (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1998; Isakovic, 2000; Dragovic-Soso, 2000). Different scholars provided facts to argue that the reforms in the Yugoslav Federation did favour the development of political rivalries and intra-party ideological competition within the republics rather than the consolidation of democracy. This claim is based on the fact that the republics were established in the constitution of the Federation to represent the interests of the dominant nation rather than that of all citizens.

The reforms that many revolutionist scholars are looking at in order to understand the nature of the regime in Yugoslavia and Serbia, are considered to have transformed the Yugoslav Federation from a multicultural state into an "ethno-federation" (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997: 169). Beverley Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz (1997) argue that the reforms (including the changes of the constitution of 1974) offered compromises that would counter Serbia's strategies for seizing control of the Federal institutions rather than an attempt to increase the regime's legitimacy. Supporting the same argument, Robert M. Hayden explains that the constitution was the first step towards a new nationalism in Yugoslavia, which he calls "constitutionalist nationalism" (1992: 654-673).

This understanding of the reforms leads to two further related arguments. First, the reforms did not favour the establishment of a democratic regime in Yugoslavia, since the resolution and settling of the conflicts and disputes were not left to the institutions of the Federation representing all citizens, but to the dominant nation within each republic and its leadership. Second, these reforms did not guarantee the rights of citizens, but those of the dominant national group within the republics (Banac, 1992; Caratan, 1997; Crawford, 1998; Ramet, 1999; Isakovic, 2000). Thus, for example, in the constitution of Serbia (1990) the status of the autonomous provinces were removed from Kosovo/a and Vojvodina together with the rights to use the mother langue in the upper level of education and media. Thus, the reforms did reduce the rights of the nationalities like Albanians and Hungarians within the

Republic of Serbia, instead of providing for the accommodation of all people's needs and rights.

Elections in the revolutionist approach are understood as a process essential in assuring the "consent of the governed" for government policies. Therefore, fair and free elections are viewed as an expression of progress in democratic policies. The understanding of the electoral process leads the scholars of this approach to the understanding of the accountability of the Serbian governing system. Different accounts observe that the Serbian election process was not democratic. To cite Garton Ash:

> What happened in Serbia was a uniquely complex combination of four ingredients: a more or less democratic election; a revolution of the new, velvet, self-limiting type; a brief revolutionary coup of an older kind; and a dash of old-fashioned Balkan conspiracy (2001: 5).

Drawing from these observations, it can be concluded that elections in Serbia were not a means of consolidating democracy. Instead, they served to bring the nationalist parties to power and helped to transform the republics from holding multiculturalistic values to supporting ethnic based politics. For revolutionists, in this environment, conflict is expected to happen because the high level of political decentralisation combined with weak democratic institutions in the Yugoslav Federation created a situation embedded with insecurities. In this context, warlike factions are expected to mobilise mass sentiment without having to account for the interests of the public being mobilised (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 2, 22). The rise of nationalistic rivalries between different nations in Yugoslavia and Serbia in the condition of an undemocratic regime is to be

seen as encouraging the prospects for war between different actors of the society (Fearon and Laitin, 2001).

In her book, '*Saviours of the Nation.' Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism,* (2002) Jasna Dragovic-Soso offers a revolutionist explanation of the Yugoslav wars. She argues that on one hand the emergence of the nationalist discourse in Serbia and the rising in power of Milosevic were the responses to the crisis produced by institutional and constitutional reforms in the Yugoslav Federation. On the other hand, the nationalist discourses of the mid-1980s were instrumental in deflecting the working of democracy in Serbia (see, also, Colovic, 2002). She argues that the nationalist discourse of Serbian intellectuals in the 1980s "removed at a crucial moment the presence of a democratic alternative to Milosevic's policy, helping the regime overcome its legitimacy crisis and contributing to Yugoslavia's descent to war" (Dragovic-Soso, 2002: 2).

In accounting for the Kosovo/a conflict, this approach would establish a direct relationship between the manipulations and undemocratic control of the information and the prospect for conflict. Different scholars observe that from 1985 onwards, in Serbia, the information served to manipulate the public. Different examples are provided to support the claim. So, it is observed that from 1985 onwards a series of publications in the popular press, lamented the "loss" of the Serbian homeland and its magnificent monasteries to the "invading"

Albanians (equated with the Ottoman Turks that defeated the Serbs at the Field of Kosovo in 1398) (Malcolm, 1998: 58-80).

Furthermore, contributing to the manipulation of information, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts issued in 1986, a memorandum, in which the present physical, political, juridical and cultural genocide towards the Kosovo/a Serbs was presented as being particularly evocative of “the blackest periods of Turkish impaling” (Malcolm, 1998: 340). The press presented the Kosovo/a Albanians as aiming to mutilate or eradicate the Serbian presence in Kosovo/a (Magas, 1993: 51; see, also, Silber and Little, 1997). This rhetoric effectively suggested that Albanians “inside” Serbia were a threat to Serbs in Kosovo/a.

The question of Kosovo/a in these different propaganda documents is treated as a matter of the “holy land” in danger, not as an institutional question. Hence, the way the case of Kosovo/a was presented in the media and other written documents did thwarted the possibility for a democratic institutional settlement of the Kosovo/a case (Colovic, 2000). According to Branimir Anzulovic, the manipulation of the information created a situation, which imposed upon politics, media, civil society and the public the acceptance of the fact that the borders of Serbia should “correspond to the boundaries of the Serbian national group” (1999: 429). The way the question of Kosovo/a was presented promoted ethno-nationalistic particularism in a multiethnic state, such

as Serbia, instead of insisting upon the equality rights of all citizens. In this context, conflict is to be expected, since there are no other intermediary institutions that are characteristic of a democratic regime, which is expected to have the capacity to resolve disputes and accommodate people's rights.

Civil society, which in the condition of democracy is expected to play an intermediary role in settling frictions between the state and citizens, in the case of Serbia is viewed as the "manifestation of the naked power of the state" (Thomas, 1999: 424). So, different sources indicate that Serbian civil society did not question Milosevic policies of ethnic cleansing against the Albanians in Kosovo/a that in legal terms are citizens of Serbia. As Troebst (1998) observes, there was no difference between Milosevic, opposition and public in the attitude toward the Kosovo/a Albanians. The opposition is considered as even having a more radical position.

The manipulation of information, lack of accountable institutions and civil society in Serbia are understood in the revolutionist perspective as developments that describe a situation so embedded with tensions as to undermine any hope that presented problem might ever be settled in institutional ways. While the developments in Serbia, far from promising the development of a multicultural and accommodating society, indicate conflict as a means to settle the situation, the way information is manipulated and civil society and institutions act would serve to define whose interests are being served and in which way. In

different accounts Milosevic is pointed as the "nationalist authoritarianist" (Gordy, 1999: 2), which encouraged a new type of nationalism in Serbia as a way to capture power.

For Dragovic-Soso, this nationalism was founded "upon double standards" (2000: 9). On the one hand, this nationalism was "based on an extreme notion of victimisation, 'genocide' and conspiracy theories, all of which preclude negotiations and compromise essential to any democratic process" (Dragovic-Soso, 2000: 9). On the other hand, this nationalism is seen to have encouraged the search for a "saviour figure," preparing the ground for Milosevic's plebiscitary monopolisation of power in the 1980s and 1990s. In the revolutionist explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict, intermingled relationship between the lack of democracy and the presence of authoritarian leaders is expected to work as follows. The lack of democracy favours the establishment of authoritative leaders, which, in turn, leads to the development of a more oppressive regime, and the effacement of all possible mechanisms that would settle disputes by peaceful means. In this context, disputes between different actors are expected to be resoled by using conflict. The case of Serbia seems to match these explanations and the Kosovo/a conflict is the result of this undemocratic processes.

To sum up, revolutionist scholarship would point to the pseudo-democratic nature of reforms, the destructive role of Milosevic as a leader

together with the manipulation of information to explain the creation of an environment inherently unstable and embedded with possibilities for conflict in Yugoslavia and Serbia. This undemocratic environment is viewed as responsible for war perspectives and programs in settling disputes and differences. In this approach, our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict depends upon the nature of the domestic regime in Serbia. Therefore, the establishment of democracy in Serbia should be seen as the solution to the Kosovo/a case. Such a reduction gives rise, in turn, to an understanding of the causes of conflict that seems to be misleading. The weaknesses of the revolutionist approach and the way they undermine our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict are discussed in the following section.

4.3.1. Revolutionism and the Kosovo/a Conflict: A Critique

This section starts by challenging the validity of two intermingled assumptions of Revolutionism, which are considered to limit our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. These assumptions are: un-democratic regimes are more prone to internal upheavals and democracies are inherently pacific. Another problem of this approach is the state-centric outlook of the conflict. The criticisms in this section are organised to reflect upon the case study.

The revolutionist approach defends the thesis that “the best guaranty of both democracy and peace is the strength of non-state secondary institutions within a country…These form a ‘civil society’, which is seen as essentially virtuous. Where this is weak, states will perpetrate atrocities” (Mann, 2004: 4). According to this assumption, civil society is regarded as having only positive effects, a means to help mediate and accommodate peoples’ needs and rights and is thus pacifying. The revolutionist accounts will apply the same rationality while telling about the effects of elections or elected institutions upon society. This rationality is exposed to criticism, which is illustrated by looking at the case of Serbia.

Different accounts indicate that Serbia cannot be considered totally an undemocratic state, since it did have a civil society and secondary institutions. To cite Timothy Garton Ash:

> Milosevic’s Serbia was never a totalitarian regime like Ceausescu’s Romania. That is one major reason why Milosevic’s fall was different. Yet, he was a war criminal, who caused horrible suffering to the Serb’s neighbours in the former Yugoslavia. But at home he was not a totalitarian dictator. Instead, his regime was a strange mixture of democracy and dictatorship: a ‘democratura’ (2001: 3).

Following on the same line of argument, Robert Thomas writes:

> For all the entrenched power of the ruling elite, Serbia under Milosevic was not a dictatorship in the *totalitarian* sense of the world. Opposition parties, and civil organisations, continued to operate throughout the period, and the independent media continued to publish and broadcast (1999: 424).

Thus, in Serbia there were political pluralism, universal franchise, holding of periodical elections and the formation of an operational parliament. As Dragovic-Soso (2002) notes, in Serbia there were created even institutions for the defence of the civil rights such as the Writers’ Association of Serbia and the Committee

for Defence of Freedom of Thought and Expression, since 1984. The opposition and the democratic movement of students were active players of the political life in Serbia. In the course of 1996 local elections, the opposition was able to organise daily rallies. These rallies led to the annulment of the November 17, 1996 local elections in which the opposition gained control in almost all relevant cities in Serbia.

It was again "the other Serbia" (Garton Ash, 2001: 4) who defeated Milosevic in the elections of 24 September 2000. As Garton Ash (2001) observes, there was opposition to Milosevic's policy in Serbia, but not to the one toward Kosovo/a. To quote Ash:

> There are Serbs who have spoken, written, organized, and worked against Milosevic from the very outset-from Veran Matic and his independent radio B92 to countless journalists who went to prison for printing what they believed to be true to the thousands engaged in the radical student movement Otpor. Their struggle was different from, but no less difficult or dangerous than, the struggle of dissidents under Soviet communism (2001: 4).

Different accounts witness that Milosevic was ousted from power through democratic procedures. He was defeated in the September 24, 2000 elections in which "2.4 million Serbs put a circle next to the name of Vojislav Kostunica on Sunday, September 24, 2000" (Garton Ash, 2001: 2-4). The daily demonstration of peoples pressured Milosevic to accept the result of the elections (Milosevic did try to deny the result by fraud, intimidation, and manipulation of the courts) (Garton Ash, 2001: 2-4). These accounts highlight the fact that democracy was present in Serbia. However, the conflict in Kosovo/a indicates that democracy did not pacifying the relations between the Serbs and the Albanians. By seeing

democracy as wholly pacifying this approach cannot adequately account for the Kosovo/a conflict.

As well as being too broad, the understanding of democracy as proffered in the revolutionist accounts is also, reductionism. In this approach all kinds of insecurities that would cause conflict are seen as coming from one source: nature of domestic regime. This framework makes extremely difficult to give an account of any other cause of conflict. This approach does not allow us to see that conflict may be rooted in the way both parties in the conflict are constructed and how they have interacted with one another. Historical accounts demonstrate that the conflict between Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo/a is old.

The conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians goes back at the time of the Congress of Berlin (1878), which tried to settle the borders of some Balkan states in the framework of the so-called Eastern Question.[71] Alternative explanations that reflect upon historical interactions of the Serbs and the Albanians seem to offer better explanations of the dynamics of the conflict. These explanations are exposed and discussed in Chapter 6.

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[71] The Congress of Berlin recognised Kosovo/a as part of Serbia. However, the Albanian national movement, at the League of Prizren (1878), organised at the same time with the Congress of Berlin, made clear its aims of establishing an Albanian state, which would include all territories inhibited by ethnic Albanians in the dissolving Ottoman Empire. The League claimed that among

The arguments of the revolutionist approach are problematic for our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict for another reason as well. By looking at the Serbian state's regime to understand the Kosovo/a conflict, this approach remains state-centric in focus. Thus, the use of violence against the Albanians is examined as a "statist" phenomenon, which creates the idea that with the establishment of democracy in Serbia, the conflict in Kosovo/a will disappear. This framework seems to simplify the understanding of the causes of the Kosovo/a conflict to the point that the explanations lose their practical relevance. An alternative approach is needed to understand the causes of insecurities and the way they are constructed and mobilised for political action by societies or/and groups rather than states as explained above. Alternative approaches to the understanding of the case study are discussed in the next two chapters.

This chapter discussed what the traditional International Relations theories- namely, Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism could tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. The Kosovo/a conflict in the traditional accounts is seen as a means used by the state of Serbia to achieve its ends defined in terms of power and order. Although different traditional International Relations approaches are based on different ontological premises they share a state-centric outlook of conflict. They work on the basis of pre-given and unchanged assumptions about

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other territories, Kosovo/a was going to be part of the new Albanian state (Malcolm, 1998; Jelawich, 1983; Elsie, 1997; Almond, 1994; Judah, 2001).

identity, which tend to abstract the understanding of conflict from its historical and social context.

CHAPTER 5

The Post-Cold War Approaches and the Kosovo/a Conflict

Two post-Cold War approaches are used to examine the Kosovo/a conflict in this chapter: post-Cold War neo-Realism and the "New Wars" approach, theoretical foundations of which were exposed and discussed in Chapter 2. These approaches differ from the traditional International Relations theories since they focus on non-state actors, respectively on ethno-national groups (Posen, 1993; Kaufman, 1996; Roe, 1999) and distorted political formations (Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 1998, 2001; Lacquer, 1997; Franck, 1995) to interpret the case study. There are two sections to this chapter. The first section uses neo-realist logic of "security dilemma" to study the case of the Kosovo/a conflict. The second section presents what the "New Wars" approach can tell us about

the Kosovo/a conflict. The chapter concludes with a section that discuses the weaknesses of these two approaches to the Kosovo/a conflict.

5.1. The Intra-State "Security Dilemma" and the Kosovo/a Conflict

This perspective would suggest that, in the condition of the emergence of anarchy after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation (1991), the efforts of both the Serbs and the Albanians to enhance their own group's security established the working of a "security dilemma," escalation of which led to conflict. Different from the traditional neo-realist approach to conflict the actors involved in the "security dilemma" are two ethno-national groups: the Serbs and the Kosovo/a Albanians. In this approach the dissolving state is seen as an anarchical system and groups as quasi-states.

Explaining the Kosovo/a conflict by referring to the intensity of the "security dilemma" this approach would draw attention to power calculations estimated in terms of the groups' cohesion and military capabilities (Posen, 1993, 1993a). So, ethnic groups' power situation, estimated as functions of created windows of opportunity and vulnerability for the Serbs and the Albanians of Kosovo/a, would define the intensity of "security dilemma" and the prospects for conflict. To define what are the windows of opportunities and vulnerabilities and their effects on the occurrence of conflict, Posen would suggest to look at

offensive capabilities, which can be used for attacks against the other group (Posen, 1993: 34).

To estimate the "offensive potential" of the Serbs as an ethnic group, this approach would suggest scrutinising both military capabilities and the effects of solidarity between the Serbs in Kosovo/a and the ones in Serbia proper. This solidarity is to be viewed as improving the offensive capabilities of the Serbs as an ethnic group. So, Posen would explain the nationalism used by Milosevic to breed solidarity among the Serbs as an effort to enhance the offensive capabilities of Serbs in the condition of increasing insecurity after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. The need for security would explain, for Posen, the high solidarity among the Serbs, and the erasing of differences between the opposition forces, the public and Milosevic's regime on the question of Kosovo/a (Thomas, 1999). Stefan Troebst's views this solidarity as such:

> [t]he whole spectrum of Serbian political opposition to Milosevic was even more nationalistic than 'Slobo' himself…the ideas of Vojislav Sesel, Vuk Draskovic and Zoran Dindjic were much more radical than Milosevic's comparatively flexible approach (1998: 9).

There are other examples that evidence the forging of Serbs' solidarity and their common attitude toward the Kosovo/a question. The findings of a public opinion survey on the "Readiness of the Serbia's Citizens to Solve Ethnic Conflict," which was carried out on November 1997 by Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia confirmed this solidarity. In the document it is stated that:

> An independent Kosovo, or the Republic of Kosovo within FRY, is admissible in the view of only a negligible number of our respondents. Likewise, very few respondents would accept a division of Kosovo. A vast percentage (41.8%) believes that the solution is to be looked for in the forcible or 'peaceful' expulsion

of the Albanians. On the other hand, 27.7% of those manifesting 'democratic tolerance' would be willing, at best, to grant the Albanians their cultural autonomy (November 1997).

To use Posen's logic, the high cohesion among different layers of Serbian society bounded by nationalism is to be viewed as a means to enhance group's offensive capabilities, which, in turn, would explain the "worst-case" outcome of the inter-groups' "security dilemma," which is conflict (1993: 31).

Following Posen's scholarship to study the Kosovo/a conflict, it can be said that the window of opportunity created for Serbs after the dissolution of Yugoslavia does not suggest that Serbs have to get involved in conflict, since Serbs did enjoy superiority in power terms. Therefore, why did we have the "worst-case" scenario in Kosovo/a? Posen would explain the "worst-case" scenario by looking at the "uneven progress" in the creation of state structures and "shifting power" (Posen, 1993: 29) between ethnic groups.

Accordingly, in the case of Kosovo/a the removal of the status of autonomy, which was followed by the declaration of independence from the Albanians, is to be understood as a change in the existent state structures, which have effects on the security of both groups. Thus, the declaration of independence of Kosovo/a by the Albanians (1990), implied a separation of Kosovo/a from the Serbian state structures. This move explains the intensification of the Serbian fears about the future of the Serbs in Kosovo/a. The Serbs in Kosovo/a were scattered in a number of vulnerable pockets

compared to the Albanians who dominated numerically the province. Thus, although the Serbs' capabilities were superior to the one of the Albanians, the security of Serbs in Kosovo/a is seen as being in danger.

Under these circumstances, drawing parallels with the explanations that Posen (1993) gives for the case of Serbs in Croatia, only offensive actions from Serbia proper can rescue the Serbs in Kosovo/a. Serbia's military superiority would explain for Posen, Serbia's preventive attacks in the province before its secession. So, this situation is to be seen as a window of vulnerability for the Serbs of Kosovo/a, which can be resolved by offensive actions of small military troops. This logic explains the action of the small Serb paramilitary units such as the "tigers" of Arkan, which were used to terrorise the Albanian population and force it to move out of the province. In the neo-realist approach, these actions are to be understood as preventive actions that would aim to resolve the security problem of the Serbs. So, Serbs are expected to feel safer in case these actions would be able to shift the ethno-demographic balance sheet of Kosovo to the disadvantage of the Albanian majority.

Different sources provide evidence that would justify Posen's assumptions. Thus, in different accounts the actions of small paramilitary troops are seen as aiming to compel the defenceless Albanians to leave Kosovo/a or at least to facilitate the settling of "between 700 000 to 1 million [Serb] peoples…from the North-East toward the South-West" of the province (Surroi,

1997: 45; see, also, 1998; Troebst, 1998: 15). According to Posen's scholarship these measures have to be understood as efforts of the Serbs to resolve the cause of their fears, which was the extinction of the Serbs in Kosovo/a.

On the other hand, Serbia's preventive measures, to use Posen's logic, would intensify the "security dilemma," if the Albanians would take measures to cope with these security threats. Posen would expect the intensification of the "security dilemma," in case the Albanians would get the arms and organise themselves to fight for their security. The emergence of the KLA and the organisation of the Albanians in Kosovo/a around it, is to be seen as the moment that "security dilemma" started to accelerate leading the way to conflict. Drawing from Kaufman's assumptions in explaining the case of Moldova, it can be said that in the moment some parts of Kosovo/a passed to the control of the KLA, this ethnic organisation has to be seen as receiving the attributes of sovereignty (1996: 151). From 1998 onwards, the conflict intensified, which according to Posen's approach, is to be expected since anarchy was the condition of inter-group relations (the KLA is to be seen as being endowed with elements of sovereignty). In such a case, "security dilemma" is to be seen as leading groups' behaviour. Thus, the intensification of the "security dilemma" explains the "worst case" scenario—the instigation of conflict on a large scale.

5.1.1. The Intra-State "Security Dilemma" and the Kosovo/a Conflict: A Critique

The application of the "security dilemma" to intra-state level by the post-Cold War neo-realist scholarship represents an effort to make use of traditional neo-realist concepts to explain contemporary conflicts. Nevertheless, the application remains problematic and in many respects undermines our understanding of the causes of conflict. In the post-Cold War neo-realist approach, the ethno-national groups are seen as autonomous and unitary units acting under the conditions of "emerging anarchy" after the dissolution of imperial regimes (Posen, 1993: 27). Based on this assumption the ethno-nationalist entities—in our case the Albanians, are expected to be controlling the territory of Kosovo/a. In the condition of the emergence of anarchy, the Serbs and the Albanians are expected to be alike, since both are looking after security. There are three main problems with these explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict.

First, in Kosovo/a anarchy is not the condition in which groups' inter-relations take place. The situation, referring to Kaufman's scholarship can be considered as "approximate" not systematic anarchy (1996: 151). The Serbian state did not at any moment (not until the peace deal with the Contact Group was reached, June 1999), lose control over the territory of Kosovo/a. On the contrary, the Serbian authorities were the protagonists of the violence in the region. They are held responsible for organising the campaigns of ethnic

cleansing and the deportation of the civil population out of the territory of Kosovo/a (Caplan, 1999; Ignatieff, 2000; Amnesty International, 1998; Médecins Sans Frontières, 1999; United States Department of State, 1999). Neither did the Albanians have control over the territory of Kosovo/a (1990-1999), despite the actions of the KLA (1997-1999) against the police stations and seizing of some separated areas of the region.

Although the Serbian state had lost legitimacy of governance in Kosovo/a[72] the political, economical and military life of the region was in the hands of Serbs (Khol and Libal, 1992; Caplan, 1999; Vicker, 1998). Thus, the political organisation in Kosovo/a was hierarchical, which attests the absence of anarchy as a condition of groups' inter-relations. Therefore, with the absence of the condition of anarchy, it would be difficult to explain the escalation of the "security dilemma" and its quality of spiralling to conflict.

Second, Posen's and Kaufman's approaches to ethno-national conflict fail to spot the distinction between a "security dilemma" and a security problem.[73] In the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, the abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo/a (1989) brought measures that aimed at leaving the Albanians out of the economic and social life of the province. Different accounts would testify that, from 1987 onwards, Serbian policies were aimed at ethnically cleansing the

[72] The argument is supported by the fact that the Albanians of Kosovo/a neglected the authority of Belgrade by establishing a separate and parallel political and economic life in the region.
[73] For this distinction see, Wheeler and Booth (1992a).

Albanians from the province (Kohl Von and Libal, 1992; Caplan, 1999). In this context, threat has to be seen as "accurately perceived" (Wheeler and Booth 1992a: 31). In this case "the situation cannot be perceived as a security 'dilemma.' It is simply a security 'problem' albeit perhaps a difficult one" (Wheeler and Booth, 1992a: 31). This is because ethnic cleansing directly and explicitly involves an ethnic group's extinction. Thus, the cause of conflict cannot be attributed to a "perceptual security dilemma" but to a "real security dilemma." In this case, the "security dilemma" is to be understood as a by-product of conflict, which "redescribes" the escalation of violence rather than being the cause for it (Roe, 1999).

Third, in the accounts that use the "security dilemma" to explain the causes of the Kosovo/a conflict, the role of power (defined in military and group's cohesion terms) is overemphasised. This conceptual framework directs the attention away from understanding two important aspects of conflict. First, this approach fails to understand that the "anarchical environment" is the outcome of the "group differentiation" (identity), rather than lack of central government (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: 115; see, also, Wendt, 1992). This approach falls short of seeing identity as discursively constructed, practically and historically enacted and anarchy as what actors make of it (Wendt, 1999). Instead, Posen and Kaufman's scholarships "end up reducing the national [identity] to some other 'more basic' factors" (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: 120).

Second, this approach is an hindrance to the understanding of the role of groups' internal social processes in the conflict formation. Different accounts of the Kosovo/a conflict reveal the importance of domestic processes in the "securitisation" of ethnicity as the underlying cause of conflict. Power based explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict undermine these aspects. Alternative explanations that take into account the role of identity as social signifier and its "securitisation" to explore the Kosovo/a conflict are exposed and discussed in Chapter 6.

5.2. Explaining the Kosovo/a Conflict as a "New War"

The Kosovo/a case although a conflict fought locally would be defined in the "New Wars" approach as a "new" or a globalised war. The "New Wars" or the political economy approach considers globalisation as the underlying cause for the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Woodward, 1995; Kaldor, 1999), in general, and turmoil in Serbia, in particular (Kaldor, 1999). Thus, intra-state conflicts are studied in the context of globalisation, which is the main contribution of this approach. Globalisation is to be understood as the underlying cause of conflict because it is expected to contribute to the decline of the role of the Serbian state and its revenues and the emergence of rival actors to the state. In these circumstances, the conflict of economic interests (for private aggrandisement and/or access to resources) of different non-state actors interconnected at the

local, national and international levels are seen as the immediate causes of the Kosovo/a conflict. This interpretation of the conflict seems to be contrasting with the liberal interpretation that “identifies in ‘commerce’ a potential force to pacify the relations among the states” since it suggest that the “globalised liberal market forces are quite compatible with regional and local structures of violence” (Jung, 1993a: 1).

Globalisation has to be seen as an important component of the political economy of the Kosovo/a conflict for two reasons. First, globalisation is seen contributing to the decline of Serbian state authority and legitimacy and the (re)emergence of criminality and identity politics in the created vacuum. Second, globalisation is seen as generating increased opportunities for economic motives to different protagonists that emerged after the retreat of the Serbian state. Considering the Kosovo/a conflict as a "new" or globalised war, the "New Wars" scholarship would suggest analysing different variables to approach the case. For example, first, the main protagonists and units of analysis; second, the primary motives of protagonists; third, resources that are used to finance the conflict; fourth, the strategy and the mode of warfare.

The referent objects of analysis in this approach are distorted politico-military formations, which have a horizontal rather than a hierarchical organisation. The erosion of the Serbian state’s legitimacy in Kosovo/a and globalisation would explain the emergence of both a growing informal economy

and different types of militia groups with trans, local and national links (Bougarel, 1996: 103).

Thus, the referent object of analysis is seen as being made of participants from local, national and transnational levels. Group's loyalties are seen as being shaped by common economic interests. In the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian paramilitary forces such as Arkan's Tigers in respectively Albanian and Serbian spectrum, are to be understood as examples of emerging horizontal cultures that transcend local and national loyalties. For Francesco Strazzari they have to be understood "as a function of the decomposition and re-composition of the state's monopoly of force, and as a bridge towards new armies and new forms of political legitimacy" (2003: 143).

Thus, the KLA and Arkan's Tigers although being local organisations are seen as part of larger politico-military formations. Their composition is seen as being mixed, because they include in their composition mercenaries coming from the neighbouring countries such as Serbska Republic in Bosnia, Krajina in Croatia, Albania and Macedonia. Furthermore, the international presence in these politico-military formations includes Serbian and Albanian diaspora in the US and in the European countries, as well the "army" of international agencies and institutions including the NGOs, the OSCE's observers and KFOR peacekeepers (see, also, Kaldor, 1999). So, the Arkan's group is viewed as a

“skilled service provider” (Strazzari, 2003: 151; Vasovic, 2000) helping the Milosevic’s elite and other international actors to satisfy their interests for enrichment and domination. To cite Strazzari:

> [t]he criminal profile of Arkan–whose tigers are accused of the worst crimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo/a–stood in striking contrast with the one of a blood – thirsty fanatic, and was more in line with the one of a skilled service provider. He was on the side of the Belgrade regime and could manage a good share of the pie of oil smuggling. Increasingly active in the importation to Serbia of German and Swedish-made fertilizers through Hungary, his Montenegrin acquaintances finally allowed him some involvement in the cigarette smuggling business. Given the extent to which criminal gangs were in symbiotic relationship with the regime, it shows the way the central regime took care of its own perpetuation (2003: 151; see, also, Staletovic, 2000).

As Arkan’s tigers the KLA is to be understood as a mafia type organisation in the control of drug running and arms trafficking and related to international mafia organisations looking after personal enrichment (Milivojevic, 1995: 68). According to Strazzari:

> The Kosovar Albanian [mafia] organizations were winning the underground war over the drug market against the Albanians from Albania, and they emancipated themselves from the role of being a mere connection ring between the Turkish Mafia and its allocation on Western market. Moreover, the strategic alliance with the Italians and even with Russian and Ukrainian groups rendered these organizations that became soon famous for the ferocity of their methods, an autonomous actor (2003: 154).

In the "New Wars" scholarship it is argued that economic motives and greed are to be seen as primary driving forces of violent conflict. Hence, the conflict in Kosovo/a is to be assessed as fought to reproduce position of power and access to resources of predatory rent seekers, rather than resolve the issues worrying the communities they pretend to represent. These groups are expected to use conflict as a means to achieve their economic interests, while identity politics is only epiphenomenal. To cite Francesco Strazzari, the “[f]ormal and informal economic and administrative practices that took root in the late days of

Yugoslavia often happened to play a key role in the priming of war dynamics" (2003: 142).

To discover the linkage between economic interests of Serbian and Albanian distorted politico-military formations and conflict this approach investigates informal economic and war activities of the KLA and Arkan's tigers. The behaviour of the warring parties is seen as being motivated by economic profits, which is achieved only by single-handed political control over Kosovo/a. These explanations assume that the fast and prompt private aggrandizement interests of these political groups necessitated both maintaining economic connections at local, national and international level and use war to uphold them (Strazzari, 2003). Thus, the control over the Kosovo/a's territory is seen as having an economic rather than ideological meaning, although ideology (nationalism) is utilised to justify the conflict and ethnic cleansing.

Groups' interests are seen as being defined in economic terms. For the scholars of this scholarship, the economic interests of different actors are the ones that shape group's loyalties and behaviour. The case of "pax mafiosa" established between Zeljko Raznatovic, better known as Arkan, and Enver Hajin considered a prominent figure among the Albanian criminal bosses operating around the Shkodra lake are presented in the accounts of this approach as an example that demonstrate that economic interest are the ones that motivate

different actors' behaviour and shape their identity loyalties (Strazzari, 2003: 146).

Most of the accounts of the "New Wars" scholarship argue that the main financing resources of the conflict beside the local "loot and plunder" are to be seen as mostly coming from various forms of illegal trading, support from neighbouring countries, diaspora groups and humanitarian assistance at international level. This argument is seen as holding true in the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, that why it is considered by many of these scholars as a "new war" (James, 1994, Block and Doyle, 1993, Milivojevic, 1998). Furthermore, Strazzari suggests that informal and criminal activities and illegal trafficking provided the resources to fight the Kosovo/a conflict, which, in turn, fuelled "rewarding forms of conflict and control over population and economic activities" to the KLA and the Arkan's Tigers (2003: 148).

According to Viviano (1994), "the Serbs have financed a part of the war in ex-Yugoslavia thanks to counterfeiting, and also through the laundering of the drug money deposited in more than 200 private banks or currency exchange offices." Furthermore, James referring to a report published by a Paris-based narcotics-monitoring group states:

> Albanian groups in Macedonia and Kosovo province in Serbia are trading heroin for large quantities of weapons for use in a brewing conflict in Kosovo…Albanian traffickers were supplied with heroin and weapons by Mafia-like groups in Georgia and Armenia. The Albanians then pay for the supplies by reselling the heroin in the West. …the Albanian dealers also trade directly with Russian soldiers for weapons in exchange for heroin (1994; see, also, Block and Doyle, 1993: 14; Milivojevic, 1995: 68).

The international and local financing of the Kosovo/a conflict, emphasised here is conceptualised as a characteristic of “new wars,” since in the case of the “old wars” state holds the monopoly of the means to finance violence.

As most of the post-Cold War approaches to conflict, the “New Wars” approach use identity or more precisely, identity politics to study conflict. Hence, for Kaldor, identity politics is used to legitimise groups’ self-defined political position. So, in the case of Kosovo/a, identity politics should be understood as a means used to legitimise the Serb or the Albanian distorted politico-military formations political claims. Strazzari suggests that identity politics is used by Arkan’s Tigers and the KLA to justify their illegal activities of private aggrandisement as assistance to respectively intimidated Serbs or Albanians of Kosovo/a and to present their ties with mafia networks as holding moral rather than economic value. In view of that, economic interests of groups are seen as becoming politically relevant through the politics of (ethnic) identity.

Hence, this approach would suggest to explore the policies of Milosevic and Serbian elite to present an exclusive Serb identity on the eve of the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation as part of identity politics. Identity politics was used to encourage a victim mentality to the Serbs, which:

> [w]as nurtured with an electronic diet of tales of ‘genocide’ in Kosovo/a, first by Turks in 1389 and more recently by the Albanians…with clips of the Second World War interspersed with current developments. In effect, the Serbian public experienced a virtual war long before the real war was to take place-a virtual war that made it difficult to distinguish the truth from fiction so that war became a continuum in which the 1389 battle of Kosovo, the Second World War and the war

in [Kosovo] were part of the same phenomenon (Kaldor, 1999: 39-40; see, also, Bieber, 2002).

Serbian ethnic identity presented as such, provided a non-negotiable situation. Crawford and Lipschutz suggest that identity politics defined as such is used as a means for gathering political supremacy that in "its most extreme form increases the odds that conflict will escalate into repression and violence" rather than negotiations (1997: 168). Thus, identity politics has to be considered as a means for facilitating conflict. Identity is used in explaining conflict in instrumental terms, as in the case of post-Cold War neo-realist approach.

The roots of the conflicts are suggested to be elsewhere. The causes of the conflict as it was argued above are to be founded on the distributional particularised enrichment interest of different political military formations and the generative "logic" of globalisation. So to sum up, in this approach the conflict is interpreted as arising from conflicting interests of enrichment of the Kosovo/a Albanians and the Serbian distorted politico-military formations that struggled for control of Kosovo/a's market and resources in the condition of the erosion of the Serbian state authority and legitimacy.

5.2.1. Explaining the Kosovo/a Conflict as a "New War:" A Critique

Viewing Kosovo/a case as a "new war" is limiting one's understanding of the causes of conflict. The Kosovo/a conflict is described in this approach as utterly

decentralised and uncontrolled, aggregating in a single process private and local conflicts, which involve different non-state actors motivated by greed and loot (Kalyvas, 2003: 475). Therefore, to use Kaldor's words "both politically and militarily" the conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians "was not against each other" but "against the civilian population and against civil society" (1999: 58). In this accounts "fear and hate" is not considered endemic to groups but manufactured during the course of the war. This conceptualisation limits our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. Three issues are discussed as follows.

First, in the "New Wars" approach the Kosovo/a conflict is views as a by product of recent globalisation and as such it is named as a "new war." This interpretation of the conflict neglects the historical relations between the Serbs and the Albanians as ethnic communities. From an historical perspective, the conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo/a is not new. The Kosovo/a conflict can be better seen as part of the continuous efforts for state-creation and nation-building, a process that is considered violent and not yet completed in the Balkans.[74] Therefore, the causes of conflict can be defined in terms of conflicting territorial claims, in view of the process of nation-building rather than a clash of economic interests of distorted politico-military formations.

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[74] The states boundaries in the Balkans, which were established mainly after the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars, were indifferent to ethnic, language and religious distribution of the population. As a consequence, the state of Serbia and Albania were created with two third of the population left outside their state borders (Danopoulos and Messas, 1997). Therefore, the control over

Second, the "New Wars" approach use identity in the explanation of the conflict as a means rather than an end. In this, the loyalties of non-state actors are not defined in terms of identity but in terms of economic interests. This is supposed to be the case because globalisation according to Kaldor has broken up the "vertically organized cultures" (1999: 71). This conceptualisation of identity undermines the substance of the conflict because what is held to fuel the 'ancient hatred' between the Serbs and the Albanians—is actually largely self-referential rather than instrumental.

Hence, this approach fails to account for the Serbs and the Albanians groups' historical grievances, which have been acquired in the process of historical interaction and can be a self-referential cause of the conflict. To account for the group's grievances, the fault line between the Serbs and the Albanians as warring parties is to be defined in vertical rather than horizontal terms. In this case, behaviour has to be understood as a product of groups' past and present inter-relations embedded in respective identities rather than instant economic interests.

So, one would be justified in arguing that the war waged by the KLA and being financed internationally cannot be explained simply as a strategy to favour the KLA's enrichment and its political control over the Kosovo/a market. Rather the emergence of the conflict is to be considered as an expression of the

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Kosovo/a (currently inhabited by an Albanian majority) either by the Serbs or the Albanians

resistance of the Albanians against Milosevic's policies of repression. In other terms, the conflict can be explained as a response to the societal threat to the existence of the Albanians of Kosovo/a. Different international and watchdog organisations have reported the violation of human rights in Kosovo/a.

Third, in the "New Wars" approach, the non-state actors are considered as the referent object of analysis. However, this approach deep down offers a state-centric outlook of the conflict. Thus, this approach points to the erosion of Serbian state's legitimacy and authority in the condition of globalisation as the underlying cause of conflict. The solution that this approach offers to settle the conflict is the restoration of the legitimacy of the Serbian state. The legitimacy should develop out of a cosmopolitan project. So, the "New Wars" approach cannot interpret "the conflict as the struggle of an oppressed national group against a colonial/imperial power in a demand for democratic citizenship" (Wilson, 2001: 367). Hence, this implicit state-centrism prevents this approach from properly defining the referent object of analysis.

This chapter provided an interpretation of the Kosovo/a conflict based on two post-Cold War approaches: neo-Realism and the "New Wars" scholarship. From the post-Cold War neo-realist perspective, the emergence of anarchy after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation promised inevitable competition for

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remains of importance as a major object of competitive claims of statehood.

security between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo/a (viewed as unitary and reified ethnic groups), which intensification led to conflict. The "New Wars" approach view the erosion of Serbian state authority (linked to globalisation) and the emergence of different distorted politico-military formations in this vacuum as the underlying causes of conflict. The non-negotiable competition for economic gains between the emerging groups is to be seen as the immediate cause of the Kosovo/a conflict. Both approaches main contribution is to introduce the logic of anarchy (Posen, 1993) and globalisation (Kaldor, 1999) to the intra-state level and consider non-state actors as the referent object of analysis.

Both approaches explain actors' behaviours as shaped by material interest (power or economic gains) and depending on the structure of the system or globalisation that are viewed as exogenous to the actors' interactions. This framework of analysis undermines our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict, since it exaggerates the autonomy of the actor from its properties (identity and interest), while underdetermining the role of actor's identity in its behaviour (Wendt, 1999: 228).

CHAPTER 6

Constructivism and the Kosovo/a Conflict

This chapter looks at what Alexander Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's approaches, whose theoretical foundations were presented in Chapter 3, can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. These approaches offer interesting contributions to our understanding of the social aspects of the Kosovo/a conflict, which is neglected in the traditional and the post-Cold War approaches discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. These constructivist approaches organise their explanations by focusing on the principle of identity.

Both approaches agree on the constructed nature of actors' identity. Hence, they would view the identities of the Serbs and Albanians as constructed in the process of interaction; however, treating them as constant and

unchanging at the moment the conflict is happening. Furthermore, identity is assessed as a means of organising social differentiation between actors, being either states (Wendt's approach) or societies (the Copenhagen School's approach). In both perspectives, actors are assumed to be unitary units. Hence, in the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, the Serbs and the Albanians are viewed as unitary actors and the referent objects of analysis.

Although both approaches refer to identity to study behaviour in international relations, they offer alternative interpretations of the conflict. Consequently, they are addressed within two separate sections in this chapter. The first section uses Wendt's approach to study the Kosovo/a conflict. The basic argument of Wendt's perspective is that negative collective memories of actors embedded on actors' identity would help explain the occurrence of conflict. The process of past interactions by which the identities of the Serbs and the Albanians get formed as enemies would explain the occurrence of conflict and subsequently the nature of the relations with one another. In this approach, it is suggested that conflict is not a simple attempt to realise selfish ends, rather it is a site of reproduction and instantiation of both actors' identities. Thus, the Serbs and the Albanians, for Wendt, learn to be enemies by treating each other in ways that do not recognise their right to life and liberty. Here, the identity of the Serbs is seen as a role related to the role-identity of the Albanians and vice versa.

The second section looks at the Copenhagen School's approach and examines what it can tell us about the case study. This approach views the conflict emerging out of actors' competition to strengthen their identities (Bilgin, 2003). The third section provides an assessment of both approaches contribution in explaining the conflict. The fourth section looks at the causal effects of "securitisation" of different aspects of ethnic identity in the emergence of conflict. Here, attention is paid to "securitisation" seen as a social process or as a so called "speech act" (Buzan et al., 1998: 26) through which elites, by way of supporting their own interests, may come to frame ethnic identity in chauvinistic and exclusivist terms. It can be assumed that this process may lead to conflict in the case of an intensive and successful "securitisation" process (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). The chapter concludes by emphasising that both Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's approaches offer essential contributions to the study of the social aspects of the Kosovo/a conflict, but suffer certain weaknesses that are discussed in the last part of this section.

6.1. Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's Approaches to Identity and the Kosovo/a Conflict

6.1.1. Wendt's Approach to Identity and the Kosovo/a Conflict

In this section Wendt's approach is used to examine the Kosovo/a conflict. In this approach, the Serbian and the Albanian "conflicting identities" are to be understood as the underlying cause of conflict. The Serbs and the Albanians are seen as unitary actors and their identities are constituted in the process of mutual interaction. In the construction of Serbian social identity, the Albanians are viewed as different and this difference is perceived and represented as conflicting with the Serbian "self." The same thing would be said for the Albanian social identity and its construction of the "other" (the Serb).

Collective knowledge inscribed in the collective memory, myths, narratives and traditions are viewed as responsible for constituting who the Serbs or the Albanians are and how they relate to each other. Sabrina P. Ramet defines as such the background of relations between the two communities: "two ethnic communities with distinct languages and religious traditions lay claim to the same territory with competing arguments as evidence" (1992: 174; 1996). For this scholarship, it is in virtue of such pretensions that have shaped the relations between the two that the Serbs and the Albanians identities are

constituted in exclusivist terms, which at the same time can help explain actors' patters of behaviour.

The difference between the Serbs and the Albanians is related to the fact that both sides believe that Kosovo/a is an important constitutive element of their identity. For the Albanians, Kosovo/a represents an important part of the Albanian medieval state—the principality of Arber, since 1190 (Drancolli, 2001: 70). The Albanian medieval state is argued to have integrated the early Illyrian tribes including the ones of Kosovo/a (Drancolli, 2001: 54-56; see, also, Buda, 1990;) in the so-called medieval state of Scanderbeg (Pulaha, 1982; Xhufi, 1993; Drancolli, 2001). This state is viewed to be bound by the distinct ethnic formation of the Albanians based on language and culture (Berisha, 1998; Malcolm, 1998; Misha, 2002; Blumi, 2002). In the nineteenth century, the League of Prizren (1878) was established as the culminating moment of the Albanian national movement. Different accounts assess that the League is represented in the memory of the Albanians as the moment of their national unity, as nationalist leaders declared: "We make no distinctions between creeds. We are all Albanians" (Skendi, 1967: 220). In this founding moment, Albanians are seen as representing themselves as "one of the oldest-established populations in Europe," always existing and as such "no people could be less 'alien' to the history of the Balkans" than them (Malcolm, 1998: 2; see, also, Misha, 2002).

On the other hand, different authors affirm that Serbs view Kosovo/a at the time of the Battle of Kosovo/a (1389) as the heartland of the Serbian people (Batakovic, 1992; Judah, 1997). This is the case because it was in Pec [Peje in Albanian] where the Serbian Church (1346) was headquartered and the Serbian kings established the Nemanjic Empire (which began to crumble with the death of the King Stefan Dusan in 1355). The Battle of Kosovo/a is often viewed as an important event, which has shaped the identity of the Serbs. It is suggested that Serbs see themselves even today as heroes bound together and sustained by the "Kosovo Covenant" that in Batakovic terms:

> Is the choice of freedom in the Celestial Empires instead of humiliation and slavery in the temporal world…although irrational as a collective consciousness, is still the one permanent connective tissue that imbues the Serbs with the feeling of national entity and lends meaning to their joint efforts (1992: 58).

Thus, an established and everlasting identity of Serbs is seen as bound to Kosovo/a, although at the moment of the conflict the province was 90 percent Albanian.

This intersubjective understanding of Kosovo/a from both sides (the Serbs and the Albanians) is to be understood as part of what Wendt calls "freestanding" (1999: 167). In this "freestanding," the Serbs and the Albanians are seen existing as independent self-organised entities. In Maja Zehfuss's (2001) terms, this conceptualisation of the agency addresses the question of identity as a question of who is considered part of the "self." In other words, Kosovo/a, as a territory and history, is to be understood as a constitutive element of the Serbian "self" and Albanian "self." At the same time, although the

belief about Kosovo/a as part of the "self" refers to the events that happened in the past, in the definition of the "self" in the present, this belief is seen as unchanging.

The interactions shaped by threats to either the Serbs or the Albanians identities would be, according to Wendt's approach, embedded in the "collective knowledge." The long historical struggle between the Serbs and the Albanians to own Kosovo/a territory is to be seen as having a special role in explaining how their identities are constituted in conflicting terms. The articulation of identity in terms of enmity presumes the exclusion of the "other's" existence in Kosovo/a.

In the examination of the Yugoslav wars, Wendt points out that the key resources that made war happen should be attributed to "a collective memory [culture] that throughout their history Serbs had been victimized" by the "others" (1999: 163). The narratives and myths of the past that Wendt refers to as the resources of the "collective knowledge" (1999: 143, 163), are utilised to explain the antagonism between the Serbs and the Albanians and the Kosovo/a conflict at the end of the 1999s. Considering that both the Serbs and the Albanians are committed and see themselves as bounded to these "collective memories," Wendt would suggest seeing them as available resources to mobilise collective actions and "explain patterns in aggregate behaviour" (1999: 163), which in the case of Kosovo/a is aggressive behaviour.

Historical events such as the Battle of Kosovo/a, the forced migration of the Serbs after the Battle of Kosovo/a (1389) and their extermination in the World War II by the SS Skenderbeg division of the Albanians are to be understood as events contributing to the construction of the negative collective memories of the Serbs towards the Albanians. These memories that portray the "other" as the enemy account for the atmosphere of hostility and suspicion that developed rapidly in Serbia on the eve of the Kosovo/a conflict. While these events are considered as the landmark of Serbs' collective memories, the retaliation of Serb guerrilla bands against the Albanians considered as the perpetrators of these crimes with counter massacres is expected to function in a similar way for the collective memory of the Albanians. To give an example of the events that shape the negative collective knowledge of the Albanians towards the Serbs we can mentioned, the retaliation of the Serbs against the Albanians at the end of WWII and the re-imposition of Yugoslav rule over Kosovo/a. At that time martial law was declared and 48 000 Kosovo/a Albanians are reported as been killed in six months (Vickers, 1998: 142-143).

In Wendt's logic the recurrence of these events having as their subject the persecution by the "other," is embedded in the deep structure of collective knowledge (culture) of both the Serbs and the Albanians. They represent what Wendt calls "macro-level regularities" (1999: 164). This negative collective knowledge about the "other," which is homeostatic in being (at least at the

moment of the conflict) would explain also, if we refer to Wendt, the tendency for conflict to recur over time between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo/a.

By considering the victimisation of the Serbs or the Albanians as "macro-level regularities" (Wendt, 1999: 164) this approach would suggest that they are everlasting. Consequently, assuming that the Serbs and the Albanians learned to be enemies[75] in their continuous struggle over Kosovo/a conflict, Wendt would suggest to see the enmity as transported from the past without variations. The indicators of tolerance[76] (Hodson et al., 1994) and social distance estimated on the base of the cases of intermarriages between Serbs and Albanians[77] (Botev, 1994) can be viewed as a fact of continuous antagonism between the two identities. To cite Hodson, these indicators reflect upon "along history of unresolved rivalries between nationalities" (Hodson et al. 1994: 1552).[78] These indicators are particularly revealing if analysed in the light of the claim that previous historical social interactions between the Serbs and

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[75] Enmity in the case of extreme negative inter-group experiences or memories would be defined as ethnic hatred.

[76] Hodson at al. (1994) uses different indicators such as the GDP per capita, infant mortality per thousands and the like to discuss the differences between the Serbs and the Albanians. These differences are assumed to affect the level of tolerance in Serb-Albanian inter-relations.

[77] Botev (1994) uses the indicator of intermarriage to define the level of integration or distance between ethnic communities that live under the roof of a common state. His example refers to the case of former Yugoslavia. Botev concludes that intermarriages between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo/a were at the lowest level in the framework of the Federation compared to the other national groups within Yugoslavia. The author notices that the percentage of exogamous marriages in Kosovo/a decreased by 50 percent in the period 1987-1989 compared to 1962-1964 (1994: 469).

[78] For example, the gross social product per capita in Kosovo/a was two times in 1955, three times in 1970 and four times in 1988 lower than in Serbia proper. In 1981, illiteracy rate in Kosovo/a was 21 percent of the population older than 15, while in Serbia proper was 11.5 percent. In 1988, infant mortality in Kosovo/a was 2.65 times higher than that in Serbia proper. The data refer to Savezni Zavod Statistiki (1963, 1973, 1990), as cited by Botev (1994: 463).

the Albanians have not only shaped both communities' identities and interests, but also sustain them as unchanged.

To sum up, from this perspective point of view, the identity of the Serbs or the Albanians is to be viewed as socially constructed in the process of common interaction that is suggested to "mirror" (Wendt, 1992: 404) the "other's" behaviour. The collective knowledge shaped by a sense of victimisation (that was constituted in the past but is taken as given in the 1990s), is to be understood as an available resource of information mobilising collective actions independent from individual beliefs. In this approach, identity is assessed as a motivational force, hiding an "unseen power" affecting egoistic behaviour through which both the Serbs and the Albanians attempt to come to term with the problem of their victimisation. The suggestion is that identity does not by itself lead to violence, but the processes of "othering" are the ones that prompt violent behaviour.

6.1.2. The Copenhagen School's Approach to Identity and the Kosovo/a Conflict

The Copenhagen School perspective broadly agrees with Wendt's claims about the constructed nature of identity. Building upon Wendt's approach to identity, the Copenhagen School, by introducing the concept of societal security provides

an alternative referent object of analysis: society. Society can be used as a referent object in explaining the Kosovo/a conflict as well and this section tries to do that. The use of the concept of society in the interpretation of conflict, first helps to overcome the state-centrism of Wendt's perspective; second, brings attention to previously neglected sources of conflict, such as the one emanating from resurgent nationalism; and last but not least, it introduces identity to the study of security.

In this approach, the Serb and the Albanian societies have to be defined in terms of identity and assessed as unitary actors. At the same time, they are to be considered as the referent object of analysis. The conflict is examined as developing out of security and identity dynamics interactions. The dynamics of this process in Bilgin's words:

> [R]esembles the security dilemma. The difference between this process and the classical security dilemma is that instead of threatening each other by building their militaries…societies…threatened each other through emphasising the dominance of their identities (2003: 211).

Drawing upon this logic, the case of Kosovo/a conflict is to be understood as prompted by the Serbs' and the Albanians' competition on strengthening the boundaries of identity (Bilgin, 2003: 211). Thus, the efforts of both sides to seize control of the Kosovo/a territory explain only the instantiation of the Serbs and Albanians selves that view Kosovo as part of their identity (Wendt's approach). The struggle for Kosovo/a, from a Copenhagen School's perspective has to be seen as creating a dominating position to whom would possess it and a necessary condition for security vis-à-vis the other.

Following this logic, the demographic threats to Serbian identity in Kosovo/a (90 percent of the population of the region is Albanian) need to be seen as a shrinking of the boundaries of "self" (Serbs being pushed away from their homeland). In other words, if the boundaries of "self" are threatened with shrinkage, this is perceived as an attempt of strengthen the sense of being of the Albanians (seizing territory at the expenses of the Serbs). In this context, it can be argued that excessive efforts in strengthening the boundaries of "self" are comprehended as a threat to the "other's" being, which explains the emergence of an ideational "security dilemma" of which escalation is expected to led to conflict.

Thus, the demand of the Albanians for self-administration (1989) and later on for independence (1999) of Kosovo/a, is to be seen as a direct threat to the Serbian identity. In this situation, the response of Serbia has to be explained as being in compliance with the strategies of self-help that would serve to "strengthen the idea of nationhood (we feeling) among [the Serbs'] own populace" (Bilgin, 2003: 212).

The logic of "security dilemma" justifies the answer on the side of Serbia to perceived threats, which was the dissolution of the Kosovo/a Assembly, the abrogation of the status of autonomy for the Kosovo/a region and

the taking over of all the institutions of the province.[79] Together with the abolishment of the status of the autonomous province, the Albanian representatives were excluded from all political, economical and social institutions. 100,000 Albanians were fired from all major public and economic and social spheres of activity and replaced by Serbs or Montenegrins. Furthermore, all political organisations as well as cultural and sport associations of the Albanian majority in the province were forbidden together with the print and media houses (Schmidt, 1993: 21-29; Troebst, 1998). The Albanian workers were fired from their jobs and the Serbs of the province acquiesced in (Magas, 1993: 262-263). All these "emergency measures" named differently as "planned starvation" (Kohl and Libal, 1992) explain Serbian willingness to counter the attempt of the Albanians for independence. The measures taken by the Serbs to strengthen their sense of being can be explained by an "altercasting" logic (Wendt, 1999: 329, 331). According to this logic, the Albanians are forced into a submissive alternative identity (stop seeing Kosovo/a as part of their identity) by using violence towards them.

This imposition of the Serbian "self" is to be seen in competition with the "other" being it— the Albanians, which were the subject of pressure to accept a particular position in Kosovo/a. Albanians are should not have been expected to welcome these measures because they represented a threat to their

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[79] On 13 September 1990, the Serbian parliament approved a new constitution, which definitively abolished the previous autonomy of Kosovo/a and Vojvodina. Both provinces became simple regions within the Serbian state.

very existence in Kosovo/a and identity. Accordingly, following the Copenhagen School logic, it is to be expected that in response to the removal of the status of autonomy, the Albanian majority in Kosovo/a, which held the same territorial claims as the Serbs, would react to these threats. The establishment by the Albanians of a parallel structure independent from the Serbian state is to be seen as part of the response and a threat to Serbian identity.

The Albanians legitimised their ownership over Kosovo by declaring independence in a referendum organised in October 1991. Within the same territory two separate political lives were organised with functioning presidencies, governments, legislatures and education and health structures. Both sides' claims for ownership and legitimacy over Kosovo/a and their efforts are to be considered as actions aimed at strengthening the idea of nationhood.

In this context, the emergence of the conflict in Kosovo/a is to be understood as the outcome of a radicalised societal "security dilemma," which builds upon the actions of the "other" aiming at strengthening the boundaries of "self." Thus, to sum up, the Serbs in Kosovo/a are viewed as feeling threatened by the demographic supremacy of the Albanians in the region. Furthermore, the actions of the Albanians that aimed at the separation from Serbia would explain the radicalisation of "security dilemma." Milosevic's words can account for the radicalisation of insecurity on the side of the Serbs:

> There is no time for sorrow. It is time for struggle…We shall win the Battle for Kosovo regardless of the obstacles facing us inside and outside the country…We

> shall win despite the fact that Serbia's enemies outside the country are plotting against it along with those in the country. We tell them that we go into every Battle with the aim of winning it.[80]

In this approach, the emergence of conflict would be explained by pointing to the "security dilemma" that intensified with the self-declaration of the independence by the Albanians and the actions of the KLA. These acts are to be assessed as an expression of strengthening Albanian identity domination. This explanation would justify the Serbs reaction with policies of ethnic cleansing, which, in turn, is to be seen as the moment when the "security dilemma" worsened and led the way to conflict. In Bartov's (2000) arguments the use of genocide against the "other" is based on the belief that a society can be better off if the "other" is eliminated. At the same time, genocide helps make societal identity distinguishable by using the labels of the "victim" and the "perpetrator." The measures that each side considered as necessary to strengthen Serbian and Albanian societies' sense of identity (inextricably linked with the ownership of Kosovo/a) explain why the sides had to resort to conflict as the last resort.

To sum up, from a Copenhagen School perspective the historical struggle between the Serbian and the Albanian societies for the ownership of Kosovo/a has to be seen as part of the process that shaped their identities in rivalry terms. Thus, the efforts on the side of the Serbs or the Albanians to strengthen their societal identity would create a "security dilemma," spiralling of which would led to violent conflict.

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[80] As cited by Ramet, 1992: 83.

6.1.3. Constructivist Approaches and the Kosovo/a Conflict: An Assessment

Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's perspectives extensively rely on identity to establish a causal link between conflict and actors' interactions. This framework was used to assess the contribution of this approach to our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. However, seeing the Serbian and the Albanian communities as unitary actor leads to a specific understanding of identity (as seen above), which is problematic in understanding the causes of the Kosovo conflict. An important weakness in both approaches accounts is that identity is viewed as having been going through a period of construction but is taken as being petrified at the moment of the analysis. This assumption has two implications.

First, in the examination of the conflict, these approaches would suggest seeing the Serbian and the Albanian collective identities as fixed in egoistic terms at the moment of the analysis. Identity constituted in this way is considered as the cause for the reproduction of self-help behaviours and the possibility for the recurrence of the conflict in Kosovo/a. Concluding that the collective memories (culture) of either the Serbs or the Albanians are almost perpetual and transferred to the present without major changes than the reproduction of the possibility for the recurrence of conflict is to be expected.

This assumption presupposes a simple historical continuity of the past in the present.

Contrarily to this assumption, the practice of interactions between the Serbs and the Albanians do not indicate a perpetual enmity. The historical records suggest that besides negative interactions that modelled collective imageries of the Serbs towards the Albanians and vice-versa, there is evidence of friendly interactions. Both approaches as explained cannot account for it. Even in the accounts of the Battle of Kosovo/a, (a landmark event that has shaped Serb victimization) different sources indicated that the Serbs and the Albanians did fight together against the Ottomans. The Turkish chronicles mention the participation of the Albanians of Shkodra in the Battle of Kosovo/a under the leadership of Tsar Dusan (Ducellier, 1994; Inalcik, 2000). Referring to the historical records Ducellier cites: "there is no reason to think that at this stage of their conquest (XIV-XV century) the Ottomans relied especially on the Albanians to oppose the Slavs" (1994:8). Even before the Battle of Kosovo/a, the same author claims that, "no mention is made of clashes between the Albanians and the Serbs at the time of Tsar Dusan, and the more so during the time of creation of the principality of Kastrioti" (1981: 9). As Christine von Kohl writes:

> It is first of all clear that the relations between the Albanians and Serbs were much multifaceted and subtle than either side describes them. It is beyond all doubt that in certain areas and in certain social milieux quite normal and friendly relations prevailed, while in others defense mechanisms and hostility were the order of the day (1992: 12).

Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's approaches cannot explain these friendly interactions because they miss the link between identity change at the actors' level to collective knowledge (culture) at the system level. This observation takes us to the other weakness of this perspective.

Second, the domestic processes are "bracketed" from the articulation of actor's identity in both approaches. In McSweeney's terms the domestic processes of "state interaction with sub-state actors…influence the sense of community" (1999: 50), which although recognised by Wendt "as intrinsic qualities that constitute actor individuality" (1995: 50) are not developed as a determinant in the articulation of actors' social identity and attendant behaviour. In a similar manner, the Copenhagen School's approach also neglects the malleability of actors' identity in domestic processes of negotiations and arrangements. In Zehfuss's arguments, part of the problem with this assumption rests on:

> The exclusion of processes of the construction of the state as a bearer of identity and of domestic processes of articulation of state identity…This reduces identity to something negotiable between states… concerned with the *boundaries* rather than the content of theories about self (2001: 335).

Furthermore, different accounts show that the Serb identity has changed more often than it is expected by both approaches, due to the groups' internal negotiations. These accounts argue that Serbian identity and collective memories have subsumed metamorphic adjustments in shaping the boundaries of "self" following group's internal interaction dynamics. Florian accounts for the metamorphosis of the Battle of Kosovo/a myth in shaping Serb identity. Thus,

the myth of the Battle of Kosovo/a was presented in a written form only at the end of the 1700s and at the beginning of the 1800s— a period that corresponds to the birth of nationalism in the Balkans. Only in 1892, was the Battle of Kosovo/a recognised by the Serbian Orthodox Church as a religious holiday (Locke, 1997: 167-201; Bieber, 2002).

In 1938, the myth was revised as a part of Pan-Slavism aiming to include the Slovens and Croats as peoples bound by the myth of the Battle of Kosovo/a. However, the other nations of the first Yugoslavia did not share the same enthusiasm. Following the birth of the communist Yugoslavia, the myth of the Battle of Kosovo/a was replaced by the myth of partisan heroism during WWII for the liberation of Yugoslavia from the Nazis and the Fascists. This myth was supposed to replace the individual national myths of the Yugoslav constituent nations and contribute to the forging of Yugoslavism, the new identity of the Yugoslav peoples. Nevertheless, these efforts were considered as a camouflage of the project for a Greater Serbia and its effects did not last long (Caratan, 1997; Pavkovic, 2000).

The myth of the Battle of Kosovo/a was rearticulated on the eve of the dissolution of Yugoslavia portraying Serbs as being always the victims of the "others." The victimisation of Serbs established the idea that all Serbs living in Yugoslavia should be included in one single state, to be safe from discrimination. This was considered as a move that would strengthen Serb

statehood and identity and deal with the issues of insecurity that Serbs faced with the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation (Wiberg, 1993).

These changes in the content of the Serb identity suggest that identity constructed in relation to difference with the “other”—the Albanians—cannot alone explain the Kosovo/a conflict. The facts show that the Serbian understanding of “self” has shifted from cooperation (Yugoslavism), to self-assertion (communist centralisation) and finally egoism (Serbianhood) according to internal elites’ negotiations. Consequently, an important part of the Serbian leadership’s behaviour and their engagement in the conflict can be explained as a function of these interests and the way they were interpreted and presented as a security issue (securitised), rather that conflicting identities. The issue is dealt in the next section of this chapter.

In McSweeney’s terms, it is “[t]he range of interests available to us [that] can cause us to reinvent the social identity appropriate to them,” thus “interests can play the decisive role in triggering the process of identity transformation” (1999: 127). Therefore, enmity becomes visible in the context of the contemporary political processes as defined by the representation of the “discourses of danger” (Campbell, 1992). Without understanding these communicative processes, it is difficult to explain the dynamics of the Kosovo/a conflict.

Another problem with Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's interpretations of the Kosovo/a conflict relates to the fact that the way these approaches look at conflict do not allow us to "decide who is the aggressor and who is the victim" (Bilgin, 2003: 213). Thus, as it was argued above, both the Serbs and the Albanians are considered to be equally responsible for the emergence of the conflict. Both parties are viewed as victims looking to mediate their historical victimisation with the Kosovo/a conflict. This interpretation has political implications. The inability to assign responsibility makes the reconciliation process difficult. This situation has important implications for the post-conflict reconstructing process since it could be difficult for the parties to gain the confidence of the "other," if nobody accepts the guilt.

The plausibility of these counterarguments suggests that the historical victimisation of either the Serbs or the Albanians is not a sufficient argument to explain the causes of the Kosovo/a conflict. In the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, uncertainty and the construction of threats through the discourses of danger, rather than a response to historical old grievances would better explain the materialisation of the conflict. The threat motivating both actors' behaviour emerged from the discourses of danger with relation to societal existence (identity), which explains why ethnic identity rather than other possible political identities was chosen to define the dimension and the scope of threat. In the process of framing a threat to identity, consensus is expected to emerge via a "securitisation" process. Thus, the explanation of the conflict would require the

understanding of this "securitisation" process, which is discussed in the following section.

6.2. The Securitisation of Identity and the Kosovo/a Conflict

Unlike the traditional power based explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict (dealt within Chapter 4 and 5), the Copenhagen School emphasises the ideational power of the "speech act" on actors' behaviour. Referring to the concept of "successful securitisation," the Copenhagen School scholars would suggest that the Kosovo/a conflict emerged out of the "securitisation" of the ethnic aspects of identity. Identity is assessed as resonating upon the historical relations between the Serbs and the Albanians as shaped by the perceived feelings of victimisation. Explaining the conflict in Kosovo/a as shaped by a successful "speech act" this approach would assess Milosevic and the Serbian elite as the "securitising actors."

Once the concept of the "speech act" is explicitly introduced to conflict analysis, it would help to explore the impetus of many events in the emergence of the conflict. On the six hundredth Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo/a Milosevic is seen as conveying the message that the Serbs were threatened by the separatist activities of the Albanians. In his speech, Milosevic presented the separatism and discrimination as existential threats to the Serbian society. So,

the Serbian enmity toward the Albanians was emphasised thought a "securitisation" process, which established a consensus around a Serbian collective identity defined by victimisation.

Presenting and getting consensus about the fact that the Serbs are being victimised by the Albanians in the course of the history is seen as the result of a "securitisation" process, which at the same time was used to justify the subsequent policies of Milosevic. Hence, the application of extraordinary measures towards the Albanians can be and was justified as needed to cope with these threats to identity. Although these threats resonate upon the collective memories of the Serbs, the emergence of the conflicts was not the simple result of the fact that the Serbs and the Albanian has learned to see each other as enemies as assumed in Wendt's approach. However, the negative collective knowledge that the Serbs and the Albanian share for each other can be seen as offering background to the claims, which Milosevic and the Serbian leadership could use successfully in the "speech act" and get the necessary approval of the Serbian people.

The economic crisis of the 1980s, in many accounts, is seen as challenging the position and interests of the Serbian elite within the Yugoslav Federation. Thus, explanations that point to the "securitisation" process view the conflict in Yugoslavia as the consequence of the purposeful and rational strategies of the Serbian leadership policies, which were threatened by changes

in the economic and political structures at the Federal level. It follows that the Serbian elite securitised ethnic aspects of identity to gain political support in the struggle with the other elites for wealth, power or legitimacy (Gagnon, 1994-95; Wiberg, 1993; Woodward, 1995; Ramet, 1996; Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997; Caratan, 1997; Isakovic, 2000). In this period of crisis, the Serb elite produced convincing interpretations of the Serbs' interests, defined in terms of ethnic identity that the community accepted and acted upon them. In fact, "securitisation" does not have an autonomous power in shaping actors' behaviour. However, once the ethnic dimension of identity was successfully securitised, it proved to be successful in mobilising the Serbs.

The "securitisation process" in the case of Kosovo/a was initiated by Milosevic to gain political support in his pursuit of power. In January 1986, Milosevic was elected head of the Serbian Party's Central Committee, by playing the alleged genocide card against the Serbs in Kosovo/a. By 1987, Milosevic is seen as consolidating control over the Serbian Communist Party's structures. Reformists were purged from the party under the label of tolerance toward the Albanians and disrespectfulness toward the suffering of the Serbs in the province of Kosovo/a (Magas, 1993: 109). After that, few voices questioned Milosevic's claims about the victimisation of the Serbs in Kosovo/a and elsewhere.

Different accounts demonstrate that after consolidating his dominating position at the party level, Milosevic aimed at extending control over Kosovo/a that had enjoyed the status of the autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia. In order to achieve that the autonomy status was removed and other measures that excluded Albanians from the political, economic and social institutions in the province and at the Federal level were taken. To legitimise these actions Serbian elite presented them as being done with the purpose of serving the interests and security of Serbs in the province and Serbia proper. However, these developments seem to have served to ensure the interests of the Serbian elite rather than those of the simple Serbs, whose lives were not improved. On the contrary, the migration of the Serbs from the province toward Serbia proper continued as the economic situation in Kosovo/a deteriorated (Gagnon, 1994-95; Caratan, 1997).

The "securitisation" of the ethnic aspects of identity, is used by the Serbian elite to get the support of the Serbs throughout the republic in the support of centralising policies. The use of "securitisation" as a strategy for gathering supremacy in its most extreme form, according to Crawford and Lipschutz "increases the odds that the political conflict will escalate into repression and violence" (1997: 168). That is what happened ultimately in Kosovo/a. This scholarship would suggest that the choice of ethnic identity as a subject for "securitisation" is not coincidental. In Gagnon's terms, the choice of ethnicity as the referent subject for "securitisation" is justified by the fact that:

> Serbian conservatives relied on the particular idea of ethnicity in their conflictual strategy because political participation and legitimization in the [Balkans] historically was constructed in such terms…Those elites who could make the best case for representing the interests of an ethnic group could increase their power *vis-à-vis* the domestic arena by being internationally recognized as the representative of their ethnic or national group (1994-5: 140).

The process of securitising the ethnic aspects of identity emphasised in the case of Kosovo/a suggests that the intolerance rooted in the ethnic culture of both the Serbs and the Albanians is not by itself a cause for conflict. The conflict can be seen as emerging because of a successful "securitisation" process by the Serbian elite, who used the idea of victimisation of the Serbs in Kosovo/a and the Albanian separatist threat to maintain its dominant position. The conflict over Kosovo/a can be seen as a reinterpretation of the inherent animosity between the Serbs and the Albanians in a securitisation process, which at the same time is viewed as an underlying causes of conflict.

In the "securitisation" process the Serbian leadership presented Albanian separatism as an existential threat to society and identity. In doing that the Serbian leadership first redefined Serb identity in ethnic terms emphasising victimisation and the history of long-term discrimination by the Albanians. In presenting the threats that were endangering the Serbs, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science contributed with its authority to make the threats believable. Thus, the Academy formulated the discriminations that the Serbs were facing and provided "scientific" guidelines for solving "the Serbian Question" (Anastasijevic, 2000). This political platform served at the same time to justify and legitimise Milosevic's actions.

However, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science was not alone in this endeavour. Other intellectuals re-fashioned their writings in nationalistic terms and the media and even the Orthodox Church joined the discourse (Bieber, 2002: 99; see, also, Dragovic-Soso, 2000). Looking at the "mediatic war" as part of the "securitisation" process, Renaud de la Brosse would define it as follows:

> The action of propaganda on the population aiming to guide them toward war prone nationalistic policies did develop in the form of a real public opinion campaign. Meanwhile it is used to justify the conquest of anciently owned territories now occupied by the enemy—an enemy that needed to be 'chased,' at the same time denigrate an ethnic group or an nation to better justify the violence used to face it, which means to present the self as the victim of other nationalisms in order to better feed its proper nationalism (2000: 3).

In this "securitisation" process, Milosevic is seen as deliberately reviving through the media and all other instruments of propaganda, the idea of the "Greater Serbia," which was presented as an important dimension of Serbian identity and security.[81] In the "securitisation" process, the myth of the Battle of Kosovo/a and its divine nature were used as events that marked the victimisation of the Serbs. The parallelism between the situations of the Serbs after the Battle of Kosovo/a in 1389 with that of the Serbs in the 1990s emphasised the frustration of the Serbs. The myth of the battle of Kosovo/a was used to create a sense of continuity of events that were taking place between the Serbs and Albanians of Kosovo/a in the 1980s and 1990s. This sense of continuity can be traced in the writings of the Serb nationalist author Bogdanovic,[82] who wrote: "Kosovo is not

[81] For the role of the political propaganda and the plan for creating a state for all Serbs and the consequences of using media for ultra-nationalist ends see, De la Brosse (2003).
[82] As cited by Bieber (2002: 100).

some imaginary legend of the past, but a real historical destiny that continues today" (1986: 286).

Drawing parallels between the situation of the Serbs in 1389 and the Serbs in Kosovo/a in 1989, the process of "securitisation" is expected to create the impression of everlasting persecution. To create this impression the current suffering of the Serbs were compared with that of the 1389 aftermath of the battle; and the migration of the Serbs from Kosovo/a as a result of the fear of persecutions by the Ottomans was compared with the Serbs migration of the 1980s towards Serbia and other republics of the Federation. WWII is another event that was recalled to encourage ethnic competition by emphasising the policies of ethnic cleansing claimed to have happened during the Fascist and Nazi occupation of the Balkans, where ethnic based states such as "Greater Croatia", "Greater Albania" and "Greater Bulgaria" were created by the Axis forces.

In the "securitisation" process, the accounts of the Serbian collective memory the distinction between the past and the present are erased. Thereby, in contrast to objectivist approaches, for the Copenhagen School scholars the accuracy of the historical facts is not important in the process of "securitisation" (Anzulovic, 1999). Hence, "securitisation" would function as a means of mobilising attributes of identity (which can be "imaginary" but do make political and personal choices to identify within a community) for political effects. That is

why, the techniques of “securitisation” utilised by Milosevic included the use of unifying national symbols with which the Serbs identified themselves. In Thomas’s words “by adopting such symbols, and particularly the Kosovo ‘master symbol’…Milosevic was able to transcend the normal, profane considerations of politics” (1999: 425). The “securitisation” can be considered successful and the role of the media, which kept the “nation in danger” rhetoric at a high-level should be seen as contributing to the success (De la Brosse, 2003).

The “securitisation” process led to conflict because the myth construction about the Kosovo/a battle was fomented in such way as to exclude any possibility of compromise between the Albanians and the Serbs and it encouraged resentment among the Serbs. Such resentment[83] offered powerful stimulus for collective action (Pesic, 1995, Bieber, 2002). Media increasing the Serbs’ resentment to the loss of Kosovo/a encouraged the view of the secession of Kosovo/a and the creation of “Greater Albania” as threats.

As a result of the “securitisation” the question of the Albanian separatism went beyond routine politics. The securitisation of the issue allowed the Serbian leadership to take repressive actions that in “normal” political circumstances would be very difficult to be legitimised. Examples include the

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[83] For a more theoretical understanding of resentment see, Liah Greenfeld (1992). She claims “resentment not only makes the nation more aggressive, but represents an unusually powerful stimulus of national sentiment and collective action, which makes it easer to mobilize collectivistic nations for aggressive warfare, than to mobilize individualistic nations, in which national commitment is normally dependent on rational calculations” (Greenfeld, 1992: 488).

establishment in Kosovo/a of the state of high alert in 1981 after the students and workers' demonstration that asked for the republic status of the region within the Yugoslav Federation (Malcom, 1998: 74-77; see, also, Troebst, 1998); dismissal of all Albanians from public sector employment (Libal and Khol, 1993; see, also, Troebst, 1998; Clark, 2000: 74-77); closing down of the University of Prishtina and all printing houses in the Albanian language (Troebst, 1998; Clark, 2000).

The "securitisation" of the Serbian ethnic identity, supported a Greater Serbian state solution and a refusal to share Kosovo/a with the Albanians, thus a zero-sum identity politics. Once the consensus had been achieved, few voices questioned the reasons that pushed the Serbian elite to support the idea of "Greater Serbia." The achievement of this consensus demonstrates the power of the securitising process.

To sum up, to examine conflict the Copenhagen School approach would point to the "securitisation" process that established an important communicative process, which in a way or another reflected the interests of Serbian elite. To cite Gagnon, "conflict is caused not by ethnic sentiments, nor by external security concerns, but rather by the dynamics of within-group conflict" (1994-95: 131). These dynamics are mainly underdetermined by the traditional and Wendt's approaches that do not consider the role of immediate communicative processes as determinant of actors' behaviour.

6.2.1. The “Securitisation” of Identity and the Kosovo/a Conflict: An Assessment

In analysing the Kosovo/a conflict, the Copenhagen School’s approach would suggest to scrutinize “securitisation” processes to explain the dynamics of the Kosovo/a conflict. Thus, the claim of Milosevic that Albanian separatism in Kosovo/a was a threat to the Serbian identity and state and its acceptance by the Serbian people can make sense only through the understanding of the “securitisation” process that started to take place in Serbia in the mid 1980s. The “securitisation” process was “successful” since Milosevic—the securitising actor—managed to convince the Serbs in Serbia proper and in Kosovo/a that Serbian identity was in danger. In this interpretation of the conflict, identity is presented as a security issue. Threats to identity are viewed as intersubjectively created.

For this scholarship, the “securitisation” of the ethnic aspects of identity was successful because it resonated upon almost stable antagonising identities of the Serbs and the Albanians, which served as the background to the Milosevic’s claims. This understanding of identity is problematic. It was explained in the previous section that seeing identity as petrified at the moment of the analysis and transported from the past without major changes is a weakness of this approach to conflict. The implications of this conceptualisation of identity into the interpretation of the Kosovo/a conflict were discussed in the

previous section. Here, only the problems related with the conceptualisation of the “securitisation” process are discussed. Pointing to the “securitisation” process would help the understanding of the dynamics of the Kosovo/a conflict. However, the way securitisation is conceptualised is of little help in making the right policy choices to settle the conflict. This impasse is due to two weaknesses of this approach.

First, the claims waged by Milosevic as the securitising actor are not questioned. That is because, in the understanding of the “securitisation” process, what matters is the collective memories of the Serbs and the message of victimisation that is conveyed from them. So, the validity of the Serbs’ claims are not scrutinized for their accuracy. This validation, however, seems to be susceptible to critique on the grounds of accuracy, normative rightness and sincerity (Wyn Jones, 1999: 111).

Hence, from the Copenhagen School’s perspective what matters in a “securitisation” process is that Milosevic’s claims have been successful in securitising the issue of Serbs’ victimisation. This approach not necessarily looks for the accuracy of Milosevic’s claims. Historical evidence that is used to claim the victimisation of Serbs is questionable and challenged by counter-arguments grounded in the findings of archaeology, linguistic sources, toponomastic data and historical records. Referring to the Battle of Kosovo/a, the Serb’s claims on the ownership of the army that fought against the Ottomans

and Serb victimisation and exploitation aftermath the battle, seems questionable by alternative historical sources. Accordingly, historical sources[84] other than Serbian ones, define the combatant forces at the battle of Kosovo/a as Christians lead by King Lazar, who was joined by Hungarians, Albanians, Bosniaks, Wlachia, Czechs and Kifchaks (Inalcik, 2000: 25). The defeat at the Field of Kosovo/a in 1389 was not only a Serb defeat since Albanians were part of the army led by King Lazar as well.

Therefore, the accuracy of the claim about the Albanian separatism presented as a constant threat to Serbian identity is questioned. This suggests that contrary to the opinion of Wæver the implications of "securitisation" - the meaning of security - is not necessarily fixed but it should be open to argumentation and debate. If Milosevic's claims were compared with historiography and other sources than maybe the "securitisation" would not have been successful. If the Serbian public and international community would have questioned the rightness of the policies of Milosevic against the Albanian in Kosovo/a from the beginning than the conflict could have been avoided.

Second, another problem with Wæver's conceptualisation of "securitisation" as Wyn Jones states is to believe "that the implications of calling an issue a 'security problem' cannot be challenged, only the objects to which

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[84] For a comprehensive review of different sources that define the battle of Kosovo, see, also, Bojovic (2000).

that label is applied" can be questioned (1999: 110). The empirical evidence of the Kosovo/a case challenges the notion that the implications of "securitisation" are fixed. In particular, the strategy of non-resistance or civil resistance (Maliqi, 1993; Clark, 2000), which was endorsed by the Albanians to face Serb repression during the first part of the 1990s was based on the belief that Albanians will gain the international attention and be awarded for not using military means in making present the issue of their rights.

This can be assumed as an approach that can hope to ameliorate threats. So, although this action was not a securitising move in the way the Copenhagen School conceived it, it had profound effects on the Kosovo/a politics, facilitating the establishment of a separate political life parallel to the one of the Serbs in Kosovo/a. The emergence of the KLA, which followed with the radicalisation of the demands of the Albanians for independence, can be understood as deteriorating threats. These demonstrate that the meaning of security is not necessarily fixed but it is opened to argumentation and dispute and subject to actor's interests.

Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's approaches offer interesting explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict. Different from the previous approaches, they offer an explanation of the social aspects of the conflict. Both approaches examine the Kosovo/a conflict by referring to the concept of identity and the

collective shared memories (culture) of the actors (state in Wendt's and society in the Copenhagen School's approaches). Identity and culture are viewed as constructed in the process of the Serbs-Albanian historical interactions and transported in the 1990s without major changes.

Based on these assumptions the conflict of Kosovo/a is interpreted as either merging from "conflicting identities" (Wendt's approach) or "competing identities" (the Copenhagen School approach). Thus, the enmity between the Serbs and Albanians is viewed as everlasting. At the same time, this enmity indicates the possibility for the recurrence of conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians in time.

Differently from the approach of Wendt, the Copenhagen School introduced the concept of "securitisation," which brings the concept of identity to the study of security issues and conflict. Furthermore, this approach emphasises the importance of communicative processes in shaping actors' behaviour. So, in the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, this approach would suggest that the emergence of the conflict should not be simply understood as emerging out of historical ethnic hatred.

Thus, the conflict is to be seen as being interubjectively created. As the domestic consensus is reached on the existence of threats to ethnic existence through the securitising process, it can be suggested that Serbian

leadership gained the support to get engaged in conflict. The main problem of these two approaches in the interpretation of the Kosovo/a conflict is their assumption about identity that reflect upon frozen historical situations. This assumption would presuppose the possibility of recurrence of conflict because conflicting identities of the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo/a would potentially remain subjects for “securitisation.”

CONCLUSION

The aim of this dissertation was to evaluate the contribution of different International Relations approaches to our understanding of the ethno-national conflict in general and the Kosovo/a conflict in particular. Part I of this dissertation presented three major International Relations scholarships to war, namely, traditional International Relations theory (namely, Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism), the post-Cold War approaches (neo-Realism and “New Wars”) and Constructivism (Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s approaches). The aim of this part was to account for the relevance of these theoretical approaches to the study of ethno-national conflict by pointing to their strengths and weaknesses. Part II used the insights gathered from Part I to assess what different International Relations theories can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. In what follows a summary of this dissertation is presented.

In Chapter 1, it was explained that the competing principles of the traditional International Relations theories (Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism), namely, power, order and emancipation offer guidance in the study of the causes of war, which can be used to study the case of ethno-national conflict as well. These principles can be used to organise the explanations of the permissive conditions under which ethno-national conflict take place. The main problem with these approaches is that they focus exclusively on narrow understandings of power, order and emancipation.

It was argued that the explanatory power of these principles is basic and too general. Realism points to power and anarchy as the underlying causes of ethno-national conflict. However, power, while important, does not alone determine the outcome of conflict. Rationalism by looking at order assumes a shared consensus about the definition of ethno-national conflict. However, this consensus refers not to outcomes, but to a set of established rules, norms and institutions concerned for the continuation and maintenance of order in the society of states. Revolutionism accounts for the necessary prerequisites, which would make war obsolete in international relations. Nevertheless, no one can prove with certainty that democracy would keep ethno-national conflict away.

Another weakness of the traditional approaches, which limit our understanding of ethno-national conflict, is their tendency to neglect the social relations that shape the conflict. Instead, these approaches make a series of

fixed assumptions about the underlying causes of conflict, such as the one concerning the role and the value of the state. This remark lays the ground for the next criticism.

The other weakness of with these traditions is their state-centric ontology. All three traditional approaches, by marginalising the importance of other actors in the understanding of war, present a distorted reality of war in contemporary politics. The practice of ethno-national conflict, which has become the predominant form of violence in contemporary politics, seems to challenges our traditional understanding of war in international relations. Other International Relations approaches try to ameliorate the deficiencies of traditional approaches to war by moving the attention to sub—and—trans state level of analysis (the post-Cold War approaches) and identity as a social signifier (Constructivism).

In Chapter 2, it was discussed that the post-Cold War approaches, namely, neo-Realism and "New Wars" adopt power and cosmopolitanism to sub—and—trans state level of analyses. This framework of analysis allows us to look at the immediate causes of ethno-national conflict. Post-Cold War neo-Realism uses the same neo-realist logic of anarchy and power to non-state level. This approach looks at the "security dilemma" between ethnic groups, in the condition of the emergence of anarchy in a decaying state, to explain the emergence of ethno-national conflict. In the "New Wars" approach the causes of "new wars" are viewed as being of socio-economic nature. This approach points

to the erosion of state authority resulting from the process of globalisation and the emergence of distorted politico-military formations as the underlying causes of the "new wars." These approaches provide a better contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict since this conflict is the explicit subject of analysis.

Both approaches take as referent object of analysis actors other than states in an effort to correct the state-centrism of the traditional International Relations approaches. Besides their contribution to the study of ethno-national conflict, the arguments of both approaches' contain a number of weaknesses that affect our understanding of the causes of ethno-national conflict. These approaches over-emphasise the role of international structures shaped by anarchy (for neo-Realism) or globalisation (for the "New Wars" approach) in shaping actors' behaviour (the ethno-national groups for neo-Realism and distorted politico-military formations for the "New Wars" approach).

At the same time, both approaches use nationalism and identity in their explanations in an effort to move traditional approaches beyond their concerns with power and cosmopolitanism. However, these approaches look at identity as a means rather than an end. Hence, national identity (for neo-Realism) and political identity (for the "New Wars" approach) are considered in instrumental terms serving either to support the offensive capabilities or to legitimise the illegal and mafia activities of groups. These approaches do not

consider identity as constructed in the process of interaction and an organising principle of actors' behaviour.

The traditional International Relations theory and the post-Cold War approaches neglect or take identity as a fixed or pre-given concept in their explanation of ethno-national conflict. The lack of attention to culture and identity in these approaches prevent them from accounting for the dynamics and social context of conflict. However, the ethno-national conflict rendered visible the role of identity as a social signifier. Constructivism looks at identity as an organising principle of international behaviour, including war.

Two constructivist variants were discussed in Chapter 3, namely, Wendt's and the Copenhagen School's approaches. In these approaches identity is viewed as a key link both to the mutual constitution of actors and structure and the way actors relate to each other. Following Wendt's logic, the underlying cause of the ethno-national conflict is to be seen in the conflict of social identities claims constituted in the process of mutual interaction. Wendt's approach to war remains state-centric and as such it is vulnerable on this issue to the same criticisms as the traditional approaches.

Different from Wendt, the Copenhagen School's approach looked at "society" as a referent object of analysis, offering as such a better theoretical base for the understanding of ethno-national conflict. In this approach, society is

about identity, which refers to ethnic and religious loyalties constituted in the process of interaction. By introducing the concept of “societal security,” the Copenhagen School offers an understanding of identity that makes it operational and applicable to study the dynamics of ethno-national conflict.

Like Wendt, the Copenhagen School offers a constructivist approach to international relations and war. Hence, “shared meanings” are viewed as created in the process of interaction. To use the logic of this approach, war-prone behaviour of an actor is seen as a factor in the calculations of the “other.” Thus, conflict is to be understood as resulting from competing identity claims of different actors. Identity in this approach represents an independent constitutive factor of behaviour.

The Copenhagen School’s approach also uses the concept of “securitisation” to analyse the dynamics of a particular conflict. “Securitisation” in this scholarship represents a discursive process. “Securitisation” as presented in this approach relies on arguments that make reference to the survival of the actor (state or society) that is defined in terms of identity. Through introducing the concept of “securitisation” the Copenhagen School scholars offer the tool that can be used to analyse the process that leads to conflict. Hence, the logic of “securitisation” can be applied to understand the outbreak of ethno-national conflict as well.

The insights gleaned from main International Relations scholarships to war in Part I, were used to study the Kosovo/a conflict in Part II. In a way Part I offered answers to the question raised in the introduction of this dissertation: Can the insights gleaned from the analyses of different International Relations scholarships to war be used to study a concrete ethno-national conflict? Part II, answered this question by looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict.

Chapter 4 looked at what traditional International Relations theories can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. Realist accounts explain the conflict as either caused by Serbia's interest to build a state of all Serbs as a function of its power-maximisation motive (classical Realism) or resulting from the end of Cold War and Communism that released nationalist antagonisms (neo-Realism). In rationalist accounts the definition of the Kosovo/a conflict is viewed as conditioned by the shared consent among states that see the case as either internal violence or as a violation of individual human rights within the Serbian state. In the revolutionist accounts, the Kosovo/a conflict is assessed as caused by the distorted nature of democracy in Serbia, autocratic policies of Milosevic and manipulation of information in a nationalistic manner.

The state-centric outlook of the traditional approaches allows scholars to concentrate their attention solely to the Serbian state, which is taken as the referent object of analysis. These approaches do not seem to be helpful in understanding the actions of the Serbian state towards the Albanians, which are

its own citizens. What is missing from the traditional accounts are explanations about identity as a social signifier. Traditional approaches work on the basis of prior, unacknowledged assumptions about identity. These approaches, by considering actors with pre-established and fixed identities, do not seem to be telling us much about the dynamics and social context of conflict.

Different from the traditional approaches, the post-Cold War approaches to the Kosovo/a conflict consider in their explanations the Serbs and the Albanians as ethno-national groups (neo-Realism) or part of distorted politico-military formations (the "New Wars" approach). The conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians is explained as emerging out of their conflicting material interest. These approaches consider the emergence of anarchy after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation or the loss of state authority due to the globalisation process as the underlying cause of the Kosovo/a conflict. This framework is the source of the problem in the interpretation of the Kosovo/a conflict for both approaches. In this framework, the Albanians and the Serbs as ethno-national groups are treated as proto-states, which behaviour is shaped by anarchy or globalisation.

Differently from the previous approaches, Constructivism looked at the Kosovo/a conflict by referring to identity and collective shared memories (culture) of the actors, viewed as social constructs. In Chapter 6, following a constructivist logic, identity and culture in the case of Kosovo/a conflict are

regarded as constructed in the process of the Serbs' and the Albanians' historical interactions. Based on these assumptions, the conflict of Kosovo/a is interpreted as either emerging from "conflicting identity" (Wendt's approach) or "competing identity" (the Copenhagen School's approach) claims. Thus, the enmity between the Serbs and the Albanians is seen as embedded in their identities. At the same time, this enmity indicates the possibility for the recurrence of conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians in time.

Chapter 6 argued that the Kosovo/a conflict can be better explained by using the concept of "securitisation". Following the logic of "securitisation," the Serbs and the Albanians are seen as an integral unified whole, which were induced to believe that their ethnic identity was in danger. Thus, "securitisation" is seen as a process and essential component in the emergence of the conflict.

The increasing in importance of ethno-national conflict in world politics has encouraged International Relations theories to move beyond their exclusive preoccupation with inter-state wars. This dissertation's aim was to account for the contribution of various International Relations approaches to our understanding of ethno-national conflict in general and the Kosovo/a conflict in particular. Different International Relations scholarships offer alternative explanations to this conflict.

The traditional theories and post-Cold War approaches allow us to examine factors that play the role of the "catalyst" in the initiation of conflict. This category of causes can be classified as the necessary conditions for the occurrence of conflict. These approaches look at conflict as a means to an end being it either power, order or emancipation. However, these explanations are not sufficient to understand the intrinsic causes of conflict. Constructivism put emphasis to the processes that lead to conflict. To explain conflict it explores interactions both as processes of construction (rather than a means to transmit information) and as relational processes in which actor *co*-construct each other. Interactionist hypothesis about actors' identity address both the construction of the actors and the causes of their conflictual relations. Thus, for constructivists actors learn to be enemies, which at the same time should be seen as creating the parameters within which selection of conflictual behaviour depends. However, formulating ethno-national identity in enmity terms in a securitising process would better explain the immediate causes of a conflict.

By comparing the main International Relations approaches to ethno-national conflict, pointing to their weaknesses and strengths; and applying gleaned insights to study the Kosovo/a conflict this dissertation demonstrated what these approaches can tell us about this conflict and the case study. No International Relations approaches to conflict is complete neither do they have all the answers about its causes. Constructivism has more things to say about conflict. In this approach the ontology of conflict is seen to be social in the sense

that is through ideas that actors ultimately relate to one another. Thus, actors learn to see each other as enemies. Furthermore, this approach is "constructionist" in the sense that in the interaction process the ideas help defines who and what the actors are. Thus, actors construct each other as enemies in the process of interaction. To conclude, in this approach conflict is seen as a socially constructed practice.

Drawing from what different International Relations theories did tell us about the ethno-national conflict, we can conclude that in the understanding of ethno-national conflict, analysis should first be focused on depicting changes in the discursive field, then looking for moments of crisis when social meaning is contestable (change in the distribution of power, economic collapse or establishment of authoritative regimes) to conclude by finding key events when the struggle can be manifested.

A comprehensive understanding of conflict is important because it helps preventing it, by assisting in making the right political choices when settling conflictual disputes. The inadequacy of international community in the definition of the events in the Kosovo/a case and concomitant responses witnessed at the same time that the causes of the conflict were not well understood.

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