Nadeem Ahmed
In northern Rakhine, a Rohingya villager who steps outside after curfew risks arrest. A farmer who wishes to work his own land may need permission. A household that refuses to send a laborer can face detention, fines, or violence. These are no longer isolated incidents. They are recurring conditions of life in areas under the control of the Arakan Army.
The pattern suggests a shift that is both political and structural. What appears at first as a series of abuses now reflects something more systematic: the consolidation of a governing order built on restriction, extraction, and control over movement.
From Battlefield Actor to Territorial Authority
The Arakan Army’s expansion across Rakhine in 2025 altered not only the balance of military power but also the organization of civilian life. As the group assumed de facto control over large parts of the region, it gained the capacity to regulate movement, impose rules, and enforce compliance. Reports from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in February 2026 describe a pattern of arbitrary arrest, detention, enforced disappearances, forced labour, extortion, and restrictions on work and movement imposed on Rohingya populations under this control.
Human Rights Watch, drawing on interviews with Rohingya who fled Buthidaung between April and July 2025, documented the mechanics of this system. Travel permits cost money. Curfews are enforced. Being outside at the wrong time can lead to arrest. People reported that they could not farm, fish, or move freely without authorization. Some were compelled to work without pay after initially receiving reduced wages. These practices indicate a shift from episodic coercion to routinized regulation.
This transformation matters because it reframes the nature of authority in Rakhine. The Arakan Army is no longer operating solely as an insurgent force confronting the Myanmar military. It is exercising forms of territorial governance that shape the daily existence of civilians.
A System of Control, Not a Collection of Abuses
The evidence across multiple sources converges on a consistent pattern. Fortify Rights documented a compulsory labor system operating across villages under Arakan Army control between November 2024 and October 2025. At least one person from each household was often required to perform labor, ranging from a single day to several months. Refusal could lead to detention, beatings, or fines. In one documented case, a Rohingya man was arrested after refusing sentry duty and then forced to build a road for ten days while being beaten.
This is not incidental coercion. It is organized extraction. The requirement that each household provide labor establishes a predictable supply of workers. The use of detention and punishment ensures compliance. The involvement of village administrators, who were themselves pressured or beaten to meet quotas, shows that the system operates through both direct force and subordinated intermediaries.
The regulation of movement reinforces this structure. Reports indicate that checkpoints have been established at village entrances and exits, and that Rohingya must obtain paid letters of recommendation to travel. Curfews restrict time as well as space. These measures do more than limit mobility. They create a controlled population whose movement, labor, and economic activity can be monitored and directed.
Extortion and taxation extend the system further. The UK Home Office, drawing on evidence from Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, recorded that taxation applied to nearly every form of property owned by Rohingya, including homes, shops, boats, fishing nets, and livestock. This level of coverage suggests an attempt to systematize revenue extraction rather than isolated acts of extortion.
Taken together, these practices form a coherent governing apparatus. Arrest, labor, taxation, and mobility control are not separate phenomena. They are interlocking mechanisms that define how authority is exercised.
Rohingya as an Extractable Population
The structure that emerges from these practices is one in which Rohingya are governed less as rights-bearing residents and more as a population to be managed, disciplined, and utilized. The compulsory labor system documented by Fortify Rights illustrates how labor is extracted directly. The requirement to pay for movement permissions converts mobility into a source of revenue. The broad taxation of property extends extraction into everyday economic life.
This configuration is reinforced by the absence of meaningful legal protections. Rohingya remain stateless and lack enforceable property rights. In such a context, checkpoints, detention, and confiscation can be implemented with limited constraint. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has also noted that the Arakan Army continues to deny recognition of Rohingya identity and uses derogatory terminology, further weakening any claim to equal treatment under its authority.
Land confiscation adds a territorial dimension to this process. OHCHR reported in February 2026 that Rohingya land and property had been confiscated and that non-Rohingya villages were being rebuilt on that land. This is not only an issue of individual dispossession. It suggests a reordering of space that may alter the demographic and political landscape of Rakhine.
In this framework, Rohingya are incorporated into a system where their labor, movement, and property are subject to continuous regulation and extraction. The governing logic is not one of inclusion but of control.
War-Making and Governance Converge
The practices described above are closely tied to the Arakan Army’s military and political objectives. Fortify Rights found that forced labor was used for both military and reconstruction purposes, including building fortifications, digging trenches, transporting supplies, and constructing roads. This indicates that extraction is not a byproduct of conflict. It is functional to both war-making and governance.
The use of civilian labor for infrastructure projects also blurs the boundary between military and administrative activity. Roads, bridges, and drainage systems are not purely military assets. They are also elements of territorial administration. The same labor that supports military operations contributes to the consolidation of control over space.
Detention-based labor further illustrates this convergence. The New Humanitarian reported that dozens of Rohingya, including women and children, were detained and forced to work for nearly three months in a camp-like setting near Maungdaw. The work included construction and maintenance tasks. The use of detention as a mechanism to secure labor underscores the integration of coercion into governance.
This merging of war-making and governance is characteristic of actors that transition from insurgency to territorial authority. The capacity to extract resources, regulate populations, and control infrastructure becomes central to sustaining both military operations and political control.
Parallel Domination and the Limits of Simplified Narratives
The emergence of Arakan Army governance complicates prevailing narratives about the Rohingya crisis. For years, analysis has focused on persecution by the Myanmar military. That remains a central component of the crisis. However, the current evidence indicates that Rohingya are now subject to coercive authority from more than one actor.
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has explicitly stated that both the military and the Arakan Army are responsible for systematic abuses against Rohingya. This creates a situation of parallel domination, where multiple authorities impose restrictions, extract resources, and exercise control without accountability.
This complexity matters for policy and analysis. A binary framework that positions the conflict as a struggle between the junta and a resistance movement is no longer sufficient to explain conditions on the ground. The presence of coercive governance by a non-state actor alters the dynamics of power and the prospects for civilian protection.
Crisis Group reporting, as reflected in the UK Home Office note, indicates that perceptions of the Arakan Army among Rohingya are not uniform across all areas. Some more stable regions have seen limited improvements, including the return of displaced people. However, these variations do not negate the broader pattern of coercion. They indicate that governance is uneven rather than absent.
Implications for Repatriation and Humanitarian Policy
The shift from insurgency to governance has direct implications for discussions about Rohingya return. Policy frameworks often assume that improvements in territorial control or a reduction in active conflict could create conditions for repatriation. However, the current evidence challenges this assumption.
If return were to occur under conditions where movement is restricted, labor is extracted, and detention is arbitrary, it would not constitute a rights-based solution. It would represent a return into a system of controlled subordination. The requirement to pay for travel permissions, the presence of checkpoints, and the risk of forced labor all suggest that basic freedoms would remain constrained.
Humanitarian conditions are also shaped by these governance practices. OHCHR has noted that both the military and the Arakan Army continue to block humanitarian aid, contributing to a severe crisis in northern and central Rakhine. Restrictions on movement further limit access to services and livelihoods. These factors combine to deepen vulnerability rather than alleviate it.
The difficulty of independent verification in parts of Rakhine adds another layer of complexity. The UK Home Office note acknowledges that some incidents remain hard to confirm due to conflict and communication restrictions. However, the convergence of findings across multiple organizations strengthens the overall assessment of systemic abuse.
A Consolidating System
Recent field reporting reinforces the trajectory identified by international organizations. A Rohingya Khobor report from April 2026 described a requirement that each village in northern Maungdaw provide 50 laborers for three days of unpaid work on road construction and military-related tasks. This aligns closely with earlier findings of household-based labor quotas and suggests that the system is continuing and potentially expanding.
Fortify Rights has already indicated that the labor system is becoming institutionalized. The use of quotas, the involvement of local administrators, and the reliance on detention and punishment all point toward consolidation rather than decline. The risk is that these practices will become normalized features of governance.
At the same time, land confiscation and reconstruction on Rohingya property raise the possibility of more permanent changes to the territorial landscape. If such processes continue, they may entrench patterns of exclusion that are difficult to reverse.
The combined effect of these trends is a narrowing of the space for civilian life. As multiple forms of control intensify, the capacity of Rohingya to sustain livelihoods, maintain property, and move freely is progressively reduced. This dynamic also contributes to continued displacement, as people seek to escape conditions of constrained and coercive existence.
Conclusion
The situation in Rakhine has entered a phase that is not adequately captured by the language of insurgency or isolated abuse. The available evidence points to the emergence of a governing system in which coercion is organized, routinized, and embedded in everyday life.
This system operates through the regulation of movement, the extraction of labor and resources, and the use of detention and punishment to enforce compliance. It is sustained by the structural vulnerability of a stateless population and the absence of accountability mechanisms.
Recognizing this shift is not a matter of rhetoric. It is necessary for accurate analysis and effective policy. Without acknowledging the consolidation of coercive governance, any assessment of the Rohingya crisis risks misrepresenting the conditions under which people are expected to live, return, or survive.
The question is no longer only who controls territory in Rakhine. It is how that control is exercised, and what kind of order it produces for those who live under it.
References
Human Rights Watch, Myanmar: Arakan Army Oppresses Rohingya Muslims, 28 July 2025.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Assistant Secretary-General Brands Kehris on Myanmar, 27 February 2026.
Fortify Rights, Myanmar: Arakan Army Subjecting Ethnic Minorities to Forced Labor, 22 October 2025.
UK Home Office, Myanmar: Rohingya (including Rohingya in Bangladesh), January 2026.
The New Humanitarian, “I lost all hope for my life”: Arakan Army accused of detaining Rohingya in forced labour camps, 27 August 2025.
Rohingya Khobor, Rohingya Villagers Forced into Unpaid Labor in Maungdaw, 18 April 2026.
