Recently, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister stated that ethnic clashes have been ongoing in Myanmar for 60–70 years. As a result, there may be no reason to delay the repatriation of Rohingya refugees. We want the repatriation to begin. According to the Foreign Minister’s remarks, we have been trying to address Bangladesh’s issues with Rohingya refugees.
For the past four decades, Bangladesh has been providing shelter to the Rohingyas. They sought refuge in Bangladesh from persecution by the state and extremist Buddhist groups in neighboring Myanmar. In 1978, 2 lakh Rohingya refugees came to Bangladesh. Another 50,000 Rohingya arrived in the early 1990s because of Myanmar’s military campaign against them. Many of the Rohingyas who came to Bangladesh during these periods spent days in various hardships and then returned to their own country, Myanmar. However, many did not return and have remained in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has sheltered them.
Following the genocide by Myanmar’s military and extremist Buddhist groups in August 2017, the number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh dramatically increased. At that time, over seven hundred thousand Rohingya refugees arrived in Bangladesh. Along with those already present, Cox’s Bazar district now hosts one million Rohingya refugees. Six hundred thousand people live in the Kutupalong megacamp, which is the world’s largest refugee camp.
Despite six years passing since the majority of Rohingya refugees fled from Myanmar’s Rakhine State to Bangladesh, there seems to be no possibility of their repatriation. The military coup in Myanmar in 2021 has further diminished the prospects of large-scale repatriation. Security and economic conditions have deteriorated further in the refugee camps. Local authorities have failed to ensure the safety of Rohingyas from armed groups and criminal networks operating in the camps. Due to competitive advantages and economic constraints, international assistance is decreasing. Furthermore, the Bangladeshi government’s limitation of Rohingya refugees’ access to income-generating activities has worsened the situation. Donors need to promptly increase humanitarian assistance. Collaborating with the government on policy changes will allow more opportunities for Rohingya refugees to stand on their own two feet. It is also critical for Bangladesh to involve Rohingya leadership in managing refugee camps more efficiently.
In the past twelve months, clashes between rival armed groups in Cox’s Bazar district in southern Bangladesh have caused the sprawling refugee camps to deteriorate chaotically. Influential Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) groups have engaged in confrontations, resulting in the deaths of several refugees. Armed groups and criminal networks are kidnapping refugees for ransom in order to fund their activities. In 2023, the number of kidnapping incidents will have nearly quadrupled. Violence, once limited to nighttime, now occurs during the day, with armed groups roaming the refugee camps with knives and locally-made guns, threatening residents and targeting opponents. Since July 2020, the Armed Police Battalion of Bangladesh has been responsible for the security of refugee camps. However, there are concerns that members of this force are involved in the problems they are supposed to address. Despite allegations of their involvement in extortion, refugee kidnappings, and even torture, the victims receive minimal assistance.
Meanwhile, international support for humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees is dwindling. In 2022, the United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP) had to reduce the amount of food rations twice. The monthly per capita allowance has decreased from $12 to $8, which amounts to 27 cents per day. This cutback is critical because most refugees rely heavily on humanitarian assistance. Restrictions imposed by the government on engaging with Bangladesh’s local population make finding legitimate employment extremely difficult for the refugees. The rise in food prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the problem further. There are already indications that reduced assistance is leading to an increase in malnutrition among children, potentially escalating domestic violence as well.
Following two unsuccessful attempts in 2018 and 2019, we will initiate a pilot project for repatriation in Napyidaw and Dhaka at the beginning of 2023. As a result, more than 1,000 refugees could return in the first phase. With China playing a mediating role, both sides (Napyidaw and Dhaka) are keen on making progress for various reasons. Myanmar’s military government believes that this repatriation will garner international support in their favor against allegations of genocide in 2017. On the other hand, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh hopes that this will benefit them in the upcoming general elections scheduled for January 2024. However, the likelihood of the repatriation attempt being successful is low. Refugees continue to be cautious about their security, skeptical of Napyidaw’s assurances, and wary of receiving natural citizenship. There are valid reasons for refugees to be cautious. Since the military coup in 2021, the situation in Myanmar has deteriorated further. In November, a new conflict erupted between the military and the Arakan Army, one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armed groups, making safe, dignified, and voluntary repatriation practically impossible.
There is a link between increasing insecurity, declining assistance, and stagnation in repatriation. These issues have created a crisis that risks spiraling out of control. The Bangladesh government’s prohibition on providing aid to refugees has further deepened their dependency and increased pressure on humanitarian assistance. Dhaka’s policy is not in line with reality, as cities surrounding refugee camps already employ thousands of refugees informally. Because of their illegal status, they face regular exploitation there and frequently have to bribe security officials for protection.
Many Rohingyas are facing despair due to the growing poverty and uncertain future in refugee camps, which has forced them to make difficult decisions. Joining armed groups or criminal networks is one way to reduce the number of mouths to feed in their families by marrying off their daughters at a young age. Despite the risks, several thousand desperate refugees have embarked on perilous journeys to Malaysia (by sea) in hopes of a better future. At the same time, although facing uncertain numbers, some refugees have returned to Rakhine State or migrated to other parts of Bangladesh despite the ban on leaving refugee camps.
To break this vicious cycle, Bangladesh needs to partner with the international community. It should announce a firm step that acknowledges the long-term nature of this crisis, even when it puts relentless pressure on the Myanmar authorities to create conducive conditions for repatriation. Donors play a crucial role in building self-reliance and reducing dependency on aid initiatives. However, they can only do so when Dhaka reconsiders its policies outside of emergency relief assistance. In the meantime, donors should prioritize humanitarian assistance in a manner that ensures refugees have enough to sustain themselves, starting with ensuring their dignity in life. To address the ongoing insecurity, Bangladesh must reform governance in refugee camps, allowing greater nonviolent leadership from within refugee communities and taking stringent measures against criminals exploiting the crisis for personal gain.
