By Rohingya Khobor Opinion Desk
What happens to public truth when a people have no country, no vote, and nearly no control over how they are described by others? In Rakhine’s information space, Rohingya communities are routinely framed as foreigners, militants, or demographic threats. This is not accidental. It is a pattern. Over the past two years, a cluster of Arakan-focused outlets and pages has recycled the same tropes, often dismissing credible reporting, elevating unverified claims, and amplifying talking points that serve armed or political actors. The result is a steady erosion of empathy and a hardening of prejudice. If we do not name that machinery, it will keep working.
The three pillars of the narrative
The recent record shows three claims appearing again and again. First, the “illegal immigrant” label that erases Rohingya history in Arakan. Second, the blanket securitization that collapses a whole population into ARSA and other fringe groups. Third, demographic panic that paints ordinary families as a strategic threat. Each of these claims is contradicted by facts on the ground, yet each is useful to someone’s politics.
When violence surged in northern Rakhine in May 2024, independent reporting documented Rohingya villages burned and civilians killed as front lines shifted. Even sympathetic analysis of Rakhine politics warned that if the Arakan Army was implicated in abuses, its public assurances about respecting Rohingya rights would ring hollow. That warning matters because the AA is likely to be decisive in Rakhine’s future security and governance.
Erasing identity with a single word
The word Rohingya is the first target. Arakanese discourse often insists that the proper label is “Bengali,” which implies foreignness and removes any indigenous claim. The move is more than semantics. It is a gate that locks people out of citizenship, voting, and protection. In a widely cited interview, AA commander Twan Mrat Naing said many Arakanese reject the name Rohingya and feel it deprives them of their history. He added that large-scale repatriation would be destabilizing. These statements illuminate the political pressure points that shape local rhetoric, and why public acceptance of Rohingya identity is still contested in Rakhine.
This is where disinformation has a clear function. If readers are primed to believe that Rohingya arrived only under British rule, any call for equal citizenship feels like an imposition. It also gives cover to deny representation. Language becomes policy by other means.
From victim to suspect in one headline
Security framing is the next tool. Reports and social posts often blur the distinction between armed actors and unarmed civilians. When the UN Human Rights Chief warned in April 2024 that Rohingya were at particular risk as Rakhine became a new battleground, the AA’s public response did not acknowledge that risk. Instead, it foregrounded claims about “Muslim extremist groups” and accused the junta of instigation, while rejecting allegations that AA fighters harmed Rohingya civilians. The rhetorical effect is predictable. The most exposed community is repositioned as the immediate danger, and the burden of proof shifts onto the victims.
This same move appears when local outlets dismiss outside reporting as “misleading” or “fake.” In May 2025, for example, a Rakhine outlet attacked a Bangladeshi newspaper’s account of forced displacement, offering blanket denials and casting the article as an intentional smear. Readers are left with a simple binary. Either believe external journalism and UN warnings, or trust the rebuttals of actors who control guns and ground.
Demographic panic as a political instrument
The demographic story line claims that Rohingya birth rates or refugee returns would overwhelm Buddhist Rakhine society. There is little evidence that such a tipping point exists, especially after years of expulsion, flight, and death. Yet panic is effective politics. It justifies restrictions, segregated camps, and exclusion from decision making. When combined with the identity and security frames, demographic anxiety makes ordinary Rohingya life appear inherently subversive. The target is not simply policy. It is the public imagination.
How pictures become weapons
No propaganda works without images. Myanmar’s military was caught years ago using photographs from Bangladesh and Rwanda to sell a false story about “Bengalis” as infiltrators or killers. That episode should have been a national reckoning. It was not. It was a preview. The same cut and paste impulse appears across local social pages whenever fighting flares, as unrelated images are recycled and captions rewritten to fit a familiar script. Once a picture travels, corrections cannot catch up. The damage is done.
Who benefits when truth breaks
Two audiences benefit. Rakhine ultra nationalists can claim to defend a besieged homeland, and they do not have to resolve the hardest question in front of them. If the AA seeks long term legitimacy, will it recognize Rohingya as equal residents of Rakhine and commit to safe return with rights. The public record raises doubts, since even sympathetic observers have flagged how rhetoric and realities diverge whenever violence escalates.
The second beneficiary is the junta. Its oldest playbook is divide and rule. If Rakhine and Rohingya communities view each other only through panic and suspicion, then pressure that should fall on the military for atrocity crimes is dispersed. It becomes yet another “complex inter communal problem” that international actors find easier to postpone.
What responsible media should do now
There is a way out. It begins with very basic discipline.
Use people’s chosen name. Refusing the word Rohingya is not neutral. It is a political act that reinforces statelessness.
Separate civilians from combatants. Armed groups and criminal networks must be reported on, but the presence of militants cannot excuse collective labeling of a whole population as dangerous.
Interrogate official rebuttals. When leaders reject UN warnings or independent investigations, test their claims against verifiable evidence. The April 2024 exchange over the UN Human Rights Chief’s statement is a clear example of why that scrutiny matters.
Handle images like evidence, not ammunition. Verify provenance. If a photo is old or from another country, say so. Myanmar’s previous scandal over fabricated images should serve as a lasting reminder.
Center survivors and facts. In May 2024 reporting, testimony from Rohingya villagers, aid workers, and investigators described burnings and flight after front lines shifted. The question for any newsroom is simple. Are we building our pages around those facts, or around talking points that make the facts disappear.
Why this matters beyond Rakhine
Information space is not a side issue in a humanitarian crisis. It is the air the crisis breathes. When the Rohingya are described as invaders, when their citizenship is put in quotation marks, when their suffering is re packaged as a threat to others, two consequences follow. First, violence becomes easier to justify. Second, solutions become harder to sell. Safe return requires public consent. Public consent requires public truth.
The work ahead will be long. It will also be specific. Platforms should curb accounts that repeatedly post demonstrably false content about targeted groups. Donors should support independent Rohingya and Rakhine reporters who verify claims in difficult terrain. Diplomats should read local media closely when assessing commitments by armed actors. Above all, every newsroom that covers Rakhine should adopt simple standards. Name people correctly. Test claims before publishing. Keep civilians at the center of the frame.
Conclusion
Rohingya families have lived through six years of exile since 2017, and decades of exclusion before that. They should not also have to live inside someone else’s story. The duty of responsible media is not to echo the loudest voice. It is to hold a line for accuracy and humanity, especially when it is unpopular. If Arakan focused outlets cannot cross that line, others must. People’s lives are at stake, and truth is not a luxury in a war. It is the path back to each other.
References
- Nasir Uddin, “The fate of the Rohingya may be in the Arakan Army’s hands,” Al Jazeera Opinion, 3 July 2024. Al Jazeera
- “Rebel yell: Arakan Army leader speaks to Asia Times,” Asia Times, interview with Twan Mrat Naing, 18 January 2022. Asia Times
- “AA responds to UN OCHR Chief Volker Türk’s statement,” Mizzima, 25 April 2024. ENG.MIZZIMA.COM
- Michael Safi, “Myanmar army fakes photos and history in sinister rewrite of Rohingya crisis,” The Guardian, 31 August 2018. The Guardian
- “Daily Star of Bangladesh disseminates false news…” Narinjara, 1 May 2025. Narinjara
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