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THESIS

**ENDING THE CYCLE: A HISTORY OF ROHINGYA
PERSECUTION, ANALYSIS OF THEIR POTENTIAL FOR
RADICALIZATION, AND A METHOD FOR ATTAINING A
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION**

by

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September 2018

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METHOD FOR ATTAINING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION**

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ABSTRACT

In August 2017, the forced mass migration of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority group in Myanmar, became world news after the country's military began to drive thousands from their homes. Within months, an estimated 671,000 Rohingya had left the country, and today remain with over 200,000 previous refugees in overcrowded, underfunded camps in Bangladesh.

This thesis aims to investigate the root causes of Rohingya persecution by the government and military of Myanmar, the likelihood that this population will become radicalized, and possible solutions to the crisis. It uses a mixed method approach to examine these questions, including a qualitative look at the history of the Rohingya; visual analytic techniques to evaluate the international response to the 2017 Rohingya refugee crisis; and a game theoretic approach to better understand the possibility of a nonviolence solution that focuses on citizenship and regional autonomy for the Rohingya.

This thesis finds that the most recent wave of forced migration has placed the Rohingya at increased risk of radicalization and offers three recommendations for mitigating these risks: providing more international aid to sustain the refugees in Bangladesh; moving beyond simply repatriating the Rohingya; and creating incentives for Myanmar to recognize the Rohingya as citizens and give them greater autonomy in Rakhine State.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM.....	1
A.	RESEARCH QUESTION	2
B.	METHODOLOGY	2
C.	FINDINGS	3
D.	OUTLINE OF THESIS	5
II.	HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF THE ROHINGYA	7
A.	ORIGINS OF ROHINGYA: FROM 9TH CENTURY TO EARLY 19TH CENTURY	8
B.	THE ROHINGYA DURING THE BRITISH COLONIAL ERA: FROM 1824 TO 1948.....	9
C.	BURMESE INDEPENDENCE: FROM 1948 TO 1961	12
D.	AUTHORITARIAN STATE: FROM 1962 TO 2011	13
E.	NEW DEMOCRACY: FROM 2012 TO 2018.....	18
F.	CONCLUSION	22
III.	THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE ROHINGYA CRISIS.....	23
A.	RAND REFUGEE RADICALIZATION FRAMEWORK.....	24
B.	ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESH’S POLICIES TOWARD THE ROHINGYA	29
C.	ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS	35
D.	ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS	39
E.	CONCLUSION	46
IV.	SECURING A PROMISE OF NONVIOLENCE	49
A.	THE ACTORS	50
B.	THE GAME.....	54
C.	ANALYSIS OF THE GAME.....	56
D.	ARBITRATED SOLUTION THROUGH ADJUSTED WINNER PROCEDURE	60
E.	CONCLUSION	63
V.	SUMMARY	65
A.	FINDINGS	67
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	69

LIST OF REFERENCES	73
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	83

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Rohingya Refugee Camp Locations	33
Figure 2.	Current Joint Response Plan Funding Breakdown	38
Figure 3.	International Words and Actions Regarding Rohingya Crisis.....	44
Figure 4.	Strategic Options.....	56
Figure 5.	The Rohingya Crisis Prisoner's Dilemma	58

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	RAND Framework’s Six Key Categories and 16 Key Variables	25
Table 2.	Myanmar Options Ranked	57
Table 3.	Rohingya Options Ranked	57
Table 4.	Adjusted Winner Procedure Point Allocations	61

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ARSA	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
EFEO	École Française d’Extrême-Orient
HaY	Harakah al-Yaqin (“Faith Movement”)
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IDP	internally displaced persons
IO	international organization
JRP	Joint Response Plan
NLD	National League for Democracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
Tatmadaw	Armed forces of Myanmar (Burma)
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

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I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

In August 2017, the mass migration of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority population in Myanmar (formerly Burma), became world news after the country's military began to forcibly displace thousands from their homes. Within weeks, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya began spilling into Bangladesh seeking safety and recounting atrocities suffered at the hands of the Myanmar military. The Myanmar government blamed the forced migration on a fringe group, the self-styled Harakah al-Yaqin (HaY), or "Faith Movement," which attacked multiple border checkpoints in the northern region of Rakhine State and killed 14 Myanmar security guards.¹ Myanmar's severe and disproportionate response prompted U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, to declare that, "the situation in northern Rakhine State constitutes ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya."² Despite the media coverage and condemnation from multiple countries and the United Nations (UN), this incident of forced migration was not new; the Rohingya in Myanmar have been the subject of multiple waves of government and military-led persecution.

As of August 2018, the violence and mass migration has subsided, but over 900,000 Rohingya remain in Bangladesh and are confined to camps along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Bilateral talks between Bangladesh and Myanmar, aided by international organizations, have attempted to begin the repatriation process. However, short of a long-term solution to address the underlying causes of the mass migration, the cycle of violence and persecution will likely continue.

Furthermore, the massive forced migration and protracted persecution of the Rohingya raises concerns about the potential for substantial radicalization of this group, especially in Bangladesh. In September 2017, during a UN Security Council session

¹ International Crisis Group, "Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase," Asia Report N°292 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 7, 2017), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/292-myanmars-rohingya-crisis-enters-dangerous-new-phase>.

² Rex W. Tillerson, "Efforts to Address Burma's Rakhine State Crisis," *U.S. Department of State* (blog), November 22, 2017, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2017/11/275848.htm>.

discussing the Rohingya crisis, Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, warned that “the devastating humanitarian situation is not only a breeding ground for radicalization, it also puts vulnerable people—including young children—at risk of criminal elements including trafficking.”³ In response to the influx of refugees, Bangladesh increased security forces in the Cox’s Bazar district, and local officials expressed concern about the presence of insurgents intermingled with the refugees.⁴

This thesis aims to investigate the factors and conditions that have caused the repeated incidents of forced migration of Rohingya and the likelihood that they may turn towards radicalization. Additionally, this thesis aims to investigate possible solutions that would mitigate the underlying issues and decrease the likelihood of future incidents of forced migration.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis aims to examine the following questions: What are the conditions that have caused the repeated incidents of forced migration of Rohingya from the country of Myanmar? Given the repeated incidents of discrimination and forced migration, what is the likelihood that the Muslim minority will turn towards radicalization? And, what are the conditions that would allow Myanmar and the Rohingya to reach an agreement that decreases the likelihood of future incidents of forced migration?

B. METHODOLOGY

This thesis aims to answer these questions through three different methods. First, it examines these questions through qualitative methods, specifically by providing a historic overview of the Rohingya, the state of Myanmar, and five waves of forced migration (1963–1967, 1971–1979, 1988–1992, 2012–2013, and 2016–2017). It identifies competing narratives between the Rohingya and the government of Myanmar over the origins of the

³ António Guterres, “Remarks at Open Debate of the Security Council on Myanmar,” United Nations, September 28, 2017, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-09-28/sgs-myanmar-remarks-security-council>.

⁴ Tarek Mahmud, “Law and Order Situation Dips in Ukhiya, Teknaf,” *Dhaka Tribune*, October 31, 2017, <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2017/10/29/law-order-deteriorating-ukhiya-teknaf/>.

Rohingya and examines five major historical periods in Myanmar (pre-colonial, colonial, independence, authoritarian rule, and new democracy), with an emphasis on key events since Myanmar's independence in 1948.

Second, the thesis uses visual analytic techniques to display critical risk factors for radicalization, specifically analyzing the size and density of refugee camps in Bangladesh, the sources of financial donations to the Rohingya crisis, and mapping the international community's inconsistent behavior regarding the crisis. The technique consolidates data from many fields to help identify relationships between various factors.

Third, the thesis uses game theory to model the conflict between the Rohingya and the government of Myanmar to explore a way to achieve an agreement that could secure a lasting solution to the crisis. The thesis uses a sequential, two-person, partial conflict game with two strategies available to each player (violence or nonviolence) to model the conflict over Rohingya citizenship and regional autonomy in Rakhine State. From this game, the thesis identifies the need for a third-party guarantor to ensure cooperation from the players and applies an arbitration technique, known as the adjusted winner procedure, to fairly divide the contentious issue of citizenship between the two players.

The thesis draws from scholarly journals, reports from international organizations, government documents, and secondary literature to investigate the history of the Rohingya and response to the 2016–2017 wave of persecution.

C. FINDINGS

This investigation yields three findings: First, an examination of the history of the Rohingya shows that their claimed origins and time of arrival in the region drastically differ from the belief held by the government of Myanmar. The Rohingya claim a pre-colonial history and a unique identity from neighboring Bangladeshis, despite sharing the same religion and speaking the same language. The government of Myanmar, by contrast, views the Rohingya as illegal immigrants brought in from Bangladesh by the British. This fundamental disagreement has contributed to the continued persecution of the Rohingya, including five waves of forced migration.

Second, drawing from a 2015 refugee radicalization assessment tool developed by the RAND Corporation, the thesis finds that the most recent wave of forced migration, which began in 2016, has placed the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh at an increased risk of future radicalization. Specifically, Bangladesh's restrictive policies toward the Rohingya, limited humanitarian aid and funding, and the lack of pressure put on the government of Myanmar by regional and international actors are all factors that increase the risk of the Rohingya radicalizing. Additionally, the RAND framework notes that the duration of the crisis plays a critical role in the risk of radicalization. As of August 2018, the most recent crisis is entering its second year. The management of the Rohingya refugee crisis by Bangladesh and the international community is critical to reducing the likelihood of radicalization within the Rohingya population.

Furthermore, a small group of Rohingya have already demonstrated a willingness to use violence to change the status quo, specifically through the emergence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), formerly HaY. ARSA was largely blamed for instigating the 2016 wave of persecution against the Rohingya after perpetrating an attack against over 30 Myanmar border checkpoints and an army base. ARSA has conducted only a few operations since 2017, and its total organizational strength is unknown, but it has demonstrated a moderate level of organization and lethality that is worth watching. Despite the efforts of Bangladesh to increase security measures, there are signs that ARSA has developed a presence in the camps.⁵ While the fluid nature of the crisis has made measuring the presence of ARSA in the camps all but impossible, the 900,000 refugees in Bangladesh provide a vulnerable population in a fertile setting from which to recruit and grow the insurgent movement. Additionally, while ARSA has not adopted an overtly religious tone,

⁵ International Crisis Group, "The Long Haul Ahead for Myanmar's Rohingya Refugee Crisis," Asia Report N°296 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 16, 2018), 7–9, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/296-long-haul-ahead-myanmars-rohingya-refugee-crisis>.

the organization traces its origins to refugees in Saudi Arabia, and several Islamic clerics have issued *fatwas* (rulings by recognized Islamic authorities) that endorse their cause.⁶

Third, a game theory approach finds that a resolution to the crisis is possible if both sides compromise on key issues, specifically the conditions for citizenship and regional autonomy for the Rohingya. However, a significant impediment to a compromise in this situation is that neither actor is unified. This is certainly the case with the Rohingya, who do not have a mechanism in place to express a singular opinion on an issue nor do they have someone who can represent their collective interests. Myanmar also does not speak with one voice; it is a nascent democracy with a civilian head of state; however, the military retains substantial autonomy and decision-making authority in its operations.

D. OUTLINE OF THESIS

The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II examines the history of the Rohingya people, with an emphasis on the competing narratives regarding their origins and citizenship in Myanmar. The chapter underscores Myanmar's unwillingness to recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic minority group and grant them citizenship as a critical driver of violence. The chapter identifies five waves of persecution of Rohingya by the government and military of Myanmar (1963–1967, 1971–1979, 1988–1992, 2012–2013, and 2016–2017).

Chapter III uses a framework developed by the RAND Corporation for assessing the risk of refugee radicalization to investigate the likelihood of the Rohingya radicalizing in the most recent wave of forced migration, which began in 2016. The chapter then uses three variables—host country policies, financial support, and statements from the international community—to analyze the effect that the international response is having on reducing the likelihood of radicalization amongst the Rohingya. Using visual analytics, the chapter highlights the camp locations and density, funding sources from regional and international actors, and their public statements regarding the crisis. The chapter finds that

⁶ International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” Asia Report N°283 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 15, 2016), 13, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state>.

Bangladesh has created restrictive laws toward the Rohingya refugee population, humanitarian relief efforts are underfunded, and most governments continue to maintain economic ties with Myanmar, allowing the government and military to continue its discriminatory policies and actions against the Rohingya. All of these factors put the Rohingya at risk for radicalization.

Chapter IV models the Rohingya conflict using game theory, specifically a two-person, partial conflict game, and finds that both players—the Rohingya and the government of Myanmar (including its military)—can maximize their payoff through mutual nonviolence. The chapter introduces and applies an arbitration technique, known as the adjusted winner procedure, to fairly divide the contentious issues between the two players and secure a mutually beneficial outcome. This payoff, however, requires a mutual “promise” not to pursue violence, which could be achieved through a negotiated agreement over the contentious issues, namely citizenship and regional autonomy for the Rohingya. Drawing from Chapter III, it identifies Japan, the UN, and the United States as possible third-party guarantors.

Finally, Chapter V concludes by presenting findings and recommendations to end the persecution of the Rohingya and to prevent their future radicalization. Specifically, the chapter recommends that international financial aid to the crisis be sustained because it is a critical component of the response and shortfalls can increase the risk of radicalization. Furthermore, radicalization of the Rohingya is still possible, and the international community should ensure that underlying issues to the crisis are addressed or the Rohingya may resort to violence to change the status quo. Lastly, Bangladesh and the international community should pressure Myanmar to confer citizenship on the Rohingya; repatriation alone will likely lead to another round of violence.

II. HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF THE ROHINGYA

In August 2017, the Rohingya became frontline news following a mass migration of an estimated 671,000 individuals from Rakhine State in Myanmar.⁷ However, this was not the first instance of forced migration by the government of Myanmar. Persecution and forced migration of the Rohingya has occurred in five distinct waves since Myanmar's independence: as a result of economic policy from 1963–1967; during an aggressive census campaign from 1971–1979; as punishment for prodemocracy protests from 1988–1992; as a result of sectarian violence from 2012–2013; and as punishment for alleged terrorism from 2016–2017. Dr. Nasir Uddin, a professor of anthropology at the University of Chittagong, describes the history of the Rohingya since 1962 as one “rife with exploitation, persecution, and discrimination.”⁸

This chapter provides an overview of the Rohingya in Myanmar and an examination of their treatment at the hands of the government.⁹ It touches on competing narratives of the first Muslims to arrive in the region, explains the historical friction around the term Rohingya, and examines the influential events and waves of persecution, particularly those since Myanmar's independence in 1948. This summary is intended to serve as a consolidated historical account of the Rohingya and provides detail that this thesis will use to examine the ongoing Rohingya crisis in Myanmar.

⁷ Hannah Beech, “Desperate Rohingya Flee Myanmar on Trail of Suffering: ‘It Is All Gone,’” *New York Times*, September 2, 2017, sec. Asia Pacific, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/02/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-bangladesh-refugees-massacre.html>.

⁸ Nasir Uddin, “State of Stateless People: The Plight of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh,” in *The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept*, ed. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts, Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 67–68, <https://muse.jhu.edu/>.

⁹ In 1989, the military government in Burma changed the name of the country to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and changed many state names, including Arakan State becoming Rakhine State. This change remains contested, as it was done without consult of the citizens. For clarity, this thesis will use Myanmar and Rakhine State for events post-1989, unless the use of the former name is needed.

A. ORIGINS OF ROHINGYA: FROM 9TH CENTURY TO EARLY 19TH CENTURY

The origins of the Rohingya are debated in academia and particularly within the current state of Myanmar. Jacques Leider, chairman of the École Française d'Extrême-Orient (EFEO) in Bangkok and a Myanmar scholar, for example, contends that the name "Rohingya," as a description of the Muslims living in Rakhine, lacks broad understanding and agreed upon meaning.¹⁰ In the simplest terms, some believe Rohingya are a distinct ethno-religious category indigenous to the Rakhine State and, as such, should be given full citizenship of Myanmar. Alternately, others, including the current government of Myanmar, claim the Rohingya are Bengali (Bangladeshi) immigrants that migrated under British rule, and therefore do not have the right to citizenship.

Most scholars agree that the first Muslims in Burma arrived during the Ninth Century in an area that first became known as Arakan, and were primarily seafarers, fisherman and traders.¹¹ Dr. Moshe Yegar, a research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and a former senior Israeli diplomat in Burma, describes that, after the ninth century, a significant wave of Bengali Muslims came into the area, around 1430, following the conversion of Bengal to Islam. He states, "Arakan served to a large extent as a bridgehead for Muslim penetration to other parts of Burma, although the Muslims never attained the same degree of importance elsewhere as they did in Arakan."¹² Yegar goes on to explain that Arakan developed close ties to Bengal and their Muslim communities as a result of the largely impassable mountains that geographically isolated Arakan from Burma.¹³ For this reason, when the Burmese Kingdom conquered the Kingdom of Arakan in the late 1800s, many thousands of Arakanese Muslims fled to Bengal to escape the violence.¹⁴ However, the Muslims who

¹⁰ Jacques P. Leider, "Rohingya: The Name, the Movement, the Quest for Identity," in *Nation Building in Myanmar* (Yangon: Myanmar Egress/Myanmar Peace Center, 2013), 4–8.

¹¹ Moshe Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group*, Schriftenreihe Des Südasien-Instituts Der Universität Heidelberg (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1972), 2.

¹² Yegar, 18.

¹³ Yegar, 18.

¹⁴ Leider, "Rohingya," 12.

remained in Burma were a small minority population and the Burmese Kingdom, which was Theravada Buddhist, permitted them to practice their religion freely, intermarry, and participate in society.¹⁵

It was during the 1800s that the term “Rohingya” was first used in the historical record. In 1799, Dr. Francis Buchanan, a British medical doctor and a member of the diplomatic mission in the region, published a report that identified three distinct dialects spoken in the Arakan region, one of which was, “spoken by the Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves ‘Rooinga,’ or natives of Arakan.”¹⁶ This account is often used as evidence of Rohingya Muslims in pre-colonial times.¹⁷ However, Leider details the etymological and linguistic origins of the term “Rohingya” and concludes, “‘Rohingya’ does not refer to, or mean anything else, but ‘Rakhine’ in the local Muslim language,” and does not describe a distinct ethnic group.¹⁸ Leider further claims “Rohingyas conflate the history of all Muslims in Rakhine’s past with their own condition in Myanmar today and they hold the belief that ‘Rohingyas’ have existed in Rakhine for many generations.”¹⁹ This debate over the arrival and distinct origins of Rohingya Muslims would later have important implications for their citizenship in independent Myanmar.

B. THE ROHINGYA DURING THE BRITISH COLONIAL ERA: FROM 1824 TO 1948

British colonial expansion in South Asia directly affected Burma and further changed the debate on the origins of the Arakan Muslims. From 1824 to 1885, the British and the Burmese kingdoms fought three wars, culminating with the British completely annexing Burma in 1885 and placing Arakan under British control through their government in India. As part of a wider colonial policy aimed at maximizing economic

¹⁵ Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group*, 27.

¹⁶ Francis Buchanan, “A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken in the Burma Empire,” *Asiatic Researches* 5 (1799): 219–40.

¹⁷ Md. Mahbubul Haque, “Rohingya Ethnic Muslim Minority and the 1982 Citizenship Law in Burma,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 37, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 463–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1399600>.

¹⁸ Leider, “Rohingya,” 9–10.

¹⁹ Leider, 2.

efficiency, the government in Rangoon imported large numbers of Indians, both Muslim and Hindu, to Burma to serve as laborers, civil servants, and merchants.²⁰ Martin Smith, a writer and journalist who focuses on Burmese issues, notes that, at its height, over half of Rangoon was Indian immigrants.²¹ Smith further notes that the Burmese grew to resent the large influx of migrants under the British and popular cartoons during the colonial period depicted Burmese “squeezed out of their own country by a motley crowd of ‘guests,’ i.e., Europeans, Chinese, Hindus, and Muslims.”²²

Within Arakan, Leider asserts that the British occupation enabled many of the Arakan people who had fled during the 1785 Burmese conquest of Arakan to return. He further claims that along with these previous residents came new settlers from Chittagong (in current day Bangladesh), drawn by the promise of economic opportunity.²³ However, insufficient and vague census data from this period make these claims difficult to verify.²⁴

Yegar notes that, in addition to a possible increase in Arakan Muslims during this time, the Muslims in this area also “established mosques, religious schools, and other institutions, even newspapers, which the Burmese Muslims before them had not done at all.”²⁵ He argues that this was due in large part to the number of Muslims that had come from India.²⁶ Yegar further notes that, in the early nineteenth century, there were twice as many Indian Muslims in Arakan as local Muslims and with this influx of people came money, initiative, and “will to act to protect their separate religious and cultural identity in the midst of their Buddhist environment.”²⁷

²⁰ Andrew Selth, “Burma’s Muslims and the War on Terror,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, no. 2 (March 2004): 108, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100490275094>.

²¹ Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, 2. updated ed, Politics in Contemporary Asia (Dhaka: University Press, 1999), 43.

²² Smith, 44.

²³ Leider, “Rohingya,” 12.

²⁴ Leider, 11–13.

²⁵ Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group*, 27.

²⁶ Yegar, 27–28.

²⁷ Yegar, 27.

In 1930, after decades of Indian migrants coming to Burma, the Burmese citizens instigated broad anti-Indian riots, and specifically anti-Muslim riots, which resulted in the deaths of over 140 Muslims, according to a government-commissioned report.²⁸ As a result, India and Burma signed an immigration agreement in 1941 in order to set limits on the number of immigrant coming to Burma; however, World War II prevented the law from going into effect.²⁹

In 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army invaded Burma. The front line between the British and the Japanese ran through the country; the Arakan State sided with British forces and the Buddhist majority of the country allied with Japanese forces.³⁰ The invasion caused approximately 22,000 Muslims to flee Arakan to Chittagong, and the retreat of the British created a “political void,” which gave rise to riots between Arakan Buddhists and remaining Muslims.³¹ During this time, both sides perpetrated brutal attacks. Yegar argues that it was in fact the Japanese invasion and the resulting tit-for-tat violence that sharply divided Arakan along religious lines.³²

In 1945, the British recaptured the Arakan region and re-established rule across the country. In 1946, Arakan Muslim leaders made a bid to become part of the newly forming Islamic Republic of Pakistan through East Bengal.³³ At the same time, a separate group called the North Arakan Muslim League proposed an independent Muslim State in Arakan.³⁴ These movements prompted the government to identify these groups in Arakan as “Mujahid Rebels.”³⁵ Despite the best effort of the Mujahid, Aung San, the Burmese Political leader orchestrating independence, denied all requests to negotiate a new

²⁸ Yegar, 37.

²⁹ Yegar, 38–39.

³⁰ Smith, *Burma*, 62.

³¹ Uddin, “State of Stateless People: The Plight of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh,” 66–67.

³² Moshe Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 34.

³³ Yegar, 35.

³⁴ Yegar, 35.

³⁵ Leider, “Rohingya,” 19.

international border or to give Muslims in Arakan independence. The British formally granted Burma independence in 1948.³⁶

C. BURMESE INDEPENDENCE: FROM 1948 TO 1961

Almost immediately following its independence, Burma was embroiled in conflict. Five separate rebellions erupted in the first year of independence, including one in Arakan.³⁷ Yegar notes that, in 1948, Buddhists in Arakan replaced the pre-independence Muslim government officials, and internally displaced Buddhist citizens were allowed to reclaim the land they lost to Muslims in the previous years.³⁸ In response, the Mujahid began calling for jihad against the Arakan Buddhists, starting a spiritually-fueled struggle for a Muslim state in Arakan.³⁹ Yegar notes, however, that this uprising ranged from 2,000 to 5,000 men out of approximately 100,000 to 120,000 Muslims in Arakan.⁴⁰ The number of rebels, in other words, was small.

In 1948, the leader of the Arakan Muslim rebels, Jafar Kawal, made the following five requests of the Burmese government:

(1) declare the Akyab (Northern Arakan) district to be an autonomous Free Muslim State under the sovereignty of Burma; (2) recognize Urdu as the language of the state; (3) establish independent schools whose language of instruction would be Urdu; (4) release prisoners; (5) grant legal status to the Mujahid movement.⁴¹

However, in 1961, government forces and Arakan Buddhists defeated the Mujahid through several military campaigns.⁴² Additionally, Pakistan, which controlled Bengal, and Burma signed an agreement that increased cooperation between their respective border commands,

³⁶ Leider, 19.

³⁷ Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 35.

³⁸ Yegar, 37.

³⁹ Yegar, 37.

⁴⁰ Yegar, 37.

⁴¹ Yegar, 40.

⁴² Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group*, 100–101.

which limited the previously practice of Mujahid crossing the frontier to launch attacks on Arakan from the safety of Bengal.⁴³

In 1960, the first Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, promised to grant Arakan autonomy within Burma.⁴⁴ Muslim leaders drafted a proposal that would ensure equal, proportionate representation for Muslims and Buddhists in Arakan and alternated between Muslim and non-Muslim leaders for both the head of state and deputy positions.⁴⁵ Importantly, the proposal guaranteed each group the right to preserve their culture through religion, education, and language.⁴⁶ In 1961, the Burmese government granted the Mujahid the “Mayu Frontier District” as a semi-autonomous region directly administered by the Burmese military. However, by 1964, the new military junta dissolved the Mayu District as part of ongoing changes throughout the country to consolidate power.⁴⁷ This decision marked the beginning of 50 years of authoritarian, military rule in the country.

D. AUTHORITARIAN STATE: FROM 1962 TO 2011

General Ne Win, with the backing of the Burmese Army (known as the Tatmadaw), led a coup to take control of Burma in March 1962. The authoritarian junta dissolved U Nu’s parliamentary government and took control of Burma, ushering in a socialist state.⁴⁸ Smith asserts that General Ne Win’s policies ensured a military-led government where political repression was common and former slogans such as “unity in diversity” were dismissed.⁴⁹ Two main efforts provided the foundation for the Burma Socialist Program: the build-up of a centralized government, and the destruction of any armed opposition to the party.⁵⁰ The military maintained a highly centralized and tightly controlled government

⁴³ Yegar, 100–101.

⁴⁴ Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 49.

⁴⁵ Yegar, 50.

⁴⁶ Yegar, 51.

⁴⁷ Leider, “Rohingya,” 22.

⁴⁸ Sean Turnell, “Myanmar’s Fifty-Year Authoritarian Trap,” *Journal of International Affairs* 65, no. 1 (Fall 2011): 79.

⁴⁹ Smith, *Burma*, 199.

⁵⁰ Smith, 199.

that included direct control of the economy, education, and the press.⁵¹ Sean Turnell, an economist and special consultant to the State Counselor of Myanmar, concludes that the coup eventually led to one of the most oppressive regimes in the world.⁵²

In the wake of the coup, the military enacted harsh economic rules on foreign-owned businesses in an effort to nationalize the country's economy. This sparked what became the first mass migration flow from the country.⁵³ Yegar estimates that, in the period from 1963 to 1967, over 300,000 Indians (mostly Muslims) and 100,000 Chinese left the country as a result.⁵⁴ The mass exodus of business owners, including the Muslims in Arakan, left Burma in a financial crisis.⁵⁵ Smith argues that this economic crisis helped cause a Muslim militant movement to form in Arakan, including the Rohingya Independence Force and the Muslim National Liberation Party.⁵⁶ Yegar asserts that the rebel leaders from these movements reached out to other Muslim countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, seeking aid and arms in their struggle against the Burmese government, but they did not send support.⁵⁷

A second forced migration occurred between 1971 and 1979. Bangladesh's struggle for independence in 1971 prompted an unknown number of Bengali Muslims to flee to Arakan to escape the violence.⁵⁸ When the violence subsided, approximately 17,000 Bengali Muslims returned to Bangladesh from Arakan, but an unknown number remained.⁵⁹ Over the ensuing years, the Buddhist population increasingly persecuted the Muslims, resulting in untold numbers of Muslims fleeing to Bangladesh.⁶⁰ Simultaneously, the government of Burma expressed increasing concern over violence attributed to

⁵¹ Smith, 199–200.

⁵² Turnell, "Myanmar's Fifty-Year Authoritarian Trap," 90.

⁵³ Smith, *Burma*, 219.

⁵⁴ Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 52.

⁵⁵ Yegar, 52.

⁵⁶ Yegar, 53.

⁵⁷ Yegar, 53.

⁵⁸ Yegar, 54.

⁵⁹ Yegar, 54.

⁶⁰ Yegar, 54.

“illegal immigrants from Bangladesh” and the Tatmadaw used this as justification for Operation “Naga Min” (Dragon King) in 1978, a census ostensibly aimed at identifying immigrants as well as refining demographic data in the problem regions of Burma.⁶¹ In reality, Naga Min forced thousands of Arakan Muslims from their homes when they failed to produce proper documents, despite not having received identity cards in 1962 when the government issued them to all citizens.⁶² Yegar argues that the government conducted Naga Min to support General Ne Win’s goal of suppressing minorities seeking autonomy in the Arakan State.⁶³

Renaud Egretreau, a research professor at the University of Hong Kong, and Larry Jagan, a former editor for Asia at the BBC World Service claim that Naga Min forced more than 200,000 Arakan refugees into Bangladesh.⁶⁴ Egretreau and Jagan further note that the refugees reported violent abuses at the hands of Arakan Buddhists and the Tatmadaw.⁶⁵ Smith claims that, following an international outcry, the majority of the Muslims who found refuge in Bangladesh were allowed to return as “bona fide Burmese citizens.”⁶⁶ However, Yegar notes that the repatriation process was difficult because the Rohingya were required to provide proof of residency before being allowed into Burma and they were unable to return to their original towns because Arakan Buddhists had taken over the vacant villages.⁶⁷

In 1982, the Tatmadaw created the Burma Citizenship Law with the aim of regulating immigration and creating a unitary society, thus ending the diverse society

⁶¹ Matthew F Smith and Tirana Hassan, “The Government Could Have Stopped This”: Sectarian Violence and Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012), 14.

⁶² Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 55–56.

⁶³ Yegar, 55.

⁶⁴ Renaud Egretreau and Larry Jagan, *Soldiers and Diplomacy in Burma: Understanding the Foreign Relations of the Burmese Praetorian State*, IRASEC-NUS Press Publications on Contemporary Southeast Asia (Singapore: NUS Press [u.a.], 2013), 132–33.

⁶⁵ Egretreau and Jagan, 132–33.

⁶⁶ Smith, *Burma*, 241.

⁶⁷ Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 57–59.

installed by the British.⁶⁸ However, Yegar contends that the law intended to safeguard dominant positions of power and advantage for the Burmese people who were present in the country before 1823.⁶⁹ Mahbubul Haque, a lecturer of political science at Prince of Songkla University in Thailand, details three main factors that led to the citizenship law: overall Burmese sentiment toward Chinese and South Asian people who emigrated to Burma during colonialism; the growth of the Muslim population in Arakan State; and that the 1948 Citizenship Law failed to create immigration control.⁷⁰

The government's new citizenship law named 1823 as the date to determine citizenship eligibility because it was the start of the first Anglo-Burmese war and the British policy of open immigration between India and Arakan.⁷¹ The law further delineated three categories of citizenship: natural citizens, associate citizens, and naturalized citizens. Natural citizens had the most rights and come from the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan ethnic groups. Associate citizens, or the offspring of mixed marriages with at least one parent being a natural citizen, were allowed to work but they could not hold government office.⁷² The third-class citizens, the naturalized, were the offspring of groups who illegally immigrated to Burma during the British rule, which included the Rohingya.⁷³ Through this law, the government effectively rendered the Rohingya stateless and systematically discriminated against naturalized citizens.⁷⁴

In 1988, General Ne Win stepped down as the leader of the Burma Socialist Programme Party amidst large-scale pro-democracy protests and demonstrations that also included the Rohingya.⁷⁵ The new regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), quickly took control of the country by violently putting down the

⁶⁸ Robert H. Taylor, *General Ne Win: A Political Biography* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015), 485.

⁶⁹ Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 61.

⁷⁰ Haque, "Rohingya Ethnic Muslim Minority and the 1982 Citizenship Law in Burma," 456.

⁷¹ Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 62.

⁷² Yegar, 62.

⁷³ Yegar, 62.

⁷⁴ Smith and Hassan, *The Government Could Have Stopped This*, 5.

⁷⁵ Taylor, *General Ne Win*, 524.

demonstrations.⁷⁶ The SLORC changed the name of the country from Burma to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Arakan State to Rakhine State, and many other state level titles that they perceived to be holdovers from the British colonial period.⁷⁷

The third wave of forced migration of Rohingya into Bangladesh occurred from 1988–1992. Yegar notes that the new government severely punished the Rohingya for their participation in the previous protests, which caused many of them to flee, followed by Rakhine Buddhists seizing Muslims lands.⁷⁸ Renewed persecution in mid-1991 sent a much larger group of over 250,000 Rohingya into the Bangladesh border districts. Egreteau and Jagan attribute this violence to “state and local Burmese authorities in Arakan.”⁷⁹

By July 1992, Bangladesh recorded 268,551 refugees from Myanmar and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) eventually classified 228,000 of them as Rohingya.⁸⁰ The SLORC government came under harsh criticism from the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission for violently putting down the pro-democracy protests, refusing to repatriate refugees from Bangladesh, and for human rights violations.⁸¹ In April 1992, Myanmar and Bangladesh signed an agreement to repatriate refugees, but progress was slow and fraught with mistrust and accusations of unfulfilled promises.⁸² Still, by the end of 1996, 200,000 refugees had returned to Rakhine State.⁸³

⁷⁶ Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 62.

⁷⁷ Gustaaf Houtman, *Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy*, ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa Monograph Series 33 (Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999), 46–54.

⁷⁸ Yegar, 63.

⁷⁹ Egreteau and Jagan, *Soldiers and Diplomacy in Burma*, 149.

⁸⁰ Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 63–64.

⁸¹ Yegar, 64.

⁸² Yegar, 64–66.

⁸³ Yegar, 65–66.

E. NEW DEMOCRACY: FROM 2012 TO 2018

The pro-democracy movement continued to build momentum during the 1990s and early 2000s as more and more members of the country demanded a voice in government.⁸⁴ The movement produced a newly ratified constitution in 2008, parliamentary elections in 2010, and a formal transfer of power from the military junta to a semi-civilian government in early 2011.⁸⁵ The first civilian president elected, Thein Sein, had only months earlier retired from the Tatmadaw, making him an easy target for those who claimed that the election was a sham. However, the government released a longtime advocate for democracy and icon in Myanmar politics, Aung San Suu Kyi, from house arrest and allowed her to run for political office.⁸⁶ She was elected to parliament in April 2012 as part of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party and became the international face of Myanmar.⁸⁷

However, also in 2012, sectarian violence erupted between Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine after three Muslims allegedly raped a Buddhist woman. A group of Rakhine Buddhists retaliated by stopping a bus and killing ten Muslims who were on board.⁸⁸ Both sides engaged in arson and indiscriminate killing throughout the state.⁸⁹ Smith notes that security forces did nothing to stop the violence; they either refused to intervene or they joined the Rakhine Buddhists and helped attack and destroy Muslim villages and communities.⁹⁰ A Human Rights Watch report published after the incident argues that what started as sectarian violence began to appear as a coordinated effort to forcibly expel the Muslims through simultaneous attacks occurring across the state.⁹¹ This report also suggests that the evidence collected by their team through 104 interviews of victims,

⁸⁴ Egreteau and Jagan, *Soldiers and Diplomacy in Burma*, 1–7.

⁸⁵ Egreteau and Jagan, 1–7.

⁸⁶ Egreteau and Jagan, 1–7.

⁸⁷ Egreteau and Jagan, 1–7.

⁸⁸ Matthew Smith, “All You Can Do Is Pray”: Crimes against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 7.

⁸⁹ Smith, 7.

⁹⁰ Smith, 7.

⁹¹ Smith, 7.

witnesses, and aid workers proves that local religious (Buddhist Monks) and political leaders urged the ethnic cleansing via pamphlets and public messages.⁹² These calls to action used several different types of appeals including denying the existence of the Rohingya ethnicity, demonizing the Rohingya, economically isolating the Rohingya, and calling for the removal of the Rohingya from the country.⁹³ This violence prompted a fourth wave of persecution against the Rohingya. Smith notes that, as a result of this violence and persecution, by early 2013, approximately 100,000 Rohingya had been displaced and 8,664 homes destroyed by the violence, of which 7,422 homes belonged to the Rohingya.⁹⁴

In response to the violence, the president of Myanmar, Thein Sein, stated, “We will take care of our own ethnic nationalities, but Rohingya who came to Burma illegally are not of our ethnic nationalities, and we cannot accept them here.”⁹⁵ Penny Green, Thomas MacManus, and Alicia de la Cour Venning, of Queen Mary University of London, note that, by the end of the violence in 2013, approximately 138,000 Rohingya had been forcibly moved to refugee camps, and were prevented from returning to their homes or blocked from employment in the state.⁹⁶

The fifth wave of forced migration began in October 2016, when approximately 300 Muslim men from a group calling themselves “Harakah al-Yaqin” (HaY, “Faith Movement”) attacked multiple border checkpoints in the northern region of Rakhine State.⁹⁷ The International Crisis Group (ICG) reports that the attackers killed nine security

⁹² Smith, 24.

⁹³ Smith, 10.

⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, “The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar,” Asia Report N°251 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 1, 2013), 10, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/dark-side-transition-violence-against-muslims-myanmar>.

⁹⁵ Radio Free Asia, “Call to Put Rohingya in Refugee Camps,” July 12, 2012, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/rohingya-07122012185242.html>.

⁹⁶ Penny Green, Thomas MacManus, and Alicia de la Cour Venning, *Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar*. (London: International State Crime Initiative, 2015), 20.

⁹⁷ International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” Asia Report N°283 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 15, 2016), 6, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state>.

guards and assailants captured 62 firearms as well as 10,000 rounds of ammunition.⁹⁸ Buddhists in the area and state security forces retaliated by razing over 1,500 buildings and firing indiscriminately into villages with an attack helicopter, killing men, women, and children.⁹⁹ The ICG notes that the group did not enjoy broad appeal and their actions were actively debated in the Rohingya community.

Some (Rohingya) felt they were “dying slowly day by day,” and that after years of desperation and hopelessness, someone was standing up for them. But there was considerable criticism of the group (HaY) in WhatsApp for not consulting or warning the community before the attacks and not considering the very serious consequences.¹⁰⁰

On 25 August 2017, HaY, now referring to itself as Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), mustered hundreds of individuals to attack 30 border checkpoints and an army base, resulting in the death of 14 security forces and 371 fighters.¹⁰¹ According to the ICG, Myanmar security forces swiftly and indiscriminately reacted by razing villages and forcing the largest exodus of Rohingya to date. By the end of 2017, approximately 671,000 had migrated to Bangladesh alone and joined the 200,000 Rohingya still in Bangladesh from the 2012 wave of forced migration.¹⁰² A Human Rights Watch report documents refugees’ stories of atrocities committed by the Myanmar military, including executions and rape, and satellite imagery shows that the Myanmar military cleared 55 of the 362 villages that were burned to the ground.¹⁰³

While the ICG does not consider the Rohingya population in northern Rakhine radicalized, they do believe that small portions of the population have supported the

⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, 6.

⁹⁹ International Crisis Group, 6–11; Evan Williams, “Myanmar’s Killing Fields,” Video, *FRONTLINE* (PBS, May 8, 2018), <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/myanmars-killing-fields/>.

¹⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” 17.

¹⁰¹ International Crisis Group, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase,” Asia Report N°292 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 7, 2017), 6, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/292-myanmars-rohingya-crisis-enters-dangerous-new-phase>.

¹⁰² International Crisis Group, 7–9.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Scores of Rohingya Villages Bulldozed,” Human Rights Watch, February 23, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/23/burma-scores-rohingya-villages-bulldozed>.

insurgency in some capacity and have demonstrated a desire to fight back after years of oppression.¹⁰⁴ As of 2018, the widespread clearance operations by Myanmar's security forces have ceased, but the Rohingya remain concentrated largely in refugee camps along the border in Bangladesh.

In November 2017, the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar reached an agreement to begin repatriation of the Rohingya as early as January 2018; however, the agreement contained fundamental flaws that risk the safety and security of the Rohingya and decrease the likelihood of success in the overall repatriation process.¹⁰⁵ As Green et al. note, "the Rohingya are to be returned to concentration camps inside Myanmar, a society that has clearly shown it does not want them...Indeed, the repatriation agreement could simply be another stage in the planned, continuing annihilation of the Rohingya."¹⁰⁶

In March 2018, the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, visited Rohingya in Bangladesh and surmised, "the majority of the Rohingya want to return to Myanmar, but only when they are able to do so in safety, dignity and with access to the basic rights that are fundamental to us all."¹⁰⁷ Dieng elaborated:

The solution to this problem lies first and foremost with the Myanmar authorities, by creating the conditions for the Rohingya population to return home in safety and be entitled to the same rights as any other citizen of Myanmar. The international community also has a responsibility to protect this population from the risk of further atrocity crimes. Under the present conditions, returning to Myanmar will put the Rohingya population at risk of further crimes.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ International Crisis Group, "The Dark Side of Transition," 22.

¹⁰⁵ Dhaka Tribune, "Rohingya Repatriation Deal: What We Know," November 26, 2017, <http://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2014/01/22/pascal-departs-without-playing-any-match>.

¹⁰⁶ Penny Green, Thomas MacManus, and Alicia de la Cour Venning, *Myanmar's Annihilation of the Rohingya* (London: International State Crime Initiative, 2018).

¹⁰⁷ Adama Dieng, "Note to Correspondents: Statement by Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, on His Visit to Bangladesh to Assess the Situation of Rohingya Refugees from Myanmar," United Nations Secretary-General, March 12, 2018, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2018-03-12/note-correspondents-statement-adama-dieng-united-nations>.

¹⁰⁸ Dieng.

As of August 2018, the government of Myanmar claimed to have repatriated one Rohingya family, but this assertion was disputed by both Bangladesh and UNHCR, who claim that the statement is merely propaganda since they were not involved in the process and no agency has independently verified Myanmar's claim.¹⁰⁹

F. CONCLUSION

Since its founding as the nation of Burma, Myanmar has demonstrated a consistent pattern of persecution against the Rohingya and has forced them from their homes in waves of increasing frequency. At the highest levels of Myanmar's government, officials continue to describe the Rohingya as illegal Bengali immigrants.¹¹⁰ Despite the persecution they have experienced, the Rohingya have not radicalized yet, nor have significant numbers used organized violence as a means to pursue their objective of legal recognition and citizenship in Myanmar.

The next chapter will explore the international community's response to the Rohingya crisis and examine implications of different countries' actions in an effort to understand the possibility of the Rohingya turning toward radicalization.

¹⁰⁹ Serajul Quadir and Shoon LeiWinNaing, "Bangladesh, UNHCR Dispute Myanmar's Rohingya Repatriation Claim," Reuters, April 14, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-refugees/myanmar-repatriates-first-rohingya-refugee-family-government-idUSKBN1HL19C>.

¹¹⁰ Reuters, "U.N. Chief 'shocked' by Top Myanmar General's Comments on Rohingya," March 27, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/u-n-chief-shocked-by-top-myanmar-generals-comments-on-rohingya-idUSKBN1H31VK>.

III. THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

In August 2017, the mass migration of the Rohingya, became world news after Myanmar's military began to forcibly displace hundreds of thousands from its borders. The Myanmar government blamed the forced migration on the insurgent group HaY, which attacked multiple border checkpoints in the northern region of Rakhine and killed 14 Myanmar security guards.¹¹¹ Within weeks, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled into Bangladesh seeking safety from the Myanmar military. Despite the official reason for the military's crackdown on the Rohingya, the persecution had begun much earlier, in October 2016, and the events in August were merely the culmination of multiple years of persecution, as described in Chapter II.¹¹²

The massive forced migration and protracted persecution of the Rohingya has raised concerns about the potential for radicalization of this group, especially in the host country of Bangladesh. Using a framework developed by RAND for refugee radicalization, this chapter seeks to investigate whether or not the local and international response is stunting the potential for radicalization of this population and, especially, the development of radical Islamic organizations within the Rohingya refugee population.

Overall, the chapter finds that Bangladesh, the principal host country, while struggling to manage a nearly unprecedented refugee crisis, has taken several measures that could potentially contribute to the radicalization of this vulnerable population. Specifically, it has created restrictive legal policies on the Rohingya refugee population, including denying a path to citizenship, and has confined the refugees to over-populated camps near the border of Myanmar. Furthermore, the regional and international humanitarian relief efforts are underfunded, and international actors are frequently inconsistent in their words and actions regarding the crisis, resulting in little international pressure on the government or military of Myanmar to change its policies and actions. The

¹¹¹ International Crisis Group, "Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State," 6.

¹¹² For further reading on the history of the Rohingya, Myanmar, and the events that led up to the most recent wave of violence see Chapter II.

RAND framework for radicalization posits that all of these factors are likely to increase the potential for radicalization of the Rohingya.

The chapter begins by providing a summary of the RAND framework for refugee radicalization, underscoring the framework's most critical variable for radicalization: the host country's administrative policies of the refugees. This section further identifies two additional variables of importance: donations (financial support) and the regional and international community's response to the crisis through public statements. The chapter then uses these three variables to analyze what effect the response is having on reducing the likelihood of radicalization among the Rohingya.

A. RAND REFUGEE RADICALIZATION FRAMEWORK

A 2015 RAND report titled *Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle East from Past Crises* focuses specifically on the conditions under which refugee populations turn toward radicalization and armed resistance. The report begins by noting that, “poverty and physical deprivation have less impact on the degree of radicalization than actions or omissions on the part of the receiving country and the international community.”¹¹³ The report examines nine cases of mass refugee flows, either from armed conflict or ethnic persecution: two cases of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (1975–1978 and 1989–1992), which are the second and third waves discussed in Chapter II; two cases of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran (1978–1988 and the 1990s); Somalis in Kenya (1990s–2000s); Rwandans in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1990s–2000s); Palestinians in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon (1967–1993); Eritreans in Sudan (1974–1991); and Iraqis in Jordan and Syria (2000s).¹¹⁴ Of these nine cases, the report finds that seven resulted in radicalization—the second case of Rohingya in the early 1990s; both cases of Afghans in Pakistan and Iran; Rwandans in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Palestinians in Lebanon; Eritreans in Sudan; and Iraqis in Jordan

¹¹³ Barbara Sude, David Stebbins, and Sarah Weiland, *Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle East from Past Crises* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 3, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE166.html>.

¹¹⁴ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 3.

and Syria—while the first case of Rohingya and Somalis in Kenya did not result in radicalization.¹¹⁵

Overall, the report finds that radicalization of refugees is not inevitable; rather radicalization occurs on a continuum of risk that increases based on how the host country and international community manage the following six categories: host country administrative and legal policies; preexisting militant groups; the level of security; the amount of shelter; local economic conditions; and conditions for youth.¹¹⁶ The report finds these six categories are the most influential in predicting the likelihood of radicalization. The report further identifies 16 variables that may predict radicalization of refugees. These categories and variables are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. RAND Framework’s Six Key Categories and 16 Key Variables¹¹⁷

Six Key Categories	
• Host country’s administrative, legal policies • Political and militant organizing • Local economic conditions and resilience	• Shelter • Security • Conditions for youth
16 Key Variables	
• Reasons for leaving the country of origin • Ethnic and religious differences • Numbers of refugees • Legal status • Principal NGOs involved • Receiving-state policies • Sending-state policies • Type of settlement/housing	• Organization of refugee facilities • Employment • Education • Refugees’ external contacts • Criminal activity • Security arrangements • Presence of armed groups • Political Organization among refugees

¹¹⁵ Sude, Stebbins, and Weilant, 3.

¹¹⁶ Sude, Stebbins, and Weilant, 5.

¹¹⁷ Adapted from Sude, Stebbins, and Weilant, *Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle East from Past Crises*.

The report stresses in particular that the host country’s legal and administrative policies are the most important and influenced all other risk factors.¹¹⁸ Specifically, the study finds that in every case of refugee radicalization “the receiving countries pursued inconsistent, sometimes punitive, policies in dealing with refugees—often, but not always, as their numbers escalated in proportion to the host country population.”¹¹⁹ When the host country limited the rights and options for refugees to become citizens, to freely enter and exit the camps, to obtain legal employment, or to receive education services the outcome trended toward radicalization.¹²⁰

The report further investigates the conditions under which militant groups emerged in refugee populations. The study states that it may be impossible to avoid radicalization if extremist elements arrive with refugees and are not disbanded or separated from the refugee population.¹²¹ In the case studies that resulted in radicalization, Rwandans in the DRC and Eritreans in Sudan had at least a moderate amount of extremist groups present that used the refugee populations to support militant groups through recruitment and by spreading propaganda.¹²² Furthermore, the report finds that refugee populations become more vulnerable to radicalization when extremist groups assume a leadership role in the camps, sometimes supported by the host country or by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).¹²³

The report also investigates the role that internal and external security of the refugee camps played in preventing radicalization. The responsibility of security typically falls to the host country and, to a lesser extent, the NGOs working within the camp.¹²⁴ If the security of the camp is well enforced, the study suggests it is easier to prevent radical

¹¹⁸ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 5.

¹¹⁹ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 8.

¹²⁰ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 5, 8.

¹²¹ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 5.

¹²² Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 9–10.

¹²³ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 9.

¹²⁴ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 10–11.

groups from obtaining access to the population.¹²⁵ Conversely, the study finds that, as internal and external security decreased, the likelihood for radicalization increased. In the cases they studied, especially Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, the report finds that the host country tends to favor geographic isolation over robust security forces, which makes effective policing difficult and leaves the refugee population vulnerable.¹²⁶ To overcome these challenges, the study advocates reducing the likelihood of radicalization by “a combination of refugee self-empowerment, tightened internal security in camps, and security assistance to host country police forces.”¹²⁷

The quality, placement, and duration of shelter is another important variable for predicting radicalization of refugees. The study finds that crowded camps with unsanitary conditions, food scarcity, and limited resources increased the risk of radicalization.¹²⁸ Additionally, the majority of the cases that resulted in radicalization occurred in rural encampments, close to the border of their country of origin.¹²⁹ The report specifically notes the case of Somali refugees in Kenya, where refugees were moved to camps in rural areas near the border, and armed groups were able to recruit refugees to fight in Somalia.¹³⁰ Importantly, the study suggests, “the longer refugees are confined to camps and the lower the likelihood that the initiating crisis will be resolved quickly, the greater the risk of radicalization.”¹³¹

The report also considers economic conditions and “resilience,” which are opportunities available to the refugee population and the economic conditions surrounding the camp. The study notes, in particular, that aid to refugees can have spillover effects on the local population.¹³² Specifically, relief efforts and supplies provided to refugees can

¹²⁵ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 10–11.

¹²⁶ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 10–11.

¹²⁷ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 11.

¹²⁸ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 5.

¹²⁹ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 5.

¹³⁰ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 11–12.

¹³¹ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 11.

¹³² Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 11.

make the local population feel “disadvantaged” if they are not receiving similar products and services from their government.¹³³ Additionally, refugees often compete with locals for opportunities to support themselves and their families through goods and services, which places an additional burden on the local population.¹³⁴ The report stresses that this resentment and competition could lead to an increase in violence between the local population and refugees, which in turn could be exploited by radical groups.¹³⁵ For example, the study finds that several economically weak host countries, including Bangladesh, have restricted refugees’ freedom of movement in order to prevent employment competition with local citizens.¹³⁶ This policy has made the refugees more dependent on the camp services and reduces self-reliance. In the most vulnerable cases, the economic conditions for refugees and the surrounding population are invariably poor, and the study asserts that this could be a driver of radicalization.¹³⁷

Finally, the conditions for youth address the 15- to 24-year-old refugee population—the age-group most vulnerable to militant and extremist recruitment—and the opportunities available to them.¹³⁸ The study finds that educational opportunities that support future employment reduce their risk of radicalization.¹³⁹ Of the cases where radicalization occurred, specifically Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, the conditions for youth were ranked as “poor,” meaning that youth had little to no economic or educational opportunities.¹⁴⁰

Drawing from this report, this chapter will use the most critical variable, the host country’s policies, to determine if Bangladesh’s response to the current crisis is lessening the risk of radicalization within the Rohingya refugee camps. Specifically, this chapter will

¹³³ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 12–13.

¹³⁴ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 15.

¹³⁵ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 12.

¹³⁶ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 5.

¹³⁷ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 5, 12–13.

¹³⁸ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 16.

¹³⁹ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 13–15.

¹⁴⁰ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 7.

look at Bangladesh's policies toward citizenship, security, shelter, economic conditions, camp conditions, and affected youth. Furthermore, this chapter will draw on two additional variables not identified in the RAND framework: donations (financial support); and public statements by heads of state and International Organizations (IOs). Specifically, the chapter will consider the donations and statements of regional actors (Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, China, India, and Sri Lanka); international actors (the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, Russia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan); and IOs (Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the UN).

These additional variables are important because, first, financial support enables virtually all other functions of refugee relief and radicalization mitigation. Without significant financial support from the international community, almost none of the other variables from the RAND framework could be addressed. Furthermore, the source of the donations may help identify countries and organizations with significant influence in the crisis and countries that may seek to encourage radicalization or have had ties to extremism. Therefore, within this investigation, the sources of the donations will also be identified in addition to amounts of money.

Second, government and IO statements are important to consider. Specifically, this chapter will consider what countries and IOs have said publicly and will try to compare these words against their actions to see if they are consistent or not. The RAND framework briefly mentions that international political and diplomatic efforts are "critical" to align objectives across the spectrum of responses to resolve refugees crises, including resolving the original conflict in the country of origin.¹⁴¹ Therefore, it is important to identify where international actors stand, both in words and in deeds.

B. ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESH'S POLICIES TOWARD THE ROHINGYA

The RAND report identifies the host country policies toward a refugee population as the most important factor for the prevention of radicalization. Drawing from the RAND

¹⁴¹ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, 15.

framework, this section considers the following policies that Bangladesh has implemented toward the Rohingya refugee population: citizenship, security, shelter, economic conditions, camp conditions, and affected youth.

Overall, the policies of Bangladesh have aimed to accommodate the Rohingya, but there are some significant shortcomings that, according to the RAND framework, could lead to radicalization. The March 2018 Joint Response Plan (JRP), a comprehensive strategy of the humanitarian relief efforts for the Rohingya published by the Strategic Executive Group—a committee based in Dhaka and co-chaired by the UN resident coordinator, International Organization for Migration chief of mission, and a UNHCR representative—praised Bangladesh for allowing the Rohingya to cross into its country and for leading the humanitarian response.¹⁴² It also highlighted significant concerns regarding the long-term welfare of the Rohingya and the need for an integrated, sustained response from the international community.¹⁴³

Despite the enormity of the crisis, Bangladesh had some measures in place to address the crisis. In 2013, the Bangladeshi government created the National Task Force, a unit that aimed to address the Rohingya crisis through its “national strategy on Myanmar refugees and undocumented Myanmar nationals.”¹⁴⁴ The National Task Force, therefore, was already in place when the next wave of Rohingya refugees began in 2016. By the beginning of August 2017, Bangladesh was already hosting an estimated 200,000 Rohingya.¹⁴⁵ Following the mass exodus, the country kept its borders open and allowed another 671,000 Rohingya to cross into its country.¹⁴⁶

Despite efforts to accommodate refugees, Bangladesh has not offered citizenship to the Rohingya. Bangladesh’s immigration policy states that the only way to obtain

¹⁴² Strategic Executive Group, “2018 Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis” (Strategic Executive Group, March 16, 2018), 7, <http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/bangladesh>.

¹⁴³ Strategic Executive Group, 7–10.

¹⁴⁴ Strategic Executive Group, 34.

¹⁴⁵ Strategic Executive Group, 7.

¹⁴⁶ Strategic Executive Group, 7.

citizenship is through marriage to a Bangladeshi, or if one parent is Bangladeshi.¹⁴⁷ Subsequently, Bangladesh passed a law in 2014 that specifically prohibits marriage between Bangladesh citizens and Rohingya; violators could face up to seven years in jail.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, Rohingya born in Bangladesh are given birth certificates that label them as citizens of Myanmar, something the government of Myanmar rejects.¹⁴⁹ As noted in the previous section, the RAND framework suggests that laws that deny citizenship to refugees may increase the risk of radicalization.

Bangladesh has also taken measures to provide security for Rohingya refugees in the areas in which they are residing. Bangladesh has dedicated 2,158 police officers from across the country to focus on the security of the district and to facilitate the biometric registration of the refugees.¹⁵⁰ Similar to the RAND framework, the International Crisis Group (ICG) argues that the increased number of security and intelligence forces around the Rohingya refugee camps will make the re-organization and recruitment of ARSA difficult.¹⁵¹ In addition to providing more security forces, Bangladesh has attempted to empower the Rohingya refugees to assist with internal camp security with a system of *majhis* (traditional leaders) who assist with low-level dispute resolutions, which has helped Bangladesh officials focus on major security threats instead of low-level crime.¹⁵² Despite the efforts of Bangladesh to increase security measures to prevent radicalization, there are signs that militant groups have established a presence in the camps. In April 2018, Bangladeshi forces arrested several ARSA members near refugee camps, and Rohingya

¹⁴⁷ Sajeeb Wazed, “Why Bangladesh Cannot Accept All the Rohingya,” *Diplomat*, January 19, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/why-bangladesh-cannot-accept-all-the-rohingya/>.

¹⁴⁸ BBC News, “Bangladesh Upholds Rohingya Marriage Ban,” January 8, 2018, sec. Asia, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42612296>.

¹⁴⁹ Dhaka Tribune, “Bangladesh Issues Birth Certificates to Rohingya Children as Myanmar Citizens,” September 25, 2017, <http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/09/25/bangladesh-issue-birth-certificates-rohingya-children-indicating-myanmar-citizens/>.

¹⁵⁰ Strategic Executive Group, “2018 Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis,” 22.

¹⁵¹ International Crisis Group, “The Long Haul Ahead for Myanmar’s Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” Asia Report N°296 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 16, 2018), 9, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/296-long-haul-ahead-myanmars-rohingya-refugee-crisis>.

¹⁵² International Crisis Group, 7.

refugee camp community leaders detained 15 suspected ARSA members, turning them over to the police.¹⁵³ However, the fluid nature of the crisis has made confirming these claims and measuring the presence of ARSA in the camps all but impossible.

Bangladesh has provided over 4,800 acres of undeveloped land to establish camps, and the country's military has provided support to the camps. As of 2018, the camps in Bangladesh represent the world's largest concentration of refugees, averaging just over 30,000 people per square kilometer.¹⁵⁴ Figure 1 depicts the locations of six refugee camps in Bangladesh and their estimated populations.¹⁵⁵ Of note, all of the camps are within nine miles of the border with Bangladesh, a point that the RAND framework suggests increases the likelihood of militants recruiting from camps.¹⁵⁶

The largest camp, number 1, has an area of 16,806,491 square meters and hosts 626,502 refugees, allowing 26.8 m² per person, not including inhospitable areas due to terrain or other camp features. Camp number 4 has the largest density at 235.5 m² per person and is situated within a local community. Camp number 4 does not have a distinct border but is still considered a refugee camp by the International Organization of Migration (IOM). Finally, not included in the data are the remaining 120,000 Rohingya who are living outside of designated refugee camps among local communities.¹⁵⁷ As noted, the RAND framework posits that the greater the number of refugees among the local population without support for the entire community, the more likely the local population will persecute the refugees. This is a concern echoed by the ICG, which is monitoring changing

¹⁵³ Radio Free Asia, "'Several' Suspected Rohingya Insurgents in Custody: Bangladesh Official," April 18, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/bangladesh-arrests-04182018161609.html>.

¹⁵⁴ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Bangladesh: Camp Settlement and Protection Profiling" (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, April 2018), <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/63821>.

¹⁵⁵ The population data was gathered from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and camp outlines gathered from the Inter Sector Coordination Group both entities regularly update the camp data and have difficulty ensuring absolute accuracy due to the fluidity of the situation on the ground.

¹⁵⁶ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, *Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle East from Past Crises*, 12.

¹⁵⁷ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Situation Report Data Summary," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, May 24, 2018, <https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis>.

local sentiment toward the Rohingya and the possibility of violence and instability in areas where they interact with the local population.¹⁵⁸




Figure 1. Rohingya Refugee Camp Locations¹⁵⁹

Also identified in the RAND framework is the importance of local economic conditions, specifically for providing opportunities for refugees. The local economy in Cox’s Bazar is severely depressed and the poverty rate of the district is below the national average, which is already low.¹⁶⁰ The JRP highlights the fact that the Rohingya have largely displaced the local unskilled labor force by working for half of what are already meager

¹⁵⁸ International Crisis Group, “The Long Haul Ahead for Myanmar’s Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” 15.

¹⁵⁹ Adapted from Inter Sector Coordination Group, “Inter Sector Coordination Group Datasets,” Humanitarian Data Exchange, July 2018, <https://data.humdata.org/organization/inter-sector-coordination-group>.

¹⁶⁰ Strategic Executive Group, “2018 Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis,” 16.

wages and the government has made efforts restrict Rohingya to the camps through a series of checkpoints.¹⁶¹ Restricting the Rohingya to camps reduces their self-reliance and may increase the likelihood for radical groups to offer compensation in exchange for participation.¹⁶²

The conditions in the camps are also an important potential predictor of radicalization, according to the RAND report. The JRP repeatedly stresses the importance of food security among the large population, and one-third of the camps have an unacceptable food consumption score.¹⁶³ According to the RAND framework, overcrowded camps with unsanitary conditions can raise the risk of radicalization.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, the UNHCR has repeatedly cited concerns about the overall need to provide adequate shelter for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.¹⁶⁵

Finally, the RAND framework notes the importance of opportunity for youth as a means of reducing the chances of extremism taking hold. The JRP specifically mentions that the Bangladeshi government has not allowed refugees to enroll in formal education facilities and has denied youth certifications from informal education opportunities.¹⁶⁶ These restrictions affect approximately 50% of the total refugee population. To address this, the JRP has laid out specific programs that will focus on providing young refugees with opportunities geared toward life skills and vocational education.¹⁶⁷ However, as of 2018, these opportunities have yet to be realized, and given the overwhelming circumstances in southern Bangladesh, combined with the enormity of need, it is unclear how likely it is that these policies will be implemented.

¹⁶¹ Strategic Executive Group, 17–20.

¹⁶² Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, *Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle East from Past Crises*, 11–12.

¹⁶³ Strategic Executive Group, “2018 Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis,” 15.

¹⁶⁴ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, *Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle East from Past Crises*, 5.

¹⁶⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Myanmar Refugee Emergency Response in Bangladesh: Supplementary Appeal (March–December 2018)” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, March 2018), 9, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/20411>.

¹⁶⁶ Strategic Executive Group, “2018 Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis,” 59.

¹⁶⁷ Strategic Executive Group, 31.

C. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS

Responding to a crisis of this magnitude requires immense financial support to enable the relief efforts and programs that ensure basic needs are met. At the onset of the crisis, in 2017, the international community donated over \$300 million to the UNHCR Rohingya Response efforts.¹⁶⁸ However, as the crisis persisted, the response has experienced a shortfall in realized donations.¹⁶⁹ The JRP cites that over \$950 million is needed for the response to be fully funded; but as of 31 May 2018, disaster responders had only received \$250 million, or approximately 27%, of required funding. Furthermore, this sum was well below the average funding level of 36% for all 2018 humanitarian response efforts tracked by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).¹⁷⁰

In addition to amounts of funding, it is also useful to identify who has provided the funding because funding could be a source of influence to the Rohingya, including a source of extremism. Overall, regional countries have contributed very little financial aid to the Rohingya crisis, despite their proximity. Aside from Japan, which has given the single largest sum, as of 2018, Thailand has donated the most to support relief efforts in Bangladesh out of any other country in the region with a reported \$100,000.¹⁷¹ India and China have elected not to contribute through the UNHCR, possibly due to a longstanding rival between countries for economic primacy in Myanmar, and the desire not to upset its government.¹⁷² Rather, India has contributed to both the Rohingya and Myanmar. Through “Operation Insaniyat,” India provided over 373 tons of food and clothing items to the

¹⁶⁸ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Crisis 2017,” Financial Tracking Service, accessed June 25, 2018, <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/628/summary>.

¹⁶⁹ Strategic Executive Group, “2018 Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis,” 8–10.

¹⁷⁰ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Crisis Joint Response Plan 2018,” Financial Tracking Service, accessed June 25, 2018, https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/656/donors?order=total_funding&sort=desc.

¹⁷¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Situation Report Data Summary.”

¹⁷² Harsh V. Pant, “India’s Balancing Act in Myanmar,” *Diplomat*, September 9, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/indias-balancing-act-in-myanmar/>.

Rohingya in Bangladesh as of 2018, and further pledged \$25 million to assist Myanmar with development projects in the Rakhine State following the return of refugees.¹⁷³ China delivered a small number of blankets and tents to Bangladesh but has avoided a more significant contribution.¹⁷⁴ As of 2018, Japan was the second largest overall donor, after the United States, at just over \$40 million, and effectively matched the donation of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.¹⁷⁵ As with India, Japan has given both to the Rohingya effort and to Myanmar, possibly to blunt China's influence and promote its economic interests.¹⁷⁶

As of 2018, the United States served as the largest contributor to UNHCR by donating just over \$80 million. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia collectively donated just under \$42 million, effectively half of what the United States has contributed.¹⁷⁷ Islamic-majority countries have contributed to the relief effort either directly or through state-sponsored charities.¹⁷⁸ As of 2018, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia leads with over \$5 million of donations to the UNHCR Rohingya Response, one third of what they donated to the Syria Response. However, these donations are significantly smaller than the \$730 million invested in the Yemen crisis.¹⁷⁹ Pakistan, despite having

¹⁷³ GKToday, "Operation Insaniyat: India Sends Second Relief Consignment to Bangladesh for Displaced Rohingyas," *GKToday* (blog), accessed July 13, 2018, <https://currentaffairs.gktoday.in/tags/operation-insaniyat>; Sanjeev Miglani, "India Pledges \$25 Million for Myanmar's Rakhine to Help Refugees..." Reuters, December 21, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-india/india-pledges-25-million-for-myanmars-rakhine-to-help-refugees-return-idUSKBN1EF1RV>.

¹⁷⁴ Charlotte Gao, "China Aids Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh While Backing Myanmar Government," *Diplomat*, October 2, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/china-aids-rohingya-refugees-in-bangladesh-while-backing-myanmar-government/>.

¹⁷⁵ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Crisis Joint Response Plan 2018."

¹⁷⁶ Bart Gaens, "Japan's Restrained Response to the Rohingya Issue," *Japan Today*, January 13, 2018, <https://japantoday.com/category/features/opinions/japan%E2%80%99s-restrained-response-to-the-rohingya-issue>.

¹⁷⁷ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Crisis Joint Response Plan 2018."

¹⁷⁸ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

¹⁷⁹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Government Donor Snapshot for 2018: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," Financial Tracking Service, accessed July 13, 2018, <https://fts.unocha.org/donors/2998/summary/2018>.

donated funds to previous Rohingya crises and being home to a sizable Rohingya population, has not donated to the Rohingya in Bangladesh.¹⁸⁰

For IOs, the OIC has donated over \$5 million to support Rohingya relief efforts through its subsidiary organization, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). In fiscal year 2017, the IDB approved just under \$10 billion for projects worldwide, meaning that .05% of their budget was allocated to the Rohingya, and matched the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's donation.¹⁸¹ ASEAN has not donated to the relief effort at all, despite the fact that the Rohingya crisis originated from within one of its member states. ASEAN is fundamentally an economic and trade association and adheres strictly to their founding principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of one another," and therefore is unlikely to provide aid to the Rohingya moving forward.¹⁸² Financial aid to the Rohingya is summarized in Figure 2.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Mateen Haider, "Pakistan to Provide \$5m Food Grant to Rohingya Camps," *Dawn*, June 9, 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1187151>.

¹⁸¹ Islamic Development Bank, "2017 Data & Group Results," Islamic Development Bank, accessed July 17, 2018, <https://www.isdb.org/what-we-do/data-group-results>.

¹⁸² Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "About ASEAN," accessed July 17, 2018, <http://asean.org/asean/about-asean/>.

¹⁸³ The treemap diagram sizes each box according to what percentage of the whole it represents. The colors indicate different types of donors. In this figure, the boxes are donations; the color blue represents government donors; red represents international organizations; and green represents private donors.




Figure 2. Current Joint Response Plan Funding Breakdown¹⁸⁴

Thus, the money to support the Rohingya relief effort comes overwhelmingly from Western powers and Japan. As of 2018, this crisis is only in its second year and is unlikely to be resolved soon, and donor fatigue is a possibility.¹⁸⁵ Money is critically important to every aspect of the relief effort, and sustained financial support will allow Bangladesh and the UNHCR to focus on mitigating radicalization by addressing the variables identified in the RAND study.

¹⁸⁴ Adapted from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Crisis Joint Response Plan 2018.”

¹⁸⁵ Daniel Langenkamp, “The Victory of Expediency: Afghan Refugees and Pakistan in the 1990s,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 27, no. 2 (2003): 229–54.

D. ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS

The RAND study suggests that the international community can significantly affect the likelihood of a refugee population turning toward radicalization based on the way in which they help resolve the original conflict.¹⁸⁶ This section highlights how governments and international organizations have responded to the crisis through public statements and, specifically, identifies which are inconsistent in their statements and subsequent actions. Overall, while many countries have publicly expressed concern for the Rohingya, they continue to conduct trade and other dealings with the government of Myanmar, allowing the government and military to continue pursuing its discriminatory policies toward the Rohingya.

First, several members of ASEAN have publicly stated their concern for the Rohingya, but they have also been overtly supportive toward the government of Myanmar. For example, at the onset of the violence in September 2017, Thailand's foreign ministry issued a statement that claimed, "The Royal Thai Government has always placed great importance to providing care and protection to Myanmar displaced persons in accordance with humanitarian principle" and seemed intent on assisting the Rohingya.¹⁸⁷ However, their actions have not been consistent with this statement. In February 2018, the Buddhist-majority nation presented an award to the Myanmar army commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, despite the alleged human rights abuses that Myanmar's military has committed.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Status of Refugees Convention and does not recognize the Rohingya as refugees. As described in

¹⁸⁶ Sude, Stebbins, and Weiland, *Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle East from Past Crises*, 15, 20.

¹⁸⁷ Kingdom of Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Response to Certain Views on the Situation in the Rakhine State," September 30, 2017, <http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/news3/6886/82025-Response-to-certain-views-on-the-situation-in-the.html>.

¹⁸⁸ Reuters, "Thailand Decorates Myanmar's Army Chief amid Rohingya Crisis," February 16, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-myanmar/thailand-decorates-myanmars-army-chief-amid-rohingya-crisis-idUSKCN1G01D1>.

Chapter II, while Thailand has allowed Rohingya to land briefly on its shores to shelter from bad weather, it will not permit them to remain in the country.¹⁸⁹

China is perhaps Myanmar's strongest regional advocate on the global stage. China made efforts to solve the crisis through mediated talks with Bangladesh and Myanmar in November 2017, but Nicholas Bequelin, the East Asia Regional Director for Amnesty International, argues that this appeared to have little to do with the long-term well-being of the Rohingya and more to preserve their economic and geopolitical interests.¹⁹⁰ China and Myanmar reached an agreement in October 2017 on a substantial deep-water port development project at Kyaukpyu, in Rakhine State; this port would give China a way to export oil and natural gas without transiting the Straits of Malacca.¹⁹¹ In the same month, China donated a small amount of aid to help the Rohingya in Bangladesh, but carefully phrased their comments about the donation, avoiding the term Rohingya and using "displaced people," in continued support of the Myanmar government's effort to not recognize the Rohingya.¹⁹²

India, while giving some aid to the Rohingya, has remained an open supporter of the government of Myanmar. In a statement shortly after ARSA attacked the Myanmar government checkpoints in August 2017, India's ministry of external affairs stated "we stand by Myanmar in the hour of its crisis, we strongly condemn the terrorist attack on August 24–25, 2017 and condole the death of policemen and soldiers, we will back Myanmar in its fight against terrorism."¹⁹³ The Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi,

¹⁸⁹ Hannah Beech, "On the High Seas, Keeping Vigil for an Unwanted Minority," *New York Times*, May 30, 2018, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/world/asia/rohingya-refugee-myanmar-thailand.html>.

¹⁹⁰ Nicholas Bequelin, "Opinion | Behind China's Attempt to Ease the Rohingya Crisis," *New York Times*, January 20, 2018, sec. Opinion, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/opinion/china-rohingya-crisis.html>.

¹⁹¹ Gregory B. Poling, "Kyaukpyu: Connecting China to the Indian Ocean," Center for Strategic and International Studies: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, April 4, 2018, <https://amti.csis.org/kyaukpyu-china-indian-ocean/>.

¹⁹² Gao, "China Aids Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh While Backing Myanmar Government."

¹⁹³ Subir Bhaumik, "Why Do China, India Back Myanmar over the Rohingya Crisis?," *South China Morning Post*, October 18, 2017, <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2115839/why-do-china-india-back-myanmar-over-rohingya-crisis>.

visited Myanmar in September 2017 and, at a joint press conference with Aung San Suu Kyi, did not use the term Rohingya nor did he mention the ongoing violence against them at the time.¹⁹⁴ India has invested heavily in infrastructure development in the country, including the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, which seeks to connect India's remote northeast region to the Myanmar deep-water port in Rakhine State and may explain India's support for Myanmar.¹⁹⁵ However, India did support a UN Human Rights Council resolution that called for an inquiry into the actions of the Myanmar military against the Rohingya.¹⁹⁶

Malaysia has also sent mixed messages in regard to the conflict. It has accepted nearly 100,000 Rohingya refugees in its country, possibly because of shared religion. Further, it has been one of the most outspoken critics of Myanmar, breaking from the official ASEAN agreement of non-interference to issue a statement about the violence, by declaring that "the subsequent clearance operations efforts by Myanmar authorities was disproportionate in that it has led to deaths of many innocent civilians and caused more than 400,000 Rohingyas to be displaced."¹⁹⁷ Despite this seemingly pro-Rohingya posture, Malaysia is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention and treats the Rohingya as illegal migrants with no legal rights.¹⁹⁸

Furthermore, several international actors have also offered little support to the Rohingya in their statements and actions. Sri Lanka's Prime Minister refused to take in

¹⁹⁴ Niranjan Sahoo, "India's Rohingya Realpolitik," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, October 31, 2017, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/31/india-s-rohingya-realpolitik-pub-74590>.

¹⁹⁵ Bhaumik, "Why Do China, India Back Myanmar over the Rohingya Crisis?"

¹⁹⁶ Sahoo, "India's Rohingya Realpolitik."

¹⁹⁷ Dato Sri Anifah Aman, "Statement By The Foreign Minister of Malaysia in Response to the ASEAN Chairman's Statement on Humanitarian Situation in the Rakhine State" (Malaysia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2017), http://www.kln.gov.my/web/are_dubai/n2017/-/asset_publisher/ME2g/blog/statement-by-the-foreign-minister-of-malaysia-in-response-to-the-asean-chairman-s-statement-on-humanitarian-situation-in-the-rakhine-state?redirect=%2Fweb%2Fare_dubai%2Fn2017.

¹⁹⁸ A. Ananthalakshmi and Joseph Sipalan, "Malaysia Intercepts Boat Carrying Rohingya Refugees, More Perilous...", Reuters, April 2, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-malaysia/malaysia-intercepts-boat-carrying-rohingya-refugees-from-myanmar-idUSKCN1HA0MG>.

Rohingya despite calls for action by Sri Lanka's Muslim minority.¹⁹⁹ The government in Sri Lanka fears that the Rohingya may incite violence and "disturb social harmony" if they are permitted asylum and views the refugee crisis as an "organized immigration racket."²⁰⁰ Russia has maintained a stance "against excessive intervention" in the internal affairs of a state and blocked UN Security Council statements condemning Myanmar.²⁰¹ As of 2018, their position, along with their veto power on the UN Security Council, has prevented the Security Council from taking action to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.²⁰² Russia also agreed to sell Myanmar new fighter jets early in 2018, despite U.S. led requests to suspend arms sales to Myanmar during the ongoing crisis.²⁰³

Japan has consistently supported the government of Myanmar, but has also made statements supporting the Rohingya. In a joint news conference with Aung San Suu Kyi on January 20, 2018, Japan's foreign minister, Taro Kono, stated "Japan wants to actively support Myanmar's efforts" and ensure "the safe and voluntary repatriation and resettlement" of the Rohingya.²⁰⁴ As previously mentioned, Japan achieved a record high investment in Myanmar during the fiscal year 2017, providing \$1.47 billion to support property, electricity, and road development projects, even beating out regional rival China.²⁰⁵ Early in 2018, Japan granted Myanmar \$3 million, with a promise of further

¹⁹⁹ PK Balachandran, "Sri Lanka Won't Allow in Rohingya Refugees, Says Prime Minister Wickremesinghe," *BD News 24*, September 23, 2017, <https://bdnews24.com/neighbours/2017/09/23/sri-lanka-wont-allow-in-rohingya-refugees-says-prime-minister-wickremesinghe>.

²⁰⁰ Balachandran.

²⁰¹ Hyonhee Shin, "U.N. Rights Investigator Calls for Pressure on China, Russia Over...," Reuters, December 28, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/u-n-rights-investigator-calls-for-pressure-on-china-russia-over-myanmar-abuses-idUSKBN1EM00J>.

²⁰² Human Rights Watch, "UN Security Council: Refer Myanmar to ICC," May 8, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/08/un-security-council-refer-myanmar-icc>.

²⁰³ Reuters, "U.S. Urges Russia and Myanmar to Reconsider Fighter Jet Deal," January 25, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-myanmar/u-s-urges-russia-and-myanmar-to-reconsider-fighter-jet-deal-idUSKBN1FE2ZB>.

²⁰⁴ Japan Times Online, "Foreign Minister Taro Kono Urges Suu Kyi to Ensure Safe Return of Rohingya Refugees," January 12, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/01/12/national/politics-diplomacy/foreign-minister-taro-kono-urges-suu-kyi-ensure-safe-return-rohingya-refugees/>.

²⁰⁵ Yuichi Nitta, "Japan Inc. Pours Cash into Myanmar despite Rohingya Crisis," *Nikkei Asian Review*, May 17, 2018, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-Trends/Japan-Inc.-pours-cash-into-Myanmar-despite-Rohingya-crisis>.

investment, to help offset the cost of repatriating the Rohingya.²⁰⁶ Similar to India, Japan seeks to blunt Chinese influence in the region.

The United States' response to the refugee crisis also has been mixed. In 2016, President Obama lifted decades-old sanctions on Myanmar and ushered in a new chapter of diplomatic relations with the country.²⁰⁷ At times, the United States has been the most outspoken against the government of Myanmar, as was the case on 13 February 2018, when the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, characterized Myanmar's denial of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya as "preposterous."²⁰⁸ Furthermore, the United States was quick to withdraw military assistance to Myanmar in October 2017, at the height of the crisis, but Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, argues that this move was largely symbolic since the United States only recently began working with the Myanmar military and had few programs.²⁰⁹ As of 2018, the United States has maintained diplomatic relations with Myanmar and has only placed sanctions on one Myanmar Army General, Maung Maung Soe, who was in charge of operations in Rakhine State.²¹⁰ Derek Mitchell, a former U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar, defends the U.S. posture toward Myanmar, arguing "the only way you can really have leverage on the military is to do something with them, and the only way to really change or hope to change their ways is to engage them."²¹¹ Furthermore, he suggests, "you do not get solutions by sanctions. You get their attention, but the question is how you are going to get both justice for what

²⁰⁶ Deutsche Welle, "Japan Grants Myanmar \$3 Million to Repatriate Rohingya Muslims," Deutsche Welle, January 12, 2018, <https://p.dw.com/p/2qjgr>.

²⁰⁷ Merrit Kennedy, "U.S. Lifts Economic Sanctions Against Myanmar," NPR, October 7, 2016, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/07/497070188/u-s-lifts-economic-sanctions-against-myanmar>; U.S. Embassy in Burma, "Secretary of State Rex Tillerson And Burmese State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi At a Joint Press Availability," November 15, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2017/11/275603.htm>.

²⁰⁸ Eli Meixler, "Nikki Haley: Myanmar Ethnic Cleansing Denial 'Preposterous,'" *Time*, February 14, 2018, <http://time.com/5157043/nikki-haley-un-myanmar-genocide-denials-preposteorus/>.

²⁰⁹ Martin De Bourmont, "U.S. Pulls Military Assistance to Myanmar Over Rohingya Abuses," *Foreign Policy*, October 24, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/24/u-s-pulls-military-assistance-to-myanmar-over-rohingya-abuses/>.

²¹⁰ Gabriela Baczynska, "EU Readies More Sanctions against Myanmar," Reuters, April 25, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-eu/eu-readies-more-sanctions-against-myanmar-idUSKBN1HW37N>.

²¹¹ De Bourmont, "U.S. Pulls Military Assistance to Myanmar Over Rohingya Abuses."

has happened as well as justice for the Rohingya.”²¹² The international response to the Rohingya crisis is depicted in Figure 3.




Figure 3. International Words and Actions Regarding Rohingya Crisis²¹³

The UN and OIC both publicly condemned the government of Myanmar for their actions against the Rohingya in September 2017, yet stopped short of stronger actions. The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, when speaking about the reported violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine, said, “This is unacceptable and must end

²¹² De Bourmont.

²¹³ Adapted from Robert Hijmans, “Free Spatial Data,” DIVA-GIS, n.d., <http://diva-gis.org/>.

immediately.”²¹⁴ Despite having banned UN representatives from future entry to Myanmar following critical comments regarding the treatment of the Rohingya in December 2017, Myanmar did permit other members of the UN to come to Rangoon in April 2018, and meet with leaders from Myanmar and Bangladesh. These UN members urged cooperation and accountability to prevent further instability.²¹⁵ The UN Security Council also issued a statement on 9 May 2018, which urged Myanmar to conduct thorough investigations into the violence perpetrated against the Rohingya and immediately allow aid groups access to the Rakhine region.²¹⁶

The OIC professed regret for not taking a more involved approach sooner; but, in May 2018, vowed to take a much stronger role to defend the Rohingya.²¹⁷ To this end, they stated the intention of creating a committee to investigate the crimes against the Rohingya and to hold the perpetrators accountable.²¹⁸ Additionally, the OIC urged its 57 member states to “defend the Rohingya” and “pressure Myanmar into ensuring a safe return for all Rohingya forced to flee their homes.”²¹⁹ However, as of August 2018, the OIC had taken little concrete action toward these expressed objectives.

ASEAN’s pronouncements toward the crisis have been nuanced. On 24 September 2017, it condemned the attacks against the Myanmar’s military, but also supported the relief efforts for the Rohingya through their Coordinating Center for Humanitarian

²¹⁴ United Nations News, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis a ‘Human Rights Nightmare,’ UN Chief Tells Security Council,” *United Nations News*, September 28, 2017, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/567402-rohingya-refugee-crisis-human-rights-nightmare-un-chief-tells-security-council>.

²¹⁵ Michelle Nichols, “U.N. Security Council Puts Spotlight on Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” Reuters, April 28, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/u-n-security-council-puts-spotlight-on-rohingya-refugee-crisis-idUSKBN1HZ0QK>.

²¹⁶ Reuters, “U.N. Security Council Pushes Myanmar on Accountability over Rohingya,” May 9, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/u-n-security-council-pushes-myanmar-on-accountability-over-rohingya-idUSKBN1IA3K5>.

²¹⁷ Faisal Mahmud, “OIC to Assume ‘stronger Role’ over Rohingya Crisis,” *Al Jazeera*, May 6, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/oic-assume-stronger-role-rohingya-crisis-180506171514197.html>.

²¹⁸ Mahmud.

²¹⁹ Mahmud.

Assistance.²²⁰ ASEAN, in keeping with the principles of the organization that guarantee “the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion of coercion” and “non-interference in the internal affairs of one another,” has done very little to pressure Myanmar to resolve the crisis or encourage action in any way.²²¹ Josh Kurlantzick, a senior fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations, summarizes, “[ASEAN member states] are not going to take a collective action on Myanmar, with Myanmar as one of its members. That is just the way ASEAN operates.”²²²

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter investigated the local and international response to the Rohingya crisis through the framework for refugee radicalization. The analysis presented in this chapter highlighted three major points that the RAND framework identifies as increasing the likelihood of radicalization of the Rohingya refugee population. First, Bangladesh’s efforts to support and secure the Rohingya face several challenges. The refugee camps are dense, some of the most concentrated camps in the world, which make managing and controlling them difficult. Furthermore, Bangladesh’s policies seek to protect their citizens and prevent the Rohingya from obtaining permanent residency in the country, which leaves the Rohingya with few choices for a future. Finally, the Rohingya are given few opportunities to be self-reliant. All of these points could lead to the radicalization of Rohingya refugees, as argued by the RAND framework. Second, financial donations are critical to aid in the relief effort and necessary to enact virtually all support programs. At the onset of the crisis, donations came in quickly, but as the crisis has dragged on and the cost of sustained response increased, there has been a shortfall in donations. This trend could continue for the Rohingya, and create the chance for other actors, such as militants or extremists, to

²²⁰ Nur Asyiqin Mohamad Salleh, “Ministers Underline Need to Address Root Causes of Rohingya Crisis,” *Straits Times*, February 7, 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/ministers-underline-need-to-address-root-causes-of-rohingya-crisis>; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on The Humanitarian Situation in Rakhine State,” September 24, 2017, <http://asean.org/asean-chairmans-statement-on-the-humanitarian-situation-in-rakhine-state/>.

²²¹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “About ASEAN.”

²²² Anis Muslimin, “ASEAN’s Rohingya Response—Barely A Peep Outside Of Malaysia,” *Forbes*, December 17, 2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/anismuslimin/2017/12/17/aseans-rohingya-response-barely-a-peep-outside-of-malaysia/>.

provide resources in their place. Lastly, the statements made by international actors and organizations toward the Rohingya have been inconsistent with their actions. Specifically, despite many statements accusing Myanmar of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya, several international actors, including the United States, continue to maintain diplomatic ties with Myanmar. Others, such as Japan and India, continue robust economic development programs in Myanmar.

The following chapter will model the conflict using game theory to show that the dominant strategy for both actors involves the use of violence, despite nonviolence being in both actors' best interests. The chapter then will demonstrate a theoretical negotiated solution that ensures nonviolence, grants Rohingya citizenship, and fairly divides the contentious issues to the benefit of both actors.

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IV. SECURING A PROMISE OF NONVIOLENCE

Since the 1960s, the Rohingya in Myanmar have been the subject of five distinct waves of government and military-led persecution. As discussed in Chapter II, a critical component of this dispute is a disagreement over the origins of the Rohingya and their citizenship status in Myanmar. The Rohingya maintain that they are citizens of Myanmar, while Myanmar claims that they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, brought in during the British colonial period.²²³

During the latest wave of persecution in 2016–2017, Myanmar forcibly displaced over 671,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh, where they added to the roughly 200,000 Rohingya refugees still in Bangladesh from the fourth wave of persecution. As described in Chapter III, the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh face an increased risk of radicalization due to restrictive policies of the Bangladeshi government, shortfalls in funding, and little international pressure on the government of Myanmar to change its policies and actions.²²⁴ In May 2018, international actors and bilateral talks between Bangladesh and Myanmar attempted to begin the repatriation process, but short of a long-term solution to address the underlying issues, the cycle of violence and persecution will likely repeat itself.

This chapter aims to model the Rohingya conflict in Myanmar using game theory to explore a fair solution for both players using the adjusted winner procedure.²²⁵ The chapter begins by describing each of the players in the game, the Rohingya and Myanmar. The chapter then describes the game, player strategies, and associated strategic moves of each player. The game demonstrates that the two players will always resort to violence unless the underlying facts used in the game are changed. The chapter then introduces and

²²³ For more information regarding the origins of the Rohingya, historical claims, and waves of persecution, see Chapter II.

²²⁴ For more information regarding the local and regional response to the 2016–2017 Rohingya refugee crisis, see Chapter III.

²²⁵ The adjusted winner procedure is an arbitrated division method where shared items of interest are evenly distributed between two actors based on the actors declared level of interest in each item.

applies an arbitration technique, known as the adjusted winner procedure, to fairly divide the contentious issues between the two players and secure a mutually beneficial outcome.

A game theory approach finds that, even though nonviolence on the part of both players would be mutually beneficial, it is unlikely to occur without a mutual promise from both sides for nonviolence at the outset. A third-party arbiter is the best source for securing a mutual promise of nonviolence through a fair division of the contentious issues, resulting in citizenship for the Rohingya and stability in Rakhine State for Myanmar.

A. THE ACTORS

The game has two players: the Rohingya and Myanmar. Rohingya refers to the ethnic Muslims from Rakhine State in Myanmar who have undergone five major waves of persecution, as described in Chapter II. Currently, the largest population of Rohingya reside in refugee camps in the Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh, as described in Chapter III.

The Rohingya lack a clear leader or group of leaders who can speak with authority on behalf of their entire population. As of 2018, the Rohingya have two potential groups that can negotiate on their behalf: ARSA, a nascent armed insurgent group responsible for guerrilla attacks on Myanmar security forces (previously known as Harakah Al-Yaqin); and the majhi system, a rudimentary form of self-government used in the refugee camps that was briefly discussed in Chapter III. Each of these groups will be described below.

ARSA's background and its organizational strength are not well known, but analysts believe it shares traits in common with previous Rohingya insurgent groups. An ICG report titled *Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State*, finds that, through interviews, a group of approximately 20 Rohingya immigrants living in Saudi Arabia formed ARSA in 2012.²²⁶ An ARSA spokesperson, Ata Ullah, who claimed responsibility for the 2017 guerilla attacks against the Myanmar military, was raised in Mecca where he received an Islamic education and became fluent in Arabic, in addition to speaking the Rohingya dialect of Bengali.²²⁷ The report goes on to claim that Ata Ullah and

²²⁶ International Crisis Group, "Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State," 12.

²²⁷ International Crisis Group, 12.

approximately 20 other Rohingya gained guerilla warfare experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan before entering Rakhine State in 2013.²²⁸ Later in 2014, Ata Ullah and his counterparts formed a cadre who trained several hundred villagers from Rakhine State and organized them into a cellular structure to prevent detection.²²⁹ The report further claims that ARSA has ties to Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and possibly India.²³⁰

ARSA conducted its first offensive operation in October 2016, when approximately 300 men armed with machetes, knives, and slingshots attacked a border checkpoint in the northern region of the Rakhine State.²³¹ ICG describes that the attack was a well-coordinated raid with multiple phases including the use of an improvised explosive device and an ambush to delay reaction forces.²³² The ICG further claims that the attack led to widespread fears and retaliation by local Buddhists and security forces.²³³ Security forces implemented area clearance operations in entire villages, attempting to cut the insurgents off from food, funds, recruits, and intelligence.²³⁴ Additionally, the Buddhists and security forces razed at least 1,500 Rohingya buildings, and the violence escalated to the point where security forces called in an attack helicopter that fired indiscriminately into villages and toward fleeing people, killing men, women, and children.²³⁵ ARSA claimed responsibility for the attacks on border checkpoints.²³⁶

The following year, in August 2017, hundreds of ARSA insurgents carrying farm tools, sharp objects, and improvised explosive devices attacked 30 border checkpoints and one army base.²³⁷ Myanmar security forces swiftly and indiscriminately reacted, causing

²²⁸ International Crisis Group, 13.

²²⁹ International Crisis Group, 13.

²³⁰ International Crisis Group, 12.

²³¹ International Crisis Group, 6.

²³² International Crisis Group, 6.

²³³ International Crisis Group, 6.

²³⁴ International Crisis Group, 7.

²³⁵ International Crisis Group, 8-10.

²³⁶ International Crisis Group, 12.

²³⁷ International Crisis Group, "Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase," 6.

the most recent forced migration of the Rohingya. Despite only attacking military targets, the ICG report predicts that the group's tactics could transition to broader terrorist tactics if the Rohingya grievances remain unresolved.²³⁸

ARSA has not adopted an overtly religious tone. However, local Islamic clerics and those in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have issued fatwas that endorse their cause.²³⁹ The fatwas declare that, due to the persecution of the Muslim communities in the Rakhine State, the violent opposition to Myanmar security forces is legal under the rule of Islam.²⁴⁰

ARSA offers strengths and limits as the potential representative of the Rohingya. First, they have established support from some Rohingya civilians, including village elders who said they were “impressed by their dedication, sincerity and strong commitment to their cause.”²⁴¹ Additionally, ARSA has financial support from Rohingya living abroad, including several private contributors from the Middle East, specifically Saudi Arabia.²⁴² However, even though ARSA claims they do not have international jihadist objectives, they have been branded as a terrorist organization with links to international jihadist groups including Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba.²⁴³ Finally, ARSA could be influenced to change their operational objectives and continue violent attacks due to their external funding sources and if violence toward Rohingya continues from the Myanmar military.²⁴⁴

The second group, the majhi, are an ad hoc form of governance in Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. The majhi provide a method for the Rohingya to voice their humanitarian concerns and to provide some resources, such as basic security. The system also establishes a rudimentary governmental structure in the camps and a structure to

²³⁸ International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” 14.

²³⁹ International Crisis Group, 13.

²⁴⁰ International Crisis Group, 13.

²⁴¹ International Crisis Group, 17.

²⁴² International Crisis Group, 17.

²⁴³ International Crisis Group, 19.

²⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, 20.

coordinate with Bangladeshi and humanitarian officials.²⁴⁵ The majhi system has three tiers of representation that range from 50–200 households to entire camps.²⁴⁶ Despite considerable success in providing a degree of organization for the Rohingya, the majhi system also has suffered challenges and has experienced corruption and misconduct.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, the majhi system may not be able to sufficiently voice the concerns of the Rohingya because they are subordinate to Bangladeshi officials who may marginalize them to advance the goals of Bangladesh.²⁴⁸ It is unclear how their leadership will develop in the future.

The second player is Myanmar, which includes both the government and military of the country. The Union of Myanmar has a complicated relationship between its government and the military. The military ruled the country from 1958 until 2010. In 2011, a newly elected democratic government came to power, but the military retained significant influence under the new government structure. Specifically, the military is constitutionally guaranteed 25 percent of the seats in the legislature, three influential union ministry positions (defense, border affairs, and home affairs), and a clause that permits them to assume power in a “state of emergency.”²⁴⁹ Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, won the election in 2015, but she was constitutionally barred from becoming president. Instead, the government created a new position for her, State Counselor, which carries with it the responsibilities of a head of state but lacks direct control over the military.²⁵⁰ Therefore, while Myanmar is ostensibly a democratic country with a civilian head of state, the military retains substantial autonomy and decision authority with regard to operations. Despite the separate authorities that exist between the military and civilian government, the game will treat Myanmar as a unified actor.

²⁴⁵ International Crisis Group, “The Long Haul Ahead for Myanmar’s Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” 7.

²⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, 7.

²⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, 6.

²⁴⁸ International Crisis Group, 7.

²⁴⁹ Government of Myanmar, “Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar” (Myanmar Ministry of Information, 2008), http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf.

²⁵⁰ Wai Moe and Richard C. Paddock, “Aung San Suu Kyi Moves Closer to Leading Myanmar,” *New York Times*, April 5, 2016, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/asia/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-state-counselor.html>.

B. THE GAME

This chapter will model the game between Myanmar and the Rohingya as a sequential, two-person, partial conflict game, with two strategies available to each player. Partial conflict differs from zero-sum in that players can benefit from cooperation, but the cooperation may be unstable. Playing the game sequentially permits an analysis of whether or not a player has a first-move advantage over the other player. The two strategies available to each player are violence or nonviolence and are described in further detail below.

First, the violence strategy for Myanmar is defined as Myanmar using any amount of force against the ethnic Rohingya. This strategy also includes denying the Rohingya rights to citizenship and claims of land ownership. The game assumes that a strategy of violence enables the government to maintain popularity among their political base, which are overwhelmingly against ethnic Rohingya Muslims.²⁵¹ However, this strategy costs the government its standing in the international community. The UN, major world powers, and numerous other international organizations have repeatedly condemned the actions of the Myanmar government, and the strongest condemnations have characterized the government's behavior as "ethnic cleansing."²⁵² Up to this point, much of the international response has been in the form of statements, as described in Chapter III, but future reactions could involve sanctions or outright intervention. Additionally, this strategy is economically taxing due to the costs of sustained military operations and a decrease in the labor force while attempting to route the Rohingya.²⁵³

A nonviolence strategy is defined as Myanmar refraining from the use of force against the Rohingya. Furthermore, this strategy includes the Myanmar government recognizing the Rohingya as citizens of the state. If the government executes this strategy, they will likely lose popular support within the country, which could prompt protests or

²⁵¹ Smith, *All You Can Do Is Pray*, 10.

²⁵² Robbie Gramer, "Tillerson Finally, Brands Myanmar Crisis 'Ethnic Cleansing,'" *Foreign Policy*, November 22, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/22/tillerson-finally-brands-myanmar-crisis-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims-war-crimes-genocide-state-department-asia-refugees/>.

²⁵³ Smith, *All You Can Do Is Pray*, 26.

demonstrations by individuals and groups who feel the government should not recognize the Rohingya as citizens. Protests and demonstrations could destabilize the country more than the instability caused by expelling Rohingya from Rakhine State. However, Myanmar would gain credibility in the international community and would likely receive praise for seeking a nonviolent solution. Furthermore, a nonviolence strategy would eliminate the possibility of international intervention and would promote the country's standing in the international community.

For the Rohingya, a strategy of violence is defined as carrying out attacks against the Myanmar government, military, and its citizens. The goal of this violence would be to coerce the Myanmar government into granting the Rohingya citizenship and recognizing their claims to land in the Rakhine State. ARSA and other predecessors have used this strategy in the past albeit unsuccessfully; none of the movements gained enough support to sway the opinion of the Myanmar government. The risks associated with this strategy are more violence against the Rohingya and loss of credibility in the international community. However, this strategy does give the Rohingya a way of fighting back against the government and its persecution. If the Rohingya obtain outside support and resources, and greater support from its own population, this strategy could become sustainable over time.

A strategy of nonviolence for the Rohingya is defined as using nonviolent protest, appeals to the international community, and any other nonviolent means to obtain citizenship in Myanmar and recognition of their claims to land in Rakhine State. Nonviolence allows the Rohingya to retain the moral high ground when compared to the actions taken by Myanmar and it gives them greater moral leverage when dealing with the international community. However, this strategy leaves the Rohingya vulnerable to persecution and widespread violence from the state, as the world witnessed in August 2017. The game assumes that, while many take the strategy of nonviolence, if a few Rohingya adopt a strategy of violence, the nonviolent Rohingya will suffer the same persecution as the violent Rohingya at the hands of the Myanmar government.

C. ANALYSIS OF THE GAME

The game is played between the government of Myanmar and the Rohingya as a two-person partial conflict game, with two strategies available to each player as depicted in Figure 4.

			Rohingya	
			Violence	Nonviolence
			C	D
Myanmar	Violence	A	AC	AD
	Nonviolence	B	BC	BD

Figure 4. Strategic Options

The game produces four possible results:

1. AC: Myanmar uses violence; Rohingya use violence
2. AD: Myanmar uses violence; Rohingya use nonviolence
3. BC: Myanmar uses nonviolence; Rohingya use violence
4. BD: Myanmar uses nonviolence; Rohingya use nonviolence

The following assumptions are built into the game. First, both players are rational actors because one must assume rationality to gauge the impacts of strategic moves accurately. Second, both players are pursuing a maximin strategy.²⁵⁴ Given these assumptions, the outcomes are rank-ordered for each player in Table 2 and 3.

²⁵⁴ A maximin strategy is played by an actor that seeks to limit risk by selecting the strategy that guarantees the maximum of the minimum payoffs.

Table 2. Myanmar Options Ranked

4— Best: Myanmar uses violence; Rohingya use nonviolence
3—Myanmar uses nonviolence; Rohingya use nonviolence
2—Myanmar uses violence; Rohingya use violence
1— Worst: Myanmar uses nonviolence; Rohingya use violence

Table 3. Rohingya Options Ranked

4— Best: Rohingya use violence; Myanmar uses nonviolence
3—Rohingya use nonviolence; Myanmar uses nonviolence
2—Rohingya use violence; Myanmar uses violence
1— Worst: Rohingya use nonviolence; Myanmar uses violence

This game, in other words, produces the same results as the Prisoner's Dilemma, a game that illustrates the challenges of securing cooperation from two players when the rational choice is to not cooperate. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation by both players can yield a better payoff for each player, but this position is unstable and the incentive for either player to cheat is high. The Nash Equilibrium is stable, as neither player can improve their payoff unilaterally, and occurs when both players cheat but yields a lower payoff for each player than cooperation. The game and the Nash Equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 5.

		Rohingya	
		Violence	Nonviolence
Myanmar	Violence	2, 2	4, 1
	Nonviolence	1, 4	3, 3

Figure 5. The Rohingya Crisis Prisoner's Dilemma

The game above highlights several key challenges for achieving a positive outcome between the Rohingya and the government of Myanmar. For both sides, the best outcome is to use violence to achieve their goals while the other side uses nonviolence. If both sides use nonviolence, the outcome is preferable to both sides using violence, yet the need to guard against cheating inevitably leads both sides to the Nash Equilibrium, outcome AC, or both sides using violence to achieve their goals. The question that remains is: what strategic moves are available to the players to improve their scores?

Given the above dynamic, it is important to break down the Prisoner's Dilemma and analyze each move sequentially:

- A will represent Myanmar using violence
- B will represent Myanmar using nonviolence
- C will represent the Rohingya using violence
- D will represent the Rohingya using nonviolence
- Myanmar has a dominant strategy: use violence
- The Rohingya have a dominant strategy: use violence
- A Nash Equilibrium exists at AC (2,2) in a pure strategy game
- Without communication the outcome is (2,2)
- With communication, we can determine if either side has a first move advantage.

First, Myanmar's strategic moves are as follows:

- If Myanmar does A, then the Rohingya do C, resulting in (2,2)
- If Myanmar does B, then the Rohingya do C, resulting in (1,4)
- Myanmar would choose (2,2)

If Myanmar forces the Rohingya to move first:

- If the Rohingya do C, then Myanmar does A, resulting in (2,2)
- If the Rohingya do D, then Myanmar does A, resulting in (4,1)
- The Rohingya would choose (2,2)

No matter which player moves first, the game ends up at the Nash Equilibrium of (2,2). Therefore, neither player can gain an advantage by seizing the first move.

Second, can a threat improve the score? For a threat to work, it has to reduce the payoff to both the issuer of the threat and the recipient of the threat. The optimal outcome for Myanmar is for the Rohingya to choose D. Therefore, Myanmar would issue a threat on C. If the Rohingya choose C, Myanmar must threaten to do B. However, while BC hurts Myanmar, it gives the Rohingya their best payoff, (4). Therefore, Myanmar does not have a threat.

Because this game is symmetrical, the same logic would follow that the Rohingya also does not have a threat. The optimal outcome for Rohingya is for Myanmar to choose B. Therefore, the Rohingya would issue a threat on A. If Myanmar chooses A, the Rohingya must threaten to do D. As before, while AD hurts the Rohingya, it gives Myanmar its best score. Therefore, the Rohingya do not have a threat either.

Finally, could either side improve its score with a promise? For a promise to work, it has to reduce the payoff to the issuer of the promise while increasing the payoff to the recipient. As with a threat, the optimal outcome for Myanmar is for the Rohingya to choose D. Therefore, Myanmar must issue a promise on D. If the Rohingya choose D, Myanmar

promises to choose B. This removes AD from the game and results in (3,3) which is an improvement over the Nash Equilibrium of (2,2). In other words, Myanmar does have a promise. Similarly, the optimal outcome for the Rohingya is for Myanmar to choose B. Therefore, the Rohingya must issue a promise on B. If Myanmar chooses B, the Rohingya promise to choose D. This removes BC from the game and results in (3,3). The Rohingya, therefore, also have a promise.

From an analysis of strategic moves, it becomes clear that only with a promise from both sides can the game move from the Nash Equilibrium of violence begetting violence to the increased payoff of mutual nonviolence at BD. How can these two sides, who have an extensive mutual distrust of each other, produce these promises and stick to them?

D. ARBITRATED SOLUTION THROUGH ADJUSTED WINNER PROCEDURE

Several different methods will meet the conditions that will allow both sides to make a promise and to enforce their delivery. One mechanism is arbitrated negotiation, such as by the UN or another third party. The adjusted winner procedure is a recently developed method that involves both players assigning a numerical value to the issues that are available for negotiation based on the level of importance that they place on obtaining each one.²⁵⁵ For this scenario, the topics are:

- Citizenship—the desire of the Rohingya to be recognized by Myanmar as natural citizens, which is currently prevented by the 1982 citizenship law
- Autonomous Muslim region—beginning in 1946, the Rohingya leadership petitioned for a semi-autonomous region for their people that would remain part of Myanmar
- Release of political prisoners—The Rohingya want the release of all their people that Myanmar has imprisoned.

²⁵⁵ Consortium for Mathematics and Its Applications (U.S.), ed., *For All Practical Purposes: Mathematical Literacy in Today's World*, Tenth edition (New York: W.H. Freeman & Company, 2016), 490.

- International support—Myanmar wants international support to stimulate economic growth and development. The Rohingya need international support to re-establish communities that have been destroyed by Myanmar.
- Mandated delegate count in parliament—The Rohingya would require a minimum required delegate count, similar to how the military currently has the right to appoint 25% of the seats in parliament.

The issues are listed in Table 4 with the players' theoretical weight assigned to each issue. Importantly, the weights for each player must sum to 100. The arbiter then awards the issues to each player based on which player weighted a given issue the highest. In this example, Myanmar would be granted authority over the autonomous region and would receive international support. The Rohingya would be granted a minimum mandated delegate count and secure the release of Rohingya political prisoners held by Myanmar.

Table 4. Adjusted Winner Procedure Point Allocations

Myanmar	Issue	Rohingya
40	Citizenship for Rohingya	50
35	Semi-autonomous Region	20
5	Political Prisoners	10
15	International Support	5
5	Minimum Parliamentary Delegates	15

While the arbiter can easily apportion four of the topics to the players, the topic of citizenship would need to be split to ensure a fair division of the topic that both players

value the most. Equation 1 depicts the resulting equation after dividing the topics, where $\{x = \text{portion citizenship to Rohingya}\}$ and $\{(1-x) = \text{portion citizenship to Myanmar}\}$.

$$50 + 40(1 - x) = 25 + 50(x) \quad (1)$$

After solving Equation 1 for x , the portion of citizenship for each player is shown in Equation 2.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Portion Citizenship to Rohingya} &= \frac{65}{90} \text{ or } 72\% \\ \text{Portion Citizenship to Myanmar} &= \frac{25}{90} \text{ or } 28\% \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

These fractions are then verified for a fair distribution for each player, which is depicted in Equation 3.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{myanmar} &= 50 + 40\left(\frac{25}{90}\right) & \text{rohingya} &= 25 + 50\left(\frac{65}{90}\right) \\ m &= 61.\overline{11} & r &= 61.\overline{11} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The equations confirm that each player received an equal share of citizenship, based on the theoretical value each player assigned to citizenship. Simply, the percentages indicate that a decision on the citizenship topic must significantly favor the Rohingya, meaning they widely obtain citizenship while Myanmar retains some control over how the law is written. However, it is difficult to define 28% citizenship for Myanmar and 72% citizenship for Rohingya.

One method of solving this problem could involve parsing out the topic of citizenship to subtopics, each player assigning new values to each subtopic, and then attempting to reach a settlement of subtopics that is in line with 28% to Myanmar and 72% to Rohingya. Alternatively, the Rohingya could grant Myanmar a conditional citizenship that Myanmar values at 28%. For example, the two players could negotiate how far back a Rohingya must trace their residency to claim citizenship. While the Rohingya would likely push to have a much more favorable interpretation, for example, one

generation, Myanmar would most likely push for five generations to restrict the citizenship claim. The Rohingya could grant Myanmar a two-generation minimum, which could fulfill part of the 28% to Myanmar.

Ultimately, these compromises would require a third-party guarantor to build trust between the Rohingya and the Myanmar government and ensure compliance. Chapter III discussed three types of external actors in the Myanmar-Rohingya conflict: regional states; international states; and IOs, including ASEAN. From the discussion in Chapter III, the following actors could provide a credible guarantor: Japan, the United States, or the UN. Japan would be the preferred guarantor. Japan is a supporter of Myanmar and invests heavily in the country but uses its influence to encourage democratic reforms and is in line with U.S. policy. Additionally, Japan is the second largest government donor to the Rohingya relief efforts and an outspoken supporter of the voluntary and safe repatriation and resettlement of the Rohingya, which is in line with UN objectives.²⁵⁶ By being an advocate for both parties, Japan could avoid allegations of bias and ensure both parties adhere to the terms of the compromise.

Alternatively, the United States could guarantee the compromise but does not have a well-developed relationship with the government of Myanmar compared to Japan. The UN would be a credible guarantor and could create a committee to oversee the compromise that includes a variety of independent authorities. China, Russia, and India would be inappropriate guarantors due to their vocal bias toward the government of Myanmar. Likewise, ASEAN and any of its member states would be a poor choice as a guarantor because of its principle of nonintervention in the affairs of member states and historical inaction.²⁵⁷

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter modeled the Rohingya refugee crisis using game theory and found that the relationship between the Rohingya and the government of Myanmar is most like the

²⁵⁶ Japan Times Online, “Foreign Minister Taro Kono Urges Suu Kyi to Ensure Safe Return of Rohingya Refugees.”

²⁵⁷ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “About ASEAN.”

classic game of Prisoner's Dilemma. Both players can maximize their payoff from mutual nonviolence but will not pursue this strategy without a mutual promise. Lacking a mutual promise, both players will revert to violence and end up diminishing their payoff. Thus, the chapter illustrated how a mutual promise could be secured through the use of the adjusted winner procedure and a third-party guarantor to fairly divide the issues depending on how much value the players assigned to each issue.

As of May 2018, the violence against the Rohingya subsided somewhat, and attempts are being made to repatriate the Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar. However, the underlying issues of citizenship and regional autonomy for the Rohingya have not been addressed, which makes another wave of persecution by Myanmar likely. The international community should seize this opportunity to bring both actors to negotiations and resolve the issues to achieve a lasting solution.

The next chapter will offer summary thoughts of the Rohingya crisis and possible next steps for regional actors and the international community.

V. SUMMARY

The Rohingya have suffered five major waves of persecution since 1962, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Rohingya being forcibly displaced from Rakhine State. The most recent wave of violence, which began in 2016, forced over 600,000 Rohingya across the border into Bangladesh and quickly became a significant humanitarian crisis due to the overwhelming numbers, the speed at which it occurred, and the lack of infrastructure to support the influx of refugees. Furthermore, the massive forced migration and protracted persecution of the Rohingya raised concerns about the potential for radicalization of this group, especially in Bangladesh.

This thesis aimed to examine the following questions: What are the conditions that have caused the repeated incidents of forced migration of Rohingya from the country of Myanmar? Given the repeated incidents of discrimination and forced migration, what is the likelihood that the Muslim minority will become radicalized? And, what are the conditions that would allow Myanmar and the Rohingya to reach an agreement that decreases the likelihood of future incidents of forced migration?

This thesis aimed to answer these questions through a mixture of three different methods. First, it examined these questions through the use of qualitative methods, specifically by providing a historic overview of the Rohingya, the state of Myanmar, and the waves of forced migration. Second, it used visual analytic techniques to display critical risk factors for radicalization, specifically analyzing the size and density of refugee camps in Bangladesh, the source of financial donations to the Rohingya crisis and mapping the international community's inconsistent behavior regarding the crisis. Third, it used game theory to model the conflict between the Rohingya and Myanmar in order to determine the dominant strategy for each actor and explore ways to achieve a mutual agreement.

This thesis applied these methods to the research questions in three substantive chapters. Chapter II examined the history of the Rohingya people, with an emphasis on the competing narratives that exist regarding their origins and citizenship in Myanmar. The chapter underscored that Myanmar's unwillingness to recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic

minority group and grant them citizenship has been a critical driver of violence during the twentieth century. Chapter II further identified five waves of persecution of Rohingya by the government and Tatmadaw (1963–1967, 1971–1979, 1988–1992, 2012–2013, and 2016–2017). The three most recent waves of forced migration stem from the citizenship law of 1982, which fully denied the Rohingya citizenship in Myanmar.

Chapter III relied heavily on a framework developed by the RAND Corporation for assessing the risk of refugee radicalization to investigate the likelihood of the Rohingya radicalizing in the most recent wave of forced migration, which began in 2016. Specifically, it focused on Bangladesh’s policies toward the refugees, international financial support to the crisis, and public statements made by regional and international actors. The chapter identified Bangladesh’s restrictive laws toward the Rohingya refugee population as potential contributors to the radicalization of this vulnerable population. Furthermore, humanitarian relief efforts are underfunded, which affects virtually all efforts to aid the refugees in Bangladesh, also increasing the risk of radicalization. Using visual analytics, the chapter highlighted the camp locations and density, funding sources from regional and international actors, and their public statements regarding the crisis, noting that most countries are condemning of Myanmar, but continue to do business with the government, reducing pressure on Myanmar to change its policies

Chapter IV modeled the Rohingya conflict using game theory, specifically a two-person, partial conflict game and found that both players—the Rohingya and the government of Myanmar (including its military)—can maximize their payoff through mutual nonviolence. However, this payoff would also require a mutual “promise” not to pursue violence, which could be achieved through a negotiated agreement over the contentious issues, namely citizenship and regional autonomy for the Rohingya. In order to ensure both side’s compliance with the agreement, the chapter explored the use of a third-party guarantor. Drawing from Chapter III, it identified Japan, the UN, and the United States as possible candidates, given their support of both the government of Myanmar and the Rohingya refugees.

A. FINDINGS

This investigation yielded three findings regarding the potential for the Rohingya to radicalize as a result of its chronic persecution. First, an examination of the history of the Rohingya showed that their claimed origins and time of arrival in the region drastically differ from the belief held by the government of Myanmar regarding the issue and prevents their willful acceptance as citizens. The Rohingya claim a pre-colonial history and a unique identity from Bangladeshis, despite sharing the same religion and speaking the same language. The government of Myanmar, by contrast, views the Rohingya as illegal immigrants brought in from Bangladesh by the British. This fundamental disagreement has contributed to the continued government persecution of the Rohingya, including five waves of forced migration. This perpetual continued persecution of the Rohingya could make the ethnic group more vulnerable to radicalization.

Second, the RAND refugee radicalization framework revealed that the most recent wave of forced migration, which began in 2016, has placed the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh at increased risk of future radicalization. Specifically, Bangladesh's restrictive policies toward the Rohingya, limited humanitarian aid and funding, and the lack of pressure put on the government of Myanmar by regional and international actors are all factors that increase the risk of radicalization. Additionally, the RAND report notes that time plays a critical role in the risk of radicalization. As of August 2018, the most recent crisis is beginning its second year, and several other cases of forced migration have become worse over time. As the RAND report demonstrates, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan (1978–1988) are an example of how the international community failed to act in a manner that could have prevented the radicalization of large portions of the refugee population and stem the violence that occurred for many years following the conclusion of the crisis.²⁵⁸ If Bangladesh and the international community do not properly manage this refugee crisis, it has the potential to be a high-risk for radicalization.

²⁵⁸ S.K. Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Cornell University Press, 2006), 44–117.

Furthermore, a few Rohingya have already demonstrated a willingness to use violence to achieve political ends. Specifically, the emergence of the ARSA in 2017 is a troubling development. ARSA was largely blamed for instigating the fifth wave of persecution against the Rohingya after perpetrating an attack against over 30 Myanmar border checkpoints and an army base. ARSA has conducted only a few operations since 2017 and its total organizational strength is not well known, but it has demonstrated a moderate level of lethality that is worth noting. Despite the efforts of Bangladesh to increase security among the Rohingya in its country, there are signs that ARSA has developed a presence in the camps. While the fluid nature of the crisis has made measuring the presence of ARSA in the camps all but impossible, the 900,000 refugees in Bangladesh provides a vulnerable population from which to recruit. Additionally, while ARSA has not adopted an overtly religious tone, the organization traces its origins to refugees in Saudi Arabia, and Islamic clerics in several countries have issued fatwas that endorse their cause.²⁵⁹

Third, a resolution to the crisis is possible if both sides come to an agreed understanding of citizenship for the Rohingya. For example, both parties could negotiate how far back a Rohingya must trace their residency to claim citizenship. While the Rohingya would likely push to have a much more favorable interpretation, for example, one generation, Myanmar would most likely push for five generations to restrict the citizenship claim. However, one of the major challenges to a negotiated agreement is that neither side is a unified actor. This is especially true of the Rohingya, who do not have a clear leader or organization that can speak with authority on behalf of their entire population. Myanmar also does not operate as a unified actor; it is a fledgling democracy with a civilian head of state; however the military retains substantial autonomy and decision authority with regard to governance.

²⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” Asia Report N°283 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 15, 2016), 13, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state>.

As of August 2018, the wave of violence against the Rohingya has subsided, and Bangladesh and Myanmar have signed an agreement to repatriate the Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar, although virtually no Rohingya have yet to return. Furthermore, neither side has addressed the underlying issues of citizenship and the rights of Rohingya in Myanmar, which makes another wave of persecution by the government and military probable.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

These findings yield the following recommendations for regional and international actors concerned with preventing the Rohingya from radicalizing:

International aid matters. First, international aid stems the tide of desperation among a displaced population. In the case of the Rohingya, the donations of the international community have provided the refugees with basic necessities and helped avoid prolonged suffering. However, as Chapter III illustrated, not enough aid has been given to provide for the more than 900,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and aid is likely to decrease as the crisis persists.

As of May 2018, monetary support to the Rohingya relief effort came overwhelmingly from Western powers and Japan. Despite their proximity, ASEAN countries have donated very little to support the Rohingya, which may be due in part to their alliances with Myanmar and the economic mandate of the organization. As the crisis enters its second year, the relief effort is already underfunded and the cost to support the Rohingya in camps in Bangladesh will persist as the crisis remains unresolved. With the current response already flagging, donor fatigue becomes a significant concern for what will likely be a protracted refugee crisis.

The international community should continue to provide financial support—including the United States, which is the single largest donor of financial aid—despite the fact that donations alone will not provide a lasting solution. As the RAND framework for assessing risk of refugee radicalization notes, crowded camps with unsanitary conditions,

food scarcity, and limited resources increase the risk of radicalization.²⁶⁰ Donations can mitigate these factors and every effort should be made to sustain donor contributions.

Rohingya radicalization is still possible. As of August 2018, ARSA is the only insurgent opposition to Myanmar persecution. As described in Chapters II and VI, ARSA has chosen guerilla tactics against the security forces of Myanmar as its principal means of protest. The group has demonstrated a limited but capable ability to conduct coordinated surprise attacks against checkpoints and army bases in Myanmar. While it appears that the majority of Rohingya do not sympathize with ARSA and may even blame the nascent organization for the 2016–2017 wave of forced migration, the RAND framework suggests that, without any chance of an improved life, more Rohingya may resort to violence and insurgency in an attempt to change the status quo. The international community should apply additional pressure on Myanmar to settle the grievances of the Rohingya, allow for safe repatriation, and make some of them citizens.

As of 2018, ARSA targeted Myanmar, particularly its military, as a means of putting pressure on the government to change its policies. However, their actions could expand to other targets, namely Bangladesh. Bangladesh has chosen to implement restrictive policies against the Rohingya and, coupled with other forms of discrimination, ARSA’s violence could include targeting people and the government in Bangladesh. Therefore, finding a more lasting resolution to this crisis and preventing the Rohingya from radicalizing should be a regional and international concern.

Repatriation alone is unlikely to resolve the problem. The 2018 solution to the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh is to repatriate the refugees to Myanmar. However, this solution has two significant shortcomings. First, many of the Rohingya do not feel safe returning to Myanmar. For example, Rohingya refugees told reporters from Al Jazeera in 2018 that “they would rather stay and die in Bangladesh rather than go back to Myanmar if there is no Rohingya recognition, government compensation and reparations, and more

²⁶⁰ Barbara Sude, David Stebbins, and Sarah Weiland, *Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle East from Past Crises* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 5, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE166.html>.

inclusivity in government services.”²⁶¹ Therefore, requiring the Rohingya to repatriate may go against their wishes and be another form of forced migration.

Second, repatriation is unlikely to work because it does little to resolve the underlying issues that have caused the violence over the preceding century. Regional and international actors have not forced Myanmar to change any of their discriminatory policies that render the Rohingya stateless and limits many aspects of their lives. Myanmar restricts whom the Rohingya can marry, how many children they may have, and where they are allowed to reside.²⁶² Myanmar refuses to recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic group and grant them citizenship, instead choosing to refer to them as “Bengalis.”²⁶³ Repatriation of the Rohingya to a country that continues to treat them in this way portends another wave of violence.

The international community could encourage Bangladesh to create a path to citizenship for the Rohingya, which would enable the Rohingya to leave the refugee camps and begin to rebuild their lives, increase self-reliance, restore self-worth, and ultimately might prevent a radical group from exploiting the population. However, the government of Bangladesh does not support this idea. When asked about the assimilations of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, Shahriar Alam, Bangladesh’s state minister of foreign affairs, responded, “no, there is no such plan because Bangladesh is already the most densely populated on Earth. We strongly believe they (Rohingya) belong to Myanmar...[Citizenship] is not an issue we should be dealing with.”²⁶⁴

Bangladesh and the international community should pressure Myanmar to confer citizenship on the Rohingya. This policy would address the core grievance of the Rohingya, defuse ARSA, and provide the trust that is necessary to begin repatriation. However, conferring citizenship on the Rohingya is not a panacea. Myanmar could find other ways

²⁶¹ Linah Alsaafin, “Q&A: Bangladesh ‘Wants Sustainable Return for Rohingya,’” *Al Jazeera*, August 15, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/qa-bangladesh-sustainable-return-rohingya-180815171325334.html>.

²⁶² Eleanor Albert, “The Rohingya Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 20, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/background/rohingya-crisis>.

²⁶³ Albert.

²⁶⁴ Alsaafin, “Q&A: Bangladesh ‘Wants Sustainable Return for Rohingya.’”

to marginalize the Rohingya while recognizing their citizenship status, but citizenship would be an encouraging step toward reconciliation. It would then be up to the international community to continue to encourage democratic reforms and human rights while admonishing inappropriate behavior by this developing democracy. Without a path to citizenship in Myanmar, the Rohingya will continue to be the largest stateless ethnic group in the world.

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