The Rohingya in Bangladesh: Another Round in the Cycle of Exodus and Repatriation?

The Rohingya in Bangladesh: Another Round in the Cycle of Exodus and Repatriation?

By Su-Ann Oh — is Visiting Research Fellow at ISEAS – Yusok Ishak Institute, Singapore. 6 December 2017.

1. On 23 November, Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to repatriate Rohingya (referred to as Bengali in Myanmar) refugees with the intention to set up a joint working group on repatriation in the coming months.
2. Myanmar’s repatriation concerns relate to the residency status of the refugees and to arresting suspected terrorists who fled to Bangladesh. It has agreed to accept refugees with identity documents issued by past governments. To comply, refugees will have to list names of family members, previous addresses in Myanmar, and birth dates, and sign a statement of voluntary return.
3. Bangladesh desires a speedy repatriation of the refugees so that their presence does not have an adverse impact on next year’s elections, or consume badly needed resources.
4. To break the cycle of exodus and repatriation that has been occurring since the late 1970s, Bangladesh has asked Myanmar to implement the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State.
5. Although the two countries are set on repatriation, this may not be the best course of action. The conditions which led the Rohingya to flee are not being addressed and long-term solutions are not in place. This next round of repatriation may just be one of many to come.

As of 19 November, 621,199 Rohingya, referred to as Bengali in Myanmar, have joined approximately 200,000 other Rohingya in Bangladesh as refugees. This latest exodus began at the end of August, after the insurgent group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), attacked police posts and the Burmese army conducted countermeasures as “clearance operations.”  in northern Rakhine State.

After some initial reluctance to allow the refugees into the country, Bangladesh has since worked to accommodate all of them and to allow international agencies and NGOs to provide emergency aid. Negotiations to repatriate the Rohingya began in September with both countries agreeing to base the process on an agreement made in 1993 when Rohingya refugees were repatriated. At the end of October, a meeting between Myanmar’s home affairs minister and his Bangladeshi counterpart was held where both parties agreed to stop the outflow of Rohingya to Bangladesh, to form a joint working group, and to cooperate to repatriate the Rohingya.

However, a week later, Myanmar accused Bangladesh of delaying the repatriation process so as to obtain international aid. This was roundly denied by the Bangladesh government which countered with the accusation that Myanmar had not agreed to the 10 points put forward by its minister at the talks in October, including the full implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, chaired by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, to ensure that the refugees’ return would be permanent.

Nevertheless, on 23 November, both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding to repatriate the refugees with the agreement to set up a joint working group and to arrange for repatriation in the coming months. In light of these developments, this article examines the divergent concerns of the two governments vis-à-vis repatriation, and argues that the rush to repatriate does not bode well for the Rohingya or for a permanent solution for both countries.

Myanmar’s concerns revolve around only accepting Rohingya whom it deems to be long-term residents – thus keeping out migrants – and arresting suspected terrorists. To ensure the former, Aung San Suu Kyi was reported to have laid down four ‘strict’ conditions for the repatriation of the Rohingya in an international conference in Yangon in mid-November. Namely, the Rohingya would only be allowed to return if they 1) could provide documentary proof of long-term residence in Myanmar, such as those relating to school registration, medical treatment and work, 2) wanted to return voluntarily to Rakhine, 3) could prove that they had relatives on the Myanmar side of the border and 4) in the case of children, could provide evidence their parents were permanent residents of Myanmar. However, in the most recent agreement, Myanmar announced that it would accept people with identity documents issued by past governments, and the refugees would have to list names of family members, previous addresses in Myanmar, birth dates and sign a statement of voluntary return.