Behind the Numbers: Myanmar’s 2025–26 Election and the Reality of Mass Disenfranchisement

By Ronnie

When Myanmar’s military junta announced a 54–55% voter turnout for its three-phase general election held between December 2025 and January 2026, the figures were presented as evidence of democratic legitimacy. [1–3] Yet a closer examination reveals a different reality: when accounting for the millions of citizens excluded from the electoral process, the actual participation rate falls to roughly 41–44% of all eligible voters nationwide. [1–3,14–16]

This gap between reported and effective turnout exposes the fundamental illegitimacy of an electoral exercise that the United Nations, Western governments, and human rights organisations have condemned as neither free, fair, nor credible. [4–7,19–25]

The official numbers: a selective count

According to figures reported by junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun and relayed by local and international media, more than 13.14 million people voted across the election’s three phases, representing just over 54% of the 24.22 million registered voters in participating townships.[1–3,7,8] The election unfolded in three stages:

• Phase 1 (28 December 2025): about 6.09 million votes cast from 11.69 million eligible voters across 102 townships, a turnout of 52.13%.
• Phase 2 (11 January 2026): about 4.24 million votes from 7.59 million eligible voters in 100 townships, a turnout of 55.95%.[1–3]
• Phase 3 (25 January 2026): about 2.79 million votes from 4.94 million eligible voters in 60 townships, a turnout of 56.48%.[1–3,7]

Taken together, these figures produce a reported turnout of approximately 54–55% from 24.22 million registered voters in 263 townships.[1–3,7,8] Xinhua, The Nation Thailand, and CRPH Support Group all cite these numbers, attributing them to the junta’s information team.[1–3,7]

However, elections were not held in roughly 65–67 of Myanmar’s 330 townships due to intense conflict and lack of regime control, meaning at least one-fifth of the country’s administrative units were excluded from voting entirely.[7,9,11–13,18] In these areas, the issue was not low turnout but the complete absence of polling.

The missing millions: recalculating real participation

To assess genuine participation, it is necessary to consider all eligible voters nationwide, not only those in townships where the military managed to organise polling.

In the 2020 general election, Myanmar’s Union Election Commission registered about 38.27 million voters across 315 townships and recorded a turnout of 71.89%. International IDEA and other observers described the 2015 and 2020 elections as broadly reflective of voter will despite structural flaws and conflict in some areas.[14–16]

Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar has experienced mass displacement, economic collapse, and widespread violence, which have significantly reduced the proportion of the population able to register or vote.[22,27–30,37] Even so, using 2020 as a baseline and combining it with the junta’s own current data, a conservative estimate for a fully inclusive voter roll across all 330 townships would be around 30–32 million eligible voters.[11,14–16,30,36]

Against that backdrop:

• Total votes cast in 2025–26 (all phases): about 13.14 million.[1–3,7,8]
• Estimated total eligible voters nationwide: 30–32 million.[11,14–16,30,36]
• Implied effective turnout: approximately 41–44%.

No official body has published this 41–44% figure; it is an analytical estimate derived by combining official 2025–26 turnout figures with 2020 electorate size and the known exclusion of dozens of townships. It strongly suggests that well over half of Myanmar’s potential electorate either could not vote or chose not to participate in what many viewed as a sham election.[7,9,18–22]

Given the scale of displacement, disenfranchisement, and insecurity, the true proportion of adults able and willing to participate may be lower still.[22,27–30,36,37]

Layers of disenfranchisement

Excluded and conflict-affected townships

Independent investigations and reporting show that large parts of Sagaing, Magway, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Rakhine, and Karen states and regions were either formally excluded from voting or effectively cut off by conflict.[11–13,18,42] Myanmar Witness and related analyses highlight that key states remained excluded even in later phases of the election.

The junta’s efforts to conduct a census and register voters also demonstrate the limits of state reach. Commentaries on the 2024–25 census note that the authorities could only operate safely in a fraction of the country, underlining how many communities lie outside effective regime control. If large areas cannot be safely counted, claims of credible electoral coverage are even weaker.

Internal displacement and access barriers

UN agencies and humanitarian organisations estimate that around 3 million people, and later approximately 3.3 million, have been internally displaced since the coup.[27–30] These displaced people often live in forests, informal camps, religious compounds, and border areas, with little or no access to formal voter registration, polling stations, or safe travel.

For such populations, voting is not simply a matter of turnout preference but of physical impossibility, lack of documentation, or fear of attack while travelling to polling sites.[27–30,37]

Rohingya exclusion

Rohingya communities were formally stripped of voting rights well before the 2021 coup. In 2015 and 2020, more than 1.1 million Rohingya were excluded from the voter lists despite having participated in previous elections.

Today, rights groups estimate that roughly 600,000 Rohingya remain in Myanmar, mostly in Rakhine State, living under tight movement restrictions and without recognised citizenship. They were not permitted meaningful participation in the 2025–26 election as voters or candidates, continuing a pattern of deliberate disenfranchisement that has been widely documented.

Political prisoners and criminalisation of dissent

Since the coup, tens of thousands of people have been detained for political reasons, including elected officials, activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens.[22–24,37] All are effectively disenfranchised.

In November 2025, the junta introduced the Law on the Prevention of Obstruction, Disruption, and Sabotage of Multiparty Democratic General Election, which criminalises criticism or perceived obstruction of the electoral process. UN human rights bodies and international NGOs report that the law carries penalties of up to 20 years in prison and potentially the death penalty, and has been used to arrest people for social media posts, leaflets, and peaceful opposition to the vote.[19–21,22,25]

UN reporting and rights groups describe multiple cases where individuals received extremely long sentences—decades in some instances—for anti-election activities, reinforcing a climate of fear around any form of dissent or boycott.[19–22,25]

From competitive elections to controlled theatre

The 2015 and 2020 general elections were not perfect, but they did include meaningful competition between multiple parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and numerous ethnic parties.[14–16,32] Voter turnout in both contests was around 70–72% and observers concluded that the results broadly reflected the will of those able to vote.[14–16]

In 2025–26, the context was entirely different. The NLD had been dissolved, its leadership—including Aung San Suu Kyi—was imprisoned, and many other parties were barred from registering or discouraged from participating. Analysts report that parties allowed to contest were largely military-aligned or considered acceptable by the junta.

Human Rights Watch, FIDH, and other organisations note that pro-democracy and ethnic parties that had collectively won about 72% of the vote in 2020 were either excluded or chose to boycott the junta’s election, while participating parties in 2025–26 had received only a minority of votes in the last credible national poll.

Reports following the final phase indicate that the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured the vast majority of contested seats, consolidating control over parliament when combined with the 25% of seats reserved for the armed forces under the 2008 Constitution.

International condemnation: “façade”, “non-election”, “fraudulent claim”

UN experts and international organisations have consistently rejected the 2025–26 election’s legitimacy. An independent UN human rights expert characterised the vote as a “façade” designed to entrench military rule, not reflect popular will. UN News described the election as “marked by fear”, highlighting that civilians were coerced by both the junta and some anti-junta armed groups.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that the military-controlled ballot risked exacerbating violence and social division rather than contributing to a political solution. Human Rights Watch labelled the process a “fraudulent claim for credibility”, citing the exclusion of opposition parties, sweeping repression, and the context of civil war.

FIDH referred to the exercise as a “non-election” that perpetuated instability and serious human rights violations, arguing that it could not resolve Myanmar’s political crisis. The Council on Foreign Relations concluded that the junta-led election was neither free nor fair and emphasised that large swathes of the population and territory were effectively excluded.

Census politics: why counting matters as much as voting

Several analysts have argued that the junta’s census, conducted in parallel with preparations for the election, may have even more lasting consequences than the vote itself. Commentaries warning that “Myanmar’s census is more consequential than its election” point out that in conflict settings, population counts determine who is formally recognised as part of the polity and who is not.

For communities already at risk—Rohingya, borderland minorities, IDPs, and those in areas controlled by resistance forces—being left out of the census can mean disappearing from official maps, budgets, and future political settlements. Analysts note that exclusion from the 2014 census was an important step in the progressive erasure of Rohingya citizenship and rights.

A census that only covers regime-held and accessible areas risks baking in the demographic and political consequences of displacement, expulsion, and territorial fragmentation.

A country under siege

The election took place against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis. UN and humanitarian sources estimate that millions of people—often cited at more than 18 million—now require some form of assistance.[27–30,37] At least 3–3.3 million are internally displaced, and millions more have fled to neighbouring countries.[27–30,37]

Human rights reports document repeated instances of airstrikes on civilian areas, village burnings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and sexual violence, as well as severe restrictions on humanitarian access. Poverty has deepened, with more than half the population estimated to be living below the poverty line.

In this environment, the basic conditions for a free and fair election—freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement, and security—are fundamentally absent.[19–23]

Whose mandate counts?

Many governments and democracy-support organisations continue to view the 2020 election as the last credible expression of the popular will in Myanmar.[14–16,33,46] Bodies such as International IDEA have emphasised that any election organised by the military that excludes the main opposition forces “will not reflect the will of Myanmar’s people”.

Structures formed in response to the coup—the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the National Unity Government (NUG), and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC)—draw legitimacy from the 2020 mandate and ongoing popular resistance, rather than from junta-supervised polls.

From this perspective, the 2025–26 election does not reset the democratic clock. Instead, it underscores the gulf between the junta’s claims to authority and the preferences expressed in 2015–2020 and in ongoing civil disobedience and resistance.[14–16,18,19,22,24]

Beyond the numbers: democracy cannot be staged

On paper, a turnout figure above 50% can resemble those in many democracies. However, when more than a fifth of townships have no polling at all, millions are displaced or denied registration, an entire minority is systematically excluded, and opposition parties are dissolved or jailed, the number becomes profoundly misleading.[1–3,7,11–13,22,27–32,36]

The 2025–26 election in Myanmar illustrates how elections can be used as instruments of control rather than channels of consent. The apparent 54–55% turnout concerns only those citizens permitted and able to participate in regime-run polling stations; it does not capture the millions who were deliberately or structurally excluded.[1–3,7,11–13,22,27–32]

When the disenfranchised townships, displaced populations, Rohingya communities, political prisoners, and those deterred by fear are included in the calculation, the effective participation rate drops into the low 40% range—if not below.[1–3,7,11,14–16,22,27–32,36] What remains is not a portrait of resilient democracy under strain, but of a population whose political voice has been systematically constrained.

For many inside and outside Myanmar, the more meaningful mandate continues to lie with the results of the 2015 and 2020 elections, and with those who resist military rule through political, civil, and—in many areas—armed struggle.[14–16,18,33,37] Until conditions exist for inclusive, competitive, and secure voting in all 330 townships, turnout statistics will reveal more about the junta’s capacity to stage an election than about the will of the people.

Endnotes

1. The Nation Thailand, “Voter turnout reaches about 55% in Myanmar’s 2025 general election,” 27 Jan 2026, https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/news/asean/40061792
2. The Star / Eleven Media (reprint), “Voter turnout reaches about 55 per cent in Myanmar’s 2025 general election,” 26 Jan 2026, https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2026/01/27/voter-turnout-reaches-about-55-per-cent-in-myanmars-2025-general-election
3. CRPH Support Group, “Voter turnout reaches about 55 per cent in Myanmar’s 2025 general election,” 26 Jan 2026, https://www.crphsupportgroup.no/post/voter-turnout-reaches-about-55-per-cent-in-myanmar-s-2025-general-election
4. Channel News Asia, “Myanmar junta says voter turnout at 52% in first phase of election,” 30 Dec 2025, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/myanmar-election-voter-turnout-52-junta-first-phase-5771086
5. Reuters, “Myanmar junta says voter turnout at 52% in first phase of election,” 31 Dec 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-junta-says-voter-turnout-52-first-phase-election-2025-12-31/
6. Al Jazeera, “Myanmar military reports 50 percent turnout in first election phase,” 31 Dec 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/31/myanmar-military-reports-50-percent-turnout-in-first-election-phase
7. Xinhua, “Over 13 mln people vote in Myanmar’s general election,” 26 Jan 2026, https://english.news.cn/asiapacific/20260127/5fe46d3945394aedb1119c0f42670e09/c.html
8. Xinhua, “Voter turnout in Myanmar’s first phase of 2025 general election reaches 52.13 percent,” 30–31 Dec 2025, https://english.news.cn/20251231/d0e41385f37a469fa423d083b6c845f7/c.html
9. Al Jazeera, “Polls open in Myanmar as military stages first election since 2021 coup,” 28 Dec 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/28/polls-open-in-myanmar-as-military-stages-first-election-since-2021-coup
10. The Nation Thailand, “USDP wins majority of seats in Phase Three of Myanmar’s general election,” 29 Jan 2026, https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/news/asean/40061885
11. US-ASEAN Business Council, “Myanmar Holds General Elections in Three Phases,” 14 Jan 2026, https://www.usasean.org/article/myanmar-holds-general-elections-three-phases
12. Myanmar Witness / Info-Res, “Myanmar military election Phase 2: Conflict persists, and key states remain excluded,” 22 Jan 2026, https://www.info-res.org/myanmar-witness/articles/myanmar-military-election-phase-2-conflict-persists-and-key-states-remain-excluded
13. Myanmar Witness / Info-Res, “Myanmar military-led election 2025–2026: Phase 1 begins amid ongoing conflict in Myanmar,” 4 Feb 2026, https://www.info-res.org/myanmar-witness/articles/myanmar-military-led-election-2025-2026-phase-1-begins-amid-ongoing-conflict-in-myanmar
14. International IDEA, “Myanmar Elections: Considerations for post-coup Myanmar,” Fact Sheet, Nov 2024, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Myanmar-Election-Fact-Sheet_Nov2024_ENG.pdf
15. Union Election Commission (Myanmar), “2020 Election Data,” 2020, https://2020election.uec.gov.mm/54?lang=gb
16. ConstitutionNet / International IDEA, “2020 General Election at a Glance,” https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/2020%20Myanmar%20Election%20at%20a%20glance.pdf
17. Wikipedia, “2020 Myanmar general election,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Myanmar_general_election
18. Wikipedia, “2025–26 Myanmar general election,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%9326_Myanmar_general_election
19. UN News, “Myanmar vote a ‘facade’ to entrench military rule, independent rights expert warns,” 7 Jan 2026, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166729
20. UN News, “Myanmar elections marked by fear as UN warns civilians are coerced from all sides,” 22 Dec 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166662
21. OHCHR, “Myanmar: Türk says military-controlled ballot exacerbates violence and social division,” 29 Jan 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/myanmar-turk-says-military-controlled-ballot-exacerbates-violence-and-social
22. Human Rights Watch, “Myanmar: Elections a Fraudulent Claim for Credibility,” 16 Nov 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/16/myanmar-elections-a-fraudulent-claim-for-credibility
23. FIDH, “Myanmar: ‘Non-election’ perpetuates instability, serious human rights violations,” 23 Dec 2025, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/myanmar/myanmar-non-election-perpetuates-instability-serious-human-rights
24. Council on Foreign Relations, “Myanmar’s Junta-Led Election Is Neither Free nor Fair,” 8 Jan 2026, https://www.cfr.org/articles/myanmars-elections-begin-laughable-their-face-deadly-serious-their-impact
25. Fortify Rights, “Myanmar’s Sham Elections,” 14 Jan 2026, https://www.fortifyrights.org/mya-inv-oped-2026-01-15/
26. UNFPA / Myanmar, “Myanmar Population and Housing Census” (including 2014 Census Atlas), https://myanmar.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/MyanmarCensusAtlas_lowres.pdf
27. Al Jazeera, “‘Bleak milestone’: UN says 3 million forced to flee in Myanmar conflict,” 8 May 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/8/bleak-milestone-un-says-3-million-forced-to-flee-in-myanmar-conflict
28. The New Humanitarian, “Myanmar displacement reaches 3 million,” 8 May 2024, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2024/05/08/myanmar-displacement-reaches-3-million
29. ReliefWeb / ECHO, “Myanmar – Conflict and population displacement (UN RC/HC Myanmar, DG ECHO) (ECHO Daily Flash of 06 May 2024),” https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-conflict-and-population-displacement-un-rchc-myanmar-dg-echo-echo-daily-flash-06-may-2024
30. UN News (audio), “Myanmar: Intensified conflict leaves 3.3 million displaced,” 16 Sep 2024, https://news.un.org/en/audio/2024/09/1154446
31. Daily Sabah, “Myanmar excludes over 1.1 million Rohingya from elections,” 8 Nov 2020, https://www.dailysabah.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-excludes-over-11-million-rohingya-from-elections
32. TIME, “Myanmar Election: Rohingya Minority Denied the Right to Vote,” 11 Nov 2020, https://time.com/5910739/myanmar-election-rohingya/
33. ANFREL, “2020 Myanmar General Elections – Interim Report of the International Election Observation Mission,” https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ANFREL-Interim-Report_IEOM-to-the-2020-Myanmar-General-Elections.pdf
34. European Parliament, “Election Observation Delegation to the 2015 Myanmar Elections,” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/212611/Election_report_Myanmar_08_November_2015.pdf
35. International Crisis Group, “Myanmar’s Electoral Landscape,” 2015 (PDF; general context), https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/266-myanmar-s-electoral-landscape.pdf
36. Arab News, “Myanmar’s census more consequential than its election,” 2 Jan 2026, https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2628124
37. Refugees International / U.S.-based advocacy, “Myanmar’s Human Rights Crisis: Insufficient International Attention,” 31 Jul 2024, https://refugees.org/myanmars-human-rights-crisis-in-freefall-with-insufficient-international-attention/