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Myanmar The Politics of Rakhine State
Executive Summary
The situation in Rakhine State contains a toxic mixture of historical centre-periphery
tensions, serious intercommunal and inter-religious conflict with minority Muslim
communities, and extreme poverty and under-development. This led to major violence
in 2012 and further sporadic outbreaks since then. The political temperature is
high, and likely to increase as Myanmar moves closer to national elections at the end
of 2015. It represents a significant threat to the overall success of the transition, and
has severely damaged the reputation of the government when it most needs international
support and investment. Any policy approach must start from the recognition
that there will be no easy fixes or quick solutions. The problems faced by Rakhine
State are rooted in decades of armed violence, authoritarian rule and state-society
conflict. This crisis has affected the whole of the state and all communities within it.
It requires a sustained and multi-pronged response, as well as critical humanitarian
and protection interventions in the interim.
Failure to deal with the situation can have impacts for the whole country. As Myanmar
is redefining itself as a more open society at peace with its minorities and
embracing its diversity, introducing the seeds of a narrow and discriminatory nationalism
could create huge problems for the future. Political solutions to the decades-
long armed conflict, including the building of a federal nation, will be much
more difficult.
The largest group in the state are the Rakhine, who are Buddhist, and there is a
significant Muslim minority, including the Rohingya – a designation rejected by the
government and Rakhine. The Rakhine community as a whole has tended to be cast
internationally as violent extremists – ignoring the diversity of opinions that exist,
the fact that the Rakhine themselves are a long-oppressed minority, and rarely attempting
to understand their perspective and concerns. This is counterproductive: it
promotes a siege mentality on the part of the Rakhine, and obscures complex realities
that must be understood if a sustainable way forward is to be found.
The grievances of the Rakhine are similar to those of Myanmar’s other ethnic
minorities – including longstanding discrimination by the state, a lack of political
control over their own affairs, economic marginalisation, human rights abuses and
restrictions on language and cultural expression. Decades of Rakhine anger have
begun to morph. Since the transition to the new government, many Rakhine have
increasingly felt that the most immediate and obvious threat that they face in rebuilding
their communities and re-asserting their ethnic identity is one of demographics.
There is a fear that they could soon become a minority in their own state – and, valid
or not, there is no doubt that it is very strongly felt in Rakhine communities.
Muslim communities, in particular the Rohingya, have over the years been progressively
marginalised from social and political life. Many have long been denied
full citizenship, with significant consequences for their livelihoods and well-being.
There are now efforts underway in the legislature to disenfranchise them, which
could be incendiary. The Rohingya see this as their last remaining connection to
politics and means of influence. Without this, it would be hard for them to avoid the
conclusion that politics had failed them – which could prompt civil disobedience or
even organised violence.
