From Legal Exclusion to Forced Displacement: The Rohingya Crisis, 1948–2026

By Rejuwan Khan*

For the Rohingya, the mass exodus of 2017 was not the beginning of persecution. It was the most devastating phase of a much longer process through which citizenship, political participation, freedom of movement, livelihoods and access to basic services were progressively restricted in Myanmar.

Nine years after the 2017 violence forced more than 700,000 Rohingya across the border into Bangladesh, the fundamental causes of their displacement remain unresolved. Around 1.2 million Rohingya refugees are now recorded in Bangladesh, while Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State continue to face insecurity, restrictions and renewed displacement.

Understanding the crisis therefore requires looking beyond 2017 and examining how decades of legal exclusion and discriminatory administration created the conditions in which mass violence and repeated displacement became possible.

Citizenship and the Architecture of Exclusion

Citizenship lies at the centre of the Rohingya crisis.

Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law established three categories of citizenship and linked full citizenship closely to membership in officially recognized “national races.” The Rohingya are not included among those recognized groups.

Although limited routes to associate or naturalized citizenship exist under the law, they require documentary evidence that many Rohingya cannot provide after generations of displacement, loss of records and discriminatory administration. UN investigators and international human-rights organizations have repeatedly criticized both the law and its implementation for contributing to Rohingya statelessness.

The consequences extend far beyond possession of an identity document.

Without secure citizenship and legal recognition, Rohingya have faced restrictions on voting and political representation, movement between villages and townships, education, healthcare, employment and access to public institutions.

National Verification Card processes have also been deeply controversial. Many Rohingya have resisted them because they fear that accepting the process could formalize their treatment as foreigners rather than restore citizenship they say was historically theirs.

Statelessness, in other words, has functioned not simply as the absence of nationality but as a mechanism through which access to other rights has been restricted.

Movement, Education and Everyday Life

Restrictions on movement have been among the most visible forms of discrimination against Rohingya in Rakhine State.

For years, Rohingya communities have faced checkpoints, travel permits, curfews and restrictions on movement between villages and townships. These controls have affected virtually every part of ordinary life.

A person who cannot travel freely may also be unable to reach a hospital, attend university, sell agricultural produce, find work, visit relatives or obtain humanitarian assistance.

Following the violence of 2012, tens of thousands of Rohingya were confined to displacement camps in central Rakhine State. More than a decade later, many remained displaced, with severe restrictions affecting their movement and access to services.

Restrictions have also affected religious and family life. Human-rights investigations have documented administrative controls relating to marriage, religious gatherings and the construction or repair of religious buildings.

Taken together, these policies created a system in which Rohingya could remain physically present in Myanmar while being progressively excluded from equal participation in the state and society.

Land, Labour and Economic Exclusion

The crisis has also had a material dimension.

Rohingya have faced restrictions on livelihoods as well as documented forced labour, confiscation and destruction of property.

This became particularly severe during successive military operations. Homes, farmland, businesses, mosques and entire villages were destroyed or made inaccessible as people fled.

During and after the 2017 operations, UN investigators documented the widespread, systematic and deliberate destruction of Rohingya-populated areas across Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. Approximately 392 villages were partially or completely destroyed.

The destruction of land and property has consequences that continue long after the immediate violence ends. Return becomes difficult when families no longer have access to their houses, farmland or documentation proving ownership.

This is one reason why repatriation cannot be reduced to transporting refugees back across the border. A meaningful return requires the restoration of rights, security and access to home and property.

Repeated Waves of Forced Displacement

The Rohingya refugee crisis has developed through repeated waves rather than one isolated event.

In 1978, Myanmar’s Operation Nagamin, or Dragon King, was followed by the flight of roughly 200,000 to 250,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh.

Another major exodus occurred in 1991–1992, when around 250,000 Rohingya crossed into Bangladesh amid military operations and reports of killings, forced labour, rape, confiscation and other abuses.

Violence in Rakhine State in 2012 displaced large numbers of Rohingya and other communities. For many Rohingya, displacement became effectively permanent as they were confined to camps and subjected to severe movement restrictions.

Another crisis followed attacks on border police posts in October 2016. Myanmar security forces launched operations in northern Rakhine State, and international investigations documented allegations of killings, rape, arbitrary arrests and widespread village burning.

Then came 25 August 2017.

Following attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on security posts, Myanmar security forces launched massive operations across northern Rakhine State.

UN investigators later documented killings, mass sexual violence, village destruction and forced displacement. More than 700,000 Rohingya fled into Bangladesh within months.

The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission found sufficient information to warrant investigation and prosecution of senior military officials so that a competent court could determine their liability for genocide. It also identified widespread crimes against humanity and other serious violations.

The distinction is important. Investigative bodies have produced extensive evidence of genocidal acts and intent, but final legal determinations of state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility belong to competent courts.

The Crisis Did Not End in 2017

One of the greatest dangers in discussing the Rohingya crisis is treating 2017 as its final chapter.

The situation has again deteriorated dramatically since fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army intensified in late 2023.

Rohingya civilians have increasingly found themselves trapped between armed actors.

The Myanmar military has subjected Rohingya men and boys to recruitment while continuing movement restrictions and restrictions on humanitarian assistance.

At the same time, as the Arakan Army expanded territorial control across Rakhine State, Rohingya refugees and international rights organizations have reported arbitrary detention, forced labour and recruitment, severe movement restrictions, confiscation of land and property, mistreatment and other abuses in areas under its control.

Human Rights Watch has also documented killings of Rohingya civilians during the recent conflict, including its investigation into the May 2024 killing of Rohingya villagers at Hoyyar Siri in Buthidaung Township.

In August 2026, the UN human-rights office reported widespread and systematic violations and abuses against Rohingya by both the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army, including arbitrary arrests, torture, forced labour and recruitment, sexual and gender-based violence, property confiscation and renewed displacement.

This contemporary reality is crucial.

The political actor controlling territory may have changed in many parts of Rakhine State, but for many Rohingya the fundamental questions remain the same: Who recognizes their identity? Who guarantees their citizenship? Can they move freely? Can they reclaim their land? And who will protect them from armed actors?

More Than 1.2 Million Rohingya in Bangladesh

The consequences are visible across the border.

According to joint Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR figures for 30 June 2026, 1,166,352 Rohingya refugees were recorded in Cox’s Bazar and another 33,819 on Bhasan Char, bringing the total to 1,200,171.

Bangladesh has now hosted successive generations of Rohingya refugees.

The consequences of prolonged displacement are increasingly severe. Refugees face restrictions on formal employment, limited educational opportunities, insecurity inside the camps, declining humanitarian funding and continued uncertainty about their future.

Children born after the 2017 exodus are growing up without knowing when, or under what political and legal conditions, they might be able to return to their ancestral homeland.

Bangladesh and host communities in Cox’s Bazar have also carried substantial social, economic, infrastructural and environmental pressures. Sustained international responsibility-sharing remains essential.

But pressure on Bangladesh cannot justify unsafe return.

Repatriation Requires More Than a Border Crossing

Rohingya refugees have repeatedly expressed a desire to return home. The central problem is not whether return is desirable, but under what conditions it can take place.

International standards require refugee return to be voluntary, informed, safe and dignified.

For the Rohingya, those principles have concrete implications.

Return cannot be sustainable if refugees remain stateless after crossing the border. It cannot be safe if they cannot travel freely. It cannot be dignified if they are confined to camps or designated settlements. It cannot restore their lives if their homes and land remain occupied, destroyed or inaccessible.

A credible return process therefore requires citizenship rights, freedom of movement, physical security, access to education and healthcare, livelihood opportunities, restoration or compensation for land and property, and credible guarantees against renewed persecution.

Without these conditions, repatriation risks reproducing displacement inside Myanmar rather than ending it.

Accountability Has Entered a Critical Stage

International accountability processes have also advanced.

The Gambia brought a case against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice in 2019, alleging violations of the Genocide Convention.

In January 2026, the ICJ held hearings on the merits of the case. The proceedings included oral arguments, witnesses and expert testimony. The hearings concluded on 29 January, and the Court has begun its deliberations.

The case concerns Myanmar’s responsibility as a state under the Genocide Convention. Other international mechanisms are pursuing evidence and potential individual criminal responsibility for atrocities committed against the Rohingya.

These processes cannot by themselves restore citizenship or allow refugees to return home. But accountability matters because a durable solution cannot be built on impunity.

Justice must also include the participation of Rohingya survivors and meaningful consideration of restitution, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence.

What a Durable Solution Requires

After decades of displacement, the basic elements of a solution are no longer difficult to identify.

Rohingya need recognition of their identity and citizenship rights. They need freedom of movement and equal access to education, healthcare, livelihoods and public institutions. Refugees need the right to return voluntarily to their places of origin rather than being transferred into another system of confinement.

Land and property claims must be addressed. Security guarantees must be credible. Armed actors must be held accountable for abuses regardless of who controls the territory.

Bangladesh cannot carry responsibility for the crisis indefinitely, and humanitarian assistance cannot substitute for a political solution inside Myanmar.

International actors therefore need to pursue several objectives simultaneously: protection for Rohingya in Myanmar and Bangladesh, sustained humanitarian financing, international accountability, pressure for citizenship and equal rights, and the creation of conditions in which voluntary return becomes genuinely possible.

Conclusion

The Rohingya crisis is often described as a refugee crisis. That description captures its humanitarian consequences but not its cause.

The deeper crisis is one of citizenship, rights and political belonging.

Repeated expulsions in 1978, 1991–1992, 2016, 2017 and the renewed displacement of recent years show what happens when a population is systematically denied effective political and legal protection.

Nine years after the 2017 mass exodus, approximately 1.2 million Rohingya remain in Bangladesh, while those remaining in Rakhine State continue to face grave insecurity and abuse.

Meanwhile, the institutions and armed actors exercising power in Rakhine have changed, but the Rohingya still lack reliable guarantees of citizenship, freedom, security and equality.

Until those questions are resolved, the Rohingya crisis will remain unresolved—not because refugees do not want to return home, but because the conditions that repeatedly forced them from home have not yet been dismantled.

*Rohingya Youth Activist and Human Rights Advocate