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A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh

Principal Findings
What’s new? Two years after atrocities in Myanmar’s Rakhine State drove a
wave of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh, prospects for repatriation remain
dim. Frustrated Bangladeshi authorities refuse to plan for the long term, have
introduced stringent security measures at refugee camps, and may move some
refugees to a remote island, Bhasan Char.
Why did it happen? The Bangladeshi government is struggling with growing
security challenges near the refugee camps and domestic political pressure to
resolve the crisis. It is also irritated by the lack of progress in repatriating any of
the estimated one million Rohingya refugees on its soil.
Why does it matter? Dhaka’s restrictions on aid activities prohibit its
partners from building safe housing in the Rohingya camps or developing programs
that cultivate refugee self-reliance. Combined with heavy-handed security
measures, this approach risks alienating refugees and setting the stage for
greater insecurity and conflict in southern Bangladesh.
What should be done? While pressing for eventual repatriation, Bangladesh
and external partners should move past short-term planning and work together
to build safe housing, improve refugees’ educational and livelihood opportunities,
and support refugee-hosting communities. Dhaka should also roll back its
counterproductive security measures and plans for relocations to Bhasan Char.
International Crisis Group
Asia Report N°303 27 December 2019
Executive Summary
Bangladesh is host to roughly one million Rohingya refugees, most of whom fled
over the border following a brutal military crackdown in Myanmar’s Rakhine State
that began in August 2017. While generously providing safe haven to this enormous
population, Bangladesh has sought to treat the displacement crisis as a short-term
challenge, focusing on the importance of repatriation and refusing to engage in multi-
year planning. This approach has not succeeded. Repatriation efforts have stalled,
crime and violence in the Rohingya camps and around them in southern Bangladesh
appear to be on the rise, and Dhaka has reacted increasingly sharply. In August, it
began rolling out stringent restrictions on refugees and NGOs that are interfering
with the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the camps and alienating refugees,
thus potentially aggravating local insecurity. Bangladesh should reverse the counterproductive
measures it has imposed, publicly acknowledge the long-term nature of
the crisis it is facing and begin working with external partners and refugees to mobilise
the resources needed to meet it.
In late 2017, after the number of Rohingya refugees crossing the border began to
diminish, Bangladesh and Myanmar moved quickly to put in place a repatriation
mechanism, but so far no refugees have returned through these formal channels.
Myanmar appears unwilling to create the conditions needed to encourage refugees
to return, while Bangladesh and its foreign partners generally appear to lack the leverage
to push Myanmar to address key issues such as citizenship and security for the
Rohingya. China, Naypyitaw’s most important regional partner, appears reluctant to
throw its full weight behind this push, and even if it did, it is unclear whether its
weight would be sufficient.
Although Bangladeshi officials privately acknowledge that the refugees are unlikely
to return in the near or even medium term, the country’s policy toward the
Rohingya remains focused on near-term repatriation. Dhaka worries that by publicly
acknowledging that Bangladesh will be hosting these refugees for years to come, it will
reduce pressure on Myanmar to make the changes needed to enable repatriation,
and could create a pull factor that draws yet more Rohingya over the border. As a result,
it is restricting the humanitarian response to meeting the refugees’ immediate
needs, rather than addressing long-term challenges such as building durable shelters
to withstand the region’s harsh monsoons, developing programs to help refugees
become more self-reliant through education and the creation of livelihood opportunities,
or helping host communities absorb the impact of the refugees on the local
economy. These are the kinds of programs and resources that will over time become
increasingly important to Dhaka’s successful management of the crisis.
Recently, Bangladesh has begun moving in the opposite direction by clamping
down on refugees and humanitarian activities. In August – amid rising concern
about insecurity in southern Bangladesh – Dhaka began rolling out new restrictions
on refugees’ freedom of movement and access to mobile phones, as well as on NGO
operations in the camps. It has begun fencing some of the camps and says it will build
watchtowers and instal surveillance cameras. Although plans are not firm, it has also
A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh
Crisis Group Asia Report N°303, 27 December 2019 Page ii
announced that it will press ahead with relocating some refugees to a silt island in
the Bay of Bengal that is vulnerable to severe weather.
Dhaka’s response to the Rohingya displacement crisis is at an inflection point. If
the Bangladeshi government continues to look at the situation through a short-term
lens and falls into a pattern of heavy-handed responses to security challenges, the
situation could become more fraught and dangerous for all concerned. In the absence
of prospects for repatriation and longer-term planning, such a crackdown will only
increase the refugees’ desperation. It could even make them more susceptible to
recruitment into criminal or extremist networks, which would add to the security
challenges Bangladesh faces.
There is another way forward. Rather than implementing the full suite of security
measures it has proposed, it could scale back the most draconian, and instead focus
on promoting genuine camp security by increasing a law enforcement presence and
ensuring accountability for offenders. Rather than treating the Rohingya displacement
crisis as a year-to-year problem, it could shift to a longer-term perspective and
loosen restrictions on the activities that donors and humanitarian partners can
undertake. Working together, Dhaka and its partners could mobilise resources and
develop programs to build safer facilities, help refugees work toward a better future
through education and livelihood opportunities, and support host communities. For
their part, external partners can make clear to Bangladesh that if it makes this pivot,
they will both continue to press Myanmar on repatriation – an essential goal that
Dhaka’s domestic constituents want to continue seeing at the top of the agenda – and
provide the funding and resources required to allow this approach to succeed.
Whether or not Dhaka publicly acknowledges it, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya
are likely to remain in Bangladesh for years to come. While the Bangladeshi
government must consider the political implications of expressly recognising this
probability, it should also consider the practical implications of failing to do so. The
most promising path for responsibly managing the Rohingya displacement crisis requires
the government to shift its sights to planning for the long term and looking to
external partners for support in making those plans succeed. That is the path it should
now take.
Yangon/Brussels, 27 December 2019