Lorraine Bergeron : Rohingya Crisis

Lorraine Bergeron : Rohingya Crisis

Lorraine Bergeron — Concordia University (Canada)

This paper aims to answer the question presented in its title by investigating whether and how a peaceful resolution to the Rohingya crisis can be imagined anytime soon, considering the deep-rooted nature of the conflict between nationalist Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State. If there is to be a resolution, I put forth the idea that ASEAN may be the most well-suited institutional actor to promote such a resolution because of its past successes in dealing with the Myanmar government and because it is in its best interest as well as in the interest of Myanmar, its fellow member. I will explain the root and direct causes of the Rohingya problem, a local problem that has deteriorated to become a humanitarian disaster. I will also show how this national problem is leading to a regional security crisis. Finally, I aim to demonstrate that the Rohingya crisis is challenging the international community since neither the national polity, nor the regional association have so far been willing or able to protect the Rohingya community from crimes against humanity. My paper will consist of two distinct parts, each aiming to tackle the above issues and to answer a main question: 1) How is the Rohingya crisis to be explained or understood? 2) Who or what can bring a peaceful resolution to a national conflict which has regional and international implications?

Rohingya Muslims are persecuted by nationalist Rakhine Buddhists living in the same Rakhine State (former Arakan State, also know as Rohang State). The violence between the two groups is not new, but reached alarming peaks in the 1990s, in 2012, 2013, and again in 2017. The government has shown little political will to end the plight of the Rohingya and is in fact accused of being the persecutor through its police and military forces (OHCHR 2018). A brief history of Myanmar is necessary to contextualize the arrival of the Rohingya community within the country characterized by a patchwork of more than 100 ethnic groups (Church 2006, 108). The Irrawaddy Valley and its lowlands concentrate the Buddhist Burman majority population, as where the ethnic minorities live in the Northern and Western hilly and mountainous regions (Church 2006, 109). From memorial times, Burman rulers were in constant conflict with princes of Shan, Mon, Kachin, Kayin (Karen), Palaung, Pao and Wa populations (Owen 2005, 83). Before the British conquest, Burma was never a united country.

It was nevertheless able to control the Arakan region where most Rohingya live within Myanmar (Church 2006, 11). Three Anglo-Burmese wars led to the capture of the last Burmese king at Mandalay in 1885 (Church 2006, 112). From then on, Burma was part the British Indian empire. Another factor of disunity is that, in the 1930s, nationalist leaders, among which U Aung San, Suu Kyi’s father, turned to Japanese support in Burma’s quest for its independence (Church 2006, 115). During WWII, the Rohingya supported the British against the Japanese. After the war, Rohingya were rewarded by the British with prestigious government offices, but they never did receive the promised “Muslim National Area” (Hossain 2017). In fact, in the 1950s, armed factions of Buddhist Rakhines and Rohingya Muslims were seeking autonomy for their respective group from the central government (Southwick 2015, 139), which neither obtained. U Aung San had convinced “many of Burma’s various ethnic groups to collaborate in outlining a ‘principle of equality’ between the majority Burman people and the other nationalities” and proposed a federal union that would include political autonomy for ethnic nationality areas (Pinheiro and Barron 2012, 261).

But following Aung San’s assassination in 1947, U Nu led Burma to independence and adopted a federal union between the large Burmese territory, reserving four states for ethnic minorities (Church 2006, 116), but refusing to give them the promised autonomy. After Independence in 1948, a mutual suspicion solidified between the Buddhist Burmese population and ethnic minorities. The suspicion lingers on today. It is thus possible to advance that there lies the root causes of discord between nationalist Buddhist Burmese and Rohingya Muslims, as well with other minority groups. From then on, the future of Burma was marked by regional insurrections and intercommunal conflicts. Ne Win’s military coup in 1962 started an era of political repression and systematic human-right abuses against minorities (Pinheiro and Barron 2016, 261). The imposition of a Burmese culture, language, tradition, and religion threatened minorities and raised violent opposition against the central government. In retaliation, Ne Win cut all resources for food, money, information, and reinforcements to minorities (Pinheiro and Barron 2012, 261). These events crystallized the animosity between Burmans and minorities.

The transition from military authoritarianism to civil democracy remains fragile. Dissension, violence, and brutality in the Northwest regions of the Myanmar, particularly in the Rakhine State, became so intense that many of the persecuted were forced to find refuge in bordering states refugee camps or in IDP “concentration” camps. In Asia, Southeast Asia, notably Myanmar, is the most affected by present refugee crises. As one of the world’s most vulnerable populations (Ullah 2016, 285), Rohingya’s plight has made the front lines of the news worldwide in the fall of 2017.